A v Corruption and Crime Commissioner

Case [2013] WASCA 288


JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   A -v- CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSIONER [2013] WASCA 288

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

McLURE P
MURPHY JA

HEARD:   19 AUGUST 2013

DELIVERED          :   18 DECEMBER 2013

FILE NO/S:   CACV 74 of 2013

BETWEEN:   A

Appellant

AND

CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
First Respondent

CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Intervener

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :BEECH J

Citation  :RE ROGER MACKNAY QC; EX PARTE A [2013] WASC 243

File No  :CIV 1940 of 2013

Catchwords:

Corruption and Crime Commission - Public examination - Closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage played during hearing - Certification that disclosure necessary in the public interest - Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA), s 152

Administrative law - Certiorari - Application to quash decision to disclose CCTV footage - Public interest - Whether the Commissioner considered irrelevant considerations or failed to consider relevant considerations - Unreasonableness - Improper purpose - Education function - Misconduct function - Subsequent investigation and fair trial of appellant

Words and phrases - Necessary - Public interest

Legislation:

Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 7A, s 7B, s 17, s 18, s 21A, s 23, s 28, s 30, s 36, s 43, s 46, s 94, s 95, s 96, s 99, s 137, s 139, s 140, s 142, s 145, s 151, s 152, s 153, s 154, s 157, s 158, s 159, s 160, s 167, s 179, s 181, s 182, s 183, s 208, s 209, s 214
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 21
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 25

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Ms K A Vernon

First Respondent           :     No appearance

Second Respondent       :     No appearance

Intervener:     Mr R M Mitchell SC & Ms A B Preston-Samson

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Lyn Zinenko Lawyers

First Respondent           :     No appearance

Second Respondent       :     No appearance

Intervener:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 43 FLR 129; (1980) 29 ALR 228

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163

Burrell v The Queen [2008] HCA 34; (2008) 238 CLR 218

Channel Seven Perth Pty Ltd v S (A Company) [2007] WASCA 122; (2007) 34 WAR 325

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1

Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; (1981) 147 CLR 297

Corruption and Crime Commission v Allen [2012]…

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A v Corruption and Crime Commissioner [2013] WASCA 288
Case
[2013] WASCA 288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the appellant, A, and the Corruption and Crime Commissioner, who had certified the disclosure of closed-circuit television footage during a hearing. The appellant challenged the decision, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Commissioner's decision. The primary legal issue was whether the Commissioner had considered irrelevant considerations or failed to consider relevant considerations when determining whether the disclosure of the CCTV footage was necessary in the public interest, under section 152(4)(c) of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA).

The appellant argued that the word "necessary" in the statute should be interpreted as "essential" or "absolutely necessary," meaning that the disclosure of the information must be indispensable to the maintenance or advancement of the public interest. The appellant contended that both the Commissioner and the primary judge had erred in failing to apply this interpretation to the statutory provision. The court was required to determine whether this argument had merit and, if so, whether it amounted to a jurisdictional error warranting the quashing of the Commissioner's decision.

The court found that the appellant's interpretation of "necessary" as "essential" was not supported by the statutory language or relevant case law. The court held that the Commissioner had not erred in his interpretation of the statutory provision and had properly considered the relevant factors in making his decision. The court also found that the primary judge had correctly interpreted the statutory provision and had not erred in his reasoning. As a result, the court dismissed the appellant's application for certiorari and affirmed the Commissioner's decision to disclose the CCTV footage.

The court did not make any further orders in relation to the case. The decision of the court was that the Commissioner's decision to disclose the CCTV footage was lawful and that the appellant's application for certiorari was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

MARTIN CJ

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARTIN CJ

In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to the non-exhaustive list of jurisdictional errors outlined in Craig, and continued:Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it [82].See also - Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531 [67]. In grounds 1.1, 2.1, 2.5 and 3.2, the appellant asserts that the primary judge erred in his construction of s 152(4)(c) of the Act. The appellant submits that 152(4)(c) involves a two-stage test which must be satisfied prior to the Commissioner certifying that official information should be disclosed; first, that the disclosure is in the public interest, and second that the disclosure is 'necessary' in the public interest. He asserts that the primary judge erred in his construction of 'necessary' in s 152(4)(c), contending that it is not enough that the disclosure merely serves the public interest, but rather that it must be 'essential' in the public interest. He further alleges that both the Commissioner and the primary judge erred in failing to actually determine the meaning of 'necessary' in s 152(4)(c) at all. Whilst the character of the error said to have been made by the Commissioner is not pellucidly clear, the substance of the allegation appears to be that the Commissioner failed to interpret s 152(4)(c) as requiring the disclosure of official information to be 'necessary' in the sense of 'essential' in the public interest, thereby misdirecting himself and posing for resolution the wrong question, and committing an error of the kind referred to in Craig v State of South Australia, 179. The appellant submits that the primary judge erred in failing to recognise this error. The appellant submits that 'necessary' in s 152(4)(c) means 'essential' using that word in accordance with its definition in the Macquarie Dictionary, namely, 'absolutely necessary' or 'indispensible'. The appellant submits that, on a proper construction of s 152(4)(c), the Commission cannot certify that the release of information is in the public interest unless it is satisfied that the release of the information is 'absolutely necessary' or 'indispensible' to the maintenance or advancement of the public interest.