FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 61
Appeal from: Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 802 File number: VID 437 of 2015 Judge: NORTH, KENNY AND PERRY JJ Date of judgment: 14 April 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from single Judge of Federal Court of Australia – cancellation of absorbed person visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appellant convicted of serious offence and did not pass character test – exercise of discretion under s 501(2) – whether jurisdictional errors in decision of Minister – Held: failure to take into account relevant consideration that appellant faced possible indefinite detention if visa cancelled, amounting to jurisdictional error – appeal allowed. Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(2), (6), (7), 501G(1)(e)
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AAA
Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) s 34(1)(b)
Cases cited: Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513; [2015] FCAFC 83
Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 43
Lam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] AATA 56
Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1018
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
Mrayhej v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 691
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 38
NBNB vMinster for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 39; 220 FCR 44
Summers v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 36; 230 FCR 179
Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 499; [2015] FCA 398
Date of hearing: 3 December 2015 Date of last submissions 18 December 2015 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 135 Counsel for the Appellant: P Hanks QC with N Karapanagiotidis Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent: P R D Gray QC with W S Mosley Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 437 of 2015 BETWEEN: ALBERT COTTERILL
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
NORTH, KENNY AND PERRY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
14 APRIL 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant is granted leave to amend the Notice of Appeal by adding ground of appeal 3 substantially in the terms of that paragraph in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 9 December 2015.
2.The appeal is allowed.
3.The orders made by Pagone J…
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 61
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Minister had taken into account all relevant considerations, particularly the risk of indefinite detention if the visa was cancelled. The court found that the Minister had failed to consider this relevant factor, which amounted to a jurisdictional error. The court noted that the Minister's decision-making process had been flawed as it did not encompass all necessary considerations, rendering the decision unreasonable. The court further clarified that it was not within its role to determine whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the Minister, but rather to ensure that the decision was legally reasonable and justified.
The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the primary judge. A writ of certiorari was issued to quash the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa, and a writ of prohibition was issued to prevent the Minister from acting on or giving effect to that decision. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the primary judge. The case highlights the importance of considering all relevant factors in decision-making processes and the necessity for decisions to be legally reasonable and justified.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant is granted leave to amend the Notice of Appeal by adding ground of appeal 3 substantially in the terms of that paragraph in the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 9 December 2015.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. The orders made by Pagone J on 7 August 2015 are set aside.
4. A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the decision of the respondent made on 17 April 2015 to cancel the appellant’s Absorbed Person visa.
5. A writ of prohibition issue, prohibiting the respondent and his delegate, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision.
6. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceeding before Pagone J.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
NBMZ is distinguishable because in that case the briefing material before the Minister did not refer to the possibility of indefinite detention at all, the indefinite detention flowed as a legal, not a practical consequence of the Minister’s decision, and the Minister considered the appellant’s health issues and found that the appellant could return to the United Kingdom notwithstanding those issues. CONSIDERATIONIntroduction Three of the four questions raised by this appeal concern the contention that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable in that it lacked an evident and intelligible justification. Some of the principles which apply to a consideration of that issue should be referred to. A statute which grants a power is presumed to require that the power be exercised in accordance with reason. When assessing whether a power has been exercised reasonably the Court exercises a supervisory jurisdiction. Hence, it is not entitled to substitute its own view for the view of the decision maker entrusted with the power. Rather, the Court enquires whether the decision was made within the bounds of legal reasonableness. It is not the role of the Court to determine whether it would have come to the same view or not. The starting point for the inquiry is a consideration of the scope and purpose of the statutory power. A decision is legally reasonable only if it falls within the statutory boundaries. Many different descriptions of what amounts to unreasonableness in the exercise of statutory power have been formulated by the courts. A decision which is so unreasonable that a reasonable decision maker could not have arrived at it falls outside the standard of reasonableness. But unreasonableness is not confined to that category of decision. For instance, it extends to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification. The many descriptions of the requirements of reasonableness in decision making are gathered together in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [5] per Allsop CJ (Stretton). Thus, a decision will be unreasonable if the power to make it is exercised according to private opinion or humour, if it is made dishonestly, capriciously, arbitrarily or if it lacks a rational ground for belief. The principles applicable to unreasonableness as a ground for impugning statutory decision making have recently been reiterated and explained by the High Court in Li and by Full Courts in Singh and Stretton. The principles are not generally in contest in this appeal. However, certain particular aspects of the application of those principles are addressed in the discussion below. In Singh the Full Court said at [42]:Unlike some grounds of review, legal unreasonableness is invariably fact dependent, so that in any given case determining whether an exercise of power crosses the line into legal unreasonableness will require careful evaluation of the evidence before the Court, including any inferences which may be drawn from that evidence.The risk of reoffending