Re Minister for Resources; Ex parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   RE MINISTER FOR RESOURCES; EX PARTE CAZALY IRON PTY LTD [2007] WASCA 175

CORAM:   WHEELER JA

PULLIN JA
BUSS JA

HEARD:   19 & 20 MARCH 2007

DELIVERED          :   28 AUGUST 2007

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1808 of 2006

MATTER                :Application for a Writ of Certiorari against the MINISTER FOR RESOURCES

EX PARTE

CAZALY IRON PTY LTD (ACN 101 049 334)
Applicant

AND

MINISTER FOR RESOURCES
First Respondent

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD (ACN 008 676 417)
WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LTD (ACN 008 677 021)
HAMERSLEY RESOURCES LTD (ACN 004 887 656)
Second Respondents

Catchwords:

Prerogative writs - Application for writ of certiorari and declaratory relief - Minister exercised power under s 111A(1)(c) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA) and terminated applicant's application for an exploration licence - Whether the Minister took into account irrelevant matters - Minister's discretionary power in relation to the grant of an exploration licence - Construction of s 111A(1)(c) - Whether State's Iron Ore Policy is inconsistent with the Mining Act or an irrelevant consideration - Relevant matters which may be taken into account in exercising the power under s 111A(1)(c) - Whether the Minister failed independently to exercise his discretion by having regard to State's Iron Ore Policy - Whether the decision to terminate the applicant's application was based on reasonable grounds in the public interest - Wednesbury unreasonableness - Whether the Minister failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness

Legislation:

Acts Amendment (Mining) Act 1981 (WA)
Acts Amendment (Mining) Act 1982 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 3(1), s 19
Iron Ore (Rhodes Ridge) Agreement Authorisation Act 1972 (WA)
Mining Act 1904 (WA) (repealed)
Mining Act 1978 (WA), s 9(1), s 42(3), s 48, s 57, s 59, s 61, s 62, s 63, s 65, s 66, s 69A, s 69B, s 69C, s 69D, s 69E, s 70A, s 70B, s 70C, s 70D, s 70I, s 70IA, s 70J, s 70L, s 75, s 78, s 85, s 98, s 99, s 100, s 101, s 102, s 102A, s 103, s 105A, s 111A, s 155
Mining Act Amendment Act 1993 (WA)
Mining Amendment Act 1985 (WA)
Mining Amendment Act 1987 (WA)
Mining Amendment Act 1994 (WA)
Mining Amendment Act 2004 (WA)
Mining Regulations 1981 (WA), reg 22A, reg 23AB
Mining (Validation and Amendment) Act 1986 (WA)

Result:

Order nisi discharged
Declaratory relief refused

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr M J McCusker QC & Mr R J Price

First Respondent           :     Mr R M Mitchell & Ms K H Glancy

Second Respondents     :     Mr K J Martin QC & Mr P C S Van Hattem

Solicitors:

Applicant:     DLA Phillips Fox

First Respondent           :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Second Respondents     :     Allens Arthur Robinson

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd sought to overturn a decision by the Minister for Resources to terminate its application for an exploration licence under section 111A(1)(c) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA). The applicant claimed that the Minister failed to exercise his discretion independently, improperly considered the State's Iron Ore Policy, and did not act in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's exercise of power was lawful, whether the Iron Ore Policy was an irrelevant consideration, and if the decision was based on reasonable grounds in the public interest.

The court examined the nature of the Minister's discretion under section 111A(1)(c) of the Mining Act, noting that the decision-maker must act in good faith and cannot be arbitrary or capricious. The court highlighted the difficulty in reviewing decisions based on opinion or policy, but found that if the evidence is all one way, it may be possible to establish error. In this case, the court concluded that the Minister was required to assess whether it was in the public interest that the relevant land should not be disturbed or the application should not be granted. The court held that the Minister's satisfaction with the public interest was a jurisdictional fact, which need not be a 'fact' in the ordinary meaning of the term.

The court found that the Minister's decision to terminate the applicant's application was not Wednesbury unreasonable, and that the Minister's satisfaction was based on reasonable grounds in the public interest. The court also held that the Iron Ore Policy was not an irrelevant consideration, as it was relevant to the public interest assessment. Furthermore, the court found that the Minister accorded the applicant procedural fairness in the decision-making process. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and discharged the order nisi, refusing the applicant's request for declaratory relief.

Orders

Orders of the court

Order nisi discharged

Declaratory relief refused

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As Gummow J explained in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 651 [130], in the context of s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which entitled the prosecutor in that case to the grant of a visa only if the Minister were "satisfied" that the prosecutor answered the description in s 36(2) of that Act:"The 'jurisdictional fact', upon the presence of which jurisdiction is conditioned, need not be a 'fact' in the ordinary meaning of that term. The precondition or criterion may consist of various elements and whilst the phrase 'jurisdictional fact' is an awkward one in such circumstances it will, for convenience, be retained in what follows. In Bankstown Municipal Council v Fripp [(1919) 26 CLR 385 at 403], Isaacs and Rich JJ pointed out that, with the object of preventing litigation on questions of jurisdictional fact, the legislature may introduce into the criterion elements of opinion or belief by the decision‑maker." In Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110, Gibbs J observed, at 118, that it is not uncommon for statutes to provide that a decision‑maker shall or may take certain action if satisfied of the existence of specified matters. After noting that whether a decision under such a statute can be effectively reviewed by the courts will often largely depend on the nature of the matters of which the decision‑maker is required to be satisfied, his Honour said, at 118 ‑ 119:"In all such cases the authority must act in good faith; it cannot act merely arbitrarily or capriciously. Moreover, a person affected will obtain relief from the courts if he can show that the authority has misdirected itself in law or that it has failed to consider matters that it was required to consider or has taken irrelevant matters into account. Even if none of these things can be established, the courts will interfere if the decision reached by the authority appears so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could properly have arrived at it. However, where the matter of which the authority is required to be satisfied is a matter of opinion or policy or taste it may be very difficult to show that it has erred in one of these ways, or that its decision could not reasonably have been reached."In Eshetu, Gummow J cited that passage, at 653 ‑ 654 [136] ‑ [137], as authority for the proposition that, where the criterion of which a decision‑maker is required to be satisfied turns upon factual matters upon which reasonable minds could reasonably differ, it will be very difficult to show that no reasonable decision‑maker could have arrived at the decision in question. His Honour added, however, at 654 [137]:"It may be otherwise if the evidence which establishes or denies, or, with other matters, goes to establish or to deny, that the necessary criterion has been met was all one way." In my opinion, s 111A(1)(c) imposes on the Minister an obligation to assess whether or not it is in the public interest that, in respect of the whole or any part of the relevant land, the land should not be disturbed or the application should not be granted. Subject to the existence of reasonable grounds for the Minister's satisfaction, it is the existence of his or her satisfaction that it is in the public interest that the relevant land should not be disturbed or the application should not be granted which enlivens the power. Compare Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297 per Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ at 302 ‑ 304; Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78 at 90 ‑ 91.