FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 56 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, BELL AND GAGELER JJ

FTZK  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2014] HCA 26

27 June 2014

M143/2013

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.The order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 May 2013 be set aside and, in its place, order that:

(a)the proceedings be heard and determined as though instituted under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);

(b)a writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision made on 23 May 2012;

(c)a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring a differently constituted Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the first respondent to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa; and

(d)the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.

3.The first respondent pay the appellant's costs in this Court.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

P G Nash QC with N P Karapanagiotidis for the appellant (instructed by Maddocks)

S P Donaghue SC with R J Sharp for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Migration – Refugees – Application for protection visa – Whether Australia had protection obligations towards appellant – Exclusion from Refugees Convention – Art 1F(b) – Serious reasons for considering that appellant had committed serious non-political crimes prior to admission – Protection visa refused on basis of Art 1F(b) – Review by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Whether open to Tribunal to apply exclusion – Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error – Whether Tribunal misconstrued test – Whether evidence logically probative of serious reasons for considering appellant had committed serious non-political crimes.

Administrative law – Judicial review – Grounds of review – Jurisdictional error – Refugees Convention – Art 1F(b) – Whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error – Whether Tribunal misconstrued test – Whether evidence logically probative of serious reasons for considering appellant had committed serious non-political crimes.

Words and phrases – "jurisdictional error", "serious non-political crime", "serious reasons for considering", "standard of proof".

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a).
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), Art 1F(b).

FRENCH CJ AND GAGELER J.

Introduction

  1. This appeal concerns the construction and application of Art 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention[1], which provides:

    "The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

    ...

    (b)he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee".

    Article 1F intersects, in Australian domestic law, with s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] HCA 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal by FTZK, a national of the People's Republic of China, concerning the refusal of his application for a protection visa. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection had refused the visa on the grounds that FTZK was excluded from protection obligations under Article 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention, which applies to individuals with serious reasons for considering they have committed serious non-political crimes prior to admission to Australia. FTZK argued that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had erred in its application of this exclusion.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the AAT had misconstrued or misapplied Article 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention, and whether it had taken into account irrelevant considerations when concluding that there were serious reasons for considering FTZK had committed the alleged crimes. The Court was required to determine if the evidence before the AAT was logically probative of FTZK's guilt and if the Tribunal's reasoning disclosed a rational connection between the material and its inference of guilt.

The High Court found that the AAT had fallen into jurisdictional error by misconstruing the test it was required to apply under Article 1F(b). While acknowledging that certain factors, such as leaving the place of a crime or making false statements, might be relevant considerations, the Court held that in the specific circumstances of this case, the factors relied upon by the AAT were not logically probative of FTZK's commission of the alleged crimes. Consequently, these factors could not constitute a reason, let alone a serious reason, for considering that he had committed them. The Court concluded that the AAT's reliance on these non-probative factors demonstrated a failure to apply the correct legal test, which required a rational connection between the evidence and the inference of guilt.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It ordered that the proceedings be heard and determined as though instituted under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that a writ of certiorari issue to quash the AAT's decision, and that a writ of mandamus issue directing a differently constituted AAT to review the decision to refuse the protection visa according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay FTZK's costs in both the Federal Court and the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. The order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 May 2013 be set aside and, in its place, order that:

(a) the proceedings be heard and determined as though instituted under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);

(b) a writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision made on 23 May 2012;

(c) a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring a differently constituted Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the first respondent to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa; and

(d) the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant's costs in this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Article 35 provides that member States are to cooperate with the UNHCR to facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the Convention. Facts and history of the proceedings On 1 February 1997, the appellant entered Australia on a Class UC Temporary Business Subclass 456 visa. He was granted a bridging visa in December 1998, which expired on 21 January 2000. The appellant conceded that details on his visa recording his occupation as "Engineer" were incorrect as he is not an engineer and has never worked as an engineer. The appellant's explanation for this was that "this was the only way [he] could get the visa and leave [the PRC]". Meanwhile, in the PRC in May 1997, the appellant was implicated by two alleged co‑accused in the crimes of kidnap and murder of a 15 year old school boy in Tianjin in December 1996. The allegations are now the subject of criminal charges laid by the Chinese authorities against the appellant. In June 1998, the Australian Federal Police received a copy of an arrest warrant for the appellant issued by authorities in the PRC in May 1997[63]. The appellant's two alleged co‑accused were executed by authorities in the PRC on 21 May 1998. On 22 May 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC provided written assurance to the Australian government that if the appellant were returned to the PRC and found guilty of the crimes charged against him, the death penalty would not be imposed. [63]Re FTZK and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 312 at [26]; FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 211 FCR 158 at 167 [32], 173 [63], 174 [82]. On 8 December 1998, the appellant applied to the Minister for a Protection (Class XA) visa, claiming that he had left the PRC because he had been persecuted on the ground of his religious beliefs. A refusal of that application by a delegate of the Minister was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the RRT") in December 1999. On the cessation of the appellant's bridging visa, between January 2000 and February 2004 he lived in Australia as an unlawful non‑citizen. In February 2004, the appellant was located and taken into immigration detention. In March 2004, soon after the refusal of a fresh application by the appellant for a bridging visa, he attempted to escape from immigration detention[64]. On 23 June 2004 the appellant was advised by an officer of the Minister of the PRC arrest warrant. [64]Re FTZK and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 312 at [52]. On 5 and 8 October 2007, the appellant filed applications in this Court seeking judicial review of the RRT's decision made in December 1999 and an injunction to prevent his removal to the PRC[65]. An injunction was issued and the matter was remitted to the Federal Court and subsequently to the RRT to be determined according to law. Following a further decision made by the RRT and subsequent judicial review proceedings, the matter was again remitted to the RRT. On 11 May 2010, the RRT found that the appellant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under Art 1A(2) of the Convention, and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration of any issues falling within the scope of Art 1F(b). [65][2007] HCATrans 616.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ (dissent) HAYNE J CRENNAN AND BELL JJ (dissent)
In an important paragraph in the reasons, the Deputy President said[25]:"The conclusion I have reached is based on the totality of the evidence I have referred to above. Any one of the various factors would not have been sufficient to establish serious reasons; it is the combination of factors which gives rise to reasons of sufficient seriousness to satisfy Article 1F of the Convention."On the findings of fact stated by the Deputy President, no logical pathway to that conclusion was disclosed. That deficiency evidenced a failure on the part of the AAT to ask itself the question which Art 1F(b) required — namely whether there was a rational connection between the material before it and an inference that the appellant had committed a serious non-political crime in China.[25][2012] AATA 312 at [73].The Federal Court decision The majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court (Gray and Dodds‑Streeton JJ) decided the case on the basis that the central question concerned the relevance of the facts found by the AAT to its conclusion that there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed serious non-political crimes[26]. The correctness of the construction of Art 1F(b) adopted by the AAT was assumed. The majority discerned relevance on the basis that although the AAT did not say so explicitly, it clearly regarded the facts which it had found about the appellant's departure from China and subsequent falsehoods as indicating a consciousness of guilt and a desire to escape from the consequences of what he had done[27]. The connection was "readily apparent" and reflected in the appellant's conduct of his case in the AAT and failure to object to cross-examination on his conduct[28].[26](2013) 211 FCR 158 at 164 [19].[27](2013) 211 FCR 158 at 171 [45].[28](2013) 211 FCR 158 at 171 [46]. Kerr J, in dissent, was not prepared to find that the AAT had reasoned as inferred by the majority. His Honour said that for the AAT to have concluded that the appellant's departure from China and subsequent falsehoods indicated a consciousness of guilt and a desire to escape from the consequences of what he had done would have required the AAT to grapple with and reject considerations standing against those conclusions. A decision-maker conscious of that responsibility could be expected not only to have recorded those conclusions, but also to have recorded how those conclusions had been reached[29].[29](2013) 211 FCR 158 at 184–185 [147]–[158], 186 [164]–[165].The orders made by the Federal Court The orders made by the Federal Court on 6 May 2013 were: "1.The applicant's application to amend his amended notice of appeal be dismissed. 2.The appeal be dismissed. 3.The applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal." The issues on the appeal The issues raised in the notice of appeal to this Court, variously expressed, are: •whether the AAT misconstrued or misapplied Art 1F of the Refugees Convention; and •whether the AAT took into account irrelevant considerations in concluding that there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed the crimes alleged. The construction and application of Art 1F(b)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HAYNE J,

None of the second, third or fourth factors upon which the Tribunal relied supported a conclusion that the appellant had committed the alleged crimes. That is, in the circumstances of this case, none of those factors was logically probative of the appellant's guilt. Because none of those factors was logically probative of that fact, none was a reason, let alone a serious reason, for considering that the appellant had committed the alleged crimes.Not irrelevant considerations The conclusion that, in the circumstances of this case, the second, third and fourth factors relied on by the Tribunal did not support the finding that the appellant committed the alleged crimes does not demonstrate that the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by taking into account irrelevant considerations. Leaving the place where a crime was committed, telling lies and fabricating evidence are matters which may properly be taken into account in deciding whether there are serious reasons for considering that a person committed an alleged crime. They are not matters which the Tribunal is forbidden[48] from considering.[48]cf Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39‑40 per Mason J; [1986] HCA 40. See also Aronson and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed (2013) at 274‑275 [5.30]. Their importance in this case is that, because they were not logically probative of the appellant's having committed the crimes alleged, and because they therefore could not be a reason for considering that he had done so, the Tribunal's reliance upon them must show that the Tribunal misconstrued the test it had to apply.Conclusion and orders Because the Tribunal misconstrued the test it had to apply, it fell into jurisdictional error. The "appeal" to the Full Court of the Federal Court should have been allowed; the appeal to this Court must be. The appellant, a national of the People's Republic of China ("the PRC"), applied unsuccessfully for a protection visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") claiming to be a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention[49] as amended by the Refugees Protocol[50] ("the Convention"). At that time, a criterion for the grant of a protection visa was that the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, be satisfied that an applicant was a person to whom Australia had such obligations[51]. In refusing the application, a delegate of the Minister found that the appellant was excluded from Australia's protection obligations pursuant to Art 1F(b) of the Convention, which is part of Australian law[52]. [49]Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951.[50]Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967.[51]Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a). Section 36(2)(a) has since been amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth), which replaced the words "to whom" with "in respect of whom". See also Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 31(3) and Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sched 2, cl 866.221(2).[52]Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2C)(a)(ii).