Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 398

Citation: Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 398
Parties: SHAYE TAMA TE PUKE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File number: NSD 1257 of 2014
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 29 April 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Cancellation of visa on character grounds – Whether Minister properly exercised discretion under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Whether risk of harm to the Australian community is a mandatory consideration – Whether Minister is bound to evaluate the likelihood of future harm – Whether Minister erred by failing to have regard to findings made by the sentencing judge – Whether the Minister made a finding that was unsupported by evidence – Whether the Minister’s decision was irrational or illogical
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 93A, 93C
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 4, 501, 501(2), 501(6), 501(7)
Cases cited: Anderson v Director General of the Department of Environmental and Climate Change (2008) 163 LGERA 400; (2008) 251 ALR 633
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia (2012) 203 FCR 389
Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd v GPT RE Ltd (2007) 153 LGERA 450; [2007] NSWCA 171
Coderre v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 143 ALD 675
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280
Colosimo v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 64 NSWLR 645
Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (2004) 61 NSWLR 558
Djalic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 292
Fraser v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1333
Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 43
Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 417
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291
King v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 142 ALD 305
Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 139 ALD 50
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Voao [2005] FCAFC 50
Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 54
MZAGK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1190
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1
NBNB v Minister for Immigration…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 398
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Te Puke, challenged the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Mr Te Puke had been sentenced to imprisonment for his involvement in a serious assault on a taxi driver, which led to the Minister concluding that he did not pass the character test. Mr Te Puke argued that the Minister had failed to properly exercise his discretion by not adequately considering the risk of harm to the Australian community and by making findings that were not supported by evidence. The court examined the legal issues of whether the risk of harm was a mandatory consideration, whether the Minister was required to evaluate the likelihood of future harm, and whether the Minister had erred by not considering findings made by the sentencing judge.

The court found that even if the risk of harm to the community was a mandatory consideration, the Minister had not failed to consider it in Mr Te Puke’s case. The court emphasised that the exercise of the Minister’s discretion under section 501(2) was broad and unconfined, and the nature and extent of the potential adverse consequences posed by the continuing presence of the person in Australia must be central considerations. The court also rejected Mr Te Puke’s argument that the Minister had erred by failing to consider findings made by the sentencing judge, as these findings were not critical or material to the Minister’s decision. Furthermore, the court held that the Minister’s finding that Mr Te Puke had prior violent offences was supported by evidence and did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

In conclusion, the court dismissed Mr Te Puke’s challenge to the Minister’s decision, finding that the Minister had not erred in exercising his discretion. The application was dismissed, and Mr Te Puke was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, Mr Te Puke’s challenge to the Minister’s cancellation of his visa fails. The Minister did not err jurisdictionally in arriving at his decision. BACKGROUND On 26 May 2012, Mr Te Puke, in company with another person, Mr Tane Hodgson, robbed and seriously assaulted a taxi driver. Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson were both 19 years old at the time. The incident occurred after Mr Te Puke, Mr Hodgson and two women who were with them, flagged-down a taxi in the early hours of the morning outside the Bayview Hotel in Gladesville. They asked the driver to take them to Rydalmere. Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson were apparently heavily intoxicated at the time after a heavy night of drinking. When the taxi arrived in Rydalmere, Mr Te Puke and his friends got out of the taxi. When the taxi driver, quite understandably, told Mr Te Puke that he had to pay the fare, which was approximately $25 to $30, Mr Te Puke replied, “You pay.” The driver, apparently fearing for his safety, grabbed a screwdriver from his taxi and got out of the taxi holding the screwdriver for his protection. A scuffle then ensued between the driver and Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson. The taxi driver fell to the ground during this melee, whereupon Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson set upon him, kicking and punching him to the head and face. The taxi driver tried to protect himself. He got to his feet and swung the screwdriver towards Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson. He apparently made some contact, but was then felled by a heavy blow to the head. For the next five minutes or so, Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson continued to viciously assault the driver. They eventually let up, but, to rub salt into the wounds, as it were, they then stole the taxi driver’s mobile phone before they left the scene. A local resident witnessed the incident and called emergency services. The driver was eventually taken by ambulance to Westmead Hospital. His injuries were such that he required surgery. He sustained fractures to the bones around his right eye socket and his nose, and bleeding in one of his ears. Some of the injuries have resulted in the driver suffering potentially permanent disability. For some time after the incident he suffered blurred and double vision and hearing loss. The operation on his eye socket has left him permanently disfigured. He continued to suffer psychological and emotional problems resulting from the incident. He was unable to return to driving a taxi for a living. On any view, Mr Te Puke’s offending behaviour was serious. As will be seen, the District Court judge who sentenced Mr Te Puke plainly believed so. So too did the Minister. Mr Te Puke and Mr Hodgson were both eventually apprehended and charged by the police with the offence of robbery in company causing grievous bodily harm. They pleaded guilty and, on 4 April 2013, were sentenced to terms of imprisonment by his Honour Judge Hoy SC in the District Court of New South Wales. The overall sentence imposed on Mr Te Puke was imprisonment for four years and six months with a non-parole period of one year and ten months.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Whatever the sentencing judge may have found, in the context of sentencing Mr Te Puke, in relation to mitigating circumstances, and however he may have characterised the offence in terms of the hierarchy of seriousness of offences of this nature, it was open to the Minister to regard the offending as “very serious.” That conclusion was open from the objective facts of the offence, which do not bear repeating. On just about any view, the offence was very serious. GROUND 4 – WAS THE MINISTER’S FINDING CONCERNING PRIOR “VIOLENT OFFENCES” ILLOGICAL OR UNSUPPORTED BY PROBATIVE EVIDENCE? The short answer to this question is “no”. This ground has no merit. In relation to the “no evidence” ground, the Minister had before him evidence that Mr Te Puke had previously been convicted of two offences, being one offence of common assault and one offence of affray. It is correct, as Mr Te Puke submits, that neither offence has, as an essential element, the actual infliction of unlawful force (see Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (2004) 61 NSWLR 558 at [71] in the case of assault and s 93C of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and Colosimo v Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 64 NSWLR 645 in the case of affray). Both of these offences can be committed by acts which merely cause another person to apprehend the infliction of unlawful force or to fear for their safety. The actual infliction of force is unnecessary. It does not follow, however, that they are not necessarily violent offences. An act which causes a fear of the infliction of unlawful force, or which causes a person to fear for their personal safety, is nonetheless capable of being characterised as a violent act. So much so is clear from the definition of “violence” in s 93A of the Crimes Act, which applies to the offence of affray. That definition makes it clear that “violence” is not restricted to conduct that causes injury or damage, but includes any other violent conduct “for example, throwing at or towards a person a missile of a kind capable of causing injury which does not hit or falls short.” It was therefore open to the Minister to characterise these offences as violent offences, even though he had no detail of the precise circumstances in which the offences were committed. Mr Te Puke’s “no evidence” ground must therefore be rejected. In any event, Mr Te Puke concedes, properly, that to establish jurisdictional error on this ground, he is required to demonstrate that the relevant fact was a critical fact, or was at least material, in relation to the Minister’s ultimate decision: Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277 at [23]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Voao [2005] FCAFC 50 at [5] and [13]; SZMWQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 187 FCR 109 at [121], [125]; Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia (2012) 203 FCR 389 at [92]. The finding concerning Mr Te Puke’s previous violent offences was neither critical nor material to the Minister’s exercise of discretion. The statement of reasons, read fairly, discloses that this finding played no part in the Minister’s assessment of the risk of Mr Te Puke re-offending, or his assessment of the extent of the harm that would be suffered by the community if Mr Te Puke did re-offend. It ultimately played no role in the Minister’s exercise of discretion.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is to be noted that, in relation to the prospects of rehabilitation, whilst his Honour concluded that the prospects were good, his Honour’s findings remained somewhat cautious and tempered. His Honour observed that Mr Te Puke had abandoned his addiction “by compulsion” because he had, by the time of his sentence, been in custody for some time. His Honour’s findings concerning Mr Te Puke’s future prospects were, understandably in the circumstances, expressed in terms of hope rather than certainty.THE CANCELLATION DECISION Subsection 501(2) of the Act provides that the Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test and the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test. The character test is defined in s 501(6) of the Act in the following terms: (6) For the purposes of this section, a person does not pass the character test if: (a)the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7)); or(aa)the person has been convicted of an offence that was committed:(i)while the person was in immigration detention; or (ii)during an escape by the person from immigration detention; or (iii)after the person escaped from immigration detention but before the person was taken into immigration detention again; or (ab)the person has been convicted of an offence against section 197A; or (b)the person has or has had an association with someone else or with a group or organisation, whom the Minister reasonably suspects has been or is involved in criminal conduct; or (c)having regard to either or both of the following: (i)the person’s past and present criminal conduct; (ii)the person’s past and present general conduct; the person is not of good character; or (d)in the event the person were allowed to enter or to remain in Australia, there is a significant risk that the person would: (i)engage in criminal conduct in Australia; or (ii)harass, molest, intimidate or stalk another person in Australia; or (iii)vilify a segment of the Australian community; or (iv)incite discord in the Australian community or in a segment of that community; or (v)represent a danger to the Australian community or to a segment of that community, whether by way of being liable to become involved in activities that are disruptive to, or in violence threatening harm to, that community or segment, or in any other way. Otherwise, the person passes the character test. Subsection 501(7) of the Act provides that, for the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if, inter alia, the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. There is no issue that, as a result of the sentence imposed by his Honour Judge Hoy SC, Mr Te Puke had a substantial criminal record and therefore did not pass the character test. Mr Te Puke was released on parole on 31 March 2014. Before his release on parole, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) wrote to Mr Te Puke to advise him that consideration was being given to the cancellation of his visa under s 501(2) of the Act. The letter invited Mr Te Puke to comment or provide information in relation to whether he passed the character test and whether the Minister or his delegate should exercise the discretion to cancel his visa. Further letters were sent to Mr Te Puke on 30 April 2014 and 2 May 2014. In response, Mr Te Puke provided the Department with a completed personal details form and (on or shortly after 8 May 2014) a two page letter containing some comments and information which may have given the Minister or his delegate reason not to cancel Mr Te Puke’s visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For the reasons that follow, it is ultimately unnecessary to answer the first question. That is because even if risk of harm is a mandatory consideration, it cannot be concluded that the Minister failed to have regard to it in Mr Te Puke’s case. It follows that Mr Te Puke’s challenge to the Minister’s decision on this ground must fail. Nevertheless, some consideration should be given to the question whether risk of harm is a mandatory consideration. That is not only because it is an important question, but also because, at least on the Minister’s case, there has been some differences of opinion in relation to this question in recent cases in the Court.Is the risk of harm to the community a mandatory consideration? Two relatively recent decisions of single judges of the Court suggest that the answer to this question is “yes”: Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 417 (Gbojueh); and Tanielu. The Minister submits, however, that these cases are wrongly decided because they are contrary to the judgment of the majority in Huynh. The Minister also points to another recent single judge decision as indicating that Tanielu was wrongly decided, or at least as indicating a difference of opinion concerning this question: MZAGK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1190 (MZAGK). The difficulty for the Minister, however, is that Huynh is not authority for the proposition that risk of harm to the Australian community is not a mandatory consideration in the exercise of the discretion under s 501(2) of the Act. It would also appear that, to the extent that there is any disagreement or difference of opinion in recent cases in the Court, that disagreement or difference of opinion relates more to the question how the Minister may or must go about assessing or determining the risk of harm. The difference is not about whether risk of harm is a mandatory consideration. The question is, ultimately, one of statutory construction. The ambit of the Minister’s discretion to cancel a visa under s 501(2) of the Act is broad and unconfined. It is not subject to any express limitations or constraints. It is well accepted that, in these circumstances, the Court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take into account a particular matter unless that can be implied from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the act in question: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40 (Peko-Wallsend). The general object of the Act is set out in s 4 of the Act. It is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens. Subsections 4(2) and 4(4) make it plain that the provisions of the Act relating to visas, and the removal of persons whose presence is not permitted by the Act, which would include persons whose visas have been cancelled, are intended to advance that object. Considered in the context of this broad object, s 501 can readily enough be seen to be dealing with one aspect of the national interest. That aspect is the protection of the Australian community by the removal from Australia of persons who, by reason of their bad character, may present a risk, or whose continuing presence may have adverse consequences for, the Australian community. The removal of such persons is effected, in the first instance, by the cancellation of their visas. Visa cancellation does not, however, automatically follow from a failure to satisfy the character test in s 501(6) of the Act. The Minister retains a discretion. Plainly enough, given the subject matter, scope and purpose of s 501, the nature and extent of the potential adverse consequences or risk posed by the continuing presence of the person in Australia must be seen to be a central consideration in the exercise of that discretion.