[2015] AATA 66
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2013/5407
Re
YVWV
APPLICANT
And
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President J W Constance
Date 9 February 2015 Place Sydney In accordance with section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth):
1. the decision of the delegate of the Minister made 10 October 2013 refusing the Applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) visa is set aside;
2. the matter is remitted to the Minister with the direction that the Applicant is not a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.
..............................[sgd]..........................................
Deputy President J W Constance
Catchwords
MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – whether protection obligations to applicant – whether serious reasons for considering that applicant had committed a serious non-political crime prior to admission – decision set aside and remitted
Legislation
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 866.22
United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art 1FCases
Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54
Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 465
Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556
FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] HCA 26
FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2013] FCAFC 44
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J W Constance
INTRODUCTION
The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia as an “unauthorised maritime arrival” on 18 May 2012. On 23 August 2012, he lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa.
On 10 October 2013, a Delegate of the Minister decided:
I am not satisfied that [the Applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under section 36 of the Migration Act and subclause 866.221 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations. Accordingly, I refuse to grant [the Applicant] a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The Applicant has applied to the Tribunal for a review of this decision.
For the reasons which follow the reviewable decision will be set aside and remitted to the Minister with a direction that the Applicant is not a person in respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.
BACKGROUND
The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in section 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and clause 866.22 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Relevantly to this matter, subsection 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that:
(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; …
Clause 866.22 of the Regulations states similarly, in part:
866.22--Criteria…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read YVWV and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] AATA 66
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence presented, including the applicant’s statements, the allegations by Sri Lankan authorities, and the inconsistencies in his accounts. It noted that the applicant's credibility was undermined by his untruthfulness and the lack of clear and credible evidence linking him to the alleged crime. The court highlighted that the standard of proof required is not equivalent to criminal or civil standards but necessitates a considered judgment based on strong evidence. Applying these principles, the court found that the evidence did not meet the exacting standard of satisfaction needed to conclude that there were serious reasons to consider the applicant had committed the alleged crime. Consequently, the court set aside the Minister's decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration, directing that the applicant is not a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The involvement of the Australian Federal Police in this matter means that the Tribunal can be “comforted that the claims are not spurious, that police in Australia have not dismissed them without further investigation ...”.[15]CONSIDERATION[15] Transcript 07/11/14 p.64.The question to be answered In FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor,[16] French CJ and Gageler J stated the question to be answered as follows:…… whether there [is] a rational connection between the material before it [the decision maker] and an inference that the appellant had committed a serious non-political crime in China.” [17][16] [2014] HCA 26.[17] FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para[6].The standard of satisfaction required In their judgment in FTZK,[18] Crennan and Bell JJ cited the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department.[19] Their Honours described the passage as drawing together “international consensus about an exacting standard of satisfaction which is not derived from domestic standards of proof”;[20]We are, it is clear, attempting to discern the autonomous meaning of the words ‘serious reasons for considering’. We do so in the light of the UNHCR view, with which we agree, that the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention must be restrictively interpreted and cautiously applied. This leads us to draw the following conclusions: (1) ‘Serious reasons’ is stronger than ‘reasonable grounds’. (2) The evidence from which those reasons are derived must be ‘clear and credible’ or ‘strong’. (3) ‘Considering’ is stronger than ‘suspecting’. In our view it is also stronger than ‘believing’. It requires the considered judgment of the decision-maker. (4) The decision maker need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt or to the standard required by the criminal law. (5) It is unnecessary to import our domestic standards of proof into the question.[21][18] FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para.[82].[19] [2012] UKSC 54.[20] FTZK and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para [82].[21] Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54, at para [75].Principles to be applied The Federal Court has set out a number of principles which are relevant in deciding the issue in this application. These principles were approved by the High Court in the FTZK judgment.[22][22] FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para [5]. These principles can be summarised as follows:1)the provisions of the Convention are beneficial and should not be construed narrowly, however the provisions of Article 1F are protective of the order and safety of the State in which refuge is being sought;[23]2)it is not necessary that the Tribunal be satisfied that the alleged crime has been committed;[24]3)strong evidence that the person has committed the alleged offence is sufficient;[25]4)the evidence need not be of such weight as to meet either the criminal or civil standard of proof.[26][23] Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556, 565; [1995] FCA 1653 (9 November 1995) [29].[24] Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (supra) 563.[25] Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (supra).[26] Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 465, 478; [2000] FCA 1889 (22 December 2000) [54].