DJB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 41 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DJB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1161

Appeal from: DJB16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3791
File number: SAD 12 of 2019
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 29 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – where Appellant contends that the IAA misapplied s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where IAA’s reasons with respect to s 473DD are conclusory and do not reveal active intellectual engagement – where error not material as not capable of affecting outcome – where Appellant seeks leave to advance new grounds on appeal – where proposed grounds lack sufficient prospects of success – where Appellant seeks to rely on new unparticularised claim not previously raised following conclusion of hearing – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, ss 36(2), 65, 473CB, 473DB, 473DD

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.39, 36.24

Cases cited:

AYE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 108

Brookfield v Capital Finance Australia Ltd [2012] FCA 415

DJB16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3791

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 92 ALJR 780

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110; 162 ALD 427

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 93 ALJR 252

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection vSZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 92 ALJR 713

Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73; 250 FCR 510

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; 147 FCR 51

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 92 ALJR 481

PXYJ v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 193

SZNXA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Date of hearing: 7 May 2019
Date of last submissions: 20 June 2019
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D F O’Leary
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SAD…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read DJB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1161
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DJB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The Appellant contested the IAA's decision, arguing that it misapplied section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Appellant contended that the IAA's reasons with respect to section 473DD were conclusory and did not demonstrate active intellectual engagement with the relevant statutory provisions.

The legal issues before the court were whether the IAA had misapplied section 473DD of the Migration Act and whether the Appellant should be granted leave to advance new grounds on appeal. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the Appellant could rely on a new unparticularised claim that had not been raised previously. The court found that the IAA's reasoning regarding section 473DD was indeed lacking, but this error did not materially affect the outcome of the IAA's decision.

In its reasoning, the court highlighted that while the IAA's conclusion did not show active intellectual engagement with the material, the error was not material as it did not affect the outcome. The court also dismissed the Appellant's request to raise new grounds on appeal, as the proposed grounds lacked sufficient prospects of success. Furthermore, the court did not allow the Appellant to rely on a new unparticularised claim that was not previously raised, as it would be inappropriate to permit such a claim at this stage. The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The final orders of the court included extending the time prescribed in rule 36.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to 18 April 2019, denying leave to raise new grounds on appeal, dismissing the appeal, and requiring the Appellant to pay the First Respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 1.39 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the time prescribed in r 36.24 be extended to 18 April 2019.

2. Leave be refused to raise new grounds on appeal.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The warrant was issued for a failure to attend court on a date following the Appellant’s arrival in Australia. However, given that the IAA accepted that there may be open legal proceedings against the Appellant in relation to dishonoured cheques, the warrant alone would not appear to have been capable of affecting the outcome of the IAA’s decision. The existence of the warrant is not capable of establishing the Appellant’s account of having been extorted and threatened to produce blank cheques that were later filled in in amounts he was unable to honour. It is only capable of establishing the existence of legal proceedings. I am unpersuaded that, had the IAA meaningfully engaged with s 473DD of the Act and determined that it would consider the arrest warrant, it might have come to a different conclusion regarding the Appellant’s claims in this regard.Further evidence Pursuant to the Court’s orders of 7 May 2019, the Appellant had leave to file post-hearing submissions but not additional evidence. Given the Minister’s opposition to the receipt of new evidence, I do not propose to consider it. However for completeness, I also accept the submission advanced by the Minister that the evidence would not assist the Appellant for the reasons identified in the Minister’s primary written submissions. New claim By his post-hearing submissions, the Appellant apparently seeks to rely on a new ground of appeal not previously raised and not particularised. That ground is that the IAA failed to consider the correct social group to which the Appellant belonged, being an associate of the LTTE with pending arrest warrants in connection with a false case initiated by the Sri Lankan authorities. No submissions are advanced by the Appellant in support of this new claim. It is inappropriate to permit the Appellant to raise a new, unparticularised ground of appeal at this stage. The hearing of this appeal has already taken place. The Appellant was granted leave to file and serve post-hearing submissions given that he was self-represented and sought an adjournment. Leave was not given to amend the grounds of appeal, and no formal application has been made to amend. Moreover, I am satisfied that the IAA accepted that the Appellant was forced to provide money and support to the LTTE, but did not accept that, as a consequence, the Appellant would have a profile that would place him at risk. As the Minister submits, even if the IAA framed its discussion by reference to the particular social group the Appellant now asserts was overlooked, it would not have affected the outcome as the IAA rejected the claim that the Appellant faced risk as an associate of the LTTE. Disposition and orders The primary judge ought to have found that the IAA did not demonstrate an active intellectual engagement with the provisions of s 473DD of the Act, and accordingly fell into legal error. However, that error was not material to the outcome of the IAA’s review. The error accordingly did not vitiate the IAA’s decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The IAA affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate.THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION The amended ground of review pursued before the primary judge was as follows:1.The Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not properly applying the test set out in section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”).Particulars1.1The applicant provided to the IAA a medical certificate, an arrest warrant and bank statements which the IAA was satisfied at paragraph [5] was new information (“the new information”).1.2It was implicit in the characterisation of the new information that it was relevant to his claims.1.3The IAA was required by section 473DD of the Act to form a state of satisfaction as to:1.3.1whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify considering the new information, and;1.3.2whether the new information, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the applicant’s claims.1.4The IAA erred in not accepting the new information was credible personal information not previously known to the delegate.1.5The IAA failed to consider the second limb to section 473DD(b)(ii), in not turning its mind to whether the new information may have affected the consideration of the applicant’s claims.1.6In so doing, the IAA constructively failed to exercise the jurisdiction imparted upon it in section 473DD. The primary judge’s discussion of those grounds was as follows:22.The plain language of [s 473DD of the Act] mandates that conditions (a) and (b) are cumulative or conjunctive with each other. This means that the information must satisfy the IAA that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering it AND it must also be information that could not have been given to the Minister before the Minister made the decision, or it must be credible personal information which could have affected the consideration of the claims.23.From paragraph 6 of the decision and reasons, it is clear that the IAA looked at the factors in condition (b) first. While the IAA does not go into detail as to why it was not satisfied, it is plain that it considered the question and [came] to the conclusion that they were not satisfied that it was credible personal information. 24.Even if there were some error because the IAA did not actually say that it had considered whether the information could have affected the consideration of the claims, unless the information was credible personal information, subsection (b)(ii) could not be met. 25.Even if one of the alternatives in subsection (b) had been met, the IAA was quite clear that it was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information, in other words, condition (a) had not been met.26.Such a finding was open on the evidence. Having made that finding, the IAA was precluded from considering that new information because there were no exceptional circumstances. His Honour was, for those reasons, satisfied that the IAA had properly construed s 473DD of the Act and that jurisdictional error had not been made out. The application for review was dismissed.THE APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister accordingly submitted that the Appellant’s supplementary submissions did not identify an error in the primary judge’s or the IAA’s reasons and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.ConsiderationMisapplication of s 473DD of the Act As set out in s 473DB of the Act, a fast track review is to be conducted by the IAA having regard only to the material provided to it pursuant to s 473CB, without accepting or requesting new information and without interviewing the referred applicant. Section 473DD contains the following exception:Considering new information in exceptional circumstances For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless: (a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and (b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information: (i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or (ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. The requirements of s 473DD are cumulative; both (a) and (b) must be satisfied before the IAA can consider the new information: see Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 92 ALJR 481 at [31] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 257 FCR 111 at [102]. In CQW17, McKerracher, Murphy and Davies JJ held at [39]:Consideration of a representation or submission by a decision-maker requires an “active intellectual process directed at that representation or submission”: Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCA 1726; (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462-3 per Black CJ; AGA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 628 at [31] per Moshinsky J. The Authority’s restatement does not show any real consideration in the sense of an “active intellectual process” directed at the material. The Minister is correct to acknowledge that the paucity in the IAA’s reasoning with respect to s 473DD of the Act might expose it to a finding of jurisdictional error. The totality of its consideration of s 473DD was as follows (at [6]):The applicant and his representative have not provided any reasons why the IAA should consider the new information under s.473DD. I note that the information predates the delegate’s decision. I am not satisfied that the information could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made, nor am I satisfied that it is credible person information which was not previously know. I am not satisfied that s.473DD(b) is met. Considering all the circumstances, I am also not satisfied that there are [no] exceptional circumstances to justify [consideration of] the new information.