Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 61

Appeal from: Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 802
File number: VID 437 of 2015
Judge: NORTH, KENNY AND PERRY JJ
Date of judgment: 14 April 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from single Judge of Federal Court of Australia – cancellation of absorbed person visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appellant convicted of serious offence and did not pass character test – exercise of discretion under s 501(2) – whether jurisdictional errors in decision of Minister – Held: failure to take into account relevant consideration that appellant faced possible indefinite detention if visa cancelled, amounting to jurisdictional error – appeal allowed.  
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(2), (6), (7), 501G(1)(e)

Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AAA

Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) s 34(1)(b)

Cases cited:

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513; [2015] FCAFC 83

Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 43

Lam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] AATA 56

Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1018

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30

Mrayhej v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 691

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 38

NBNB vMinster for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 39; 220 FCR 44

Summers v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 36; 230 FCR 179

Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 499; [2015] FCA 398

Date of hearing: 3 December 2015
Date of last submissions 18 December 2015
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 135
Counsel for the Appellant: P Hanks QC with N Karapanagiotidis
Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the Respondent: P R D Gray QC with W S Mosley
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 437 of 2015
BETWEEN:

ALBERT COTTERILL

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, KENNY AND PERRY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 APRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant is granted leave to amend the Notice of Appeal by adding ground of appeal 3 substantially in the terms of that paragraph in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 9 December 2015.

2.The appeal is allowed.

3.The orders made by Pagone J…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, Cotterill, who was challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel his absorbed person visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958. The appellant had been convicted of a serious offence and had failed the character test, leading to the Minister's decision. The primary issues in the case were whether the Minister had made any jurisdictional errors in his decision and whether the decision was unreasonable due to a lack of evident and intelligible justification.

The court examined whether the Minister had taken into account all relevant considerations, particularly the risk of indefinite detention if the visa was cancelled. The court found that the Minister had failed to consider this relevant factor, which amounted to a jurisdictional error. The court noted that the Minister's decision-making process had been flawed as it did not encompass all necessary considerations, rendering the decision unreasonable. The court further clarified that it was not within its role to determine whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the Minister, but rather to ensure that the decision was legally reasonable and justified.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the primary judge. A writ of certiorari was issued to quash the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa, and a writ of prohibition was issued to prevent the Minister from acting on or giving effect to that decision. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the primary judge. The case highlights the importance of considering all relevant factors in decision-making processes and the necessity for decisions to be legally reasonable and justified.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant is granted leave to amend the Notice of Appeal by adding ground of appeal 3 substantially in the terms of that paragraph in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 9 December 2015.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The orders made by Pagone J on 7 August 2015 are set aside.

4. A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the decision of the respondent made on 17 April 2015 to cancel the appellant’s Absorbed Person visa.

5. A writ of prohibition issue, prohibiting the respondent and his delegate, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision.

6. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceeding before Pagone J.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the concluding paragraphs of this section the Minister discussed the risk that the appellant would reoffend as follows:31. In considering the risk Mr COTTERILL's conduct may be repeated, I have taken into consideration the information that he was not required to undertake any sex offenders courses during his three months imprisonment, that for about 51 years he had no other convictions, that he has not offended since his November 2012 convictions and since his release from prison in February 2013, and that he has been involved with a men's Christian support group since his release. I have also taken into account character references from his family and friend, and his age, medical conditions, physical frailty, as well as the fact that he is subject to reporting requirements to police.32. In considering the likelihood of Mr COTTERILL engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, I have given weight to the fact that Mr COTTERILL has spent since 1976, a period of some 38 years in the community since his last offence. I also note that he has spent some two years in the community since being released from jail in February 2013, after serving three months imprisonment, and has completed a 12 month good behaviour bond.33. While taking account of all of the above issues, I find that there is low risk he may re-offend, and that even if Mr COTTERILL poses only a low risk of re-offending, serious harm could result to a member of the Australian community if he were to re-offend in a similar manner.THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE Before the primary judge the appellant contended that there was no clear basis on which the Minister could find that the offending was very serious, that the offences caused the victims to suffer serious harm, or that there was a risk, even a low risk, of reoffending. These conclusions were unreasonable in the sense explained in the judgment of Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 (Li), namely, that they lacked an “evident and intelligible justification”. The primary judge rejected these arguments. As to the seriousness of the offending, the primary judge said that the question was one of fact for the Minister to determine. The orders of the Magistrates’ Court recorded the offences, the sentences imposed, and also the sentences that would have been imposed if the appellant had not pleaded guilty. That was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the offending was serious, even though the Minister did not have details of the circumstances of the particular offences. Then, as to the Minister’s finding that the offences committed by the appellant caused his victims to suffer serious harm, the primary judge held that this finding was open on the material available. He said:14… It is of the nature of such crimes against children that they will be caused harm without the need for direct evidence of actual harm. It was not a finding that required the Minister to obtain any evidence, or to have any further knowledge, of the foundational conduct of the particular offences charged for the Minister to conclude that the offending, in fact, did cause serious harm.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

NBMZ is distinguishable because in that case the briefing material before the Minister did not refer to the possibility of indefinite detention at all, the indefinite detention flowed as a legal, not a practical consequence of the Minister’s decision, and the Minister considered the appellant’s health issues and found that the appellant could return to the United Kingdom notwithstanding those issues. CONSIDERATIONIntroduction Three of the four questions raised by this appeal concern the contention that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable in that it lacked an evident and intelligible justification. Some of the principles which apply to a consideration of that issue should be referred to. A statute which grants a power is presumed to require that the power be exercised in accordance with reason. When assessing whether a power has been exercised reasonably the Court exercises a supervisory jurisdiction. Hence, it is not entitled to substitute its own view for the view of the decision maker entrusted with the power. Rather, the Court enquires whether the decision was made within the bounds of legal reasonableness. It is not the role of the Court to determine whether it would have come to the same view or not. The starting point for the inquiry is a consideration of the scope and purpose of the statutory power. A decision is legally reasonable only if it falls within the statutory boundaries. Many different descriptions of what amounts to unreasonableness in the exercise of statutory power have been formulated by the courts. A decision which is so unreasonable that a reasonable decision maker could not have arrived at it falls outside the standard of reasonableness. But unreasonableness is not confined to that category of decision. For instance, it extends to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification. The many descriptions of the requirements of reasonableness in decision making are gathered together in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [5] per Allsop CJ (Stretton). Thus, a decision will be unreasonable if the power to make it is exercised according to private opinion or humour, if it is made dishonestly, capriciously, arbitrarily or if it lacks a rational ground for belief. The principles applicable to unreasonableness as a ground for impugning statutory decision making have recently been reiterated and explained by the High Court in Li and by Full Courts in Singh and Stretton. The principles are not generally in contest in this appeal. However, certain particular aspects of the application of those principles are addressed in the discussion below. In Singh the Full Court said at [42]:Unlike some grounds of review, legal unreasonableness is invariably fact dependent, so that in any given case determining whether an exercise of power crosses the line into legal unreasonableness will require careful evaluation of the evidence before the Court, including any inferences which may be drawn from that evidence.The risk of reoffending