FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| NGUYEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 339 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for a “Carer’s Visa” (Class BU) – visa refused – Judicial Review. |
| Legislation: Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s.75(v) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.368(1), 359A, 359AA, 368, 424A, 424AA, 474, 476 Migration Regulations, r.1.15AA(1) |
| Applicant: | THI VE NGUYEN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | BRG 268 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Howard |
| Hearing date: | 15 February 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 15 February 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 28 February 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Boccabella |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | T Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms Stoker |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 23 February 2016.
A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s application for review made on 28 October 2014 according to law.
That the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 268 of 2016
| THI VE NGUYEN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 28 May 2014 the applicant applied for a class BU visa. At that time class BU contained three subclasses including subclass 836 (carer). The applicant was therefore seeking what is referred to as a “carer’s visa”.
The Minister’s delegate rejected the application on 17 October 2014. On 28 October 2014 the applicant sought a review of the delegate’s decision by the second respondent. In a decision dated 23 February 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a visa. On 21 March 2016 the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
Jurisdiction
The applicant in this case seeks the issue of constitutional writs.
Section 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) provides:-
“476(1) Subject to this section, the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.”
Section 75 of the Constitution relevantly provides:-
75. Original jurisdiction…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCCA 339
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it retained jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs, such as prohibition or mandamus, in relation to a "privative clause decision" made by the Tribunal under the *Migration Act*. This question required the Court to consider the interplay between section 476(1) of the Act, which grants the Federal Circuit Court jurisdiction similar to the High Court under section 75(v) of the Constitution, and section 474 of the Act, which purports to make such decisions final and unchallengeable.
The Court reasoned that while section 474(1) renders a privative clause decision final and conclusive, it does not entirely extinguish the Court's jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs. Drawing on the High Court's decisions in *Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf* and *Craig v South Australia*, the Court held that jurisdiction is retained if the Tribunal's decision is affected by "jurisdictional error." Jurisdictional error was explained as an error of law that causes the decision-maker to identify a wrong issue, ask a wrong question, ignore relevant material, rely on irrelevant material, or make a mistaken finding or conclusion, in a way that affects the exercise of power. Such an error means the decision-maker has exceeded their authority or powers.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) provides:-“476(1) Subject to this section, the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.” Section 75 of the Constitution relevantly provides:-75. Original jurisdiction of High CourtIn all matters:…v. in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth;the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.” The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to issue constitutional writs is subject to section 474 of the Act. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:-“474. Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).” The relevant decision of the Tribunal in this case was made on 23 February 2016 and is a privative clause decision. The Court does, however, still have jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs in relation to the Tribunal’s decision – provided the Court is satisfied that the decision made by the Tribunal is, in fact, affected by jurisdictional error. In the decision of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at paragraph 82:-“82. It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by “jurisdictional error” under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 if an administrative tribunal (like the Tribunal):-“falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the Tribunal which reflects it”.“Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.” [1][1] In these reasons for judgment the emphasis and the underlining has been added.