MRWF v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MRWF v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 206

Appeal from: MRWF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 504
File number: WAD 180 of 2018
Judges: MCKERRACHER, REEVES AND FARRELL JJ
Date of judgment: 21 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a single judge decision upholding a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) not to grant the appellant a protection visa – whether the primary judge correctly considered whether the Tribunal had complied with s 43(2B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – whether the test requiring there to be “strong evidence” for having “serious reasons for considering” a person to be complicit in crimes against humanity was correctly applied – whether the primary judge erred in refusing to admit evidence on the appeal – where none of the grounds of appeal was made out – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  Opened for signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Cases cited:

Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v Delegate of the Australian Postal Commission (1979) 37 FLR 457

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 310 ALR 1; [2014] HCA 26

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Malouf v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1995] 1 FC 537

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108

MRWF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 504

SHCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 561; [2003] FCAFC 308

Date of hearing: 14 August 2018
Date of last submissions: 17 August 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr J L Cameron
Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr P Macliver

Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

WAD 180 of 2018
BETWEEN:

MRWF

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MCKERRACHER, REEVES AND FARRELL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

21 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal filed 3 May 2018 be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed or agreed.

3.The non-publication order made by the primary judge on 13 April 2018 and extended on 11 May 2018 be discharged.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. MRWF (a pseudonym) has appealed from a judgment of a single judge of this Court delivered on 13 April 2018 (see MRWF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 504). In that judgment, the primary judge dismissed MRWF’s appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) given on 19 May…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 206
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal against a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court, who had upheld a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) not to grant the appellant, MRWF, a protection visa. MRWF, a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity, had applied for a protection visa on the basis of his fear of persecution by the Turkish authorities due to his involvement with the Jandarma and JITEM, as well as a blood feud between his family and another family. The Tribunal found that MRWF had a well-founded fear of serious harm amounting to persecution but refused to grant him a protection visa because there were serious reasons for considering him complicit in crimes against humanity.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly considered whether the Tribunal had complied with s 43(2B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), whether the test requiring there to be "strong evidence" for having "serious reasons for considering" MRWF to be complicit in crimes against humanity was correctly applied, and whether the primary judge erred in refusing to admit evidence on the appeal. The court found that the primary judge had correctly considered the relevant issues and that there was no error in the Tribunal's decision. The court also found that the evidence MRWF sought to introduce on appeal was not relevant to the issues before the court and that the primary judge had not erred in refusing to admit it.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that MRWF pay the costs of the first respondent and that the non-publication order made by the primary judge be discharged. The court found that none of the grounds of appeal had been made out and that the Tribunal's decision was correctly made. The court also found that the primary judge had correctly exercised his discretion in refusing to admit the additional evidence on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal filed 3 May 2018 be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed or agreed.

3. The non-publication order made by the primary judge on 13 April 2018 and extended on 11 May 2018 be discharged.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It should be noted that the parties accepted before the primary judge that the relevant law was that applying as at the date MRWF made his application for a protection visa (see [2018] FCA 504 at [6]).THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The factual and procedural background to this appeal is complex. It involves two separate decisions of a delegate of the Minister and a lengthy decision (278 pages) of the Tribunal. The most convenient way to outline that background is to set out verbatim the comprehensive summary that the primary judge provided in his judgment (see [2018] FCA 504 at [15]–[32]) as follows:15 The applicant is a 50 year old male citizen of Turkey of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in Australia in 2010 on a student visa.16 In April 2011, he applied for a protection visa.17 In his application, the applicant claimed he feared returning to Turkey based on his involvement with the Jandarma and Jandarma Istihbarat ve Terorle Mucadele (JITEM) [also known as Jandarma, a group within the Turkish paramilitary force responsible for policing the rural regions of south-east Turkey in which the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, operated], as well as by reason of a blood feud between his family and another family. He said he feared harm including being attacked, imprisoned or killed.18 The applicant attended an interview before a delegate of the Minister in July 2011 as part of his initial protection visa application. At this interview the applicant was assisted by his legal representative, a support person and a Turkish interpreter.19 On 31 October 2011, this delegate (the first delegate) refused his application. The first delegate found that, although the applicant had a genuine fear of harm with regard to his fear of being persecuted by JITEM and the PKK as a result of his involvement with the Jandarma and JITEM, there was not a real chance of the persecution occurring. Accordingly, the first delegate was not satisfied the applicant was owed protection obligations under s 36 of the Act.20 On 22 November 2011, the applicant applied for merits review of the first delegate’s decision before the then Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT).21 On 3 March 2012, the applicant’s representative provided the RRT with detailed submissions regarding the applicant’s fear of persecution by the Turkish authorities. These submissions outlined that the applicant was not involved in the commission of crimes against humanity and that the applicant began his involvement with JITEM because he believed it to be a legitimate group, as opposed to the PKK, and because he was able to use his position with JITEM to save some people from torture and death.22 The applicant appeared before the RRT on 13 March 2012 and 21 March 2012 with the assistance of an interpreter. He was represented by his migration agent.23 On 29 June 2012, the RRT found that the applicant was “a reliable witness who showed no evidence of overstating or exaggerating his claims” and that his claims were consistent with, and supported by, independent country information.24 The RRT concluded that the applicant’s fear of serious harm amounting to persecution was well-founded. However, the RRT considered country information which indicated that JITEM had been found to have carried out serious crimes of the kind which may fall within the type described in Art IF of the Convention.25 In this light, the RRT noted that the material before it may have given rise to issues relating to Art 1F of the Convention. The matter was remitted to the Minister’s Department for further consideration as to whether the applicant was excluded from protection by Art 1F.26 On 12 March 2014, another delegate of the Minister (the second delegate), following further consideration, refused to grant the applicant a protection visa by reason of the Art 1F consideration, despite noting the RRT’s direction that “the applicant has a real chance of being persecuted for a Refugees Convention Reason” and that the “applicant’s fear of persecution, as defined under the Refugees Convention, is therefore well-founded”.27 The second delegate noted that there were “significant developments in the field of Turkish-Kurdish relations which appear to offer a real chance of a negotiated peace settlement”, in reference to whether a cessation clause applied, for the purposes of Art 1C of the Convention. However, because the delegate found that the applicant was excluded from protection by Art 1F, he did not find it necessary to finally consider Art 1C.28 In considering Art 1F, the second delegate accepted that the applicant “did not personally commit any acts of murder, torture, enforced disappearance of persons and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity”. However, the second delegate found it was necessary to determine if the applicant was complicit in committing a crime against humanity. The second delegate concluded that, despite the applicant not having been convicted or formally accused of committing a crime, he had voluntarily admitted to providing information to the Jandarma about the PKK.29 As a result, the second delegate was not satisfied that Australia had protection obligations in respect of the applicant under the Convention by virtue of his exclusion under Art 1F. The second delegate found that the applicant therefore did not meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.30 The applicant sought merits review of the second delegate’s decision, this time in the Tribunal (following the merger of the RRT with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal). On 19 May 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the second delegate to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa for the Art 1F reason. It is this Tribunal’s decision that is the subject of the present “appeal”.31 The Tribunal was satisfied that there was a serious reason for considering that the applicant was complicit in the commission of a crime or act contemplated by Art 1F(a) and 1F(c) of the Convention.32 As a result, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Act.(Emphasis in original; headings omitted)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In response, the Minister agreed that the construction of the expression “serious reasons for considering” was settled in FTZK. Accordingly, he submitted that, to amount to “serious reasons for considering”, the evidence must be capable of being regarded as “strong” (see FTZK at [14] per French CJ and Gageler J and at [80] per Crennan and Bell JJ). The Minister submitted that the primary judge had concluded ([2018] FCA 504 at [108]) that the Tribunal had correctly stated the legal test for complicity for the purposes of the application of Art 1F of the Convention (including the requirement that there be “serious reasons for considering”) and had applied that test correctly having regard to the facts as found by it, which findings were open to it on the evidence before it. The Minister further contended that it was “clearly apparent from [the primary judge’s] Judgment and from the Tribunal’s reasons to which his Honour referred, that his Honour did not place any reliance upon SHCB in determining that there was no error by the Tribunal in its consideration of what amounts to ‘serious reasons for considering’”.Ground 3 – Alleged error in failing to receive further evidence The following particulars were provided by MRWF with respect to the third ground of appeal:3.1. It was within his Honour’s discretion to admit the evidence in the affidavit notwithstanding that it had not been before the Tribunal. 3.2. The evidence had become available only after both parties had completed giving their evidence, but before their final submissions were due. 3.3. The evidence was equally available to both parties. 3.4. As the prosecutor of the case, the Minister had a greater duty than the appellant to ensure that all evidence was before the Tribunal supporting his claim that the appellant was disentitled to protection under the provisions of Article 1F of the Refugees Convention. 3.5. The evidence was relevant insofar as it involved the principals in the crimes in which the Tribunal held that there was serious concern that the appellant, as an informer to the JANDARMA, was complicit as an accomplice to the crimes and acts alleged against JITEM. 3.6. While arguably hearsay, as was all of the evidence in support of the alleged crimes of JITEM, the evidence would have been admissible before the Tribunal notwithstanding its hearsay character. 3.7. The interests of justice required that the affidavit be admitted in support of the applicant’s claim for judicial review, as it cast doubt upon whether there could be ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the appellant was complicit in ‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’(Emphasis in original) In his written submissions, MRWF submitted that s 44(7) of the AAT Act empowered the Federal Court on appeal under s 44(1) to make certain findings of fact and under s 44(8)(b) to receive further evidence. In dismissing his interlocutory application to lead the evidence in the Reuters report concerning the acquittal of Colonel Temizoz and members of JITEM, MRWF submitted that the primary judge had erred ([2018] FCA 504 at [50]) in holding that he had no jurisdiction to receive that evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the Minister pointed out in his submissions, the question whether the Tribunal complied with s 42(2B) of the AAT Act was considered by the primary judge ([2018] FCA 504 at [116]–[132]). After describing the scope of the question raised by MRWF (at [116]) and setting out the terms of s 43(2B) of the AAT Act (at [117]), the primary judge observed that “[t]he substantive question is whether, even if some non-compliance with the requirements of this provision is shown, jurisdictional error is established” (at [118]). On that question, his Honour referred to a judgment of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108 and he then summarised the submissions made by MRWF with respect to it (at [119]–[121]). Following that summary, his Honour identified the main conclusions the Tribunal reached and the evidence upon which it relied to reach those conclusions as follows (at [123] and [125]–[127]):123 I consider that on a fair reading the Tribunal’s conclusion, at [130], as to the Turkish based group known as JITEM being responsible for crimes against humanity which follows its reference to “on the evidence”, that clearly is a reference to the evidence set out by the Tribunal in the preceding paragraphs of its reasons at [127]-[129].…125 The Tribunal’s statement at [141] of having reviewed the extensive and conflicting evidence must be seen in its proper context, namely, that it follows the Tribunal’s reference to the evidence and submissions made at [62]-[123] and the subsequent discussion by the Tribunal of that evidence at [142]-[162].126 Similarly, there was no relevant failure of the Tribunal, in relation to [143], by reason of “the exclusion of non-specified evidence”. The Tribunal concluded, at [143], by stating that in the circumstances (as set out earlier in that paragraph) it was appropriate for the Tribunal to rely on those portions of both translations (of the first delegate’s interview and the RRT hearings) but exclude those sections of the evidence that were not subsequently translated. I accept that the Tribunal was not referring to the exclusion of “unspecified” evidence but was referring to the evidence of the first delegate’s interview and the RRT hearings that was not subsequently translated.127 I also consider that the Tribunal’s reasons at [163] and [164] do not demonstrate any failure to comply with s 43(2B). These paragraphs stated the Tribunal’s overall conclusions based on its assessment of the evidence and its findings as to that evidence as set out at [142]-[162]. (Emphasis added) The primary judge then proceeded to reject MRWF’s primary contentions on this ground of appeal, that the Tribunal had “merely cut and pasted large segments from the evidence before jumping to a conclusion without any reasoned analysis”, in the following terms at [128]:… Properly and fairly read the Tribunal dealt with a large mass of evidence that had been produced in the course of the decision-making processes I have outlined. The applicant, before the Tribunal, challenged the reliability of much of the evidence as translated. In the result, the Tribunal very carefully decided what of the transcribed evidence it could properly rely upon. The Tribunal, as it was entitled to do, indicated that it was not prepared to rely on any of that evidence that came later and conflicted with the evidence of the applicant given earlier in the decision-making processes. The Tribunal was not prepared to accept the applicant’s account of events before it in preference to the position as he had stated it in earlier processes. In the circumstances, this finding was open to it. It fully explained, in logical terms, why it came to that view.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Secondly, MRWF claimed that there were problems with the interpreters who assisted the Tribunal, a matter which he claimed the Tribunal itself had acknowledged in its decision. In particular, MRWF claimed the interpreter problems arose with respect to the question whether he had provided attendance lists for PKK meetings to the Jandarma. This issue can also be disposed of briefly. Not only was this issue not raised in MRWF’s notice of appeal, but the critical evidence to which it relates, concerning the provision of attendance lists for PKK meetings, was information that MRWF himself provided in his statutory declaration. It was not, therefore, information that was affected by any interpreter error, even if there were such an error. For these reasons, we will confine our consideration to the three issues that are properly raised by MRWF’s grounds of appeal.CONSIDERATIONGround 1 – Alleged failure to comply with s 43(2B) of the AAT Act As the Minister pointed out in his submissions, the question whether the Tribunal complied with s 42(2B) of the AAT Act was considered by the primary judge ([2018] FCA 504 at [116]–[132]). After describing the scope of the question raised by MRWF (at [116]) and setting out the terms of s 43(2B) of the AAT Act (at [117]), the primary judge observed that “[t]he substantive question is whether, even if some non-compliance with the requirements of this provision is shown, jurisdictional error is established” (at [118]). On that question, his Honour referred to a judgment of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362; [2010] FCAFC 108 and he then summarised the submissions made by MRWF with respect to it (at [119]–[121]). Following that summary, his Honour identified the main conclusions the Tribunal reached and the evidence upon which it relied to reach those conclusions as follows (at [123] and [125]–[127]):123 I consider that on a fair reading the Tribunal’s conclusion, at [130], as to the Turkish based group known as JITEM being responsible for crimes against humanity which follows its reference to “on the evidence”, that clearly is a reference to the evidence set out by the Tribunal in the preceding paragraphs of its reasons at [127]-[129].…125 The Tribunal’s statement at [141] of having reviewed the extensive and conflicting evidence must be seen in its proper context, namely, that it follows the Tribunal’s reference to the evidence and submissions made at [62]-[123] and the subsequent discussion by the Tribunal of that evidence at [142]-[162].126 Similarly, there was no relevant failure of the Tribunal, in relation to [143], by reason of “the exclusion of non-specified evidence”. The Tribunal concluded, at [143], by stating that in the circumstances (as set out earlier in that paragraph) it was appropriate for the Tribunal to rely on those portions of both translations (of the first delegate’s interview and the RRT hearings) but exclude those sections of the evidence that were not subsequently translated. I accept that the Tribunal was not referring to the exclusion of “unspecified” evidence but was referring to the evidence of the first delegate’s interview and the RRT hearings that was not subsequently translated.127 I also consider that the Tribunal’s reasons at [163] and [164] do not demonstrate any failure to comply with s 43(2B). These paragraphs stated the Tribunal’s overall conclusions based on its assessment of the evidence and its findings as to that evidence as set out at [142]-[162]. (Emphasis added)