FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Spruill v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1401
Citation: Spruill v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1401 Appeal from: Spruill v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 681 Parties: RICHARD SPRUILL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1580 of 2012 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 10 December 2012 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – visa cancellation under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2) – whether decision affected by jurisdictional error – where Ministerial Direction required the Tribunal to make a determination about whether cancellation is, or is not, in the best interests of the child – whether failure of Tribunal to complete the exercise of its jurisdiction – whether failure to inform the applicant of critical issue – whether finding of fact for which there was no evidence Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(1)(b), 476A(2), 501(2)
Federal Court Rules r 4.19(3)Cases cited: Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 145 applied
Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 897 applied
Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 referred to
Nweke v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 126 ALD 501 appliedDate of hearing: 10 December 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Godwin (pro bono) Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr JD Smith Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1580 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: RICHARD SPRUILL
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 DECEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave be granted to the applicant to amend his originating application for review of a migration decision, the amended application being as filed in Court on 10 December 2012.
2.A writ of certiorari, directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, issue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal the subject of the proceeding and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.
4.The professional fees charged by the applicant’s counsel in this Court be paid directly to the applicant’s counsel pursuant to r 4.19(3) of the Federal Court Rules.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1580 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: RICHARD SPRUILL
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE:
10 DECEMBER 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1401
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved interpreting the binding requirements of the Ministerial Direction and determining whether the AAT had properly exercised its jurisdiction in light of these requirements. The court needed to assess whether the AAT had adequately made a determination about whether visa cancellation was in the best interests of the child, as mandated by the Ministerial Direction. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the AAT's failure to address this specific requirement constituted a jurisdictional error, and whether there were any findings of fact for which there was no evidence.
The court concluded that the AAT had not fulfilled the binding requirements of the Ministerial Direction by making a specific determination about whether visa cancellation was in the best interests of the child. Instead, the AAT had merely considered the issue as a factor in its overall assessment. This omission was held to be a jurisdictional error, as the language of the Ministerial Direction clearly required a distinct determination. Additionally, the court found that the AAT's failure to inform the applicant of this critical issue further compounded the error. Consequently, the court granted the applicant leave to amend his application, quashed the AAT's decision, and remitted the matter for reconsideration in accordance with the law. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicant's costs, and the applicant's counsel's professional fees were to be paid directly to them.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to the applicant to amend his originating application for review of a migration decision, the amended application being as filed in Court on 10 December 2012.
2. A writ of certiorari, directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, issue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal the subject of the proceeding and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.
4. The professional fees charged by the applicant’s counsel in this Court be paid directly to the applicant’s counsel pursuant to r 4.19(3) of the Federal Court Rules.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the third head, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did not act on the basis that Purvis J of the Family Court found that the applicant had a history of engaging in domestic violence; rather, the Tribunal drew inferences from findings made by Purvis J that the applicant had such a history.Consideration As to the first head of review, applying Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 145 at [55], Direction no. 55 imposes binding requirements on relevant decision-makers, including the Tribunal. In my opinion, construing the words of the Tribunal beneficially rather than zealously, the Tribunal has not done what is required by cl 9.3(1), that is, “make a determination about whether cancellation is, or is not, in the best interests of the child”. Instead the Tribunal has posited an argument and then found that argument did not outweigh the risk to the Australian community. As submitted by counsel for the applicant, the language of clause 9.3(1) is not a requirement merely to have regard to the best interests of the child. While I accept that each case turns on its own facts and on the language used by the decision-maker, and while I accept that both Nweke and Lesianawai were concerned with different provisions, in my view, the judgments in those cases point to the conclusion which I have reached. Those decisions were for review of a decision by the Minster and the Minister was not bound by his direction as then in force, or indeed by the present direction. This explains the references to Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 and the reliance on procedural fairness. Nevertheless, in my view, the principle is the same and indeed the terms of cl 9.3(1) tend to reinforce rather than detract from the reasoning of Jagot J in Nweke and of Katzmann J in Lesianawai. The question in those cases was whether the Minister had given primary consideration to the best interests of the child or children: cl 9.3(1) now requires decision-makers to whom the direction applies to make a determination about whether cancellation is or is not in the best interests of the child. In Nweke, Jagot J held at [21] that the Minister had not treated the best interests of the applicant’s children as a primary consideration because he never confronted the central question of what the best interests of the children required him to decide with respect to the proposed deportation of the father. Not having done so as his starting point, the Minister also could not then assess whether any other consideration outweighed the best interests of the children understood as a primary consideration. In Lesianawai, Katzmann J approved and followed Nweke in relation to the Minister’s reasons which her Honour was considering and concluded at [51] that the Minister had not meant to be any more definite than his language suggested. Her Honour held on the facts of that case that the Minister had not, from his language, reached a conclusion about what the children’s best interests involved or required.