VWYJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 23 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VWYJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 1

MIGRATION – visa – protection visa – disqualification because of war crimes, crimes against humanity or serious non-political crimes – whether jurisdictional error by Administrative Appeals Tribunal

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judgments and orders – interlocutory or final – order dismissing application for extension of time to appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – leave to appeal – whether extension of time to apply should be granted – whether any prospect of success on appeal

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 36, 417, 474(1), 474(2), 477(1), 483, 500(1)(c)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 44(1), 44(2A)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 10

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954) art 1F

VWYJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 658 affirmed
VAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] AATA 143 affirmed
Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483 cited
Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143 (2003) 131 FCR 28 cited
Vranic v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCAFC 26 (2002) 67 ALD 798 followed
Arquita v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1889 (2000) 106 FCR 465 considered
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1125 (2000) 102 FCR 51 cited

VWYJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

VID 361 of 2005

GRAY, KIEFEL AND LANDER JJ
16 MARCH 2006
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 361 of 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

VWYJ
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

GRAY, KIEFEL AND LANDER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The time within which the appellant was required to apply for leave to appeal be
extended, so as to permit him to apply for leave to appeal on 16 November 2005.


           

2.        The appellant’s oral application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3.        The appeal, instituted by notice of appeal filed on 21 April 2005, be dismissed.

4.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 361 of 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

VWYJ
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

GRAY, KIEFEL AND LANDER JJ

DATE:

16 MARCH 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRAY J:

The nature and history of the proceeding

  1. By notice of appeal, filed on 21 April 2005, the appellant seeks…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read VWYJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of VWYJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, VWYJ, sought to challenge a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which found that he was disqualified from obtaining a visa under Article 1F of the Convention due to his alleged involvement in war crimes. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had made a jurisdictional error in its decision, which would permit the appellant to challenge the decision in the Federal Court. The court also had to consider whether to grant the appellant an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, given his lack of legal representation and financial resources.

The court found that the AAT had not made a jurisdictional error in its decision. The AAT had concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious non-political crimes. This conclusion was sufficient for the appellant to be disqualified from obtaining a visa under the Convention. The court further found that the AAT’s decision remained a privative clause decision, which meant that the appellant could not challenge the decision in the Federal Court. The court also found that the appellant had no prospect of success in an appeal, given the AAT’s findings.

As a result, the court dismissed the appellant’s application for leave to appeal and his purported appeal. The court also granted the appellant an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, so that he could apply on the day of the hearing. The court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, as there was no reason to deviate from the usual rule that costs follow the event. The court agreed with the reasons and orders proposed by Gray J, and did not need to address the test proposed by Weinberg J in Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 465 at [54] because of the finding made by the AAT at [26] of the AAT reasons.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time within which the appellant was required to apply for leave to appeal be

extended, so as to permit him to apply for leave to appeal on 16 November 2005.

2. The appellant’s oral application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3. The appeal, instituted by notice of appeal filed on 21 April 2005, be dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY, KIEFEL AND LANDER JJ
The manner in which the AAT set out its conclusions, at [49] of its reasons, makes plain that the AAT’s primary finding was that, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious non-political crimes by his personal participation in the massacre of civilians at the Sabra and Shatilla camps. The remaining conclusions are expressed to be alternative or additional to this primary conclusion. The primary conclusion itself was sufficient for the appellant to be disqualified by art 1F of the Convention. Even if the AAT were in error in either of the ways suggested above, any such error did not affect the exercise of its statutory function. Any such error was not, therefore, a jurisdictional error. The AAT’s decision remains a ‘privative clause decision’, within the meaning of s 474(2) of the Migration Act. Section 474(1) therefore has the effect of preventing any challenge by the appellant to the decision, invoking the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by s 39B of the Judiciary Act. Section 483 of the Migration Act also deprives the appellant of any right to appeal under s 44(1) of the AAT Act. The primary judge was correct to reach both of these conclusions.Conclusion Counsel for the Minister contended that, if the Court were of the view that there was no jurisdictional error associated with the decision of the AAT, it would be appropriate for the Court to refuse the appellant an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal from the judgment of the primary judge. Alternatively, the Court could grant the extension of time and refuse the appellant leave to appeal, on the basis that an appeal had no prospect of success. In the circumstances, the second option appears preferable. The appellant is obviously unaware of the technical distinction between an interlocutory judgment and a final judgment. It is not an easy distinction, even for lawyers. Through lack of financial resources, he is unable to be represented by a lawyer. Not only was the Minister not prejudiced by any delay in applying for leave to appeal, her counsel was content to argue the central issue of jurisdictional error. The Court should therefore order that the time within which the appellant could apply for leave to appeal should be extended, so as to enable him to apply on the day of hearing. The appellant’s application for leave to appeal, and his purported appeal, must be dismissed. There is plainly no prospect of an appeal succeeding, in the light of the conclusions expressed above. No reason was advanced, and none appears, why the usual rule, that costs follow the event, should not be applied. The appellant will therefore be ordered to pay the Minister’s costs. I agree with the reasons of Gray J and with the orders his Honour proposes. I agree with Gray J’s reasons and the orders which he proposes. I agree that this Court does not need to address the test proposed by Weinberg J in Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 465 at [54] because of the finding made by the AAT at [26] of the AAT reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY, KIEFEL AND LANDER JJ