HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, BELL AND GAGELER JJFTZK APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ANOR RESPONDENTSFTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2014] HCA 26
27 June 2014
M143/2013
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.The order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 May 2013 be set aside and, in its place, order that:
(a)the proceedings be heard and determined as though instituted under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);
(b)a writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision made on 23 May 2012;
(c)a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring a differently constituted Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the first respondent to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa; and
(d)the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.
3.The first respondent pay the appellant's costs in this Court.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
P G Nash QC with N P Karapanagiotidis for the appellant (instructed by Maddocks)
S P Donaghue SC with R J Sharp for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Submitting appearance for the second respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
Migration – Refugees – Application for protection visa – Whether Australia had protection obligations towards appellant – Exclusion from Refugees Convention – Art 1F(b) – Serious reasons for considering that appellant had committed serious non-political crimes prior to admission – Protection visa refused on basis of Art 1F(b) – Review by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Whether open to Tribunal to apply exclusion – Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error – Whether Tribunal misconstrued test – Whether evidence logically probative of serious reasons for considering appellant had committed serious non-political crimes.
Administrative law – Judicial review – Grounds of review – Jurisdictional error – Refugees Convention – Art 1F(b) – Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error – Whether Tribunal misconstrued test – Whether evidence logically probative of serious reasons for considering appellant had committed serious non-political crimes.
Words and phrases – "jurisdictional error", "serious non-political crime", "serious reasons for considering", "standard of proof".
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a).
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), Art 1F(b).
FRENCH CJ AND GAGELER J.
Introduction
This appeal concerns the construction and application of Art 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention[1], which provides:
"The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
...
(b)he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee".
Article 1F intersects, in Australian domestic law, with s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act
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- Case
- [2014] HCA 26
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the AAT had misconstrued or misapplied Article 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention, and whether it had taken into account irrelevant considerations when concluding that there were serious reasons for considering FTZK had committed the alleged crimes. The Court was required to determine if the evidence before the AAT was logically probative of FTZK's guilt and if the Tribunal's reasoning disclosed a rational connection between the material and its inference of guilt.
The High Court found that the AAT had fallen into jurisdictional error by misconstruing the test it was required to apply under Article 1F(b). While acknowledging that certain factors, such as leaving the place of a crime or making false statements, might be relevant considerations, the Court held that in the specific circumstances of this case, the factors relied upon by the AAT were not logically probative of FTZK's commission of the alleged crimes. Consequently, these factors could not constitute a reason, let alone a serious reason, for considering that he had committed them. The Court concluded that the AAT's reliance on these non-probative factors demonstrated a failure to apply the correct legal test, which required a rational connection between the evidence and the inference of guilt.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It ordered that the proceedings be heard and determined as though instituted under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that a writ of certiorari issue to quash the AAT's decision, and that a writ of mandamus issue directing a differently constituted AAT to review the decision to refuse the protection visa according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay FTZK's costs in both the Federal Court and the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. The order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 May 2013 be set aside and, in its place, order that:
(a) the proceedings be heard and determined as though instituted under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);
(b) a writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision made on 23 May 2012;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring a differently constituted Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the first respondent to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa; and
(d) the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs in this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HAYNE J,
None of the second, third or fourth factors upon which the Tribunal relied supported a conclusion that the appellant had committed the alleged crimes. That is, in the circumstances of this case, none of those factors was logically probative of the appellant's guilt. Because none of those factors was logically probative of that fact, none was a reason, let alone a serious reason, for considering that the appellant had committed the alleged crimes.Not irrelevant considerations The conclusion that, in the circumstances of this case, the second, third and fourth factors relied on by the Tribunal did not support the finding that the appellant committed the alleged crimes does not demonstrate that the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by taking into account irrelevant considerations. Leaving the place where a crime was committed, telling lies and fabricating evidence are matters which may properly be taken into account in deciding whether there are serious reasons for considering that a person committed an alleged crime. They are not matters which the Tribunal is forbidden[48] from considering.[48]cf Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39‑40 per Mason J; [1986] HCA 40. See also Aronson and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed (2013) at 274‑275 [5.30]. Their importance in this case is that, because they were not logically probative of the appellant's having committed the crimes alleged, and because they therefore could not be a reason for considering that he had done so, the Tribunal's reliance upon them must show that the Tribunal misconstrued the test it had to apply.Conclusion and orders Because the Tribunal misconstrued the test it had to apply, it fell into jurisdictional error. The "appeal" to the Full Court of the Federal Court should have been allowed; the appeal to this Court must be. The appellant, a national of the People's Republic of China ("the PRC"), applied unsuccessfully for a protection visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") claiming to be a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention[49] as amended by the Refugees Protocol[50] ("the Convention"). At that time, a criterion for the grant of a protection visa was that the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, be satisfied that an applicant was a person to whom Australia had such obligations[51]. In refusing the application, a delegate of the Minister found that the appellant was excluded from Australia's protection obligations pursuant to Art 1F(b) of the Convention, which is part of Australian law[52]. [49]Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951.[50]Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967.[51]Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a). Section 36(2)(a) has since been amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth), which replaced the words "to whom" with "in respect of whom". See also Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 31(3) and Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sched 2, cl 866.221(2).[52]Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2C)(a)(ii).