BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 96

Appeal from: BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 965
File number: VID 1059 of 2016
Judges: BROMBERG, DAVIES AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 13 June 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – exercise of power under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appellant made representations in accordance with s 501CA(3) to the Assistant Minister that he feared harm if forced to return to his country of nationality – Assistant Minister failed to consider appellant’s claim to fear harm in circumstances where appellant could apply for protection visa – whether exercise of revocation power under s 501CA(4) requires consideration of a claim to fear harm in the applicant’s country of nationality in circumstances where applicant may apply for protection visa – consideration of whether there is an order in which the criteria for a protection visa must be considered – discussion of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Le (2016) 244 FCR 56 – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 197C, 198, 499, 501, 501C, 501CA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2 cl 866.225, Sch 4 public interest criterion 4001

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 105; 243 FCR 451

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 83; 231 FCR 513

BMX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1183; 244 FCR 153

Brown v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 141; 149 ALD 485

COT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 1) [2015] FCAFC 190; 236 FCR 148

Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 61; 240 FCR 29

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 448

Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 79; 314 ALR 130

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Lam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1226; 104 FCR 454

Mazid v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1641

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Le [2016] FCAFC 120; 244 FCR 56

Minister for Immigration…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court addressed an appeal concerning the exercise of power under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant, who had a Partner (Temporary) visa that was cancelled, sought a revocation of that cancellation based on his claim of fear of harm if he returned to his country of nationality. The Assistant Minister declined to revoke the cancellation, prompting the appellant to appeal the decision. The central legal issue was whether the exercise of the revocation power under section 501CA(4) necessitated the consideration of the appellant’s claim to fear harm in his country of nationality, particularly in light of the appellant's potential to apply for a protection visa.

The court held that the primary judge correctly concluded that it was not obligatory for the Assistant Minister to determine the level of risk faced by the appellant's daughter in circumstances where the Assistant Minister found that her best interests would be served by the revocation of the visa cancellation. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the treatment of the best interests of his child as a primary consideration required an evaluation of the risk of harm beyond the mere possibility of harm to the child if she returned to Lebanon. The decision in Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs was cited, which held that the treatment of a child's best interests as a primary consideration required the Minister to identify what the best interests of the child indicated should be the decision made and then to assess whether any other considerations outweighed those interests. The court found that the primary judge's interpretation of this requirement was correct and that the appellant's reliance on the cited passages to argue for a broader evaluation of risk was misplaced.

In light of the above, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and remitted the matter for determination according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The court's decision underscores the importance of correctly interpreting legislative provisions regarding the treatment of children's best interests in immigration decisions and the limited scope of such considerations in the context of visa revocations.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge made on 17 August 2016 be set aside.

3. In lieu thereof, order that the Assistant Minister’s decision dated 7 September 2015 be set aside, and the matter remitted for determination according to law.

4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

We have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Davies J in draft. Her Honour has summarised the general background to this appeal, and the relevant legislative provisions. We differ from her Honour on the outcome of the appeal, because of the view we have taken about the appellant’s second ground of appeal. For the reasons set out below, in our opinion the appeal should be allowed.THE APPELLANT’S CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ASSISTANT MINISTER’S DECISION The facts and background concerning the appellant, his criminal offending, conviction and sentencing, his migration status, and the course leading to the cancellation of his visa and the Assistant Minister’s decision not to revoke that cancellation, are set out in the decision of the primary judge at [13]-[42]. We do not repeat them here, or aspects of the legislative scheme, unless it is necessary to explain our reasoning. In particular, we do not repeat the factual and evidentiary matters to which his Honour refers concerning the first ground of appeal, because we have not found his Honour’s decision to be affected by any error in this respect. However, as to the second ground of appeal, where in our opinion the primary judge did err, it is critical to examine the terms of the representations made by the appellant pursuant to s 501CA(3) of the Migration Act after the mandatory cancellation of his Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (Subclass 820) visa on 6 February 2015. Those representations were made in several different documents, in response to an invitation under s 501CA(3). As is generally the case, the invitation sent out to individuals in the appellant’s circumstances did not indicate whether the Assistant Minister intended to make this decision personally, or through a delegate. The identity of the decision-maker affected the operation of what was then Direction No. 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA – a direction given by the Minister under s 499 of the Migration Act and, by force of s 499(2A) binding on delegates and merits review tribunals, but not binding on the Minister or Assistant Minister personally. As part of the invitation to make representations, the appellant was required to complete what was described as a “Revocation Request Form”, which was in evidence. Again the form was structured in the alternative, giving the individual affected no idea whether the decision was to be made personally by the Assistant Minister or by a delegate and therefore no idea whether the matters in Direction 65 were given force and effect through s 499 or not. It was not argued that the failure to give notice to the appellant, at the time he was putting forward his representations, whether this decision would be made by a person bound by Direction 65 or the Assistant Minister, was a denial of procedural fairness. The answer to that question may be left for another day. On this form, the appellant handwrote the following (identifying information removed):I urge the Minister of Immigration to intervene in this matter under section 501 as reasons why the mandatory cancellation of my visa should be revoked.I have a daughter [redacted] who is the age 2 years (2 months) born on [redacted]. It will be too dangerous for me and my daughter to move overseas. I am very remorseful many with strong family values. It is difficult for me to travel constantly with my family overseas as the current civil war in Lebanon is getting very dangerous. I am a husband and father to a family who desperatly need my support on a social and psychological.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge rejected these contentions and, with respect, correctly concluded at [62] of his Honour’s reasons for decision that it was not incumbent on the Assistant Minister to make a finding on the level of risk that would be faced by the appellant’s daughter in circumstances where the Assistant Minister concluded that her best interests would be served by revocation of the cancellation decision. The decision in Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 568, (2001) 107 FCR 133 (“Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”) does not support the appellant’s contention that the treatment of the best interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration required an evaluation of the risk of harm beyond the possibility of harm to the appellant’s daughter if she returned to Lebanon. In Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Full Court held that the Tribunal had denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to act on the basis that the best interests of the applicant’s children were a primary consideration in the exercise of the discretion to grant or refuse a visa. It was held that the treatment of a child’s best interests as a primary consideration in making a decision affecting a child requires the Minister first to identify what the best interests of the child indicate should be the decision made, and then to assess whether any other considerations outweigh the child’s best interests. The Full Court stated at [32]-[34]:32.An identification by the Tribunal of what the best interests of Mr Wan’s children required, and a recognition by the Tribunal of the need to treat such interests as a primary consideration, would not have led inexorably to a decision by the Tribunal to adopt a course in conformity with those interests. That is, even had the Tribunal concluded that the best interests of the children indicated that Mr Wan should be granted a visa, it was legally open to it to refuse to grant Mr Wan a visa. Provided that the Tribunal did not treat any other consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of Mr Wan’s children, it was entitled to conclude, after a proper consideration of the evidence and other material before it, that the strength of other considerations outweighed the best interests of the children. However, it was required to identify what the best interests of Mr Wan’s children required with respect to the exercise of its discretion and then to assess whether the strength of any other consideration, or the cumulative effect of other considerations, outweighed the consideration of the best interests of the children understood as a primary consideration.33.The written reasons of the Tribunal suggest that it regarded the expectations of the Australian community as a primary consideration (indeed, it might be thought, the primary consideration) in the exercise of the discretion to grant or to refuse to grant Mr Wan the visa for which he had applied. The Tribunal was entitled to regard the expectations of the Australian community as a primary consideration provided that it did not overlook that, on the procedure which it had adopted, procedural fairness demanded that it act on the basis that the best interests of Mr Wan’s children were a consideration of equal significance (that is, also a primary consideration). So, for example, the Tribunal might have concluded that the best interests of Mr Wan’s children required that Mr Wan be granted the visa, but that the damage to their interests that would flow from his being refused the visa would be of only slight or moderate significance. If the Tribunal had also concluded that the expectations of the Australian community were that a non-citizen who engaged in conduct of the kind engaged in by Mr Wan would not be granted a visa, and that a decision to grant such a visa would be a most serious affront to the expectations of the Australian community, it would have been entitled to conclude that, in the circumstances of the case, the best interests of the children were outweighed by the strength of community expectations.34.Nothing in the Tribunal’s written reasons for decision, however, suggest that it undertook an exercise of the above kind. It did not act on the basis that the best interests of the children were a primary consideration in the exercise of the discretion to grant, or to refuse to grant, Mr Wan the visa for which he had applied. To the extent that it gave consideration to the interests of the children, it did not give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to their best interests. …The appellant relied on these passages, and particularly [33], for the proposition that the Assistant Minister could not weigh the best interests of the child against the countervailing consideration of the risk to the community posed by the appellant, which was evaluated by the Assistant Minister, without also evaluating the probability or gravity of the potential harm to the appellant’s daughter if she returned to Lebanon. Those passages do not support that proposition.