Beydoun v City of Stirling

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   BEYDOUN -v- CITY OF STIRLING [2015] WASC 25

CORAM:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD:   19 MARCH 2014

DELIVERED          :   27 JANUARY 2015

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1099 of 2013

BETWEEN:   GHASSAN BEYDOUN (also known as JOHN BEYDOUN)

Appellant

AND

CITY OF STIRLING
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :SJA 1100 of 2013

BETWEEN              :KAMAR DAOUD AKKACH

Appellant

AND

CITY OF STIRLING
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :SJA 1103 of 2013

BETWEEN              :PEARL ASSET PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

CITY OF STIRLING
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

For File No               :  SJA 1099 of 2013

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE C P CRAWFORD

Citation  :CITY OF STIRLING -v- GHASSAN (JOHN) BEYDOUN; KAMAR DAOUD AKKACH AND PEARL ASSET PTY LTD

File No  :PE 34318 of 2010, PE 34319 of 2010, PE 34320 of 2010

For File No               :  SJA 1100 of 2013

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE C P CRAWFORD

Citation  :CITY OF STIRLING -v- GHASSAN (JOHN) BEYDOUN; KAMAR DAOUD AKKACH AND PEARL ASSET PTY LTD

File No  :PE 34321 of 2010, PE 34322 of 2010, PE 34323 of 2010, PE 34324 of 2010

For File No               :  SJA 1103 of 2013

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE C P CRAWFORD

Citation  :CITY OF STIRLING -v- GHASSAN (JOHN) BEYDOUN; KAMAR DAOUD AKKACH AND PEARL ASSET PTY LTD

File No  :PE 34325 of 2010

Catchwords:

Planning scheme - Whether appellants breached s 218 (a) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) by failing to comply with planning scheme - Whether premises being used as a restaurant - Use of premises - Meaning of 'use'
Planning scheme - Whether appellants breached s 218 (a) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) by failing to comply with planning scheme - Whether date of offence constitutes elements of offence
Planning scheme - Whether personal capacity element of offence of failure to comply with requirement of a planning scheme
Criminal law and procedure - Liability of director of corporation for actions committed by company
Criminal law and procedure - Appeals to single judge against sentence by a magistrate - Whether magistrate provided adequate reasons for sentence - Turns on own facts
Criminal law and procedure - Appeals to single judge against sentence by a magistrate - Fine for breach of planning scheme - Whether sentence manifestly excessive - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Code (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)

Result:

Leave to appeal granted for some grounds of appeal
Appeals dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

SJA 1099 of 2013

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr W Vogt

Respondent:     Ms A M Wood

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Vogt Graham Lawyers

Respondent:     Kott Gunning Lawyers

SJA 1100 of 2013

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr W Vogt

Respondent:     Ms A M Wood

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Vogt Graham Lawyers

Respondent:     Kott Gunning

SJA 1103 of 2013

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr W Vogt

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Details
Case
[2015] WASC 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Beydoun v City of Stirling involved the appellants, Mr Beydoun, Ms Nguyen, Mr Nguyen, and Pearl Asset, contesting charges laid by the City of Stirling under s 218 (a) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), alleging that they failed to comply with the planning scheme by operating a restaurant at premises located at 13A Wanneroo Road, Joondanna. The primary legal issues revolved around whether the premises were being used as a restaurant and if the appellants were in breach of the planning scheme by permitting on-site food consumption. The case also explored the applicability of the personal capacity element of the offence and the interpretation of the term 'restaurant' within the context of the planning scheme.

The court examined the evidence presented, including photographs and witness testimonies, to determine whether food was being prepared and consumed on-site. The learned Magistrate concluded that the premises were indeed being used as a restaurant, as defined by the planning scheme, because food was prepared on-site for consumption both on and off the premises. The court held that the Council's opinion that the premises were being used as a restaurant was sufficient under the statute, and there was no requirement for the Council to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of its opinion. The court further clarified that the appellants' argument challenging the validity of the Council's opinion was not properly before it, as it was neither raised at trial nor supported by the necessary evidence.

The reasoning and outcome of the case established that the appellants were indeed in breach of the planning scheme by operating a restaurant without compliance with the required conditions. The appellants' appeal against the sentence was dismissed, and the decision of the lower court was upheld. The final orders confirmed the convictions and fines imposed on the appellants for their failure to comply with the planning scheme.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Factual background There was no dispute that in January 2002, an application was made pursuant to TPS2 for a development at 13A Wanneroo Road Joondanna, namely to use the premises for 'Kebabs, Sweets and Pastries and Café'.[6] The applicants were described as Dung Nguyen, Quang Nguyen and Pearl Asset Pty Ltd and the contact person in respect of the application was John Beydoun. There was also no dispute that an approval to commence that development was granted on 12 February 2002. The approval was for a 'Take Away Food Outlet'.[7] That approval was subject to conditions, including the following:[8]9.There shall be no increase to the seating capacity.…13.The premises being used for takeaway food only and that consumption of food on the premises is NOT PERMITTED.[6] Exhibit GG, Exhibit I.[7] Exhibit J.[8] Exhibit J. At the time of the offences, TPS2 did not contain any reference to 'Takeaway Food Outlet' as a permitted use of premises. When TPS2 was originally gazetted, the term 'Take Away / Fast Foods' was defined to mean:[9]a building or portion of a building wherein food is prepared and offered for sale for consumption principally off the premises and includes in the case of industrial zones, a lunch shop. [9] Exhibit 1. I mention for completeness that the definition of 'Take Away / Fast Foods' was deleted from TPS2 in August 2008. At the same time the following definition of the term 'Fast Food Outlet' was inserted into TPS2:[10]premises used for the preparation, sale and serving of food to customers in a form ready to be eaten without further preparation, primarily off the premises.[10] Exhibit K, cl 1.1.11.2. Between 2002 and early 2008, a business known as Baba's Café was conducted from the premises at 13A Wanneroo Road Joondanna. In late 2007, either Mr Beydoun or Pearl Asset (no finding was made by the learned Magistrate as to the identity of the lessee) took over the lease for the adjoining shop, at 13B Wanneroo Road Joondanna, which had formerly operated under the name 'Bells Kitchen'. An officer of the City gave evidence that an approval existed under TPS2 for the use of the premises at 13B Wanneroo Road as a shop. On 14 March 2008, the City granted a building licence to undertake work at the Premises. The licence was for work described as 'Commercial Building ‑ fit out to Baba's Kebab Café', but the approved drawings which accompanied the licence referred to Shop 13A and 13B Wanneroo Road, and indicated that both 13A and 13B were to be fitted out as one combined premises. In late 2008, officers of the City including Mr David Spencer, a senior planning officer, attended at the Premises and met with the occupants. Mr Spencer's evidence was that 13A and 13B Wanneroo Road were being used as one premises, with no dividing wall between them, using the name 'Little Lebanon Café'. Mr Spencer formed the view that food was being consumed on the Premises and that a restaurant (as that term was defined in TPS2) was being operated at the Premises.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Decision On the question whether the Premises were being used for a restaurant, the learned Magistrate's reasoning was, in summary, as follows. The learned Magistrate noted that the definition of restaurant in TPS2 required satisfaction that food was prepared solely for sale and consumption within the building, or portion thereof. An establishment which supplies takeaway food was expressly included in the definition of restaurant, subject to the Council being satisfied that it forms only a minor part of the business. Her Honour found that on the offence dates, Little Lebanon Café was being operated as an establishment at which food was prepared on site for sale and consumption on the Premises. That this occurred on 2 and 3 May 2009 was evident from photographs supplied by Mr Beydoun in the Submission and from the evidence of three witnesses: Mr Bhatti, Mr Amirthalingam and Ms Amirthalingam. In addition, Mr Akkach's evidence was that in September 2009 Little Lebanon Café was operating in the same manner as in May 2009 and this was consistent with the other evidence, including Mr Bhatti's evidence. The learned Magistrate found that the Premises had been refurbished and expanded from a mere takeaway outlet to cater for patrons consuming food, seated at tables on site, and this was confirmed by a sign at the front of the Premises. The learned Magistrate was satisfied that food was not prepared solely for consumption by patrons within the Premises, and hence that the use did not come within the first limb of the definition of 'Restaurant' in TPS2. The learned Magistrate found that it was intended that food would also be prepared and sold for consumption offsite. The question then was whether the business conducted at the Premises came within the second limb of the definition of restaurant in TPS2, namely that food was prepared and sold for consumption outside the building where the Council was of the opinion that that formed only a minor part of the business. The learned Magistrate held that the use of the Premises fell within this part of the definition of 'Restaurant' in TPS2, for the following reasons. First, she concluded that the fact that a wholesale sweet business was also operating from the Premises was irrelevant to whether a restaurant was being operated at the Premises. Secondly, the learned Magistrate noted that the definition of 'Restaurant' in TPS2 required that the Council be of the opinion that takeaway food was a minor part of the business, and there was no evidence that the Council had delegated its authority to form an opinion to Mr Spencer or to any other officer. Thirdly, the learned Magistrate found that the Council had formed the opinion that a restaurant was being operated at the Premises, having regard to the evidence of the Council's Decision, to its direction that the applicant be advised to cease operations as a restaurant forthwith, and to the specific reference in the Council's decision to TPS2. Finally, the learned Magistrate rejected a submission advanced on behalf of the accused that the court was required to determine if the Council's opinion was objectively reasonable. She concluded that:[14]there is no foundation for that proposition in TPS2. The extended definition of restaurant simply requires the Council to be of the opinion that sales of takeaway food form a minor part of the business. The words 'where Council is of the opinion that' are conclusive. No objective determination is required. In those circumstances the City is not required to adduce evidence to establish that its opinion was objectively reasonable.[14] Decision, 26.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The case the appellants appeared to advance at trial was that the Court was required to assess whether, in light of the evidence adduced at the trial, the Council's opinion could be said to be reasonable. Although as a general observation, there is force in the submission that all statutory powers should (subject to a contrary indication) be required to be exercised reasonably,[44] the fact that a power is not exercised reasonably will not necessarily result in its invalidity. Traditionally, a finding of jurisdictional error on the grounds of unreasonableness would require a finding that the decision was one which was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have reached it.[45] In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li,[46] the plurality emphasised that the test for 'manifest unreasonableness' was not limited to that formulation. Manifest unreasonableness will be found in a decision which is arbitrary, capricious or fanciful,[47] a decision which lacks an evident or intelligible justification,[48] or a decision where the result itself 'bespeaks error'.[49] Merely because a decision is unreasonable, in the sense that it is one about which reasonable minds might differ, is not sufficient to render the decision invalid. (A contrary conclusion would blur irretrievably any distinction between judicial review and merits review.) In my view, the appellants did not raise a challenge to the validity of the Council's opinion at the trial.[44] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332, 370 ‑ 371 [88] ‑ [92] (Gageler J), citing Kruger v Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 36 (Brennan CJ) and Attorney‑General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1, 36 (Brennan J).[45] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, 230.[46] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332.[47] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 [28], [65]. [48] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 [76].[49] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 [85]. Secondly, to the extent that counsel for the appellants sought to raise that argument for the first time on the appeal, I would not entertain that course. It is well established that a party in criminal proceedings is bound by the conduct of his or her case, and save in exceptional cases will not be permitted to rely on an argument not advanced in the court below.[50] In the present case, a consideration of the validity of the Council's opinion would require a consideration of the terms of the decision and the material before the decision maker. Not all of that material was before the Court below and no application was made to have such material placed before the Court. [50] A v Corruption and Crime Commissioner [2013] WASCA 288 [110] ‑ [112]; Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 148 [13] (Buss JA), [67] (Newnes JA, Pullin JA agreeing); see also Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Graincorp Operations Ltd [2010] NSWCA 317 [114] ‑ [115]; Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, 8; University of Wollongong v Metwally [1985] HCA 28; (1985) 60 ALR 68, 71.