Gray v Franken
[2020] WASC 120
•14 APRIL 2020
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: GRAY -v- FRANKEN [2020] WASC 120
CORAM: CORBOY J
HEARD: 20 & 25 MARCH 2020
DELIVERED : 25 MARCH 2020
PUBLISHED : 14 APRIL 2020
FILE NO/S: SJA 1010 of 2020
BETWEEN: PETER JAMES GRAY
Appellant
AND
MATTHEW FRANKEN
First Respondent
JOSHUA MITCHELL
Second Respondent
STACEY WHITEROAD
Third Respondent
GEORGINA KENELLY
Fourth Respondent
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) - Breaches of a family violence restraining order - Turns on its own facts
Legislation:
Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)
Result:
Leave to appeal out of time and leave to appeal on each ground of appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Appellant resentenced
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Ms E R Zillessen |
| First Respondent | : | Mr G J Stockton |
| Second Respondent | : | Mr G J Stockton |
| Third Respondent | : | Mr G J Stockton |
| Fourth Respondent | : | Mr G J Stockton |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid - Perth |
| First Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Second Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Third Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Fourth Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Abeyakoon v Brown [2011] WASCA 63; (2011) 211 A Crim R 338
Bernard v Williams [2015] WASC 182
Closter v Humphreys [2012] WASC 145
Day v Millson [2015] WASC 183
Dennis v Lanternier [No 2] [2017] WASC 5
Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9
Howell v Davies [2019] WASC 220
Rogers v Hitchcock [2015] WASC 120
Wallam v Dent [2008] WASC 170
Wallan v Grosveld [2015] WASC 145
Weaver v Biggs [2019] WASC 333
Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82
CORBOY J:
The appeal and its result
The appellant was convicted of six breaches of a family violence restraining order (FVRO) contrary to s 61(1) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (RO Act). In brief summary, the history of the appellant's offending and sentencing is that:
(a)The appellant first breached the FVRO on 22 October 2017. On 13 February 2018, he was sentenced for that offence to a term of imprisonment for 7 months, suspended for 12 months (JO 12823/2017).
(b)The appellant further breached the FVRO on 1 August 2018, 3 September 2018 and 5 February 2019. On 15 February 2019, he was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 12 months (JO 10710/2018; JO 11664/2018; and JO 1388/2019) (the CSIO).
(c)The appellant again breached the FVRO on 20 and 28 February 2019 and 1 March 2019 (PE 16721/2019; PE 16722/2019; and PE 16723/2019). By committing those offences, the appellant also breached the CSIO. He was sentenced for the further offences and the breach of the CSIO on 2 October 2019. The sentencing magistrate held that it would not be unjust to require the appellant to serve the full term of imprisonment imposed by the CSIO. In addition, her Honour sentenced the appellant to terms of imprisonment of 5 months for each of the subsequent offences, with one sentence (on PE 16723/2019) ordered to be served cumulatively on the term of imprisonment that had been previously suspended. Accordingly, the appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 15 months' imprisonment. A parole eligibility order was made.
The appellant appealed against the sentences imposed on 2 October 2019 on two grounds:
(a)The sentence imposed for each offence was manifestly excessive as to the type of sentence, alternatively as to the length of sentence, having regard to the circumstances of the offences, the personal circumstances of the appellant and sentencing standards.
(b)The total effective sentence of 15 months' imprisonment did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the appellant's conduct having regard to all relevant circumstances - that is, the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
The appeal was commenced out of time. The appellant and his solicitor, Ms Zillessen, made affidavits in which they explained the delay. I accepted their explanations.
I concluded that the time for commencing the appeal should be extended; the appellant should be granted leave to appeal on each ground; the appeal should be allowed; the sentence should be set aside and the appellant resentenced. Having regard to the time that the appellant had spent in custody, I made orders in the appeal and resentenced the appellant on 20 March 2020 to a total effective sentence of 12 months' imprisonment. These are my reasons for making the orders and for resentencing the appellant.
The appellant's offending
It is relevant to note that the appellant had convictions for breaching violence restraining orders made prior to the FVRO:
(a)On 9 January 2016, he was convicted of breaching a violence restraining order. The offence occurred on 8 January 2016 and a conditional release order was made for 3 months.
(b)On 15 May 2017, the appellant was again convicted of a breach of a violence restraining order. The offence occurred on 14 May 2017 and the appellant was fined $700.
(c)On 24 May 2017, the appellant was again convicted of a breach of a violence restraining order. The offence occurred on 6 May 2017 and the appellant was fined $750.
The FVRO was obtained by the appellant's former partner, Ms A (the protected person). The FVRO also protected B, the son of the protected person and the appellant. It was served on the appellant on 11 August 2017. The terms of the FVRO prohibited the appellant from, among other things:
(a)communicating or attempting to communicate with the protected person by any means, including by SMS or text messages or any other electronic means; and
(b)approaching within 100 m of the protected person.
As noted earlier, the appellant breached the FVRO on 22 October 2017 (JO 12823/2017). He went to the protected person's residence and called out for his son while standing near the front door. The protected person's grandfather was at the house. He went to the front door and told the appellant to leave. The appellant then banged on the door and yelled for about 10 minutes before leaving. The protected person was at home during the incident and was left upset and crying.
On 13 February 2018, he was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment, suspended for 12 months.
The appellant again breached the FVRO on 1 August 2018 by sending two emails to the protected person, with one of the emails copied to the protected person's solicitor (JO 10710/2018). The precise meaning of the emails was difficult to discern. However, it can be inferred from the emails, and from the other emails referred to below, that the appellant was frustrated by not being able to have contact with B. The protected person responded to the first email by requesting the appellant stop emailing her 'such rubbish' and to the second email by advising the appellant to 'sort [himself] out'. The protected person added that the appellant could have 'something to do with [B]' once he had sorted himself out.
The appellant further breached the FVRO on 3 September 2018 by sending eight emails to the protected person (JO 11664/2018). Again, the emails concerned the appellant's child. They did not threaten the protected person with violence but the tone of the emails was abusive and they disclosed an apparent deterioration in the appellant's emotional state. It was plain that the emails were a product of increasing anger and frustration. I have no doubt the protected person would have found the emails offensive and disturbing.
On 5 February 2019, the appellant again breached the FVRO by approaching the protected person at the Joondalup Health Campus. He had heard that the protected person had been admitted to the Emergency Department. He was permitted by hospital staff to see the protected person in the admissions ward. The protected person was with her partner when the appellant approached and asked if she was alright. He was a few metres from her when he made the inquiry. He apparently then left the ward without further incident.
The appellant was convicted of charges JO 10710/2018; JO 11664/2018 and JO 1388/2019 on 15 February 2019. A total effective sentence of 10 months' imprisonment was imposed. The sentence was conditionally suspended for 12 months.
On 20 February 2019, the appellant again breached the FVRO. The appellant forwarded to the protected person an email from 'Health Line; Wellness Wire' which had as its subject 'Nuts, honey and 20 common sense keys to nutrition'. The email contained links to articles on nutrition and exercise. There was no message accompanying the forwarded email (PE 16722/2019).
On 28 February 2019, the appellant again forwarded an email to the protected person. The forwarded email was an email that the appellant had received from 'Rebel Active' about an offer for the sale of children's football boots. The forwarded email was accompanied by a message from the appellant stating 'what's the best thing any child would want more than anything???' (PE 16721/2019).
Finally, on 1 March 2019 the appellant sent a further email to the protected person which was said to be inspired by rap verses (PE 16723/2019). The email stated:
Chubby bubby no messin I am onto more than u can figure. now congratulations to you for wasting my time how hard is it to use your common sense whose the daddy me or you or am I the mother and you is you the only bubby.
The appellant's sentencing
The magistrate received the following reports for the purpose of sentencing the appellant:
(a)psychological report dated 17 August 2019 provided by a forensic psychologist, Ms Oliveri;
(b)pre‑sentence report prepared by two team members of the East Perth Adult Community Corrections Centre; and
(c)report dated 11 September 2019 from the appellant's general practitioner, Dr Livingstone.
Ms Oliveri's report provided a detailed account of relevant aspects of the appellant's personal circumstances – childhood and adolescence; relationship with the protected person; forensic history; substance use; and mental health issues. In summary, Ms Oliveri reported that:
(a)The appellant apparently had a normal relationship with his parents but was often cared for by his maternal grandparents during his childhood and adolescence. Consequently, he was very close to his maternal grandparents and struggled after they passed away in 2013 and 2014.
(b)The appellant's behaviour during his adolescence was problematic. He began using cannabis in year 8 and was increasingly distracted and disruptive at school. He left school in year 11 and has worked in a variety of jobs since that time. He has had periods of unemployment.
(c)The appellant was 25 years of age when he formed a relationship with the protected person. The relationship was maintained for approximately 18 months. Their child, B, is aged 6 years. The appellant admitted that he had been unable to accept the end of his relationship with the protected person and wanted regular contact with his son.
(d)The appellant did not consider the FVRO was warranted and did not regard his behaviour towards the protected person as inappropriate. He had attempted to pursue child access and custody issues in the Family Court.
(e)The appellant had a history of cannabis and methylamphetamine use and a problem with alcohol. He engaged in substance abuse counselling in 2017/2018 and advised Ms Oliveri that he considered he no longer had a problem with substance misuse. He was resistant to engaging in further counselling.
(f)The appellant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and drug‑induced psychosis in the past. He had been admitted to Graylands Hospital for one week as a result of a drug‑induced psychosis. He had engaged in psychological counselling in 2017/2018 and reported making some treatment gains.
(g)Ms Oliveri described the appellant's presentation as emotionally immature and disinhibited. He had poor impulse control and was noted to laugh inappropriately at times during her interview with him. He lacked insight and self‑awareness and viewed himself as a victim. He had treatment needs in relation to domestic violence, relationship skills, substance misuse, mental health and personality issues, emotional regulation and coping skills, impulsivity, decision‑making and consequential thinking. Ms Oliveri considered that the appellant was at a moderate risk of physical domestic violence and at a high risk of breaching future violence restraining orders.
The pre‑sentence report noted that the appellant maintained there was no justification for the FVRO and that he was fixated on contact with B. He had been recommended for Start Court but had failed to attend a number of appointments and had been rejected by the court. His compliance with the requirements of the CSIO had been 'less than satisfactory'.
The appellant's mother had advised the authors of the pre‑sentence report that the appellant had re-engaged with a psychologist. That was confirmed by the report provided by Dr Livingstone who stated that, to his observation, the appellant appeared to be no longer abusing substances and presented as being 'much more coherent and well‑kempt'. There were no obvious signs of mental illness and a mental health care plan had been prepared and settled with the appellant.
The magistrate noted the following matters in sentencing the appellant:
(a)he had been warned when the CSIO was made that he would inevitably be required to serve a term of imprisonment if he again breached the FVRO but he had nevertheless offended shortly after the order had been made;
(b)he sought to minimise and justify his offending;
(c)it did not appear that the appellant had engaged 'in any fruitful discussions for resolution of the Family Court issues because [the appellant] continued to embark on this course of behaviour that sees [him] now before me for sentencing';[1]
(d)the appellant's compliance with the conditions imposed by the CSIO was not satisfactory and he had been assessed at a high risk of reoffending by breaching the FVRO;
(e)the most recent offences had been apparently committed while the appellant was affected by alcohol and that was contrary to his assertions to Ms Oliveri that he did not have a continuing problem with substance abuse;
(f)there had been a significant break in the appellant's offending behaviour and he was making efforts to address his mental health and substance abuse issues; however, 'I am afraid that it is too little too late' and it was necessary to 'send a clear message both by way of personal and general deterrence' and otherwise, the appellant would 'make a mockery of the court's authority in preserving the integrity and value of FVRO's';[2]
(g)it was not unjust to trigger the entire term of imprisonment that had been previously suspended; and
(h)the sentences to be imposed would be reduced by 15% pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) and it was necessary to give effect to the totality principle in determining the total effective sentence.
[1] ts 8, 2 October 2019.
[2] ts 9, 2 October 2019.
The terms of imprisonment imposed on 2 October 2019 for each offence were as follows:
CHARGE DATE OF OFFENCE TERM IMPOSED JO 10710/2018 28 August 2018 3 months concurrent JO 11664/2018 3 September 2018 7 months cumulative JO 1388/2019 5 February 2019 3 months cumulative PE 16721/2019 20 February 2019 5 months concurrent PE 16722/2019 28 February 2019 5 months concurrent PE 16723/2019 1 March 2019 5 months cumulative
The RO Act
Section 61 of the RO Act provides that a person who is bound by a family violence restraining order or a violence restraining order and who breaches that order commits an offence. The penalty for the offence is a fine of $6,000 or imprisonment for 2 years or both.
Section 61A applies where a person is convicted of an offence under s 61(1) and the person has committed, and has been convicted of, at least two offences under s 61(1) with the period of 2 years before the person's conviction of the relevant offence. Where the section applies, a penalty must be imposed for the relevant offence that is or includes imprisonment unless the court is satisfied that:
(a)imprisonment would be clearly unjust given the circumstances of the offence and the person; and
(b)the person is unlikely to be a threat to the safety of a person protected or the community generally.[3]
[3] RO Act, s 61A(5) and (6).
It was not in issue that s 61A applied when the appellant was sentenced on 2 October 2019 and it was not alleged that the magistrate erred in finding that a term of imprisonment should be imposed for the offences committed by the appellant in February and March 2019.
The parties' submissions
The effect of the appellant's submissions can be shortly stated:
(a)it was accepted that there was no error, express or implied, by the magistrate who made the CSIO;
(b)it was also accepted that the sentencing magistrate had not erred in concluding it was not unjust to require the appellant to serve the full term of imprisonment imposed by the CSIO;
(c)the sentence of 5 months' imprisonment for each of the offences committed in early 2019 was manifestly excessive having regard, in particular, to the content of the emails, the fact that the appellant had ceased sending emails or attempting to make any contact with the protected person after 1 March 2019 and the steps that the appellant had taken since that date to address the causes of his offending;
(d)the order that the sentence imposed on PE 16723/2019 be accumulated with the term of imprisonment to be served on cancellation of the CSIO had resulted in a sentence that was manifestly excessive for that offence;
(e)alternatively, the order produced a total effective sentence that was manifestly excessive, alternatively infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
The respondents submitted that the sentences imposed by the magistrate were within the range of sentences customarily imposed for a breach of s 61 ‑ reference was made to Dennis v Lanternier [No 2];[4] Howell v Davies;[5] Weaver v Biggs;[6] Bernard v Williams;[7] Day v Millson;[8] Wallam v Grosveld;[9] and Rogers v Hitchcock.[10] The respondent made detailed submissions regarding the seriousness of the appellant's offending by comparison with the circumstances of those cases. The gist of those submissions was that:
Although it is accepted that the offending does not fall into the higher end of the range of seriousness of offences identified by Jenkins J in Dennis, the Appellant's offending demonstrates repeated contempt for the welfare of the protected person, and orders of the Court.
[4] Dennis v Lanternier [No 2] [2017] WASC 5.
[5] Howell v Davies [2019] WASC 220.
[6] Weaver v Biggs [2019] WASC 333.
[7] Bernard v Williams [2015] WASC 182.
[8] Day v Millson [2015] WASC 183.
[9] Wallam v Grosveld [2015] WASC 145.
[10] Rogers v Hitchcock [2015] WASC 120.
The respondents further submitted that:
(a)General deterrence was a significant factor in sentencing for this type of offence.
(b)Personal deterrence was an important consideration in sentencing the appellant. He had committed the offences over a relatively short period and the reports received by the magistrate indicated that the appellant did not accept responsibility for his offending and there was a high risk of the appellant breaching the FVRO in the future.
(c)The email that was the subjective of charge PE 16723/2019 constituted an 'objectively' more serious breach of the FVRO than the emails that were the subject of charges PE 16721/2019 and PE 16722/2019 – the email had a threatening overtone in that it apparently challenged the protected person's position on parenting issues; it was sent after the protected person had asked the appellant to stop sending emails and had warned him that if he persisted she would report the matter to the police; and it was the third breach of the FVRO committed over a period of two weeks.
(d)It was open to the magistrate to find that the appellant's change in behaviour after sending the email on 1 March 2019 was 'too little too late' in light of the appellant's previous offending and the need for general and personal deterrence.
(e)In the circumstances, it could not be concluded that the sentences imposed by the magistrate were manifestly excessive or infringed the totality principle.
The relevant principles
The principles that apply to an appeal against sentence are well established. They were outlined by the Court of Appeal in Wilson v The State of Western Australia.[11] Those principles also apply to an appeal under pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA): Closter v Humphreys.[12]
[11] Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82.
[12] Closter v Humphreys [2012] WASC 145.
An appeal court will not intervene to set aside a sentence merely because it might have exercised the sentencing discretion differently to the sentencing judicial officer. Rather, the court should only intervene if a material error of fact or law has been made or the result is manifestly unreasonable or unjust. Accordingly, the fact that an error has been made in sentencing does not automatically mean that the sentencing discretion should be exercised afresh.
Further, s 14(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act applies to sentencing appeals: Abeyakoon v Brown.[13] In Wallam v Dent,[14] Jenkins J considered that s 14(2), when applied to a sentencing appeal, would ordinarily require the appeal court to consider what the appropriate penalty would have been for the offence if no error had been made in exercising the sentencing discretion at first instance. If a lower sentence ought to have been imposed at first instance, then the appeal court would not be able to exercise the discretion in s 14(2) to dismiss the appeal because no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. If, on the other hand, the same sentence ought to have been imposed despite the error made in the lower court, the discretion in s 14(2) would ordinarily be exercised.
[13] Abeyakoon v Brown [2011] WASCA 63; (2011) 211 A Crim R 338.
[14] Wallam v Dent [2008] WASC 170.
An error in sentencing may be express or implied. A plea that a sentence is manifestly excessive is an allegation of implied error. In determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, it is necessary to consider the maximum penalty for the offence, the standard of sentencing customarily observed with respect to the offence, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of offences of the relevant kind and the personal circumstances of the offender.
A sentence may have infringed the totality principle because of an express error. However, a general plea that the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle is an allegation of implied error.
The first limb of the totality principle requires the total sentence to bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences, viewed in their entirety, and having regard to the circumstances of the case including those referrable to the offender personally. Where the principle of totality applies, it is of little importance how the ultimate aggregate is made out. Consequently, although there may be instances where it is appropriate to consider whether an individual sentence was tainted by an express error, 'generally speaking where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count will usually fall to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence.'[15] However, the severity or leniency of an individual sentence may be relevant to assessing whether the total effective sentence infringed the totality principle.
[15] Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9 [40] (Owen JA with whom McLure P and Pullen JA agreed).
Disposition
I took into account various matters in determining the appeal, not all of which pointed to the conclusion that the sentence imposed on the appellant should be set aside and the appellant re‑sentenced.
First, I accepted the respondent's submissions that general and personal deterrence were significant factors in sentencing the appellant. As Hall J explained in Rogers v Hitchcock:[16]
The Restraining Orders Act is legislation of the utmost importance as part of the legal response to domestic violence … deliberate breaches of court orders or police orders made under the Act undermine the efficacy of such orders. Deterrence both personal and general must play a significant role when orders are breached. If those who are the subject of such orders believe they can breach them without suffering any real consequence then there will be little incentive to be compliant.
[16] Rogers v Hitchcock [2015] WASC 120 [46].
As the respondent rightly emphasised, the appellant had breached the FVRO on six occasions, with the last three offences being committed within a period of about two weeks and shortly after the appellant had been sentenced to the CSIO.
Second, it could not be reasonably argued that the magistrate had erred in finding that it was not clearly unjust to cancel the CSIO. The appellant did not contend to the contrary at the hearing of the appeal. Further, the appellant did not allege that the magistrate ought to have found that it would have been clearly unjust to impose a term of imprisonment under s 61A of the RO Act. He was right not to have done so.
Third, the terms of the CSIO were within the range of sentences customarily imposed for offending of the kind committed by the appellant. However, the terms of the order could not be described as lenient. A comparison with the cases to which the respondents referred indicates that the term of imprisonment that was conditionally suspended was at the upper end of the range of sentences that might have been imposed.
Fourth, the appellant's further offending after the CSIO was made plainly required terms of imprisonment to be imposed for those offences. Further, in my view, the magistrate was entitled to conclude that some accumulation was required given that the appellant had breached the CSIO shortly after the order was made by sending three emails in a little over two weeks.
Fifth, the appellant had only twice approached the protected person in breach of the FVRO. The first approach occurred on 22 October 2017. It was a serious breach but it occurred two years prior to the offences of February/March 2019. The second occasion occurred on 5 February 2019 when the appellant went to the Joondalup Health Campus after being advised that the protected person had been admitted to the Emergency Department. Plainly, the appellant ought not to have gone to the hospital but he apparently left without incident after inquiring about the protected person's wellbeing.
Sixth, two of the three emails sent after that incident were relatively innocuous. That is not to excuse the appellant's breaches of the FVRO but the emails contained nothing that was threatening or abusive. The third email sent on 1 March 2019 was nonsensical and did not threaten the protected person with harm. However, I have no doubt that the protected person would have been unsettled by its oddity and frustrated and angered by the appellant's refusal to adhere to the prohibition on contact.
Seventh, the appellant had ceased breaching the FVRO after he sent the email on 1 March 2019. Further, he had taken steps to address the causes of his offending after committing the offence on 1 March 2019. In particular, he had reengaged with counselling by a psychologist and established a mental health plan under the supervision of his general practitioner. It appeared from his general practitioner's report that the appellant's emotional state and general wellbeing had improved as a result of counselling.
Finally, it was not entirely clear whether the appellant had ceased sending emails to the protected person after 1 March 2019 of his own accord or whether he had stopped because Ms A had carried out her threat and reported his breaches to the police. Given that:
(a)the appellant had previously breached the FVRO despite the suspended imprisonment order and the CSIO;
(b)and that he had voluntarily engaged in counselling,
it was open to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant had decided, of his accord, to cease sending emails to the protected person or otherwise attempting to contact her in breach of the FVRO. The fact that the appellant had not sent any emails to the protected person for six months by the time he was sentenced was significant in light of his history of offending. It was, in my view, especially significant given Ms Oliveri's comments about the appellant's personality structure.
General and personal deterrence and punishment were significant considerations in sentencing the appellant and it was, as the magistrate found, too late for him to contend that he should not be required to immediately serve a term of imprisonment for his offending. However, the fact that he had not breached the FVRO for six months prior to being sentenced, and that he voluntarily taken steps to address the causes of his offending, were also important considerations. In my view, it was necessary for the appellant's efforts at rehabilitation to be recognised and encouraged.
In all the circumstances, I concluded that the sentence of 5 months' imprisonment cumulative on PE 16723/2019 was not, in itself, manifestly excessive, but it resulted in a total effective sentence that infringed the first limb of the totality principle (ground 2 of the appeal notice). Accordingly:
(a)I granted the appellant leave to appeal on each ground of his appeal notice;
(b)I allowed the appeal on ground 2;
(c)I resentenced the appellant to 2 months' imprisonment on each of PE 16721/2019; PE 16722/2019; and PE 16723/2019 (the sentences being reduced on grounds of totality);
(d)I ordered that the sentence imposed on PE 16723/2019 be served cumulatively on the sentence of 10 months' imprisonment that the appellant was required to serve immediately on cancellation of the CSIO so that a total effective sentence of 12 months' imprisonment was imposed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
LW
Associate to the Honourable Justice Jenkins14 APRIL 2020
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