FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AYY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 130
Appeal from: AYY15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2911 File number: VID 1406 of 2016 Judge: STEWARD J Date of judgment: 21 February 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review – whether Tribunal’s decision was irrational or illogical – whether Tribunal failed to consider claims cumulatively – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36 Cases cited: CNC15 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2017] FCA 1540
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS & Anor (2010) 240 CLR 611
SZTALv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 936
Date of hearing: 15 February 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 18 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the Respondents: Ms M Stone Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper ORDERS
VID 1406 of 2016 BETWEEN: AYY15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or as assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STEWARD J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court handed down on 17 November 2016 which rejected the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it was then) (the “Tribunal”) dated 14 May 2015. The Tribunal’s decision was that it was not satisfied that the appellant was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”).
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil who had sought a Protection (Class XA) visa from a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”). On 10 December 2013, the Minister refused to grant that visa. On 27 December 2013, the appellant lodged an application for review with the Tribunal.
BACKGROUND
The appellant represented himself before the Tribunal hearing on 13 May 2015. The Tribunal referred to the department’s file relating to the appellant, the material referred to in the Minister’s decision, and otherwise identified at par [20] of its reasons for decision the other material it had considered.
At par [6] to par [18] of its reasons, the Tribunal set out the relevant criteria for application under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa). The appellant does not dispute those criteria.
The appellant gave evidence before the Tribunal and was found to be a…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 130
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal's decision was irrational or illogical and whether it had failed to consider the appellant's claims cumulatively. The court was required to determine if the Tribunal's decision contained any jurisdictional error and whether the appellant's concerns about the Tribunal's consideration of his claims had merit.
The court found that the Tribunal had considered all the material presented by the appellant, including the submissions of the appellant's migration agent, and that there was no basis for concluding that the material was not taken into account. The court held that the Tribunal's conclusion was open to it on the evidence, and that the appellant's complaint about the Tribunal's findings was misconceived because it overlooked the objective element of the requirement that there be a well-founded fear of persecution. The court concluded that it was open for the Tribunal to determine that there was no sufficient foundation for the appellant's fear.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, as agreed or as assessed. The court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision and held that the appellant's complaints about the Tribunal's consideration of his claims were not well-founded. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court was affirmed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or as assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the written submissions of the appellant invoked the decision of this Court in SZTALv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 556. Following a dismissal of an appeal from that case by the High Court ((2017) 91 ALJR 936) this ground of appeal was not pursued.CONSIDERATION In my view the appellant’s first ground is not made out. In SZMDS, Crennan and Bell JJ said at par [130]: In the context of the Tribunal’s decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.In my opinion it was open on the evidence for the Tribunal to decide that, in all the circumstances, the warnings communicated by the Sri Lankan CID in 2011 to the appellant did not satisfy the criteria for the grant of a protection visa pursuant to either s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa). In my opinion, it was plainly a matter taken into consideration by the Tribunal, but of itself was not sufficiently persuasive. The learned primary judge was correct to conclude at par [11] of the reasons below that the Tribunal’s conclusion must be considered “in the context of the conclusions preceding it and the Tribunal was entitled to give such weight to the evidence led by the applicant as considered appropriate in all circumstances”. At the hearing, the appellant expressed the view that he could not reconcile, on the one hand, his subjective fear and the Tribunal’s findings as to his credibility with, on the other hand, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the fear of persecution was not well founded. His complaint in this regard is misconceived because it overlooks the objective element of the requirement that there be a well-founded fear of persecution. In CNC15 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2017] FCA 1540, Charlesworth J said at par [23]:It is well established that the requirement that there be a well-founded fear of persecution contains both subjective and objective elements. There must be a subjective fear of being persecuted, and the fear must be objectively well-founded: “it must not all be in the mind; there must be a sufficient foundation for that fear”: Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 396 (Dawson J).It was therefore open for the Tribunal to conclude that there was no sufficient foundation for the appellant’s fear.