FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BEZ17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 283
Appeal from: Application for extension of time within which to appeal: BEZ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Federal Circuit Court of Australia, SYG841/2017, Orders dated 1 August 2018) File number: NSD 1830 of 2018 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 6 March 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time within which to appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for leave to rely on a ground not advanced before primary judge – circumstances in which such applications may be granted – applications granted.
MIGRATION – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority adopted an unduly narrow construction of s 473DD(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to consider new information – appeal allowed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, ss 473DB, 473DD, 473FA
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03
Cases cited: AXL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 208
BAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1463
BOZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 418
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192; 257 FCR 148
CMY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1333
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 322; 43 FCR 280
Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1
Coshott v Crouch [2017] FCAFC 135; 254 FCR 413
DWK17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 66
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108; 187 FCR 362
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: Ex parte Palme [2003] HCA 56; 216 CLR 212
Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney [2012] FCAFC 146 (2012) 207 FCR 277
Spruill v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1401; 135 ALD 45
SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; 232 FCR 262
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Tauariki v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1408; 135 ALD 51
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 15 February 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 79 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Garsia Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kay Hoyle Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs
Table of Corrections 8 March…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 283
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the applicant's proposed ground of appeal was without prospects of success and whether it was expedient and in the interests of justice to grant leave. The court noted that the applicant was legally represented, but the lawyers' failure to raise the proposed ground was likely due to a significant want of understanding of the relevant provisions rather than a forensic choice. The court concluded that the proposed ground was not without prospects of success and that the absence of reasons in the primary judge's decision did not present practical difficulties to its resolution. The court found that granting leave was expedient and in the interests of justice.
The court allowed the application for an extension of time and the application to rely on a ground of appeal not advanced before the primary judge. The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was set aside. The court ordered that the decision of the IAA be quashed, and a writ of mandamus issue requiring the IAA to redetermine the review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent according to law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time be allowed.
2. The application to rely on a ground of appeal not advanced before the primary judge be allowed.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. Order 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 1 August 2018 be set aside.
5. In lieu thereof, the following orders are substituted:
(a) The decision of the second respondent of 23 February 2017 be quashed.
(b) A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to redetermine the review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 4 October 2016 according to law.
6. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Kay Hoyle submits that leave to rely on a ground not advanced before the primary judge should not be granted for the following reasons:If the Court is minded to grant the extension of time, then it will still need to consider whether leave should be granted to rely on a ground not advanced before the primary judge. There are a number of reasons why leave should not be granted:(a)the applicant was at all times legally represented (both in the framing of his grounds of review and in the position taken at hearing, including the forensic choices;(b)as the ground was not advanced before the primary judge, this Court does not have the benefit of the primary judge’s reasons (notwithstanding that the primary judge did not give reasons in dismissing the application for judicial review);(c)the consequence of granting leave is that this Court will be in the position of exercising original jurisdiction. Given that this Court is not ordinarily permitted to exercise original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions, this Court should be slow to accede to any application that has the practical effect of allowing it to do so;(d)the effect of (c) is that the first respondent may be placed in the position where its rights of appeal are circumscribed, given that appeal from a decision of this Court exercising appellate jurisdiction as a Full Court is by special leave to appeal to the High Court and not as of right to this Court (which would otherwise be the case in an appeal from the FCC);(e)weighing the matters set out in (a)-(d) above, the applicant’s case should not only have sufficient merit but be a strong case. The present case is of insufficient merit to outweigh the other factors weighing against the grant of leave.ConsiderationFactor (a) In SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; 232 FCR 262 (SZSFS) Logan J made the following observation at [9]:In cases like the present and in relation to an application for leave to raise on appeal a point not taken below, it is always necessary to remind oneself of a number of matters. The disparity between the resources available to the Minister and an applicant for a Protection Visa is usually likely to be very great. An explanation of the kind proffered by the Appellants may be all that can be proffered. Further, an appeal to this Court is the final means by which, as of right, a Protection Visa applicant may secure a fresh opportunity to press on the merits before the Tribunal a claim for such a visa. Yet further, in terms of the future health, comfort or even life of an appellant, much possibly may turn on whether he or she has that further opportunity, given that the alternative to securing a Protection Visa is leaving Australia. In the present proceedings, it is uncontentious that the applicant was legally represented but as the transcript of the hearing before the FCCA reveals, BEZ17’s former lawyer advanced manifestly unsustainable propositions. The Court should not be unfairly critical of the lawyer(s) then representing the applicant, but with the benefit of hindsight the ground BEZ17 now seeks to press would appear to have been an obvious one that should have been identified by his legal representative(s) in the court below. Having read the transcript of the proceedings before the primary judge which is in evidence before me, I am prepared to infer that the most likely reason for the ground now contended for not having been advanced was a significant want of understanding on BEZ17’s lawyers’ part of the operation of the relevant provisions of Pt 7AA of the Migration Act not a forensic choice. Having regard to the observations of Logan J in SZSFS I proceed on the basis that although factor (a) tends against a grant of leave it does not compel that conclusion. Factor (b)