SBAR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SBAR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 1502

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 500(1)(c), 476
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Refugees Convention, Art 1A(2), Art 1F

Arquita v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1889 – referred to
N.96/1441 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (11 June 1998) – referred to
Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia (1991) 172 CLR 501 – referred to
W.98/45 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (17 August 1998) – referred to
Re Refugee Review Tribunal: Ex parte Aala (2000) 176 ALR 219 – referred to
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30, (2002) 190 ALR 601 – referred to
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 – cited
Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 – referred to
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 – applied

SBAR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 238 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
6 DECEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 238 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SBAR
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 238 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SBAR
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

6 DECEMBER 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is expressed to be an application by way of appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) given on 5 December 2001. For reasons which appear at [28] below, I have treated it as an application to have the decision of the Tribunal set aside under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent (the delegate) given on 17 May 2001 refusing to grant to the applicant a protection visa for which he had applied under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) on 25 February 2001, shortly after his arrival in Australia.

  2. The issue before the delegate, and on review before the Tribunal, was whether the decision-maker was satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol, using those terms as defined in the Act (the Convention), and whether the applicant therefore satisfied the criterion set out in s 36(2) of the Act for a protection visa.  The…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1502
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of SBAR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs was before the court for consideration of an application related to a decision made by the Tribunal. The applicant, SBAR, contested the decision made by the Tribunal which had reviewed the decision of the delegate of the respondent. The primary issue for the court to decide was whether the right of appeal on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act was available to the applicant from the Tribunal’s decision.

The court examined the definition of “primary decision” under s 476(6) of the Act and determined that the Tribunal’s decision met the criteria for a privative clause decision. The court concluded that the right of appeal on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act was not available to the applicant. However, the court acknowledged the continuing jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. The court also considered whether the complaints of the applicant amounted to jurisdictional error, but found that they did not.

In its reasoning, the court highlighted that the Tribunal was obliged to accord the applicant procedural fairness during the hearing, as established in relevant case law. The court found that the applicant was represented by solicitors and had the opportunity to submit written and oral evidence. Therefore, the court concluded that the Tribunal did not fail to accord the applicant procedural fairness. Additionally, the court found no error in the Tribunal's findings of fact based on the applicant’s own admissions during the examination by the delegate.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
I consider that the decision in NAAV applies with equal force to the present application involving a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s review of the decision of the delegate of the respondent was under s 500(1)(c) of the Act. Section 476(1) of the Act states that “despite any other law”, the Court does not have any jurisdiction in relation to a “primary decision”. The expression “primary decision” is defined in s 476(6) relevantly to mean a “privative clause decision” that has been reviewed under s 500. The term “privative clause decision” is defined in s 474(2) of the Act. Section 474(2) is in the following terms:“privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).”The Tribunal’s decision is a decision of an administrative character made under the Act, and is not a decision referred to in subs (4) or (5) of s 474. Consequently, in my view, the right of appeal on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, which would otherwise be available to the applicant from the Tribunal’s decision, is not available. Section 475A of the Act, however, preserves or recognises the Court’s continuing jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, and as that is in a real sense the only available basis upon which the present application could be maintained, I have treated the application as having been made on that basis. The decision of the Tribunal, being a privative clause decision, is however within the extended jurisdictional web created by s 474(1) of the Act, as explained in NAAV. The complaints of the applicant, even if made out, would not amount to jurisdictional error so as to enliven the power under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to declare the Tribunal’s decision invalid. Accordingly I have reached the view that the application must be dismissed. I so order. In this matter I see no reason why the normal rule as to costs should not apply. I order that the applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

No argument was presented that the Tribunal’s decision was not made in a good faith attempt to perform its review function.CONSIDERATION I consider that the Tribunal was obliged to accord the applicant procedural fairness in the course of its hearing: see Re Refugee Review Tribunal: Ex parte Aala (2000) 176 ALR 219; Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30, (2002) 190 ALR 601. However, despite his claims to have requested, and to not have been granted, a hearing before the Tribunal, I am not persuaded that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. He was represented at the hearing by solicitors. A hearing was conducted on 25 October 2001. His solicitors made a detailed written submission to the Tribunal on 4 September 2001, as well as attending at the hearing. No doubt those solicitors considered whether, at the hearing, the applicant should give evidence to the Tribunal. The fact that he did not do so, and the fact that he apparently expected to have the opportunity to do so, does not in the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal failed to accord him procedural fairness. I am also not persuaded that the Tribunal erred in law in making the findings of fact which it did. I have carefully considered the transcript of the applicant’s examination by the delegate which took place on 3 March 2001. It provided a proper foundation for the specific findings of fact which the delegate made, and which the Tribunal adopted, as to the nature of the applicant’s work with KHAD. Contrary to the applicant’s specific assertions, it records the applicant as having asserted that his responsibilities with KHAD were important and that his department was like “the heart of the organisation” as it was a “very very important department”. He confirmed during that examination that he had joined KHAD in 1980 during his last year of school, and that for two years KHAD had been a civilian state information service, but it converted to a military information service in 1982. He confirmed that he was a member of PDPA and was sponsored by three permanent members of PDPA before he was eligible to be appointed to KHAD. He confirmed that after a short time he had been transferred to the L35 Department of KHAD, and was promoted to supervisor of that department, and that he held that office until 1992. He confirmed that he had been sent to Uzbekistan by the then Soviet KGB for training, and that at that time he attended seminars where he received training in recruitment techniques, photographic and filing training and the use of hand grenades and general military training. He confirmed that ultimately his rank was the highest rank that was achievable in that office, namely the equivalent of an army major. As noted, the applicant further said in that interview that the L35 Department of KHAD was like “the heart” of the organisation, and that he operated three divisions: Statistics Operative, Statistics Agentura, and Archives. He described in detail to the delegate the activities of those divisions. The Statistics Operative division opened and managed files regarding particular active opposition individuals, groups, organisations and political parties involved in anti-government activities. That included searching and collecting information about those entities, recording that information on files, and providing that information as requested to other officers of KHAD or to other government departments. The Statistics Agentura division dealt with the opening and management of files of KHAD secret agents. He confirmed that, as a result of handling the files of persons arrested by KHAD, he would be aware of the arrest and, in respect of persons under 65 years of age, he would from time to time learn of those who had died in detention as a result of ill-treatment and torture. Both the delegate and the Tribunal acknowledged that the applicant, in his evidence, claimed that he did not see photographs of tortured people, but that he did see files reporting deaths of persons in custody. The findings were made, despite their awareness of his evidence on that topic, on the basis of the other evidence he gave in that interview.