Nguyen v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NGUYEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 339
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for a “Carer’s Visa” (Class BU) – visa refused – Judicial Review.

Legislation:

Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s.75(v)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.368(1), 359A, 359AA, 368, 424A, 424AA, 474,

 476

Migration Regulations, r.1.15AA(1)

Cases cited:

Biyiksiz v Minister for Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 814
Jiang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 907Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
SZAYG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 90
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2009] FCAFC 46
Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480

Applicant: THI VE NGUYEN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: BRG 268 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Howard
Hearing date: 15 February 2017
Date of Last Submission: 15 February 2017
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 28 February 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Boccabella
Solicitors for the Applicant: T Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Stoker
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 23 February 2016.

  2. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s application for review made on 28 October 2014 according to law.

  3. That the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 268 of 2016

THI VE NGUYEN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 28 May 2014 the applicant applied for a class BU visa.  At that time class BU contained three subclasses including subclass 836 (carer).  The applicant was therefore seeking what is referred to as a “carer’s visa”. 

  2. The Minister’s delegate rejected the application on 17 October 2014.  On 28 October 2014 the applicant sought a review of the delegate’s decision by the second respondent.  In a decision dated 23 February 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a visa.  On 21 March 2016 the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Jurisdiction

  1. The applicant in this case seeks the issue of constitutional writs. 

  2. Section 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) provides:-

    “476(1) Subject to this section, the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.”

  3. Section 75 of the Constitution relevantly provides:-

    75. Original jurisdiction…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 339
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application before Judge Howard of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The applicant, Mr. Nguyen, sought to challenge a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The central dispute revolved around the extent to which the Federal Circuit Court could review decisions of the Tribunal, particularly in light of a privative clause within the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth).

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it retained jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs, such as prohibition or mandamus, in relation to a "privative clause decision" made by the Tribunal under the *Migration Act*. This question required the Court to consider the interplay between section 476(1) of the Act, which grants the Federal Circuit Court jurisdiction similar to the High Court under section 75(v) of the Constitution, and section 474 of the Act, which purports to make such decisions final and unchallengeable.

The Court reasoned that while section 474(1) renders a privative clause decision final and conclusive, it does not entirely extinguish the Court's jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs. Drawing on the High Court's decisions in *Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf* and *Craig v South Australia*, the Court held that jurisdiction is retained if the Tribunal's decision is affected by "jurisdictional error." Jurisdictional error was explained as an error of law that causes the decision-maker to identify a wrong issue, ask a wrong question, ignore relevant material, rely on irrelevant material, or make a mistaken finding or conclusion, in a way that affects the exercise of power. Such an error means the decision-maker has exceeded their authority or powers.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to issue constitutional writs is subject to section 474 of the Act. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:-“474. Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).” The relevant decision of the Tribunal in this case was made on 23 February 2016 and is a privative clause decision. The Court does, however, still have jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs in relation to the Tribunal’s decision – provided the Court is satisfied that the decision made by the Tribunal is, in fact, affected by jurisdictional error. In the decision of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at paragraph 82:-“82. It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by “jurisdictional error” under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 if an administrative tribunal (like the Tribunal):-“falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the Tribunal which reflects it”.“Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.” [1][1] In these reasons for judgment the emphasis and the underlining has been added.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) provides:-“476(1) Subject to this section, the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.” Section 75 of the Constitution relevantly provides:-75. Original jurisdiction of High CourtIn all matters:…v. in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth;the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.” The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to issue constitutional writs is subject to section 474 of the Act. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:-“474. Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).” The relevant decision of the Tribunal in this case was made on 23 February 2016 and is a privative clause decision. The Court does, however, still have jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs in relation to the Tribunal’s decision – provided the Court is satisfied that the decision made by the Tribunal is, in fact, affected by jurisdictional error. In the decision of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at paragraph 82:-“82. It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by “jurisdictional error” under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 if an administrative tribunal (like the Tribunal):-“falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the Tribunal which reflects it”.“Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.” [1][1] In these reasons for judgment the emphasis and the underlining has been added.