Wilson v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WILSON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2010] WASCA 82

CORAM:   McLURE P

OWEN JA

HEARD:   13 APRIL 2010

DELIVERED          :   4 MAY 2010

FILE NO/S:   CACR 12 of 2010

BETWEEN:   LEE MICHAEL WILSON

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :O'NEAL DCJ

File No  :IND 917 of 2009, IND 1362 of 2009

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Sentencing - Offender in custody on other offences prior to sentencing - Whether appropriate credit given for time in custody - Three offences relating to MDMA or methylamphetamine - Totality principle - Sentence of 6 years and 3 months not disturbed

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application for an extension of time refused

Category:    D

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Colangelo v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 294

Dann v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 254

Dao v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 237

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 81

Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473

  1. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:    This is an application for an extension of time within which to appeal and for leave to appeal against a total sentence of immediate imprisonment for 6 years and 3 months imposed on the appellant for drug offences.

Appellate sentencing principles

  1. The relevant principles on which an appellate court operates are dictated by the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) and by previous decisions of the High Court and of this court that we are bound to follow or that represent persuasive authority. Those principles include the following.

    1.The imposition of a sentence involves the exercise of a discretion.  An appellate court can only intervene if the appellant demonstrates that the judge erred in exercising the discretion in one of two ways.  The first is called express error and it involves acting on a wrong principle, for example, by mistaking the law, mistaking the facts, taking into account an irrelevant matter or failing to take into account a relevant consideration.  The second is referred to as implied or inferred error.  It arises where, although it is not possible to discover the exact nature of the error, the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 505. In most instances a challenge based on implied error will involve the contention that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive (or inadequate) and (or) that the total effective term imposed for all charges offends the totality principle.

    2.It follows that the appeal court will not intervene simply because the members of the…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASCA 82
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Wilson v The State of Western Australia, the appellant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal against a sentence of 6 years and 3 months imposed for various drug-related offences. The court had to determine whether the sentence was lawfully imposed and whether the appellant was appropriately credited for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. The appellant was already in custody on unrelated offences at the time of sentencing for the drug charges.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or unjust, which would warrant intervention by the appellate court. The court had to consider whether the trial judge had erred in exercising their sentencing discretion, either expressly by acting on a wrong principle or impliedly by imposing a sentence that was so unreasonable as to constitute a substantial wrong. The court also needed to assess whether the appellant had demonstrated that a different sentence should have been imposed at the original hearing.

The court held that the sentence, while significant, did not constitute a substantial wrong or manifest injustice that would warrant appellate intervention. The court noted that it was not their role to substitute their own discretion for that of the trial judge, unless a clear error was demonstrated. The court found that the appellant had not shown that the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate, nor had they demonstrated that the trial judge had failed to consider relevant factors or had acted on an irrelevant matter. The court also concluded that the appellant had not been denied appropriate credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The court did not make any additional orders beyond dismissing the appeal. The sentence of 6 years and 3 months imprisonment for the drug-related offences was upheld, and the appellant was not granted leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an application for an extension of time within which to appeal and for leave to appeal against a total sentence of immediate imprisonment for 6 years and 3 months imposed on the appellant for drug offences. The relevant principles on which an appellate court operates are dictated by the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) and by previous decisions of the High Court and of this court that we are bound to follow or that represent persuasive authority. Those principles include the following.1.The imposition of a sentence involves the exercise of a discretion. An appellate court can only intervene if the appellant demonstrates that the judge erred in exercising the discretion in one of two ways. The first is called express error and it involves acting on a wrong principle, for example, by mistaking the law, mistaking the facts, taking into account an irrelevant matter or failing to take into account a relevant consideration. The second is referred to as implied or inferred error. It arises where, although it is not possible to discover the exact nature of the error, the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 505. In most instances a challenge based on implied error will involve the contention that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive (or inadequate) and (or) that the total effective term imposed for all charges offends the totality principle. 2.It follows that the appeal court will not intervene simply because the members of the court, had they been sentencing the offender at the original hearing, might have imposed a different sentence: House, 505.3.Even if error is demonstrated the appellate court can intervene only if it is satisfied that a different sentence should have been imposed at the original hearing: Criminal Appeals Act s 31(4)(a).4.An appellant must obtain leave to appeal on each ground that she or he wishes to advance in support of the appeal and the court must not grant leave unless it is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding: Criminal Appeals Act s 27(1) and (2). 5.To have a reasonable prospect of succeeding, a ground must have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding, or a real prospect of success: Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [25] - [61], especially [56]. The sentences which the appellant now challenges were imposed for charges set out in two separate indictments: IND 917 of 2009 (the first indictment) and IND 1362 of 2009 (the second indictment). The appellant faced other charges which we will mention a little later. Count 1 on the first indictment is a charge of conspiring to sell a prohibited drug. Little is disclosed in the sentencing materials about the facts of this charge. On 5 July 2008 the appellant conspired with another to purchase 500 MDMA tablets from the other person for $20 per tablet with the intent to sell or supply them to other persons. It was agreed that the proceeds of the on‑sale of these tablets was to be shared equally between them. The appellant was arrested on 22 August 2008.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established