JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: H -v- DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION [2015] WASC 276
CORAM: CHANEY J
HEARD: 2 JUNE 2015
DELIVERED : 7 AUGUST 2015
FILE NO/S: GDA 13 of 2014
BETWEEN: H
Applicant
AND
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MR S BLUEMMEL (INFORMATION COMMISSIONER)
File No :F 051 of 2013
Catchwords:
Freedom of information - Access to school science test paper - Nature of appeal - Public interest
Legislation:
Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 27(1)(a), s 85(1), sch 1, cl 11
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: In person
Respondent: Mr J M Misso
Solicitors:
Applicant: In person
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
A v Corruption and Crime Commissioner [2013] WASCA 288; (2013) 306 ALR 491
Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McCabe (1990) 26 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [No 2] [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320
O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210
Paridis v Settlement Agent Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361
Re H and Department of Education [2014] WAICmr 21
Re James and Australian University [1984] AATA 501; (1984) 2 AAR 327
Re Redfern and University of Canberra [1995] AATA 200; (1996) 66 FoI Review 80
Re Simonsen and Edith University [1994] WAICmr 10
Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) [2001] HCA 49; (2001) 207 CLR 72
Tsai and Griffith University [2014] QICmr 39
CHANEY J: The appellant brings this appeal pursuant to s 85(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) (the Act) seeking to set aside a decision of the Information Commissioner to refuse the appellant access to questions on a chemistry test paper (the test) that his daughter had completed at Perth Modern School (the school) in August 2012.
Background
On 9 November 2012, the appellant applied to the respondent, the Department of Education, for access to the test.
On 21 December 2012, the respondent determined that, pursuant to s 24 of the Act, it would provide the appellant with access to his daughter's answers to the test (test answers) but with the questions redacted. The respondent concluded that the test was exempt matter under cl 11(1)(a) and (b) of sch 1 to the Act which provide:
(1)Matter is exempt matter if its disclosure could reasonably be expected to ‑
(a)impair the effectiveness of any method or procedure for the conduct of tests, examinations or audits by an agency; or
(b)prevent the objects of any test, examination or audit conducted by an agency from being attained;
and that cl 11 (2) of…
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- Case
- [2015] WASC 276
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues revolved around the interpretation and application of the Freedom of Information Act, specifically whether the Department of Education’s decision to deny access to the test paper constituted an error of law. This involved examining whether the decision was manifestly unreasonable or if relevant considerations were overlooked. The court was tasked with determining if the decision maker’s reasoning was within the bounds of legal reasonableness and if all pertinent factors were appropriately considered.
The court found that the Department of Education's decision was not manifestly unreasonable. The reasoning was grounded in the public interest considerations outlined in clause 11(2) of Schedule 1 of the Act. The court emphasised that while the appellant's belief that parents should have access to their children's test papers held some merit, the decision hinged on whether the Commissioner's conclusion was legally sound. The court concluded that the Commissioner did not make an error of law in denying the request, as the decision was within the realm of legal reasonableness and all relevant considerations were duly taken into account.
The final orders of the court affirmed the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, upholding the Department of Education’s denial of access to the school science test paper. The appeal was dismissed with no orders for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However there will be an error of law if a decision maker has made a finding which is manifestly unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable decision maker could have made that finding.[8] The concept of unreasonableness was explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332, where Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ said:In Sharp v Wakefield, it was said that when something is to be done within the discretion of an authority, it is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice. That is what is meant by 'according to law'. It is to be legal and regular, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful. The discretion must be 'exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself'. It is pointed out in Wade and Forsyth that the legal conception of discretion dates from at least the 16th century. In Sharp v Wakefield, Lord Halsbury LC had referred to Rooke's Case of 1598, in which it was stated that the discretion of commissioners of sewers 'ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law'.This approach does not deny that there is an area within which a decision‑maker has a genuinely free discretion. That area resides within the bounds of legal reasonableness. The courts are conscious of not exceeding their supervisory role by undertaking a review of the merits of an exercise of discretionary power. Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a court's view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker. Accepting that the standard of reasonableness is not applied in this way does not, however, explain how it is to be applied and how it is to be tested. (citations omitted)Later their Honours concluded that '[u]nreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification'.[9] [8] Paridis v Settlement Agent Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361 [56], citing Federal Commissioner of Taxation v McCabe (1990) 26 FCR 431, 437.[9] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 [76]. There will also be an error of law if a decision maker has failed to take into account a relevant consideration that it was bound to take into account. The factors that a decision maker is bound to consider in his or her discretionary value judgment are determined by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act.[10] [10] A v Corruption and Crime Commissioner [2013] WASCA 288; (2013) 306 ALR 491 [88]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 [23]. In his written submissions, the appellant described this matter as 'a case about whether parents can access children's school test questions through the' Act. He expressed the belief that 'parents should be able access test papers because children cannot resolve issues arising from test questions alone and parents have a right to know about their children's test performance and this information is important for parents to guide their children'. While that may be the appellant's underlying motivation for the proceedings, and while it may be that considerations of that nature might be relevant to questions of public interest which fall to be considered in the context of cl 11(2) of sch 1 of the Act, the outcome of this case necessarily turns not upon the correctness of that belief, but upon the question of whether or not the Commissioner, in reaching his conclusion, has made an error of law.