PXYJ v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PXYJ v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 193

Appeal from: PXYJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 927
File number: WAD 315 of 2018
Judges: BARKER, BANKS-SMITH AND COLVIN JJ
Date of judgment: 13 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Court of Australia – where delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs refused to grant appellant a partner visa on character grounds under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision – where primary judge dismissed application for judicial review of Tribunal’s decision – where review grounds amended before primary judge – where grounds on appeal in same terms as original grounds raised and abandoned before primary judge – whether primary judge erred in not finding Tribunal erred by not giving primary weight to best interests of appellant’s children – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by apprehended and/or actual bias – whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations or relied on irrelevant considerations – whether primary judge failed to make a finding that Tribunal’s decision unreasonable – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5J and s 501

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.  Opened for signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) Art 1A

Cases cited:

AAM15 and Others v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2015) 231 FCR 452; [2015] FCA 804

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456; [2017] FCAFC 96

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Liand Another (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Others (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6

Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 250 FCR 510; [2017] FCAFC 73

O’Brien and Others v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310; [1982] HCA 33

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347; [1994] FCA 1105

Sun and Others v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2016) 243 FCR 220; [2016] FCAFC 52

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63

SZUGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 868

Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 107 FCR 133; [2001] FCA 568

Date of hearing: 9 November 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 72
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PJ Hannan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

WAD 315 of 2018
BETWEEN:

PXYJ

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BARKER, BANKS-SMITH AND COLVIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to rely on…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 193
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of PXYJ v Minister for Home Affairs involves an appellant, PXYJ, who appealed against the Minister for Home Affairs' decision to refuse to grant him a partner visa on character grounds under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The refusal was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), and the primary judge dismissed PXYJ's application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The primary issues in the appeal concerned whether the primary judge erred by not finding the Tribunal's decision was affected by apprehended or actual bias, by not making a finding that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations or relied on irrelevant considerations, and by not finding the Tribunal's decision unreasonable. Additionally, the appellant argued that the Tribunal did not give primary weight to the best interests of his children.

The court examined whether the grounds of appeal were properly raised and whether leave was required to argue them. The court found that the question of bias was not raised in the original judicial review application, and therefore, the ground was considered abandoned. Similarly, the grounds regarding the Tribunal's consideration of relevant and irrelevant factors were not argued before the primary judge. The court concluded that no sufficient basis had been provided to argue these grounds on appeal. The court further found that the primary judge had reasonably considered the relevant factors when reviewing the Tribunal's decision. It was noted that the Tribunal had regarded the primary considerations outlined in the Migration Act and the evidence presented, including the appellant's offending history and the impact on his family.

The court ultimately found that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by bias, and that the Tribunal had properly considered the relevant factors, including the best interests of the children, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly. The court found that the Tribunal's failure to explicitly mention the best interests of the children did not constitute a jurisdictional error, as the primary judge had considered the Tribunal's comprehensive analysis. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to rely on grounds 2 and 5 be refused.

2. The appellant’s notice of appeal dated 12 July 2018 be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In these circumstances, ground 1 of the notice of appeal fails.DID THE PRIMARY JUDGE ERR BY FAILING TO FIND THAT THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION WAS AFFECTED BY APPREHENDED AND/OR ACTUAL BIAS? As may be seen from the three grounds that were advanced on the judicial review application before the primary judge, the question of bias – actual or apprehended – was not raised. Indeed, ground 2, as now formulated, reflects ground 2 of the original notice of appeal before the primary judge which was amended to delete that ground. We agree with the submissions of the Minister that, in the circumstances, that ground was abandoned in the Court below. We refer to our reasons above concerning the question of leave. We can see no basis upon which leave should be given to now advance this ground of appeal. In these circumstances, we would refuse leave to rely on ground 2.DID THE PRIMARY JUDGE ERR BY FAILING TO MAKE A FINDING THAT THE TRIBUNAL FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS OR RELIED ON IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS? No grounds that reflect these grounds of the appeal were argued before the primary judge. Rather grounds 3 and 4 substantially reflect grounds 3 and 4 of the original notice of appeal in the Court below. There is merit in the Minister’s contention that these grounds were abandoned in the proceeding below and leave to advance them on this appeal is required. We refer to our reasons above concerning the grant of leave. No sufficient basis has been advanced by the appellant as to why leave should be granted to argue these grounds. To the extent that, by these grounds the appellant intends to contend that the primary judge erred for these reasons in finding that neither grounds 2 or 3 of the grounds of review before him were not established, we do not consider that they are made out. There is nothing in the way in which the primary judge dealt with ground 1 of the judicial review application before him, which we have just traversed in dealing with ground 1 of this appeal, to suggest that the primary judge should have made a finding that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations or relied on irrelevant considerations when it made its decision. The primary judge reasonably found that the Tribunal had regard to the primary considerations set out in cl 11 of Direction 65. Ground 2 of the judicial review application, as expressed in written submissions before the primary judge, asked the question whether the Tribunal had misunderstood its discretion under s 501(1) of the Act when directing itself that the appellant had to establish “an objectively well‑founded fear of persecution, if he were returned to India now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future”. The appellant, before the primary judge, pointed to [96] of the Tribunal’s reasons, which was in the following terms:The Tribunal, therefore, finds that [the applicant’s] claims that he will face harm in India, taken at their highest, do not reach the level that they would constitute an objectively well-founded fear of persecution if he were returned to India now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge also noted the appellant’s observation that the two primary considerations analysis also appeared to be contained in [113] of the Tribunal’s reasons. At [20] of his reasons, the primary judge set out [113] (with his emphasis added):There are considerations that weigh in [the applicant’s] favour. These include the negative consequences of his deportation on his minor children and wife. These considerations do not, however, outweigh the two primary considerations detailed above in relation to the safety and expectations of the Australian community. While life will inevitably be difficult initially for [the applicant’s] wife and children, this does not outweigh the Tribunal’s concerns for the safety of the Australian community arising from [the applicant’s] serious sexual offending against a minor and the risk of his offending in the future. On balance, the primary considerations referred to above, which should generally be given more weight, outweigh these other considerations.(Emphasis added by the primary judge.) The primary judge noted the appellant’s argument that, while the Tribunal made an implicit finding about the best interests of his two children, it did not in fact treat it as a primary consideration. Rather, it treated the wife and children compendiously, as if they were a subsidiary consideration under cl 12.2 of Direction 65 concerning the “Impact on family members”. The primary judge, at [23], noted the appellant’s contention that, at [74] of the Tribunal’s reasons, there was no mention of the evidence of the appellant being a “good father”, which had been noted elsewhere by the Tribunal, for example at [57] of its reasons. And that was despite cl 11.2(4)(b) of Direction 65 specifically requiring the Tribunal to consider under the “best interests of minor children”, “the extent to which the non-citizen is likely to play a positive parental role in the future (taking into account the length of time until the child turns 18)”. At [25], the primary judge noted the appellant’s further contention that the Tribunal’s failure to advert to the fact that the appellant’s children were both Australian citizens was also an omission of significance in the context of considering the children’s best interests. After reference to authority, the primary judge properly observed that it must be remembered that the reasons of an administrative decision‑maker are intended to inform and not be scrutinised by an overzealous eye attuned to error, as stated in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Others (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; [1996] HCA 6. The primary judge said that consistent with those requirements, it was important not to simply examine a summary conclusion, as at [113] of the Tribunal’s reasons, without also taking into account the process of analysis in the course of quite extensive reasons. The primary judge noted that in Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 107 FCR 133; [2001] FCA 568, a Full Court of this Court found jurisdictional error by reason of the failure by the decision‑maker to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the mandatory primary consideration of the best interest of the child or children. However his Honour noted this case before him stood in marked contrast to Wan.