FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
King v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 766
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Details
- Case
- [2014] FCA 766
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of King v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, Mr King, challenged the legality of the Minister's decision to cancel his visa under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue was whether the Minister was required to consider the surrounding circumstances of Mr King's criminal offences when exercising the discretion to cancel his visa. This issue arose from a divergence in the case law, particularly the decisions in Huynh and NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Mr King argued that the Minister's failure to consider the specifics of his criminal history constituted a breach of natural justice and procedural fairness.
The court examined the statutory framework, particularly section 501G(1) which requires the Minister to provide reasons for the cancellation decision, and section 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which mandates the inclusion of findings on material questions of fact. The court found that section 501 does not impose an obligation on the Minister to consider specific factors personal to the visa holder, such as the circumstances of the offence. Instead, the decision-making process is left to the Minister's discretion, informed by the statute's purpose and the context provided by Ministerial Direction No 21. The court relied on the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom, which affirmed that the Minister is not bound to consider extraneous factors when exercising the discretion under section 501.
The court concluded that the Minister was not required to consider the surrounding circumstances of Mr King's criminal offences when deciding to cancel his visa. The Minister's decision was upheld as it was within the bounds of the statutory discretion granted by section 501. The reasons provided by the Minister were sufficient to meet the statutory requirements, and the failure to consider additional details of the criminal history did not invalidate the decision.
The court examined the statutory framework, particularly section 501G(1) which requires the Minister to provide reasons for the cancellation decision, and section 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which mandates the inclusion of findings on material questions of fact. The court found that section 501 does not impose an obligation on the Minister to consider specific factors personal to the visa holder, such as the circumstances of the offence. Instead, the decision-making process is left to the Minister's discretion, informed by the statute's purpose and the context provided by Ministerial Direction No 21. The court relied on the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom, which affirmed that the Minister is not bound to consider extraneous factors when exercising the discretion under section 501.
The court concluded that the Minister was not required to consider the surrounding circumstances of Mr King's criminal offences when deciding to cancel his visa. The Minister's decision was upheld as it was within the bounds of the statutory discretion granted by section 501. The reasons provided by the Minister were sufficient to meet the statutory requirements, and the failure to consider additional details of the criminal history did not invalidate the decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Section 501G(1) relevantly provides as follows:Refusal or cancellation of visa—notification of decision(1)If a decision is made under subsection 501(1) or (2) or 501A(2) or section 501B or 501F to:(a)refuse to grant a visa to a person; or(b)cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;the Minister must give the person a written notice that:(c)sets out the decision; and(d)specifies the provision under which the decision was made and sets out the effect of that provision; and(e)sets out the reasons (other than non‑disclosable information) for the decision; …(4)A failure to comply with this section in relation to a decision does not affect the validity of the decision.Section 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act1901 (Cth), in turn, operates upon s 501G(1)(e) and provides as follows: Content of statements of reasons for decisions Where an Act requires a tribunal, body or person making a decision to give written reasons for the decision, whether the expression “reasons”, “grounds” or any other expression is used, the instrument giving the reasons shall also set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.Section 501 – the relevance of matters surrounding the offence? Section 501 has potentially given rise to some division of opinion between decisions of the Full Court of this Court differently constituted. That difference centres upon the relevance of an individual’s circumstances to the manner in which the discretion conferred by s 501 is to be exercised. For present purposes, attention may be confined to the 2004 decision in Huynh and to the subsequent Full Court 2014 decision in NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38, (2014) 307 ALR 49. It was this potential divergence of views which occasioned the application made on behalf of Mr King to have the matter referred at the outset to a bench of three (or possibly) five Judges of this Court. This was considered on behalf of Mr King to be a preferable course to any adverse decision being the subject of an appeal. In Huynh the applicant was a Vietnamese national who had been sentenced to two years imprisonment for supplying heroin. Her visa had been cancelled pursuant to s 501. It was concluded by a majority that no obligation arose under the Migration Act to take into account the remarks of the sentencing judge. In allowing an appeal, Kiefel and Bennett JJ relevantly concluded:Whether a relevant consideration[71] With respect to his Honour, the fact of possession of a criminal record, the reason why a person does not pass the character test, does not of itself render the circumstances surrounding the offences committed, and the reasons for the sentences imposed for them, relevant considerations to the exercise of the Minister’s discretion. A relevant consideration in an administrative law sense has a limited meaning. It is one which the decision-maker is bound to take into account in making the decision in question. The factors which the decision-maker is bound to take into account are determined by the construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If they are not stated, they are to be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39–40 per Mason J.[72] The Act does not state what factors the Minister is bound to consider in determining whether or not to cancel a person’s visa. The nature of the minister’s discretion under s 501 of the Act has been considered in a series of cases……[75] His Honour the primary judge’s approach, in our respectful view, seeks to import into the character test considerations not required by the Act and then merges that test with the discretion to be exercised by the Minister. Consideration of matters surrounding the offences the subject of the criminal record is not relevant to a decision whether a visa holder passes the character test, in the circumstance where they hold a substantial criminal record as defined. It follows as a matter of course. Even if it were relevant, the question as to whether they pass the character test has been answered at the point where the Minister may exercise the discretion given by the section.[76] The remarks of the sentencing judge and of the Court of Criminal Appeal as to the extent of the respondent’s involvement in the drug offence in question only become necessary to the Minister’s consideration if there is some obligation, on the Minister’s part, to take that matter into account in each case. No such obligation arises from s 501. Nor, in our view, can it be said that there is some general obligation to take account of what is said by the courts on these occasions. It is for the Minister to determine, in the exercise of the discretion given by the section, whether they assume importance in a particular case. It follows in our view that neither the topic referred to by his Honour the primary judge nor what the courts had to say about it can be regarded as relevant considerations in an administrative law sense.Wilcox J dissented. His Honour relevantly concluded at 517:[43] It is plainly within the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act that, in determining how to exercise the discretion conferred by s 501(2), the Minister should have regard to the nature of the person’s offence. This is an essential step in assessing the degree of criminality involved in the offence and, therefore, its significance as an indicator of the person’s character and the desirability or otherwise of excluding the person from Australia. However, it is for the Minister, as the statutory decision-maker, to determine what information about the circumstances of the offence — that is, on what matters and to what level of detail — he or she wishes to receive in order to exercise the relevant statutory discretion…The Minister’s exercise of discretion was upheld. This decision, it was said on behalf of the Minister, has been approved by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50, (2006) 228 CLR 566 (“Nystrom”). It was there unsuccessfully contended that the cancellation of a transitional (permanent) visa was vitiated by reason of a failure to have regard to (inter alia) the fact that the claimant also held an absorbed person visa. The approval of the decision in Huynh emerged, so it was submitted, from the following conclusion of Heydon and Crennan JJ:[127] In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh the majority of the Full Federal Court held that, given the breadth of s 501, it is not possible to imply into the Act “some obligation on the Minister's part to consider specific factors, personal to the visa holder, such as the circumstances surrounding the offences they have committed”.[128] Parliament has left it to the Minister to decide the matters which are relevant to whether a person who fails the character test should be permitted to remain in Australia. Considerations relevant to the exercise of the power depend on the nature, scope and purpose of the power, understood in its context in the Act. As Ministerial Direction No 21 makes clear, the Minister considers that two of the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion are related to the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the community.[129] In these circumstances where Mr Nystrom holds two visas, each of which confers the same substantive rights, in cancelling one the Minister is not bound to take into account the “nature” of the other. This is because there was no consideration relevant to Mr Nystrom's Absorbed Person Visa which was not relevant to and considered when the Minister cancelled his Transitional (Permanent) Visa. Thus, there has been no failure to take account of relevant considerations. Section 501F(3) confirms that conclusion.Gleeson CJ agreed with Heydon and Crennan JJ: [2006] HCA 50 at [1], (2006) 228 CLR 566 at 571.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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