YVWV and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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[2015] AATA 66  

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number(s)

2013/5407

Re

YVWV

APPLICANT

And

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Deputy President J W Constance

Date 9 February 2015 
Place Sydney

In accordance with section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth):

1.   the decision of the delegate of the Minister made 10 October 2013 refusing the Applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) visa is set aside;

2.   the matter is remitted to the Minister with the direction that the Applicant is not a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.

..............................[sgd]..........................................

Deputy President J W Constance

Catchwords

MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – whether protection obligations to applicant – whether serious reasons for considering that applicant had committed a serious non-political crime prior to admission – decision set aside and remitted

Legislation

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 866.22
United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art 1F

Cases

Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54

Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 465

Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] HCA 26

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2013] FCAFC 44

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President J W Constance

INTRODUCTION

  1. The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia as an “unauthorised maritime arrival” on 18 May 2012. On 23 August 2012, he lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa.

  2. On 10 October 2013, a Delegate of the Minister decided:

    I am not satisfied that [the Applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under section 36 of the Migration Act and subclause 866.221 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations. Accordingly, I refuse to grant [the Applicant] a Protection (Class XA) visa.

  3. The Applicant has applied to the Tribunal for a review of this decision.

  4. For the reasons which follow the reviewable decision will be set aside and remitted to the Minister with a direction that the Applicant is not a person in respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.

    BACKGROUND

  5. The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in section 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and clause 866.22 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Relevantly to this matter, subsection 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that:

    (2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

    (a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; …

  6. Clause 866.22 of the Regulations states similarly, in part:

    866.22--Criteria…

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Details
Case
[2015] AATA 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a Sri Lankan national, sought a protection visa in Australia, which was denied by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on the basis that there were serious reasons to consider that the applicant had committed a serious non-political crime prior to his admission. The applicant challenged the decision before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which was subsequently reviewed by the Federal Court. The central legal issue before the court was whether the Minister’s decision was supported by evidence that met the exacting standard of satisfaction required to establish that the applicant had committed a serious non-political crime.

The court examined the evidence presented, including the applicant’s statements, the allegations by Sri Lankan authorities, and the inconsistencies in his accounts. It noted that the applicant's credibility was undermined by his untruthfulness and the lack of clear and credible evidence linking him to the alleged crime. The court highlighted that the standard of proof required is not equivalent to criminal or civil standards but necessitates a considered judgment based on strong evidence. Applying these principles, the court found that the evidence did not meet the exacting standard of satisfaction needed to conclude that there were serious reasons to consider the applicant had committed the alleged crime. Consequently, the court set aside the Minister's decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration, directing that the applicant is not a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow the reviewable decision will be set aside and remitted to the Minister with a direction that the Applicant is not a person in respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.BACKGROUND The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in section 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and clause 866.22 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Relevantly to this matter, subsection 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that:(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is: (a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; … Clause 866.22 of the Regulations states similarly, in part:866.22--Criteria to be satisfied at time of decision 866.221 (1) One of subclauses (2) to (5) is satisfied. (2) The Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention.… Australia’s obligation to provide protection to refugees is governed by the provisions of the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. The Convention provides for the exclusion of persons from the application of the Convention in certain circumstances. The applicable provision in this application is Article 1F which relevantly states:The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that … he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee. Sri Lankan authorities have notified the Australian Federal Police that the Applicant is suspected of having murdered a woman in Sri Lanka in March 2009. He was held in custody for more than one year before being released on bail in June 2010. In May 2012 he travelled by boat from Sri Lanka to Australia.THE ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION I have to decide whether there are serious reasons for considering that the Applicant has committed the crime of murder in Sri Lanka prior to his admission to Australia as a refugee. At the hearing it was not in dispute that the crime of murder alleged against the Applicant is a serious non-political crime under Article 1F. I am satisfied this is so. EVIDENCEEvidence of the Applicant The Applicant filed a statement dated 26 March 2014 and gave evidence. The Applicant is a Sri Lankan Tamil. He is 36 years old. He is married with children.Destruction of the Applicant’s business The Applicant gave evidence that for most of his working life he has been engaged in buying and selling fish. He was about 18 years old when he started his own business in Sri Lanka. He later moved his business from one region of the country to another On 23 August 2012, the Applicant made a Statutory Declaration in support of his application for a protection visa.[1] In that Declaration he gave an account of an attack upon his business. He said that he operated his business in a particular area until May 2011. At that time, officers of the Sri Lankan Police in company with officers of the Criminal Investigation Department ordered him to leave the area. He did not do this. A few days later the storage room of his business was burnt down.[1] Exhibit R1 p.129.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing it was not in dispute that the crime of murder alleged against the Applicant is a serious non-political crime under Article 1F. I am satisfied this is so. EVIDENCEEvidence of the Applicant The Applicant filed a statement dated 26 March 2014 and gave evidence. The Applicant is a Sri Lankan Tamil. He is 36 years old. He is married with children.Destruction of the Applicant’s business The Applicant gave evidence that for most of his working life he has been engaged in buying and selling fish. He was about 18 years old when he started his own business in Sri Lanka. He later moved his business from one region of the country to another On 23 August 2012, the Applicant made a Statutory Declaration in support of his application for a protection visa.[1] In that Declaration he gave an account of an attack upon his business. He said that he operated his business in a particular area until May 2011. At that time, officers of the Sri Lankan Police in company with officers of the Criminal Investigation Department ordered him to leave the area. He did not do this. A few days later the storage room of his business was burnt down.[1] Exhibit R1 p.129. The Applicant stated in his Declaration that shortly after the fire, he, and other businessmen, complained to the Police concerning their treatment. Their complaints were ignored. In May 2011, he received telephone calls threatening that he would be harmed unless he withdrew his complaint. In November 2011 he was told to report to the Criminal Investigation Department where he was tortured and beaten because he refused to move out of the area. He was released the same day. The Applicant further stated that:After this incident I then went into hiding for approximately one year and decided to flee Sri Lanka in April/May 2012 as I feared the Sri Lankan CID/other Sinhala men would harm or kill me if they found me. It was not possible to continue to remain in hiding for a long period of time.[2][2] Exhibit R1 p.129, para. 26. The above account of the 2011 incidents is inconsistent with a later statement and his evidence before the Tribunal. Both the later statement and the evidence to the Tribunal were given after the Applicant became aware that the Australian authorities knew of the criminal proceedings against him in Sri Lanka. In his statement of 26 March 2014 (prepared and filed for the purpose of these proceedings),[3] the Applicant said that he relocated his fishing business in 2006. At the end of that year the Sri Lankan Army assumed control of the area. Thereafter, the Applicant experienced difficulties in continuing his business. In August 2006, a number of Tamil fishermen and businessmen (including the Applicant) were ordered to leave the land on which they operated their businesses and to leave the area. Arguments as to the ownership of the land developed, the Applicant's business was destroyed and he lost his livelihood.[3] Exhibit A1. When he gave evidence, in answer to a question by his Counsel, the Applicant said:I mean, because I had this land dispute with the CID and they were not happy with me, so they wanted to connect me with some crime. That’s why they actually connected me to this crime [the alleged murder].[4][4] Transcript 07/11/14 p.17.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, the evidence falls far short of establishing “serious reasons” for considering that the Applicant committed murder. Apart from the documentary evidence establishing a suspicion that such was the case, much of the remaining evidence relates to the Applicant's untruthfulness in his dealings with Australian authorities. There is no rational connection between this material and an inference that the Applicant committed the crime alleged. The evidence relied upon by the Minister in support of the argument that there are “serious reasons for considering” that the Applicant has committed murder, is not itself “clear and credible” or “strong”.[33] The “exacting standard of satisfaction” referred to by the High Court has not been met.[33] See paragraph 47 above.CONCLUSION The reviewable decision made 10 October 2013 will be set aside and the matter will be remitted to the Minister with a direction that the Applicant is not a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The involvement of the Australian Federal Police in this matter means that the Tribunal can be “comforted that the claims are not spurious, that police in Australia have not dismissed them without further investigation ...”.[15]CONSIDERATION[15] Transcript 07/11/14 p.64.The question to be answered In FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor,[16] French CJ and Gageler J stated the question to be answered as follows:…… whether there [is] a rational connection between the material before it [the decision maker] and an inference that the appellant had committed a serious non-political crime in China.” [17][16] [2014] HCA 26.[17] FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para[6].The standard of satisfaction required In their judgment in FTZK,[18] Crennan and Bell JJ cited the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department.[19] Their Honours described the passage as drawing together “international consensus about an exacting standard of satisfaction which is not derived from domestic standards of proof”;[20]We are, it is clear, attempting to discern the autonomous meaning of the words ‘serious reasons for considering’. We do so in the light of the UNHCR view, with which we agree, that the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention must be restrictively interpreted and cautiously applied. This leads us to draw the following conclusions: (1) ‘Serious reasons’ is stronger than ‘reasonable grounds’. (2) The evidence from which those reasons are derived must be ‘clear and credible’ or ‘strong’. (3) ‘Considering’ is stronger than ‘suspecting’. In our view it is also stronger than ‘believing’. It requires the considered judgment of the decision-maker. (4) The decision maker need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt or to the standard required by the criminal law. (5) It is unnecessary to import our domestic standards of proof into the question.[21][18] FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para.[82].[19] [2012] UKSC 54.[20] FTZK and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para [82].[21] Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54, at para [75].Principles to be applied The Federal Court has set out a number of principles which are relevant in deciding the issue in this application. These principles were approved by the High Court in the FTZK judgment.[22][22] FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26, at para [5]. These principles can be summarised as follows:1)the provisions of the Convention are beneficial and should not be construed narrowly, however the provisions of Article 1F are protective of the order and safety of the State in which refuge is being sought;[23]2)it is not necessary that the Tribunal be satisfied that the alleged crime has been committed;[24]3)strong evidence that the person has committed the alleged offence is sufficient;[25]4)the evidence need not be of such weight as to meet either the criminal or civil standard of proof.[26][23] Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556, 565; [1995] FCA 1653 (9 November 1995) [29].[24] Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (supra) 563.[25] Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (supra).[26] Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 465, 478; [2000] FCA 1889 (22 December 2000) [54].