GWRV and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)
[2021] AATA 2803
•10 August 2021
GWRV and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2021] AATA 2803 (10 August 2021)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2020/3911
Re:GWRV
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
Date:10 August 2021
Place:Perth
The Reviewable Decision, being the delegate’s decision of 11 November 2019, is affirmed.
...........................[Sgd].............................................
Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – refusal to grant a protection visa – whether Tribunal satisfied there are serious reasons to consider that the Applicant committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia – non-political crime – serious non-political crime – serious Australian offence – serious foreign offence – serious reasons for considering – Applicant served two prison sentences in Mongolia – Applicant convicted of “hooliganism” offence, for which he served approximately three years’ imprisonment in Mongolia – Applicant convicted of “murder without aggravating circumstances” for which he served approximately 11 years’ imprisonment in Mongolia – prior to leaving Mongolia Applicant charged with contracting with a third party to kill an associate who owed him money – reviewable decision affirmed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Applicant self-represented – first hearing by videoconference vacated due to sound quality issues – Applicant ready to proceed at first hearing – second hearing was arranged to be conducted in person – Applicant refused to be transported to attend second hearing in person – Applicant claims he was not notified of second hearing and was not ready to proceed – Tribunal refused to grant adjournment –– Applicant made written request for a re-hearing approximately six weeks after the hearing had concluded – procedural fairness implications of a re-hearing – objectives in s 2A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) considered – Tribunal refused to grant re-hearing
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 2A, 37
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 12, 35A(1)
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 45(1), 45(7)
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 5
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 5H(1), 5H(2), 36(2), 36(2)(a)
CASES
Applicant NADB of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 126 FCR 453; [2002] FCAFC 326
Arquita v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 321; [2000] FCA 1889
Dhayakpa v the Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556
FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 310 ALR 1; [2014] HCA 26
JSDW and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 2420
Ovcharuk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 549; [1998] FCA 1314
Re Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 173; [1992] 2 FC 306
ZYVZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 28
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) arts 1F(a), 1F(b), 1F(c)
Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 (Cth)
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 July 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (4 September 2003)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
10 August 2021
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is a 49-year-old citizen of Mongolia. He arrived in Australia on 20 February 2017 under a three month stay visa. He subsequently applied for a FA-600 Tourist visa, which ceased on 20 May 2017. The Applicant has a lengthy visa history, which includes the granting of several bridging visas (two of which were cancelled and one of which was refused), and two applications for protection visas.
The Respondent provided the following timeline of the Applicant’s visa history at paragraph [4] of their Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (RSFIC) (see also migration history timeline in protection visa decision record at T20/209–210; and T23/237):
14 May 2017
Applicant applied for FA-600 Tourist visa (onshore)
20 May 2017
Applicant’s Tourist visa ceased
23 May 2017
Applicant granted associated Bridging visa A
29 January 2018
Bridging visa A cancelled under s 109 of the Act
21 February 2018
Applicant applied [for] Protection visa
5 March 2018
Bridging visa C granted
8 May 2018
Bridging visa C cancelled under s 109 of the Act; Applicant detained at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre as unlawful non-citizen
10 May 2018
Applicant withdrew application for Protection visa
15 May 2018
Applicant requested removal from Australia
16 May 2018
Applicant withdrew request for removal from Australia
12 July 2018
Applicant applied [for] Protection visa and associated Bridging visa E
16 July 2018
Bridging visa E application refused
24 July 2018
Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed refusal of Bridging visa E
6 September 2018
Protection visa application refused
12 September 2018
Applicant applied for merit review of Protection visa refusal
22 February 2019
Administrative Appeals Tribunal remitted Protection visa application with direction that applicant is a refugee pursuant to s 5H(1)(a) of the Act
(Emphasis added.)
The current application originates from the protection visa application made by the Applicant on 12 July 2018, as listed in the table above. To be more precise, the application form was signed by the Applicant on 7 July 2018 (T8/96), was stamped as being received by the Department on 17 July 2018 (T8/75, 97), but was acknowledged in the notification of refusal letter as being lodged with the Department on 12 July 2018 (T11/131).
As the above timeline shows, the application was refused by the Department on
6 September 2018 (T11/131–134). On 12 September 2018, the Applicant lodged an application to review this refusal decision with the Migration and Refugee Division (MRD) of the Tribunal (T13/136–142). This application for review was successful and, in a decision dated 22 February 2019, the matter was remitted to the Department for reconsideration with the direction that the Applicant was a refugee within the meaning of s 5H(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) (T17/178–193).
However, the MRD Member who made the decision on 22 February 2019 provided the following clarification (T17/193):
The Tribunal notes that the material before it may give rise to issues relating to s 5H(2). The Migration and Refugee Division of this Tribunal has no power to determine s.5H(2) issues. As the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant is a refugee as defined in s.5H(1), the matter will be remitted to the Department for reconsideration, including consideration as to whether s.5H(1) does not apply in this instance, because of the application of s.5H(2).
Section 5H of the Migration Act provides:
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person:
(a)in a case where the person has a nationality—is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well‑founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)in a case where the person does not have a nationality—is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well‑founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note: For the meaning of well‑founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
(2)Subsection (1) does not apply if the Minister has serious reasons for considering that:
(a)the person has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined by international instruments prescribed by the regulations; or
(b)the person committed a serious non‑political crime before entering Australia; or
(c)the person has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 5H(2) was enacted to codify arts 1F(a), 1F(b) and 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (together referred to as the Refugees Convention) (see Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Caseload Legacy) Bill 2014 (Cth), at [1173] (Explanatory Memorandum)).
Article 1F of the Refugees Convention states that:
F.The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a)he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b)he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c)he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
In a letter dated 24 April 2019, the Applicant was invited to attend an interview “to discuss your visa application and your claims that you are a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations” (T18/197). The interview took place on 1 May 2019, and on
26 May 2019 the Applicant made post-interview submissions after listening to the recording of the interview (T19/199–204).
However, a delegate decided, in a decision dated 11 November 2019, to refuse to grant the Applicant a Permanent Protection (Subclass XA-866) Visa (the Visa) on the basis that the Applicant did not satisfy a criterion of s 36(2) of the Migration Act (T20/208–227). Section 36(2) provides, in part, that:
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; …
Specifically, the delegate was satisfied that there were serious reasons for considering that the Applicant had committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia, and therefore, by operation of s 5H(2) of the Migration Act, he was not a “refugee” (T20/223 and 227). In so finding, the delegate referred to two convictions and one charge recorded against the Applicant in Mongolia, being the:
(a)1991 hooliganism conviction;
(b)1994 murder conviction; and
(c)2015 murder charge.
It is the delegate’s decision of 11 November 2019 that is the Reviewable Decision currently before the Tribunal.
The Applicant signed to acknowledge receipt of the Reviewable Decision on approximately 30 December 2019 (T21/228–229).
On 24 January 2020, the Applicant lodged an application with the Tribunal seeking review of the Reviewable Decision (T2/6–11). The application for review was made to the MRD of the Tribunal. It appears that it took some months for Registry staff to identify that the application should be in the General Division of the Tribunal, given that the Tribunal’s Registry wrote to the Respondent on 20 August 2020 notifying the Respondent of the application for review and requesting lodgement of the s 37 (T-documents) within 28 days (T1/1–5).
ISSUE
A person may be eligible for a protection visa, where the person is a non-citizen in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection obligations, by virtue of their status as a refugee (ss 5H(1) and 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act).
However, if the Minister is satisfied that there are serious reasons for considering that the person committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia, the person does not satisfy the definition of a “refugee” in s 5H(1) of the Migration Act (s 5H(2)(b) of the Migration Act).
Therefore, the issue for determination in this application is whether the Tribunal is satisfied that there are “serious reasons” for considering that the Applicant committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia.
HEARING AND THE EVIDENCE
The application was initially listed for hearing on 31 March 2021. The Applicant appeared by videoconference from immigration detention, due to COVID-19 measures being in place at the detention centre, which prevented the transport of detainees. The Applicant was ready to proceed with the hearing at that time but, due to difficulties with sound quality, the hearing was adjourned.
The application was re-listed to be heard in person on 14 May 2021. However, the Applicant refused to be transported to the Tribunal when he was woken up by detention centre staff that morning. Upon being advised that the Applicant had refused to be transported to the hearing, the Tribunal’s Registry emailed a letter to the Applicant at the detention centre confirming that the hearing would be proceeding. A videoconference link with the detention centre was arranged so that the Applicant could appear. The Applicant appeared by videoconference but said that he did not know about the hearing. He asked for the hearing to be adjourned. However, a hearing notice of the re-listed hearing had been sent to him at the detention centre on 31 March 2021.
After hearing the Applicant’s submissions seeking an adjournment, as well as submissions from the Respondent’s legal representative opposing any adjournment, the Tribunal decided that the hearing should proceed and gave the following explanation to the Applicant (transcript/3):
GWRV, I’m inclined to say that we should proceed today. You were ready to proceed on 31 March and you knew that we would be having a hearing in the weeks following that. So I think you have had notice and plenty of time to prepare. So I think we need to go ahead today. I don’t really see that there’s very much benefit in delaying the hearing for much longer, because I wouldn’t be giving you the opportunity to file any further evidence and we really need to hear from you as to what your side of the story is. I don’t really see that there’s going to be any benefit to you to delaying the hearing further, and I don’t think that you’re going to be disadvantaged by proceeding today.
Consequently, the hearing proceeded on 14 May 2021, with the Applicant being self-represented and appearing by videoconference. The Applicant also gave evidence and was cross-examined through a Mongolian interpreter. Mr A Burgess of Sparke Helmore Lawyers appeared for the Respondent by videoconference.
The following material was admitted into evidence at the hearing:
(d)the Applicant’s statement (approximately five typed pages), dated 8 December 2020 (Exhibit 1);
(e)s 37 documents (T-documents), numbered T1–T23, consisting of pages 1–237 (Exhibit 2); and
(f)US State Department Country Reports 1995, Mongolia, dated March 1996 (US State Report) (Exhibit 3).
After the hearing, on 23 June 2021, the Applicant sent the following correspondence by email to the Tribunal’s registry:
As per the previous email, the hearing on 31 March 2021 was postponed due technical issues, the date of the rescheduled meeting was unknown at the time. I was told that AAT will inform me of the date and time of the postponed meeting in person and by e‐mail. However, until the new meeting started, which was on 14 May 2021, I did not know that the meeting will be held on 14 May 2021. On 14 May 2021 I was sleeping in the room, and the officer woke me up, and told me that I am having a meeting with AAT. I was in shock, because I did not know that I would attend the meeting and I was unprepared. I told the officer and asked them if they could reschedule the meeting for another day, because I need to be prepared for that meeting in every aspect since it is an important meeting for me. But they refused to reschedule the meeting, and gave the meeting notice during the meeting on 14 May 2021. (copy is attached to this e‐mail, taken by mobile phone).*
As I was in shock and panic, had dizziness and was unprepared for a sudden meeting, therefore the meeting in my opinion was unsuccessful and I am not satisfied with the meeting process.
Thus I would like to redo the meeting. I would like to request for legal help (free lawyer) for me, because I need legal help and support for my case, and to attend the meeting with the lawyer. Besides, I also need a professional interpreter who can translate complicated case materials and sentences. From my previous experiences, because of the mistakes made by the interpreter there can be a misunderstanding of my statements and wrong communication. I would be very grateful if you would consider my above requests.
(*The attached document was a photograph of the emailed letter discussed at paragraph [19] above from the Tribunal’s Registry sent to the Applicant on the morning of the hearing after he refused to be transported to the hearing, confirming that the hearing would be proceeding.)
On 19 July 2021 the Respondent sent the following correspondence to the Tribunal by email, opposing the Applicant’s request for another hearing:
We refer to the attached correspondence from the applicant seeking for the matter to be reheard.
We are instructed to oppose the request for a second hearing of the matter which was heard to completion on 14 May 2021.
By way of background, the applicant has been in immigration detention since at least December 2019 (T21).
The applicant lodged his application in the Tribunal on 24 January 2020.
On 29 September 2020 the applicant sought an adjournment of a preliminary conference listed for 7 October 2020 so that he could seek the assistance of an interpreter to assist him with the T-documents that he had received. That adjournment request was granted by the Tribunal and the matter was listed for a directions hearing on 28 October 2020 and the applicant attended the directions hearing (with the assistance of an interpreter) and did not raise any request for an adjournment of the hearing listed for 31 May 2021. At the directions hearing, the applicant was directed to provide any further evidence upon which he intended to rely upon by 9 December 2020. The applicant provided a document entitled “statement and supporting evidence of [GWRV]” on 8 December 2020.
On 17 December 2020 the applicant was sent a listing notice, putting him on notice of the hearing listed for 31 March 2021. That hearing was unable to be conducted due to technical difficulties with the videolink and on that occasion SM Evans-Bonner advised she would relist the matter for 14 May 2021 in person. The applicant was also sent written notice of the new hearing date on that day.
On the morning of the hearing, the Tribunal and the Respondent were advised that the applicant was not ready for his transport and the Tribunal therefore decided to proceed to hear the matter by video-link. The applicant requested an adjournment of the hearing on that occasion because he said that he wasn’t ready and this request was refused by SM Evans-Bonner on the basis that the applicant had previously prepared for the hearing on 31 March 2021 and had been on notice of the rehearing for some time.
The hearing on 14 May 2021 proceeded without technical issue. At the hearing, the applicant was provided with an interpreter and did not raise any issue with the quality of the interpretation at the hearing. The applicant gave evidence and was cross examined on his evidence. The parties both gave closing submissions and closed their cases.
The applicant now seeks to restate the same objection which he made at hearing and which was refused. It appears that his request for an interpreter now relates to having the documents interpreted to him and not to do with the quality of interpretation at hearing. The applicant had previously been given an adjournment of the ADR to obtain any interpretation and had seven months between that request and the hearing to do so. Whilst the applicant states that he has previously experienced mistakes made by interpreters, he does not point to any difficulty or inaccuracies in the translations provided at the hearing on 14 April 2021. The applicant has also now requested the help of a pro-bono lawyer.
The request for a rehearing is opposed by the Respondent. The applicant has given his evidence and been cross examined on it. He has given and heard closing submissions at the hearing. To allow the applicant to reopen his case would cause procedural unfairness to the Respondent on the basis that the applicant already gave evidence and is privy to the conclusions that the Respondent seeks the Tribunal to make based on his answers to questions asked of him in cross examination. It would also be inconsistent with the Tribunal’s objective as stated in s2A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, having regard to the length of time that the application has been on foot whilst the applicant is detained at the expense of the Commonwealth.
The Tribunal agreed with the submissions of the Respondent and decided that it was appropriate to refuse the request for a re-hearing. Consequently, on 19 July 2021 the Tribunal made an order in the following terms:
After considering the Applicant’s request made on 23 June 2021 for a rehearing of this application (the Rehearing Application), together with the Respondent’s submissions in reply dated 19 July 2021, the Tribunal refuses to grant the Rehearing Application.
(Original emphasis.)
The Tribunal notes that the Applicant was ready to proceed at the earlier hearing on
31 March 2021 and had notice of the rescheduled hearing. No further evidence or submissions were filed between 31 March 2021 and 14 May 2021 which would require additional preparation. No issues regarding the quality of the interpreting were apparent to the Tribunal during the hearing on 14 May 2021, and none were raised by the Applicant until his email of 23 June 2021, which was over a month after the hearing. Neither were any issues about obtaining legal representation raised by the Applicant with the Tribunal on 31 March 2021 or 14 May 2021. Further, the ability to test the Applicant’s evidence at a re-hearing may be compromised, given that he is on notice of the questions that are likely be asked of him under cross-examination.
Indeed, at the hearing on 14 May 2021, the Applicant was able to competently represent himself. He gave detailed evidence, and appeared to have no difficulty with his recollection, including being able to reference specific dates that certain events occurred.
Having regard to these circumstances and the Tribunal’s objectives in s 2A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal is of the view that a re-hearing would not be fair or just, and that to grant a rehearing in these circumstances would not promote public trust and confidence in the decision-making processes of the Tribunal. Further, it would not be economical or quick to prolong the application further.
DID THE APPLICANT COMMIT A SERIOUS NON-POLITICAL CRIME BEFORE ENTERING AUSTRALIA?
Non-political crime
“Non-political crime” is defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act, which states that:
non‑political crime:
(a)subject to paragraph (b), means a crime where a person’s motives for committing the crime were wholly or mainly non‑political in nature; and
(b)includes an offence that, under paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the definition of political offence in section 5 of the Extradition Act 1988, is not a political offence in relation to a country for the purposes of that Act.
(Original emphasis.)
Section 5 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) defines “political offence”. Notably, it does not include an act of violence against a person’s life or liberty:
political offence, in relation to a country, means an offence against the law of the country that is of a political character (whether because of the circumstances in which it is committed or otherwise and whether or not there are competing political parties in the country), but does not include:
(a)an offence that involves an act of violence against a person’s life or liberty; or
(b)an offence prescribed by regulations for the purposes of this paragraph to be an extraditable offence in relation to the country or all countries; or
(c)an offence prescribed by regulations for the purposes of this paragraph not to be a political offence in relation to the country or all countries.
(Original emphasis.)
The Respondent contends that there are two offences and one charge that the Applicant was convicted of or charged with in Mongolia that constitute non-political crimes.
1991 hooliganism conviction
Firstly, the Applicant admitted that he served a sentence of imprisonment in Mongolia between 1991 and 1994 for “hooliganism”. The MRD Member who made the decision on 22 February 2019 noted in his statement of decision and reasons, at paragraph [44] that this conviction “related to gang violence whilst he was at college in which he cut a person’s hand” (T17/189). Otherwise, there is minimal information before the Tribunal about this conviction, including no reference or explanation of the offence in any of the Applicant’s written statements, other than in the Applicant’s post-interview statement (T19/200; see also T20/215 and 218). In this statement, the Applicant said:
In 1991 i was a student. In the dormitory two guys initiated a fight. Court decided it was hooliganism and i was given 3 years sentence for hooliganism.
(Without alteration.)
1994 murder conviction
The Applicant also admitted that he was convicted of “[m]urder without aggravating circumstances” (T19/201) in Mongolia in 1994.
A translated statement from the General Agency for Enforcement of Judicial Decision Imprisonment Service dated 29 January 2018 confirmed that the Applicant was sentenced to a term of 15 years’ imprisonment, of which he served approximately 11 years (T19/203):
in accordance with article No. 91.1 of the special chapter No.91 of Criminal Code of Mongolia, [the Applicant] … was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment under the protocol No.57 by the Court of the Capital city dated from 21 Jun 1994, in prison camp [number omitted] and was released from this prison camp on 09th Jun 2005 before the deadline of his imprisonment.
In a written statement sent to the Department on 19 July 2018, the Applicant explained (T10/107):
· In 1994, I was very young, just 22 years old. I was very close to my younger brother [name omitted], who is 2 years younger. On 01/10/1994, my younger brother came from overseas trip and outside of the entrance hall of my apartment building as he said he met his old friend. His old friend was drunk and demanded vodka from my brother because he knew that my brother just came from overseas. I was entering my home and met them outside of my apartment. I saw my brother refusing to buy his friend vodka as he was very drunk. I said to his friend that he was very drunk so we won’t buy vodka for him, so please go home. But he started arguing with me. Our conversation shortly turned into an argument and during the brawl he punched me. And then my younger brother told him that he punched an innocent person and during brawl my brother hit him in the face, so his friend fell on the ground. While falling, he hit the ground by his head and later died in hospital. Because of this incident, I and my younger brother were accused for murder. I did not kill the man, but I was there in company of my brother. Two brothers of one family were accused for murder and at that time, because my younger brother’s wife expecting a child, I pleaded guilty for manslaughter.
· So this way, and also under the mounting pressure from police, I was convicted for 15 years of imprisonment. I spent time in jail from Oct 1994 to Jun 2005 after spending 10 years in prison. I was released early because of my exemplary behaviour during my jail time.
(Without alteration.)
The Applicant also explained in his post-interview statement (T19/200):
in 1994 the crime of which I was convicted for manslaughter, I was given a 15 year sentence for which I served 10 years. Again to mention, I did not commit the crime. The person who argued with my brother hit me, after which i fell down and was unconscious for a while. When I wake up my brother already hit the man and after taken to the hospital the man died. It was so hard for my family if two brothers from one family will be imprisoned. Also at that time my brother’s wife was pregnant and there were only starting to build a life and waiting for a baby, so therefore I took all the responsibility on me and by that helped my brother.
(Without alteration.)
2015 murder charge
The third alleged offence formed the basis of the MRD Member finding on 22 February 2019 that the Applicant was a refugee under s 5H(1) of the Migration Act. The facts were summarised by the delegate (T20/211) as follows:
In May 2014, [the Applicant] loaned the equivalent of around $40,000AUD to his mother’s relative named [Z*] on a six month term. Z then missed the loan interest repayments and tried to hide from the applicant. Eventually the applicant spoke with Z’s friend, and allowed the friend to audio record the applicant saying he will kill Z if he does not repay the loan. In November 2014, Z’s wife brought the money he owed to the applicant’s office.
On 27 May 2015, the applicant returned to Ulaanbaatar from an organised tour to the Russian Federation. He was arrested that day in connection with the stabbing murder of Z in the early morning of 22 May. The applicant protested his innocence. He told the police he was on his way to Russia at the time of the murder and was not in Ulaanbaatar.
On 8 June 2015, the applicant was detained and charged with murder under clause 35.3 of the Criminal Law of Mongolia and clause 91.2.11 of the Special Part of the Criminal Law of Mongolia. The applicant claims the police had the audio recording of him threatening to kill Z as recorded by Z’s friend and were also prejudiced against him because of his previous manslaughter conviction.
On 2 July 2015, the Khan Uul District Court found there was no proof the applicant committed murder and ordered he be released on bail. The applicant later learned a man named [K*] was arrested for the murder. The applicant then continued his business activities and travelled overseas a number of times.
In January 2018, the applicant learned the police in Mongolia wanted to question him again because they believe the applicant paid K to kill Z. The applicant claims that K is now free on bail.
The applicant claimed that if he returns to Mongolia, he will be falsely accused and convicted of Z’s murder. He fears he will be detained, and that under Mongolian law, he can be held on remand for up to 2.5 years. The applicant claims he will be denied bail because the police will think he will compromise the investigation and influence witnesses.
(*Names omitted and replaced with a letter throughout these reasons.)
In the translated transcript of K’s appeal court hearing, the findings of the “Capital City Criminal Court of Appeal” (Court of Appeal) included the following statement implicating the Applicant (T16/174):
When reviewing these statements from all sides, witnesses herein made a true and informed statement. In that K is ordered by others to an intentional and organised murder of Z in order to keep [the Applicant] under his threats and source his living expenses from [the Applicant]. Therefore, it is established that he killed Z in order to create an economic advantage for himself. In examining the behaviour of the victim and the accused as well as personal relationships with others and as a result of comparative analysis of circumstantial evidence, it was concluded that K has engaged in an aggravated assault on the life of the victim. This conclusion is legitimate and fully justified with legal bounds, and correct laws were applied when decision is made. Here forth, the Appeals Court concludes that the decision from the First Instance Court has established the true nature of the crime correctly.
The Court of Appeal also stated the following in its findings, further implicating the Applicant as having ordered for Z to be killed (T16/176):
Although the defendant K was not acquainted with the victim Z, he still discussed with [the Applicant] about the victim. [The Applicant] directed the defendant to the victim’s home, the defendant then study the victim’s behavior, schedule, routes he took and observed his car and home for a period of time before attacking him from behind and stabbing the victim on his way home. It is established that the witness testimonies in case files, written reports, physical and circumstantial evidence are sufficient to conclude K committed this crime by organizing and planning beforehand by the order of others to create and gain a material and non-material advantage to himself and others. This decision is legitimate and fully justified within legal bounds. The accused [the Applicant] left the country on 29 April 2016, while being investigated in relation to this crime. …
Firstly, the Tribunal notes that the convictions for hooliganism in 1991 and murder in 1994, as well as the alleged contract killing resulting in the 2015 murder charge, were committed before the Applicant came to Australia.
The 1991 hooliganism conviction was a gang related incident, which involved an act of violence when the Applicant was a student, where the Applicant got into a fight in a dormitory and cut a person’s hand. The 1994 murder conviction resulted from a fight the Applicant and his brother had with an old friend who was drunk. The victim of the alleged contract killing offence that resulted in the 2015 murder charge owed the Applicant money. The latter two offences involved acts of violence against a person’s life and are therefore not political offences according to s 5 of the Extradition Act. None of the three offences have a political aspect. That is, they involve acts of violence against a person in social or business contexts.
Consequently, the Tribunal finds that each of the Applicant’s crimes and his alleged crime were non-political and were committed before he entered Australia.
Serious non-political crime
A “serious non‑political crime” is not defined in s 5H(2) of the Migration Act. However, s 5(1) of the Migration Act defines the terms “serious foreign offence” and “serious Australian offence” as follows:
serious Australian offence means an offence against a law in force in Australia, where:
(a)the offence:
(i) involves violence against a person; or
(ii) is a serious drug offence; or
(iii) involves serious damage to property; or
(iv) is an offence against section 197A or 197B (offences relating to immigration detention); and
(b)the offence is punishable by:
(i) imprisonment for life; or
(ii) imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than 3 years; or
(iii) imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than 3 years.
serious foreign offence means an offence against a law in force in a foreign country, where:
(a)the offence:
(i) involves violence against a person; or
(ii) is a serious drug offence; or
(iii) involves serious damage to property; and
(b)if it were assumed that the act or omission constituting the offence had taken place in the Australian Capital Territory, the act or omission would have constituted an offence (the Territory offence) against a law in force in that Territory, and the Territory offence would have been punishable by:
(i) imprisonment for life; or
(ii) imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than 3 years; or
(iii) imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than 3 years.
(Original emphasis.)
Both definitions include offences involving violence against a person and which are punishable by a fixed or maximum term of not less than three years’ imprisonment. Further, the definition of a “serious foreign offence” uses the law in force in the Australian Capital Territory as a comparative benchmark to determine whether an offence committed overseas is a “serious foreign offence”.
The Respondent referred the Tribunal (see RSFIC, para [37]) to JSDW and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 2420 (JSDW) which concerned art 1F of the Refugees Convention and s 36(2C) of the Migration Act. Deputy President Kendall (now his Honour Judge Kendall) and Deputy President Boyle, at [38], accepted the following:
JSDW concedes that the definitions of “serious Australian offence” and “serious foreign offence” are not exhaustive, but submits that they should “serve as a benchmark for indicating what sort of offences may be considered serious enough to warrant exclusion under Article 1F(b) and s 36(2C)” … The Tribunal does not disagree with this proposition.
The Tribunal notes that although the observations made by the Tribunal in JSDW concerned s 36(2C)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act, they are equally applicable to this application concerning s 5H(2) because both subsections use the same definitions.
When compared with the definitions of a “serious Australian offence” and a “serious foreign offence” above, it is observed that each of the Applicant’s offences, including his alleged contract murder offence, involve violence against a person. Regarding the Applicant’s 1994 murder conviction, comparatively the offence of “murder” in the Australian Capital Territory is punishable by a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (s 12, Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act)).
With respect to the alleged 2015 murder charge, s 45(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) which concerns “complicity and common purpose” provides that “[a] person is taken to have committed an offence if the person aids, abets, counsels, procures, or is knowingly concerned in or a party to, the commission of the offence by someone else”. Due to the operation of s 45, procurement of a murder is punishable by the same penalty as if the person committed that murder (s 45(7), Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code).
An offence equivalent to the 1991 “hooliganism” conviction does not exist in the ACT statutes. The Respondent submitted, and the Tribunal agrees, that the offence of “affray” under s 35A(1) of the Crimes Act is an approximate equivalent. Whilst this offence involves violence against a person, the maximum term of imprisonment is two years which falls short of the three-year maximum contemplated by the definitions of “serious Australian offence” and “serious foreign offence”.
Further guidance as to what may constitute a “serious non-political crime” for the purpose of s 5H(2) of the Migration Act can be found in Court and Tribunal decisions that have considered the phrase.
Further examples of “serious crime” in the context of art 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention are given in paragraph [40] of the Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Background Note) which relevantly states:
Examples of ‘serious’ crimes include murder, rape, arson and armed robbery. Certain other offences could also be deemed serious if they are accompanied by the use of deadly weapons, involve serious injury to persons, or there is evidence of serious habitual criminal conduct or other similar factors. On the other hand, crimes such as petty theft or the possession for personal use of illicit narcotic substances would not meet the seriousness threshold of Article 1F(b).
In Applicant NADB of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 126 FCR 453; [2002] FCAFC 326 (NADB), the Full Court of the Federal Court provided the following guidance, at 465 [41]:
The courts in the common law jurisdictions have rejected the views expressed in the UNHCR Handbook and by eminent writers that Art 1F(b) requires a balancing test. Those views appear to be based upon a policy allegedly underlying Art 1F(b) that a person should not be denied the protection of the Refugees Convention unless the seriousness of the crime outweighs the risk of the persecution the person is likely to suffer if he or she is refouled to his or her country of nationality. The difficulty with that view is that the policy underlying Art 1F(b) is to be found in the Article's specification of the criterion for exclusion to be the commission of a ‘serious non-political crime’ prior to the person’s admission into the intended country of refuge. Thus, the Article provides that the commission of such a crime, of itself, is sufficient to exclude the person in question from the protection of the Refugees Convention. In the context of the limited manner in which the Refugees Convention has been incorporated into municipal law in Australia (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1 at 15-16; 187 ALR 574 at 584) the purpose of Art 1F(b) is clear; if a person has committed a serious non-political crime prior to the person’s admission into the intended country of refuge he or she is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. In determining whether the disqualifying crime is ‘serious’ it is appropriate to have regard to the fact that it must be of such a nature as to result in Australia not having protection obligations to persons who commit such crimes. However, there is no textual or contextual basis for reading into Art 1F(b) an additional requirement of a balancing test nor would such a requirement be justified on the basis that it is giving effect to a purpose or object of Art 1F(b) of the Refugees Convention.
In summary, the Full Court in NADB confirmed that the Tribunal does not have to balance the risk of persecution against the nature of the serious non-political crime. If the Tribunal has serious reasons for considering that a person has committed a serious non-political crime, that alone is enough to exclude the person from the protection of the Refugees Convention.
Relying on the above authorities, as well as the comparative provisions in the Crimes Act and the Criminal Code, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant’s 1994 murder conviction, for which he was convicted and served approximately 11 years’ imprisonment, is a “serious non-political crime”. The Background Note specifically refers to “murder” as being an example of a serious crime and the Tribunal is of the opinion that murder is a crime of such a nature as to result in Australia not having protection obligations towards persons who commit such a crime (NADB). For the same reasons, the Tribunal is also of the view that the Applicant’s 2015 murder charge, which concerns a contract killing, is similarly serious, and meets the definition of a “serious non-political crime”.
The Tribunal notes that the Respondent does not contend that the 1991 “hooliganism” conviction meets the threshold definition of a serious non-political crime (RSFIC, paragraph [42]). The Tribunal agrees. Although violence was involved in this offence, the comparative offence of affray is only punishable by a maximum of two years’ imprisonment and so the offence does not meet the definition of a “serious Australian offence” or a “serious foreign offence”. The Tribunal is not of the opinion that the offence of “hooliganism” is so serious as to result in Australia not owing protection obligations towards the Applicant.
Serious reasons for considering
Having found that the 1994 murder conviction and the 2015 murder charge were serious non-political crimes committed, or allegedly committed, outside of Australia, the Tribunal now turns to the “serious reasons for considering” aspect of the issue for determination. That is, whether there are serious reasons for considering that the Applicant committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia.
The Migration Act does not define what constitutes “serious reasons for considering”. However, the Explanatory Memorandum states at paragraph [1173] that:
Consistent with the Refugees Convention, the threshold for a person to satisfy the paragraphs in new subsection 5H(2) is that the Minister has serious reasons for considering the person is captured by the subsection. ‘Serious reasons for considering’ is not intended to be equated with a level of satisfaction ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ or ‘on the balance of probabilities’ but requires strong evidence.
The Explanatory Memorandum continued to explain that:
New subsection 5H(2) is intended to be interpreted consistently with the existing Australian case law in regards to Article 1F of the Refugees Convention.
Numerous judicial authorities have considered the phrase, “serious reasons for considering”, in the context of art 1F of the Refugees Convention. These will now be discussed.
In Dhayakpa v the Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556 at 563, French J made the following observations about Article 1F of the Refugees Convention:
Article 1F excludes from the application of the Convention persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed the classes of crime or been guilty of the classes of act there specified. The use of the words ‘serious reasons for considering that’ suggests that it is unnecessary for the receiving State to make a positive or concluded finding about the commission of a crime or act of the class referred to. It appears to be sufficient that there be strong evidence of the commission of one or other of the relevant crimes or acts. The precise construction of that phrase does not fall for consideration in the present case as it is not in dispute that the crime relied upon by the Tribunal to ground the rejection of the claim for refugee status was committed.
In Arquita v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 321; [2000] FCA 1889 (Arquita), Weinberg J at 330–331, cited the above passage from Dhayakpa (noting that the AAT had followed a line of authority of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Re Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 173; [1992] 2 FC 306). His Honour then provided the following summary of other relevant cases (at 331 [40]–[42]) where the phrase “serious reasons for considering” has been judicially considered:
40This dictum by French J was accepted as correctly stating the relevant legal principles in Ovcharuk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 153 ALR 385; 27 AAR 203 by Marshall J at first instance. His Honour said at ALR 388:
Notwithstanding that French J's views about the words “serious reasons for considering” were not central to his reasons for judgment and notwithstanding that Mr Dhayakpa had been found guilty of conspiracy, whereas Mr Ovcharuk has not, I consider his Honour’s approach to the meaning of those words to be highly persuasive.
41On appeal, the Full Court in Ovcharuk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 88 FCR 17; 51 ALD 549; 158 ALR 289 also considered the construction of Art 1F. In that context, Whitlam J at 294 observed:
What is most striking to me about Art 1F is the plain, matter-of-fact requirement that there should be “serious reasons for considering that” a person “has committed” a specified type of crime (paras (a) and (b)), or “has been guilty” of the proscribed acts: para (c). Charges or convictions are not required. Indeed, in some cases, even though a person claiming to be a refugee has been charged with or convicted of an offence, it may be perfectly clear that there are no serious reasons to consider that person has committed a crime. In other cases, such facts may be strongly probative of such serious reasons. It all depends on the facts of the particular case.
42In W97/164 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] AATA 618 (unreported, AAT, President Mathews, No 12974, 10 June 1998) Mathews J, sitting as President of the AAT, reviewed the authorities governing the meaning to be ascribed to the expression “serious reasons for considering” in Art 1F(b). Her Honour said:
... I do not agree with the standard which was set in Ramirez. I find it difficult to accept that the requirement that there be “serious reasons for considering” that a crime against humanity has been committed should be pitched so low as to fall, in all cases, beneath the civil standard of proof. The seriousness of the allegation itself and the extreme consequences which can flow from an affirmative finding upon it would, in my view, require a decision-maker to give substantial content to the requirement that there be “serious reasons for considering” that such a crime has been committed. The process whereby the seriousness of the allegation influences the level of proof required to substantiate it is well known to Australian courts (Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; 44 ALR 334 ; 12 ALJR 100, Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; 46 ALR 298; 14 ALJR 196. [Emphasis added]
See also N96/1441 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] AATA 619 (unreported, AAT, President Mathews, No 12977, 11 June 1998); and W98/45 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] AATA 948 (unreported, AAT, President Mathews, No 13450, 17 August 1998).
After reviewing these authorities in Arquita, Weinberg J relevantly concluded, at 333 [51]–[55], that:
51It was for the AAT to determine, upon all the evidence, whether Art 1F operated so as to preclude the applicant from being considered for the grant of a protection visa. As Branson J said in Ovcharuk at FCR 186; ALD 561; ALR 301:
Whether there are serious reasons for so considering will depend upon the whole of the evidence and other material before the decision-maker.
52I regard the observations of French J in Dhayakpa as being particularly helpful in elucidating the meaning of the expression ‘serious reasons for considering’. It was unnecessary, in accordance with those observations, for the AAT to ‘make a positive or concluded finding about the commission of a crime’. It was sufficient if there was ‘strong evidence of the commission of’ the crime specified.
53In my view the applicant’s contention that Art 1F(b) requires the relevant decision-maker to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant has committed a serious non-political crime cannot be sustained. Nor can his alternative contention that Art 1F(b) requires proof on the balance of probabilities. There is nothing in the language of Art 1F(b) that suggests it should be read as imposing upon a decision-maker an obligation to apply either of these curial standards of proof.
54It is sufficient, in my view, if the material before the decision-maker demonstrates that there is evidence available upon which it could reasonably and properly be concluded that the applicant has committed the crime alleged. To meet that requirement the evidence must be capable of being regarded as ‘strong’. It need not, however, be of such weight as to persuade the decision-maker beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the applicant. Nor need it be of such weight as to do so on the balance of probabilities. Evidence may properly be characterised as ‘strong’ without meeting either of these requirements.
55To the extent that the reasons of Mathews J in W97/164 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; N96/1441 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; and W98/45 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs suggest to the contrary, I respectfully disagree.
In FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 310 ALR 1; [2014] HCA 26 (FTZK), French CJ and Gageler J at 8–9 [14] said the following with respect to the construction of Article 1F(b):
The qualifying term ‘serious’ indicates that the reasons must be sufficient to support a strong inference. There are a variety of mechanisms, administrative and judicial, by which a receiving state may determine whether that threshold is reached. Weinberg J, in a careful consideration of the construction of Art 1F(b) in Arquita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stated the position accurately when he said (at [54]):
[54]It is sufficient ... if the material before the decision-maker demonstrates that there is evidence available upon which it could reasonably and properly be concluded that the applicant has committed the crime alleged. To meet that requirement the evidence must be capable of being regarded as “strong”. It need not, however, be of such weight as to persuade the decision-maker beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the applicant. Nor need it be of such weight as to do so on the balance of probabilities. Evidence may properly be characterised as “strong” without meeting either of these requirements.
Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC and Lord Dyson MR observed in Al-Sirri v Home Secretary (at [75]):
[75]It is unnecessary to import our domestic standards of proof into the question. The circumstances of refugee claims, and the nature of the evidence available, are so variable.
Underpinning the requirement for strong evidence is a consciousness of the potentially profound adverse consequences of exclusion from the protection of the Refugees Convention for a person otherwise entitled to that protection.
(Footnotes omitted.)
The above authorities concerned art 1F of the Refugee Convention. However, in ZYVZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 28, Colvin J considered the phrase “significant reasons for considering” in the context of
s 36(2C) of the Migration Act. For the reasons explained at paragraph [46] above, his Honour’s analysis is equally relevant to this application concerning s 5H(2) of the Migration Act. At [24]–[26], his Honour stated:[24]I note that at the time of the decisions in Arquita and FTZK, the form of the legislation was to incorporate the provisions of the Convention as expressing Australian law. That form led the Court in FTZK to consider the meaning of the provisions as a matter of international law. Such meaning depends upon the construction which the international community would attribute to the treaty and the application of the principles codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19 at [22].
[25]The present form of the legislation is different. It enacts a provision which reflects the language of the Convention as Commonwealth statute law. However, it may be comfortably concluded that the law was intended to give effect to Australia’s treaty obligations. As explained by Edelman J in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [69]–[71] the scheme for complementary protection was introduced into the Migration Act for the express purpose of conforming its terms to the requirements of the Convention: see also Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ at [1]. Therefore, a construction which accords with those obligations should be favoured: Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 38; and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J).
[26]For those reasons, the phrase ‘significant reasons for considering’ should be interpreted in the manner described in FTZK.
As noted by Whitlam J in in Ovcharuk v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 549; [1998] FCA 1314, “charges or convictions are not required” in order for there to be “serious reasons for considering” that a person has committed a serious non-political crime. However, in these circumstances the Applicant pled guilty to the offence of murder, was convicted in a court of law, and served a prison sentence of approximately 11 years for the crime.
The Tribunal notes the US State Report says the following about the independence of the Mongolian judicial system (Exhibit 3):
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary. The courts are independent, and there is no evidence that they discriminate against any group, or that decisions are made for political reasons. …
All accused persons are guaranteed due process, legal defense, and a public trial, although closed proceedings are permitted in cases involving crimes against the State, rape cases involving minors, and particularly brutal murders.
The Tribunal finds that the fact of the Applicant’s conviction and sentence constitutes strong evidence of the commission of the crime (Explanatory Memorandum; Dhayakpa; Arquita). Although the Applicant denies that he committed the 1994 murder and asserts that he took the blame for his brother, his evidence was inconsistent. In one version of events, the Applicant was conscious when his brother punched his friend to the ground (T10/107 at paragraph [35] above), and on another version the Applicant stated that he was unconscious at the time his brother delivered the fatal blow to his friend (T19/200 at paragraph [36] above). Even if these versions of events could be reconciled, there is no independent evidence to support the Applicant’s assertion that he did not commit the offence and that he took the blame for his brother. It would not be logically probative for the Tribunal to accept the Applicant’s uncorroborated version of events over the facts of a conviction found by a court when there is no evidence to suggest that the Tribunal should doubt the integrity of the judicial process of that court.
Therefore, the Tribunal finds that it can “reasonably and properly be concluded that the Applicant committed the crime [that is, the 1994 murder conviction] alleged” (Arquita; see also FTZK; ZYVZ). Consequently, the Applicant does not meet the definition of a “refugee” in s 5H(1) of the Migration Act.
It is therefore unnecessary for the Tribunal to consider whether there are “serious reasons for considering” that the Applicant has committed a serious non-political crime with respect to the 2015 murder charge. For completeness, the Applicant denied having any involvement with this offence, stating that he was travelling to Russia at the time that it occurred. However, the Court of Appeal, in its findings concerning K’s appeal, clearly implicated the Applicant in procuring K to murder Z (see above paragraphs [38]–[39]). Although K denied that he was ordered by the Applicant to murder Z, the Court of Appeal disagreed and accepted the testimony of several witnesses who confirmed that the Applicant had made threats against the victim, Z, including threats to kill the victim, as being truthful (T16/174–175). Specifically, as was noted above at paragraph [38], the Court of Appeal stated that, “[w]hen reviewing these statements from all sides, witnesses herein made a true and informed statement”. The Court of Appeal also referred to the Applicant leaving the country while he was being investigated (see above, paragraph [39]).
Based on the findings of the Court of Appeal, and the lack of any other evidence to support the Applicant’s assertion that he was not involved, the Tribunal finds that it has “serious reasons for considering” that the Applicant committed the crime which was the subject of the 2015 murder charge. However, this finding is not material because, as the Tribunal has explained above, the Tribunal’s finding regarding the 1994 murder conviction is sufficient to exclude the Applicant from being a refugee for the purpose of s 5H(1) of the Migration Act.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal is satisfied that there are “serious reasons” to consider that the Applicant committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia.
DECISION
The Reviewable Decision, being the delegate’s decision of 11 November 2019, is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
...[Sgd].....................................................................
Associate
Dated: 10 August 2021
Date of hearing: 14 May 2021 Applicant: Self-represented Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr A Burgess, Sparke Helmore Lawyers
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