Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1522

MIGRATION – review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal – refusal to grant a Spouse (Provisional) (Class UF) visa, subclass 309, to the visa applicant – review applicant sponsor of visa applicant – where marriage between review applicant and visa applicant authorised in Vietnam and recognised in Australia – where Tribunal considered that visa applicant not “spouse” of review applicant – whether error of law in the manner in which Tribunal considered evidence concerning commitment of visa applicant and review applicant

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476(1)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 1, Item 1220A, Schedule 2, subclass 309

Nassouh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 788 (14 June 2000) referred
Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dhillon (Federal Court, 8 May 1990, unreported) referred
Bretag v Immigration Review Tribunal (Federal Court, 29 November 1991, unreported) referred
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 referred
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 referred
Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 546 referred
W124 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1387 referred
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 referred
V340 of 2000 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 111 FCR 536 referred
Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 referred
Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 referred
Malik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 291 referred
Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 476 referred
Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541 referred
Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1671 referred
Tobasi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1050 referred
Arif v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1053 referred
Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 183 ALR 188 referred
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 referred
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 referred
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 referred
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Asif (2000) 60 ALD 145 referred

VAN PHAI TRAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 680 of 2001

KENNY J
MELBOURNE
10 DECEMBER 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 680 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

VAN PHAI TRAN
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 DECEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The application be dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1522
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had upheld the Minister's refusal to grant a visa to the visa applicant on the grounds that the marriage to the review applicant was not genuine and continuing. The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to make further inquiries, had not provided an opportunity to give evidence, and had made an error of law.

The court considered whether the Tribunal had breached any statutory obligations by not making further inquiries or requesting additional evidence from the parties. The court found that there was no obligation on the Tribunal to make further inquiries or request evidence, as these were matters for the applicant to provide. The court also considered whether the Tribunal had denied the review applicant the opportunity to give evidence, but found that the Tribunal had provided the review applicant with an opportunity to present evidence and arguments. Finally, the court considered whether the Tribunal had made an error of law, but found that the Tribunal had applied the correct legal principles in its decision.

The court concluded that the Tribunal had not made any errors in its decision, and dismissed the application for judicial review. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application. The case highlights the importance of providing sufficient evidence to support a visa application and the limited role of the Tribunal in reviewing such decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

These regulatory provisions give detailed expression to the general provisions of the Act concerning visas for non-citizens. Section 45(1) requires that a non-citizen who wants a visa must apply for a visa of a particular class. As will be seen, pursuant to the Act (ss 31, 40, 45(2) and (3) and 505), the Regulations make provision for classes and subclasses of visas for which application may be made, including the criteria that must be met and the circumstances that must exist, before an application can be successful. background facts The respondent, by his delegate, refused the visa applicant’s application on 19 April 2000. On 9 May 2000, the review applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal held a hearing on 22 May 2001, during which the review applicant gave evidence. As already noted, however, the review applicant was unsuccessful in his application to the Tribunal and instituted this review proceeding in this Court. The Tribunal accepted that the visa applicant first met the review applicant on 21 June 1995, when the review applicant travelled to Vietnam from Australia to meet the visa applicant. The meeting had been arranged by the review applicant’s mother, who had sent the review applicant the visa applicant’s name and photograph, in the hope that they might marry. After spending several weeks together, they did in fact marry in Vietnam on 15 July 1995. After a brief honeymoon, the review applicant returned to Australia. The visa applicant had not been married prior to her marriage to the review applicant. The review applicant had been in a de facto relationship from 1976 until 1982 when he fled Vietnam. There were three children of this relationship and, after migrating to Australia in 1983, he subsequently sponsored his then de facto wife and children to migrate to Australia. His relationship with his de facto wife ended in 1992. The visa applicant first applied for migration to Australia as the review applicant’s spouse on 10 October 1995 (“the first visa application”). In November 1996, the review applicant returned to Vietnam for one week to assist her in her visa interview. In May 1997, this first visa application was refused by a delegate of the respondent on the ground that the relationship was not genuine. On 3 August 1997, the review applicant moved to the United States, where he stayed until March 1999. During this time the visa applicant heard little from the review applicant. The Tribunal recorded that:The review applicant stated that in 1997 when [the Department] refused the application he was devastated and decided that there was no point in continuing the relationship, as he had been told that there was little chance of overturning the decision. He said that he told the visa applicant to forget about him even though she did not want the marriage to end. He said that he went to the United States and lived with his parents, effectively cutting all ties with the visa applicant. He stated that he could not return permanently to Vietnam because he was formerly a soldier in the South Vietnamese Army and his future could not be guaranteed. He also said that he would not have been able to support himself financially.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Counsel for the review applicant did not contend in his written submissions that, for this purpose, there was any relevant difference between s 427(1)(d) (which, as noted, governs the Refugee Review Tribunal) and s 359 (which governs the Migration Review Tribunal). If there is a case in which a failure to inquire betokens reviewable error, the present is not one. Accordingly, I reject the submission that, in considering and assessing the material before it, the Tribunal was in breach of any obligation to make further inquiries prior to determining the application before it.Failure to request evidence Generally, it is for an applicant to provide the decision-maker with whatever information or material he or she may have that tends to support his or her case: cf Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, at 576 per Gummow and Hayne JJ. The law imposes no obligation on the Tribunal to request the review applicant to meet a deficiency in the case that the applicant chooses to advance to the Tribunal. Section 359A of the Act, which requires the Tribunal to give an applicant particulars of information that it considers would be the reason (or part of the reason) for affirming the decision under review, has no application where the basis for the Tribunal’s decision is the absence of information or other material: see V340 of 2000 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 111 FCR 536, at [55] per Ryan J (concerning the Refugee Review Tribunal’s equivalent obligation under s 424A(1)); Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396, at [95] per Allsop J (with whom Heerey J agreed); Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109, at [54] per Sackville J; and Malik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 291, at 294-5 per Wilcox J. Section 360 submissions The review applicant contended in written submissions that, in breach of the Act, the review applicant had been denied the opportunity to appear and give evidence on an issue that the Tribunal considered was critical to its decision. Pursuant to s 360(1) of the Act, the Tribunal must (save in the circumstances referred to in s 360(2)) invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. (Section 425, to which the review applicant’s contentions referred, makes equivalent provision in relation to the Refugee Review Tribunal.) The nature and effect of a statutory provision such as s 360(1) has been discussed on a number of occasions including in Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 476, at [59]-[70], and at [94] per North J (concerning s 425); affirmed on appeal at (2001) 115 FCR 253 per French, Whitlam and Katz JJ (24 December 2001); Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541, at [45] per Black CJ, Hill and Weinberg JJ; Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1671, at [11]-[14] and [21] per Lindgren, Tamberlin and Mansfield JJ. See also Tobasi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1050 at [35]-[41] per Mansfield J and Arif v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1053 at [13]-[14] per Mansfield J.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J
The review applicant gave further evidence of these matters at the Tribunal hearing. In addition he produced evidence of two money transfers sent to the visa applicant in 1996 and stated that he sent money to her whenever he could with friends when they visited Vietnam.the tribunal’s reasons for decision The Tribunal found that the marriage between the visa applicant and the review applicant was authorised in Vietnam, and that the marriage was recognised in Australia. As the Tribunal noted, however, subclause 309.211(2) required the visa applicant to be the “spouse” of an Australian citizen and, by virtue of the definition of “spouse” in reg 1.15A, the visa applicant was required to satisfy the decision-maker that she and the review applicant had “a mutual commitment to a shared life …”, and that the relationship between them was “genuine and continuing”. After the referring to Nassouh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 788 (14 June 2000); Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dhillon (Federal Court, 8 May 1990, unreported); and Bretag v Immigration Review Tribunal (Federal Court, 29 November 1991, unreported), the Tribunal stated:In relation to the question of whether the relationship between the visa applicant and the review applicant is genuine and continuing, the Tribunal has considered the oral evidence and the material on the files, including documents provided by the review applicant and the visa applicant. The Tribunal has had regard to the factors in subregulation 1.15A(3) but notes that the visa applicant is living overseas, so it is difficult for the couple to be assessed against these criteria. As far as financial aspects of the relationship are concerned, the Tribunal notes that there is evidence of two international money transfers from the review applicant in 1996 (about two years before the application under review), but there is no documentation to support the oral evidence that the review applicant has sent money to the visa applicant through friends. There is no evidence that the review applicant has made plans to share his income, assets and home with the visa applicant in Australia. There is no evidence that during periods of cohabitation they shared financial resources. On the question on the nature of the household and the social aspects of the relationship, the Tribunal takes into account the photographs taken during the visits by the review applicant in 1999 and 2000/2001. However there is no independent evidence from the visa applicant, family members, friends or other persons that would support the oral evidence from the review applicant. With regard to the commitment to each other, the Tribunal takes into consideration the visit by the review applicant to Vietnam in December 2000/January 2001 and his evidence that he cohabited with the visa applicant during the visit. The Tribunal also takes into account the telephone accounts submitted by the review applicant showing many calls by the review applicant to the visa applicant’s number from December 1998 to the present, the letters produced to the Tribunal dated from 1995 and 1997 (before the application under review), four untranslated letters from the visa applicant dated May 1999 to October 1999, and two letters from the review applicant dated May 1999. The Tribunal takes into account the evidence by the review applicant that his mother asked him to reconcile with the visa applicant in 1999 after which he and the visa applicant resumed the marital relationship.The Tribunal takes into account that at the time of the application in July 1999 the parties had spent less than one month together (apart from the cohabitation of four days after the marriage in 1995) and at the time of decision they had spent a further three weeks together. Apart from the visits, the photographs and the telephone accounts there is little to support the claim of a mutual commitment. There is no material from the visa applicant, her parents or relatives, or the review applicant’s parents either at the time of application or since that date concerning the commitment by the visa applicant to the review applicant. For these reasons the Tribunal finds that the review applicant and the visa applicant have not demonstrated a clear commitment to each other at the time of the application or at the time of decision. Having regard to all the factors referred to in subregulation 1.15A(3), and applying the test outlined in Dhillon and Nassouh, the Tribunal was unable to be satisfied that the visa applicant meets the criteria as the spouse of an Australian citizen within the meaning of subregulation 1.15A(1). Therefore the Tribunal finds that the visa applicant does not satisfy subclause 309.211(2). Subclause 309.211(3) relating to an intention to marry is not applicable. (Emphasis added.)Since the visa applicant did not satisfy either subclauses 309.211(2) or (3), she did not satisfy subclause 309.211(1) at the time of the application and cl 309.221 at the time of the decision. The Tribunal concluded that she did not meet the criteria for the grant of the visa, and affirmed the decision under review.the parties’ submissions

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

Since it was not entirely clear which of his written submissions the review applicant had determined not to press and his counsel agreed that, in the respondent’s written submissions, the respondent had summarised the review applicant’s submissions accurately, I propose to deal with each of them briefly under the headings used in the respondent’s submissions. I note, however, that, save for the “error of law” submission referred to above, no other issue was the subject of argument at the hearing today.considerationProper, genuine and realistic consideration In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 (“Anthonypillai”), at [78], a Full Court of this Court rejected the use of the formula “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” to express the circumstances in which it can be said that the Tribunal had failed to “review” a decision. At [80], the Full Court said:Where an applicant for review in this Court contends that there has been a failure on the part of the Tribunal to perform its statutory duty, that submission must be shown to fall within an existing ground of review contained in s 476(1). … . It should be remembered that a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction which does not fall within any of the grounds for review contained within s 476(1) may, nonetheless, give rise to a claim for relief in the High Court. It will not, however, form the basis for review of any decision in this Court. In this case, the review applicant has not established that there was any failure on the Tribunal’s part to “review” the decision in the sense referred to in Anthonypillai, at [78]. (I assume, for these purposes, that the approach taken in Anthonypillai is consistent with Yusuf and offers an additional test for reviewable error.) See also Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 546, at [24] and W124 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1387, at [37]-[40].Obligation to make inquiries Plainly enough, the Tribunal has power to make its own inquiries. This discretionary power is conferred by s 359 of the Act. In Anthonypillai, however, the Full Court agreed with the judge at first instance that s 427(1)(d) of the Act (concerning a similar power of the Refugee Review Tribunal upon review of a protection visa decision) did not impose any duty on the Tribunal to make further inquiries. At first instance (2000) 62 ALD 136) in connection with s 427(1)(d), Merkel J observed (at [13]-[14]):The question of whether the [Refugee Review Tribunal] might have a duty, rather than just a power, to undertake inquiries has been considered in a number of cases. However, two recent cases discounted earlier authorities in favour of the existence of a duty to inquire on the basis that they were founded upon a view of the powers of review available under Pt 8 of the Act which has now been established to be wrong: see Majeed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 470 at [18]-[23] per Ryan J and Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277 at [29]-[32] per French J cf Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 96 FCR 125 at [66] and [67] per Drummond J and Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2000] FCA 172 at [8] per Drummond J.For the reasons given by Ryan J in Majeed and French J in Rahman it is unlikely that a mere failure to exercise a power to inquire under s 427(1)(d) will amount to a breach of any duty by the RRT. There may be some special or exceptional circumstances, such as a failure by the RRT to honour an undertaking to inquire, where a duty arises but the circumstances of the present case do not fall into that category.