FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 44

Citation: FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 44
Appeal from: FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 312
Parties: FTZK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 422 of 2012
Judges: GRAY, DODDS-STREETON AND KERR JJ
Date of judgment: 6 May 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – visa – protection visa – whether protection obligations to applicant – finding of serious reasons for considering that applicant had committed serious non-political crime – based partly on conduct of applicant after crime – failure of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to articulate how subsequent conduct was relevant – whether Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – jurisdiction – purported appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – determination of Chief Justice that appeal be heard and determined by Full Court – section under which appeal brought, and under which determination made, inapplicable to decision relating to visa – whether proceeding incompetent – whether capable of amendment to invoke jurisdiction of Court – whether leave to amend should be given – whether Full Court validly exercising original jurisdiction of Court – whether further direction for hearing and determination by Full Court could be made in the exercise of another statutory power

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 3(1), 43(2B), 44(1), 44(3), 44(3)(b)(ii), 44(4), 44(5)
Constitution s 75(v)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 7, 19(2), 20, 20(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5E, 36(2), 474(2), 476A, 476A(1)(b), 476A(1)(d), 476A(2), 483, 500(1), 500(1)(c)(i)
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) ss 2, 3, Sch 1 Pt 1 Items 17, 27, Sch 1 Pt 2 Items 40 and 41

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 Arts 1F, 5(1)   

Cases cited: Al-Habr and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] AATA 150 cited
Australian Education Union v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2012] HCA 3 (2012) 285 ALR 27 cited
Colby Corporation Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCAFC 10 (2008) 165 FCR 133 cited
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 followed
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutionsof the Australian Capital Territory [2003] HCA 28 (2003) 214 CLR 318 cited
D’Amore v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2012] NSWSC 473 cited
Edwards v The Queen [1993] HCA 63 (1993) 178 CLR 193 considered
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission [2010] HCA 1 (2010) 239 CLR 561 cited
Lilley v Comcare [2013] FCA 26 cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108 (2010) 187 FCR 389 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 (2010) 240 CLR 611 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 (2001) 206 CLR 323 followed
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56
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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship was heard in the High Court of Australia. The applicant, FTZK, was seeking a review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to refuse his application for a protection visa. The AAT had found that there were serious reasons for considering that the applicant had committed a serious non-political crime. The applicant argued that the AAT had failed to properly consider his evidence and had relied on irrelevant considerations in making its decision.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the AAT had taken into account irrelevant considerations in making its decision and whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court had to determine whether the AAT had made a jurisdictional error in considering the applicant's conduct after the alleged crime and whether the court could amend the notice of appeal to invoke its jurisdiction.

The court held that the AAT had taken into account irrelevant considerations in making its decision. The court found that the AAT had failed to articulate how the applicant's conduct after the alleged crime was relevant to the decision and had therefore made a jurisdictional error. The court also held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, despite the fact that the appeal was brought under a section of the Migration Act that was inapplicable to the decision relating to the visa. The court found that the proceeding was capable of amendment to invoke the court's jurisdiction and that leave to amend should be granted.

The final orders of the court were that the applicant's application to amend his amended notice of appeal be dismissed, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. The court found that the AAT's decision was valid and that the applicant was not entitled to a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application to amend his amended notice of appeal be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

Where we differ is as to whether this court is entitled to conclude that critical additional findings of flight and consciousness of guilt were impliedly arrived at by the Tribunal despite there being no reference to them in the Tribunal’s reasons.BACKGROUND In late December 1996, a 15 year old boy was kidnapped on his way to school. Ransom was demanded. The boy's father was unable to make contact with the kidnappers. The next day the boy's body was discovered in a frozen pond. His hands and feet were bound. An autopsy report revealed that the boy had been alive when he had been thrown into the pond or pushed under the ice. The Tianjin Public Security Bureau of the People’s Republic of China investigated the death. It alleges that FTZK, the Applicant, was one of three perpetrators. The other two were arrested. Both are said to have confessed. They were later executed. The Applicant had left China before those arrests took place. He entered Australia on 1 February 1997 on a UC Temporary Business subclass 456 visa. In June 1998 the Australian Federal Police received a copy of an arrest warrant for the Applicant issued in China for kidnapping and murder. In December that year the Applicant applied for a protection visa. He stated he had been subjected to detention and torture in China as a practising Christian. His application was refused. In December 1999 that decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The existence of an arrest warrant was not referred to in any of those proceedings. The Applicant then disappeared into the community and could not be located. As a result his immigration status became that of an “unlawful non-citizen”. Eventually in February 2004 his whereabouts were discovered and he was detained at Maribyrnong Detention Centre pending return to China. He made an unsuccessful attempt to escape from that Centre in March 2004. All of those events happened before the Applicant was told that a warrant for his arrest had been issued. He learnt of that in June 2004. In 2007 the Applicant filed an urgent application with the High Court seeking, inter alia, a review of the RRT decision that had rejected his claim for refugee status. When the matter came before the High Court the Commonwealth conceded that it had known about the Chinese arrest warrant since 1998 but had informed neither the RRT nor the Applicant of its existence. Counsel for the Applicant submitted that had the existence of the arrest warrant been disclosed it would have corroborated the Applicant’s allegation in the RRT that bogus charges would be proffered against him upon his return: see Plaintiff M117/2007 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCATrans 616. On 18 October 2007 the High Court issued an injunction preventing the Applicant’s removal and, following other proceedings, the Applicant’s claim for a protection visa was remitted in 2009 to the RRT for reconsideration. The RRT rejected the Applicant’s contention that the Applicant would be persecuted because of his religion but accepted that, in view of the steps that had been taken to link him to the murder of the young boy since he left China, he had a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of political opinion.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For practical purposes, the question of validity of the determination of 27 July 2012 does not need to be determined. On 26 February 2013, the Chief Justice gave a direction pursuant to s 20(1A) of the Federal Court Act. His Honour stated that he considered that this matter is of sufficient importance to justify the giving of a direction under that subsection, and directed that the original jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the whole of the matter be exercised by a Full Court. The Court can proceed to consider the substance of the proceeding on that basis.The evidence before the Tribunal The Tribunal had before it a number of documents, provided by the government of China. A case summary report by the Tianjin Public Security Office No 5 Team 1 recorded a report on 20 December 1996 of the kidnapping of a 15 year old student on his way to school. A witness had seen the boy dragged into a vehicle. The student’s father reported a ransom demand by telephone, with which he had endeavoured unsuccessfully to comply. On the following day, the student’s body was found in a pond, with his hands and feet tied. A mobile phone that had been purchased on 8 December 1996 was found at the scene. The student had drowned. Three suspects were identified, a Mr Zhong, a Mr Wu and the applicant. An autopsy report stated that the student was alive when thrown into the pond. What was described as a transcript of an interview conducted by an investigator with Mr Wu contained an admission that Mr Wu had taken part in the kidnapping and killing of the student. He said that the applicant and Mr Zhong planned and carried out the kidnapping. Mr Wu said that the applicant was 24 or 25 years old, living behind a particular named bureau (Mr Wu did not know his exact address), formerly a security guard in the Jili Building and now living in Australia. Mr Wu said the applicant was involved in purchasing the mobile phone used to contact the student’s father, and in the planning of the kidnapping and the means of collecting the ransom. He said the applicant had pulled the student from his bicycle into the vehicle driven by Mr Zhong and the applicant took part in trying to contact the student’s father to collect the ransom. Mr Wu said he and the applicant wished to release the student but Mr Zhong opposed this and it was then decided to throw the student into the pond. Mr Wu said the applicant and Mr Zhong did this. Mr Wu also said that he saw the applicant once after the events and the applicant told him to forget about what had happened. What was described as a transcript of an interview with Mr Zhong contained an admission by Mr Zhong that he had taken an active role in the kidnapping. Mr Zhong said he was an employee of the company of which the student’s father was a manager. He said that he and Mr Wu discussed the plan to kidnap the student initially, and Mr Wu introduced him to the applicant later. Mr Zhong gave a description of the kidnapping similar to that given by Mr Wu, but he said that Mr Wu and the applicant threw the student into the pond. Mr Zhong also said that, after the kidnapping and “before he left”, the applicant came to his home and asked Mr Zhong to get him a job.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Migration Litigation Reform Act also inserted, in s 5E of the Migration Act, a definition of “purported privative clause decision”. Relevantly, that definition means:a decision purportedly made...under this Act...that would be a privative clause decision if there were not:(a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or(b) an excess of jurisdiction;in the making of the decision.For the Tribunal to reach a decision, purportedly pursuant to s 500(1)(c) of the Migration Act, in reliance on irrelevant considerations would amount to jurisdictional error. Such an error results in the Tribunal exceeding its power and authority (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and consequently to an excess of jurisdiction. Alternatively, such an error could be regarded as a failure to exercise jurisdiction, because the applicant has not had the review to which s 500(1)(c) of the Migration Act entitles him. It seems clear, therefore, that s 44 of the AAT Act can have no application to the decision of the Tribunal in the present case. Either that decision is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s 474(2) of the Migration Act, or (if the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations) it is a purported privative clause decision, because the Tribunal has exceeded or failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it. In either case, s 483 of the Migration Act operates to deprive s 44 of the AAT Act of any operation in relation to the Tribunal’s decision. The Migration Litigation Reform Act also inserted into the Migration Act a new section, s 476A (see item 17 in Sch 1 to the Migration Litigation Reform Act). Relevantly to this case, s 476A(1) provides:(1)Despite any other law, including section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and section 8 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, the Federal Court has original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision if, and only if:...(b)the decision is a privative clause decision, or a purported privative clause decision, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review under section 500; or...(d)the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to the decision under subsection 44(3)...of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.(2)Where the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c), that jurisdiction is the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution. In the light of the combination of the provisions of ss 483, 474(2) and 5E of the Migration Act, it is difficult to imagine to what decisions of the Tribunal s 476A(1)(d) could apply. In any event, it seems clear that it could not apply to the decision of the Tribunal in the present case, which falls squarely within ss 483, 474(2) and 5E. The consequence is that any challenge by the applicant to the validity of the Tribunal’s decision could only be brought to this Court in reliance on the grant of jurisdiction in s 476A(1)(b) of the Migration Act. It would be necessary for the applicant to seek relief of a kind or kinds for which s 75(v) of the Constitution provides. The most obvious of the remedies would be a writ of mandamus, directed to the Tribunal, requiring it to hear and determine according to law the applicant’s application for a review of the Minister’s decision to refuse him a protection visa. Usually, this remedy would be sought in conjunction with an application for a writ of certiorari, designed to remove into the Court the decision of the Tribunal and to quash that decision, to make way for the lawful exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal then dealt with the reports of Dr Nesossi and Dr Sapio. It did not accept the opinion of Dr Sapio that the applicant did not commit the crimes alleged, because Dr Sapio did not set out the evidence on which she relied in reaching that conclusion. The learned Deputy President did not consider the opinions expressed sufficient to diminish the seriousness of the reasons he had stated. Even if the system in China were as described, in the Tribunal’s view there was insufficient evidence to find that any of the features described affected the investigation into the crimes alleged against the applicant. At its highest, the views of the experts amounted to speculation. The Tribunal rejected an argument that the two transcripts of interrogation were deliberately falsified or that those being interrogated had been persuaded to make false allegations against the applicant. The Tribunal found that this argument was also based on speculation, rather than on evidence. It acknowledged that there were many inconsistencies between the transcripts, but found that there were none that caused the Deputy President to disregard either or both of those transcripts. The Tribunal also dealt with the argument that the Chinese government had not produced all the documents in relation to the investigation. It accepted that this was probably so, but was not satisfied that the failure to do so detracted from the status of the documents produced. The Tribunal said it was unaware of any reason to expect that the authorities would have produced all documents.Irrelevant considerations There can be no doubt that for an administrative decision-maker to take into account irrelevant considerations, in a way that affects the decision-maker’s exercise or purported exercise of the decision-making power, is one of the core elements of jurisdictional error. In its classic formulation of the concept of jurisdictional error in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179, the High Court referred to “to rely on irrelevant material” as one of the circumstances that would give rise to jurisdictional error. As McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ expressed agreement) said in Yusuf at [82], relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law and to exceed the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. If such an error occurs, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that followed. There was no jurisdiction to make it. This analysis suggests strongly that the question whether material is irrelevant depends not upon the view taken by the administrative decision-maker, but upon the determination by the Court reviewing the administrative decision. Further, the party alleging that an administrative decision is the result of jurisdictional error (in this case, the applicant) must establish that such an error has been made. In other words, it is for the applicant in this case to establish that material taken into account by the Tribunal was objectively irrelevant to the task of the Tribunal in determining whether there were serious reasons for considering that the applicant had committed a serious non-political crime.