Evidence-Onus of proof-Issue of criminal offence arising in civil action-Direction
unduly accentuating civil standard-New trial-Will-Beneficiary alleged to have killed testator-Exclusion from benefit-Acquittal on criminal charge- Conclusiveness-Admissibility
A testatrix died of strychnine poisoning, and the person who by her last will was appointed executor and constituted residuary devisee and legatee was tried upon indictment for her murder. He was acquitted. Notwith- standing his acquittal proceedings were brought by one of her next of kin for the purpose of establishing that in fact he did unlawfully kill the testatrix and on that ground was disabled from occupying the office of executor or taking under the will. The question was tried with a jury. The evidence in support of the issue was entirely circumstantial. The judge in the course of a charge to the jury adverse to the defendant emphasized the difference between the standards of proof upon a criminal charge and upon a civil issue and laid weight on the slightness of the preponderance of probability upon which they might find that he poisoned the testatrix. After deliberating upon their verdict for some time the jury sought a further direction upon the "point about probabilities." The judge gave a further direction, which amounted to an instruction to find homicide if they considered there was any greater probability favouring that conclusion. The jury found that the defendant unlawfully killed the testatrix.
Held (1) that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support such a finding (2) by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. (Starke J. expressing no concluded opinion), that the defendant's acquittal did not prevent the applica- tion of the rule of public policy excluding from the office of executor and from benefits under a will a person who unlawfully killed a testator and did not operate to conclude the issue of the defendant's innocence or guilt and was not even admissible as an evidentiary fact upon that issue but (3) that there had been a mistrial because, though the standard of persuasion required in support of an indictment did not apply, nevertheless the effect of the judge's direction and further direction would be to lead the jury (a) to disregard the gravity of the issue and to lose sight of the consideration that reasonable satisfaction is not independent of the nature of the fact to be proved SO that
the graver the allegation the greater should be the strictness of proof demanded, and (b) to think that they should make a mere comparison of the probabilities of guilt with those of innocence rather than to consider whether they were really satisfied that the defendant did kill the testatrix.
Observations of Lord Atkin in New York v. Heirs of Phillips Deceased, (1939) 3 All E.R. 952, at p. 955, explained.
Decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Full Court): In re Roche; Allen v. Helton, (1940) Q.S.R. 1, reversed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Queensland.
The appellant, Edwin Claude Helton, was tried twice for the murder of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Helton v Allen [1940] HCA 20
Case
[1940] HCA 20
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland concerning a dispute over a will. The appellant, Helton, was appointed executor and residuary beneficiary under the will of the deceased, Margaret Jane Roche. The respondent, Isabella Allen, a next of kin, sought to have the provisions benefiting Helton removed from the will, alleging that Helton had unlawfully killed the testatrix. Helton had previously been tried for murder and acquitted.
The central legal issues before the High Court were: (1) whether Helton's prior acquittal on a criminal charge of murder precluded the civil court from determining whether he had unlawfully killed the testatrix for the purposes of the rule of public policy preventing a killer from benefiting from their victim's estate; (2) whether the acquittal was admissible as evidence in the civil proceedings; and (3) whether the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the standard of proof in a civil case involving an allegation of crime were adequate.
The Court held that Helton's acquittal on the criminal charge did not prevent the application of the rule of public policy, nor did it operate to conclude the issue of his guilt or innocence in the civil proceedings. The acquittal was not admissible as evidentiary fact. However, the Court found that there had been a mistrial. This was because the judge's directions, particularly a further direction given in response to the jury's query about probabilities, unduly emphasized the civil standard of proof. The directions were found to have led the jury to disregard the gravity of the allegation and to focus on a mere comparison of probabilities rather than on whether they were reasonably satisfied that Helton had killed the testatrix.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland, and ordered a new trial. The costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellant, with the costs of the abortive trial to abide the result of the new trial.