FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Te Puke v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 398
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 398
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that even if the risk of harm to the community was a mandatory consideration, the Minister had not failed to consider it in Mr Te Puke’s case. The court emphasised that the exercise of the Minister’s discretion under section 501(2) was broad and unconfined, and the nature and extent of the potential adverse consequences posed by the continuing presence of the person in Australia must be central considerations. The court also rejected Mr Te Puke’s argument that the Minister had erred by failing to consider findings made by the sentencing judge, as these findings were not critical or material to the Minister’s decision. Furthermore, the court held that the Minister’s finding that Mr Te Puke had prior violent offences was supported by evidence and did not constitute a jurisdictional error.
In conclusion, the court dismissed Mr Te Puke’s challenge to the Minister’s decision, finding that the Minister had not erred in exercising his discretion. The application was dismissed, and Mr Te Puke was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons that follow, it is ultimately unnecessary to answer the first question. That is because even if risk of harm is a mandatory consideration, it cannot be concluded that the Minister failed to have regard to it in Mr Te Puke’s case. It follows that Mr Te Puke’s challenge to the Minister’s decision on this ground must fail. Nevertheless, some consideration should be given to the question whether risk of harm is a mandatory consideration. That is not only because it is an important question, but also because, at least on the Minister’s case, there has been some differences of opinion in relation to this question in recent cases in the Court.Is the risk of harm to the community a mandatory consideration? Two relatively recent decisions of single judges of the Court suggest that the answer to this question is “yes”: Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 417 (Gbojueh); and Tanielu. The Minister submits, however, that these cases are wrongly decided because they are contrary to the judgment of the majority in Huynh. The Minister also points to another recent single judge decision as indicating that Tanielu was wrongly decided, or at least as indicating a difference of opinion concerning this question: MZAGK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1190 (MZAGK). The difficulty for the Minister, however, is that Huynh is not authority for the proposition that risk of harm to the Australian community is not a mandatory consideration in the exercise of the discretion under s 501(2) of the Act. It would also appear that, to the extent that there is any disagreement or difference of opinion in recent cases in the Court, that disagreement or difference of opinion relates more to the question how the Minister may or must go about assessing or determining the risk of harm. The difference is not about whether risk of harm is a mandatory consideration. The question is, ultimately, one of statutory construction. The ambit of the Minister’s discretion to cancel a visa under s 501(2) of the Act is broad and unconfined. It is not subject to any express limitations or constraints. It is well accepted that, in these circumstances, the Court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take into account a particular matter unless that can be implied from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the act in question: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40 (Peko-Wallsend). The general object of the Act is set out in s 4 of the Act. It is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens. Subsections 4(2) and 4(4) make it plain that the provisions of the Act relating to visas, and the removal of persons whose presence is not permitted by the Act, which would include persons whose visas have been cancelled, are intended to advance that object. Considered in the context of this broad object, s 501 can readily enough be seen to be dealing with one aspect of the national interest. That aspect is the protection of the Australian community by the removal from Australia of persons who, by reason of their bad character, may present a risk, or whose continuing presence may have adverse consequences for, the Australian community. The removal of such persons is effected, in the first instance, by the cancellation of their visas. Visa cancellation does not, however, automatically follow from a failure to satisfy the character test in s 501(6) of the Act. The Minister retains a discretion. Plainly enough, given the subject matter, scope and purpose of s 501, the nature and extent of the potential adverse consequences or risk posed by the continuing presence of the person in Australia must be seen to be a central consideration in the exercise of that discretion.