Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Nguyen

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Nguyen [2017] FCAFC 149

Appeal from: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 339
File number: QUD 153 of 2017
Judges: FLICK, BARKER AND RANGIAH JJ
Date of judgment: 20 September 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for a carer’s visa – whether community services reasonably available 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – review of reasons provided – reasons fail to adequately address a central question – findings on material facts – not satisfied by a statement of a conclusion – need to refer to evidence on which finding of material facts based – a reference to web addresses not sufficient

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – need to identify appellable error – no appellable error discernible on central question – appeal dismissed   

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 359, 359AA, 359A, 368, 430

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15AA(1)

Cases cited:

Biyiksiz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 814

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, (2014) 88 ALJR 754

Jung v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 173

King v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 766, (2014) 142 ALD 305

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30, (2001) 206 CLR 323

Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 339

Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 688

Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 141, (2013) 229 FCR 290

TelePacific Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCA 158, (2005) 218 ALR 85

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184, (2003) 75 ALD 630

Date of hearing: 22 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr L Boccabella
Solicitor for the First Respondent: T Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

QUD 153 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

THI VE NGUYEN

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

FLICK, BARKER AND RANGIAH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 SEPTEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. On 28 May 2014 the Appellant, Mrs Thi Ve Nguyen, applied for an Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) Carer (subclass 836) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”).

  2. Mrs Nguyen is a Vietnamese…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Nguyen, the central issue before the court was the review of a decision by the Minister concerning an application for a carer’s visa. The dispute revolved around whether the relevant decision-maker adequately addressed whether community services were reasonably available to the applicant's mother. The applicant, Nguyen, argued that the decision-maker failed to sufficiently address this crucial aspect in the reasons provided, which impacted the fairness and adequacy of the review process.

The legal issues before the court included whether the decision-maker provided adequate reasons for the decision and whether the decision-maker appropriately identified and addressed material facts. The court had to determine if the decision-maker's reasons complied with statutory requirements to include findings on material questions of fact and references to the evidence. The case referenced Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf, which emphasised that the Tribunal must set out its findings on material questions of fact and reference the evidence supporting those findings.

The court found that the decision-maker's reasons were inadequate as they did not sufficiently address the availability of community services and the nature of the services provided by the aged care facilities. The reasons provided were more conclusory rather than factual, and the reference to web addresses as sources of evidence did not meet the statutory requirement to detail the evidence on which material findings were based. The court concluded that the decision-maker's failure to identify the specific evidence and findings on material facts rendered the decision reviewable.

The appeal was dismissed as the court could not discern any appellable error regarding the central issue of community services availability. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision underscores the necessity for decision-makers to explicitly address material facts and evidence in their reasons to ensure a fair and thorough review process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In giving content to the requirement to adequately explain the basis for an administrative decision, reliance was also placed by Counsel on behalf of Mrs Nguyen upon Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30, (2001) 206 CLR 323. The Court was there considering s 430 of the Migration Act which similarly required a statement of reasons to include “reasons”, “findings on any material questions of fact” and a reference “to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based”. Within that context, Gleeson CJ observed (at 330):[5] When the Tribunal prepares a written statement of its reasons for decision in a given case, that statement will have been prepared by the Tribunal, and will be understood by a reader, including a judge reviewing the Tribunal’s decision, in the light of the statutory requirements contained in s 430. The Tribunal is required, in setting out its reasons for decision, to set out “the findings on any material questions of fact”. If it does not set out a finding on some question of fact, that will indicate that it made no finding on that matter; and that, in turn, may indicate that the Tribunal did not consider the matter to be material. …McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ also further observed (at 346):[68] Section 430 does not expressly impose such an obligation. In its terms, it requires no more than that the Tribunal set out the findings which it did make. Neither expressly nor impliedly does this section require the Tribunal to make, and then set out, some findings additional to those which it actually made. …[69] It is not necessary to read s 430 as implying an obligation to make findings in order for it to have sensible work to do. Understanding s 430 as obliging the Tribunal to set out what were its findings on the questions of fact it considered material gives the section important work to do in connection with judicial review of decisions of the Tribunal. It ensures that a person who is dissatisfied with the result at which the Tribunal has arrived can identify with certainty what reasons the Tribunal had for reaching its conclusion and what facts it considered material to that conclusion. Similarly, a court which is asked to review the decision is able to identify the Tribunal’s reasons and the findings it made in reaching that conclusion. The provision entitles a court to infer that any matter not mentioned in the s 430 statement was not considered by the Tribunal to be material …A correct application of the information to the conclusion reached One of the two main issues resolved by the Tribunal included the question of whether it could be satisfied that community services were reasonably available to the mother. The difficulty revealed by the manner in which the Tribunal exposed the fact that it had obtained information during the course of the hearing was that:·the Tribunal did not then identify the source of its information that “there are plenty of residential care places and there’s 73 available in your area at the moment”.Without further information being disclosed, it is difficult to see how a party could meaningfully respond to a statement so broadly expressed. The information then disclosed, moreover, did not disclose: ·anything as to whether any of those “residential care facilities” offered services which could reasonably satisfy the needs of the mother.These difficulties were further compounded by the fact that the Tribunal’s reasons for decision at paras [16], [49] and [53] fail to: ·disclose anything as to the nature of the services in fact provided by one or other (or all) of the 73 aged care facilities other than that disclosed in paras [49] and [52].Those paragraphs, moreover: ·are expressed more in terms of a conclusion rather than a finding of fact which may be found to be supported by a reference to the evidence, presumably evidence to be found in the information obtained by, but not disclosed to, the parties; and ·seem to conflate the findings in respect to reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i) with reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(ii). Paragraph [52] (for example) seems to address reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i) but then shifts its attention to (or conflates) considerations of relevance to reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(ii). Although the requirements imposed by reg 1.15AA(1)(e) are expressed in the disjunctive, there is no impediment to the Tribunal considering both of the requirements together (cf. Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 688 at [31] to [32] per Buchanan J). But that which remains unclear from paras [52] to [54] of the reasons for decision is a statement as to those findings which the Tribunal has considered “material” to one requirement or the other. It may also be finally noted that:·the requirement imposed by s 368(1)(c) of the Migration Act to make “findings on any material questions of fact” is not met by a statement as to an ultimate conclusion founded upon a series of primary facts without a statement as to what those primary fact are, those being the facts which are “material” to the conclusion reached; and ·although there is no necessary difficulty with an administrative decision-maker making a statement such as that contained in para [55] that consideration has been given to “the evidence overall”, such a statement does not shield from scrutiny such consideration as was in fact given to the evidence and (in particular) evidence going to a centrally relevant submission. A statement that a Minister for example has “considered all relevant matters” and “all other evidence” may be said to fall short of an adequate reference to the evidence and falls short of putting a party in a position whereby they can “connect” in any meaningful manner the “findings” to the evidence (cf. King v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 766 at [37], (2014) 142 ALD 305 at 320 per Flick J. See also: Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 141 at [22], (2013) 229 FCR 290 at 297 to 298 per Flick J. It is “not only prudent but also desirable” to explicitly deal with such matters: [2013] FCAFC 141 at [31], (2013) 229 FCR 290 at 299 per Katzmann J. Wigney J agreed: [2013] FCAFC 141 at [34], (2013) 229 FCR 290 at 300). It is necessary “to explain what evidence [the Tribunal] has accepted or rejected”: cf. TelePacific Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCA 158 at [50] to [53], (2005) 218 ALR 85 at 95 to 96 per Sackville J. The reference in para [49] of the Tribunal’s reasons to the “web addresses” is, it is respectfully considered, not a sufficient reference to the evidence for the purposes of s 368(1)(d) of the Migration Act. That which is demanded by that provision is not a reference to the sources from which the evidence may be independently discerned. Rather, what is required is a reference to that part of the information to be apparently found at one or other (or possibly all) of the “web addresses” from which evidence may be found to base a finding made on a “material question of fact”. There remains no necessity to refer to every piece of evidence (WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46] to [47], (2003) 236 FCR 593 at 604 to 605 per French, Sackville and Hely JJ), but there remains a necessity to refer to “the evidence” which founds facts “material” to a decision reached.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established