Giglia v The State of Western Australia
[2010] WASCA 9
•22 JANUARY 2010
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: GIGLIA -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2010] WASCA 9
CORAM: McLURE P
OWEN JA
PULLIN JA
HEARD: 8 OCTOBER 2009
DELIVERED : 22 JANUARY 2010
FILE NO/S: CACR 170 of 2008
BETWEEN: NUNZIO CLAUDE GIGLIA
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :EATON DCJ
Citation :STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA v GIGLIA
File No :IND 1525 of 2006
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Sentencing - Multiple drug offences - Dealing in MDMA and methylamphetamine - Whether effective term of 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment offended totality principle - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr T F Percy QC & Ms S S Chelvanayagam
Respondent: Mr J A Scholz
Solicitors:
Appellant: Sharmini Chelvanayagam
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201
Pollock v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 121
The State of Western Australia v Higgins [2008] WASCA 157
McLURE P: I agree with Owen JA.
OWEN JA:
Introduction
This is an application for leave to appeal and an appeal against a sentence of 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment imposed on the appellant following his conviction on 14 offences relating to drugs. The offences were committed as part of an enterprise carried out by the appellant and several co‑offenders to try to sell MDMA and methylamphetamine.
Background
On 11 April 2007 the appellant and two co‑offenders, Troy Smith and Ruben Bettencourt, were charged on indictment with a range of drug offences. The indictment contained 24 offences in total. Another co‑offender, Troy Best, was charged with 32 offences on a separate indictment. All the offences the subject of the indictments were said to have been committed during May 2006.
The appellant was charged with 17 offences. He was charged with three counts of possessing MDMA with intent to sell or supply, one count of possessing methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply, nine counts of offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine, three counts of selling or supplying methylamphetamine and one count of attempting to possess MDMA with intent to sell or supply.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to all 17 charges. Smith pleaded not guilty to the five charges he faced. Bettencourt pleaded not guilty to the two charges he faced. Best pleaded guilty to all 32 charges contained in the indictment against him. He was sentenced on 25 January 2007 by Kennedy CJDC and received a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
The appellant, Smith and Bettencourt were tried before Eaton DCJ and a jury between 1 September and 9 September 2008. At the conclusion of the trial, the appellant was found guilty on 14 of the 17 counts. Smith was found guilty on four of the five counts, and guilty of a lesser charge on the fifth count. Bettencourt was convicted of the two counts with which he had been charged.
On 25 November 2008 the appellant was sentenced by Eaton DCJ. His Honour sentenced the appellant to a total effective term of 8 years and
6 months' imprisonment. The appellant was made eligible for parole and was declared a drug trafficker. The appellant's co-offenders were also sentenced. Bettencourt received a sentence of 8 months' imprisonment suspended for 12 months. Smith received a sentence of 5 years and 2 months' imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
I have set out in a schedule at the end of these reasons a table identifying the 14 charges of which the appellant was convicted and the individual sentences relating to each of those counts.
Relevant facts
In early March 2006 the police began to intercept the mobile telephones of the appellant and Best. The intercepts were carried out as part of an investigation called Operation Alpha.
On 2 March 2006, during a phone call at 5.15 pm, the appellant and Best discussed obtaining 'five or six' from Smith. The reference to 'five or six' meant five or six hundred ecstasy tablets. That night, the appellant obtained 300 ecstasy tablets. The next day he gave some of those tablets to Best, who went on to sell or supply them to others (count 1).
On 10 March 2006 the appellant and Best decided to expand their drug dealing activities by selling methylamphetamine. They agreed to pool their money and buy 3 oz (84 g) of the substance. They met at 5.45 pm that day in a car park near a primary school. Best gave the appellant his share of the money, and the appellant then purchased 3 oz of methylamphetamine from an unknown person (count 2). The following day, the appellant 'cut' the methylamphetamine with another substance so as to increase the weight of the drug from 3 oz to 5 oz.
On 12 March 2006 Best called the appellant and asked him to bring some of the methylamphetamine around. After some discussion about how much of the drug the appellant should bring, it was agreed that he would not bring all of it. Best then made a series of telephone calls offering to sell or supply the methylamphetamine to others. At 2.42 pm Best called a man and asked him to 'move a few' for a price of 'six and a half', meaning take a few ounces of methylamphetamine for $6,500 per ounce (count 3). At 3.32 pm Best called another man and asked him whether he could offload some of the 'shit' he had been talking about. Three hours later, the man called Best back and Best agreed to bring some methylamphetamine around for the man to inspect (count 4). At 3.40 pm Best called a different man and told him about some 'stuff' that he had which was really good. The man asked whether it had been 'smashed' (cut with another substance to increase the amount of the drug) and the two agreed to meet somewhere in Melville (count 5).
On 14 March 2006 at 3.47 pm Best phoned a man called 'Gazman' and asked him how many 'boots' (ounces) he wanted. Gazman said he wanted two 'boots'. Best then called the appellant and asked him to grab the other two pairs of boots (count 7). On 16 March 2009 Gazman called Best and said he was going to give one of the 'things' back because the stuff was no good, but he would keep the other one.
By 17 March 2006, the appellant and Best had not disposed of all the methylamphetamine as it was of poor quality. At about 4.52 pm that day a man phoned the appellant and asked whether he could get any white stuff, not pills. The appellant said that he could. The two discussed providing a sample and the cost of buying an ounce, which was $6,500 (count 9). Later that day a man named Robert called the appellant and asked what was on him. The appellant told Robert that he had 'shard' (which is another term for crystal methylamphetamine) and agreed to supply some to him (count 10).
By 21 March 2006 the appellant and Best were somewhat disillusioned with their venture into methylamphetamine, which had not gone according to plan. The failure seems largely to have been as a result of the poor quality of the drug they were attempting to sell. They decided to return to selling ecstasy.
The appellant phoned Smith and asked whether he could get any 'rounds'. Smith told the appellant he could, but they would not be cheap. The appellant said he wanted '500 or a thou', meaning 500 or 1,000 tablets. A short while later Smith phoned the appellant back and offered him 'beige Euros at $23 for a thou', meaning $23 per tablet if they bought 1,000 of them.
The appellant phoned Best and discussed the purchase price of the ecstasy and how much they could sell it for. After the conversation with Best, the appellant phoned Smith and told him he wanted 500 tablets for $23 each, but would need three 'tester' tablets because nobody had heard of 'beige Euros'. There was a further telephone discussion between the appellant and Smith about the testers.
The next day, 22 March 2006, the appellant sent Smith a text message asking what was going on. Smith replied, telling the appellant that he could get the testers that night. After a series of telephone calls and text messages, the appellant and Smith met at a petrol station and Smith gave the appellant the testers.
Early the next morning, 23 March 2006, the appellant sent Smith a text message asking him to get '5 hunge organised'. There were two more telephone calls between the two men in which they arranged to meet at a petrol station. At 3.30 am the appellant and Bettencourt drove to the petrol station and parked next to Smith's car. Smith then sold the appellant 500 ecstasy tablets (count 14).
On 25 March 2006 the appellant and Best still had some methylamphetamine which had not yet sold. The appellant and Bettencourt made several calls to try to sell the remaining drug. Bettencourt called a man named Jamie, who asked for a 'half‑weight' on credit until the next day. Bettencourt said no but the appellant said yes. The appellant later sold Jamie 'a weight of the other shit', meaning a quantity of methylamphetamine (count 17).
On 26 March 2006 at 8.44 pm the appellant phoned a woman called Lydia and offered to sell her two 'bowls' of methylamphetamine, a bowl being one eighth of an ounce or 3.5 g (count 18). Later that evening the appellant phoned a man and told him he had 'two killer bowls left for a G each', a G being $1,000 (count 19).
On 27 March 2006 the appellant and Best had some telephone conversations with Smith about buying some more ecstasy, after having raised the idea with Smith two days earlier on 25 March. The appellant sent Smith a message saying he would take 'a thou at $21', meaning 1,000 ecstasy pills at $21 each. By text message they agreed to do the deal the next day. The appellant told Smith that Best would meet him to collect the ecstasy.
The following day, 28 March 2006, there were a number of calls between the appellant and Smith, the appellant and Best, and Best and Smith. Eventually it was decided that Smith and Best would meet at a hotel. At 3.25 pm Smith told Best that he could only get 500 tablets and Best asked him to get the other 500 on the weekend.
At 3.45 pm Best drove his car to a shopping centre, having visited the appellant's house earlier in the day while the arrangements were being made. Less than 10 minutes later Smith approached Best's car and sold him the ecstasy (count 22). Smith then drove off in his own car.
Best's car was stopped by police later that afternoon and searched. The search revealed 469 ecstasy tablets and $10,500 in cash, which was to be used to purchase the other 500 ecstasy tablets that Smith had been unable to provide that day (count 23).
Later in the day the homes of Smith and the appellant were searched, as well as Smith's car. The appellant was later charged with 17 counts arising from the possession and supply of MDMA and methylamphetamine.
Sentencing remarks
The sentencing judge began by outlining the defence case raised by the appellant. The appellant had claimed that the conversations recorded in the intercepts were not about drugs. He said that he was having a dispute with a former business partner who was threatening him. Under duress from that person, the appellant pretended that he was dealing in drugs. He was given a list of phone numbers and told to follow instructions. He did not know what the conversations were about and would simply say the words and phrases that he was told to say.
The appellant's defence had been rejected by the jury. The sentencing judge said:
Without going into the details of your evidence, suffice to say that very clearly the jury did not accept your account as a truthful account, given the elaborate and fanciful nature of your evidence. I must say, I was not surprised that the jury took the attitude that they did. It was an audacious and incredible tale. I conclude that you were a commercial dealer of both methylamphetamine and ecstasy.
The sentencing judge noted that the appellant had instructed counsel to inform the court that he was remorseful and was sorry about his involvement in the offending. According to his Honour, this expression of remorse was welcome but somewhat belated. When the appellant was interviewed by the author of the presentence report, he was still attempting to convince others of his innocence.
The sentencing judge set out the appellant's personal circumstances. The appellant was 27 years old. He was born in Western Australia to a close family of Sicilian origin. He had one sibling, an elder sister. Prior to his remand in custody, the appellant had been living at home with his parents. In 2008 he became engaged to be married.
His Honour considered the appellant's education and work history. Having completed year 12, the appellant obtained employment with a television station as a camera operator. While working in that capacity he completed a one-year course in broadcast operations for film and television. He moved to Sydney in the course of his employment, spending 10 months there.
The appellant had returned to live in Perth in 2001. He left the television station and set up his own courier business. Three years later, he sold his courier business and bought a music store. He remained in that business for two years and then set up a disc jockey enterprise.
The sentencing judge outlined the appellant's criminal record. The appellant's previous offending was relatively minor. At the age of 19 he was convicted in the Court of Petty Sessions of common assault. In the following month he was convicted of possession of a controlled weapon and stealing. Since then, his offending had largely been confined to traffic matters.
His Honour noted that, according to the presentence report, the appellant did not have a substance abuse problem. He had never tried cannabis or any other illicit substances. He was in good mental and physical health.
The sentencing judge considered the letters that had been written in support of the appellant. The appellant had written a letter in which he said that he was a good person who got tangled in a web because of his good nature and was unable to escape from that web. A letter written by his first cousin said that the appellant would have a strong support network upon his release from prison. One of the appellant's neighbours wrote a letter in which he said that the appellant was honest, reliable, hardworking, conscientious and courteous. Finally, the appellant's fiancée wrote indicating that he still had her support.
The sentencing judge outlined the appellant's position in the hierarchy of the criminal enterprise. Smith acted as the supplier of ecstasy to the group. Bettencourt was an associate of the appellant and Best in the drug business, and was best described as a sales representative. The main business was carried out by the appellant and Best. As between the appellant and Best, both were equally culpable. The major difference between the two men was that Best had pleaded guilty on the fast‑track system and was entitled to a discount for doing so.
The sentencing judge then imposed sentences in respect of each offence, the details of which are set out in the schedule at the end of these reasons. Relevantly for this appeal, the appellant received a term of 2 years' imprisonment in relation to count 1, possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply. The total effective sentence imposed was 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment. The appellant was made eligible for parole. He was also declared to be a drug trafficker.
Grounds of appeal
The appellant advances two grounds of appeal, namely:
1.The sentence of two years' immediate imprisonment imposed on Count 1 was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case.
PARTICULARS
a)The count involved the possession with intent of 300 tablets of MDMA (ecstasy). The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive having regard to the quality and purity of the drug in question.
b)The sentence imposed was outside the range of a broad discretionary judgment having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
c)The sentence imposed was excessive having regard to sentences imposed by the Courts in this State for similar offences and to similar cases decided in the Court of Appeal.
2.The learned sentencing judge failed to adequately apply the totality principle to the overall head sentence imposed.
PARTICULARS
a)Given the multiple counts in respect of which the appellant was convicted the totality principle required the sentencing judge to take a last look at the ultimate head sentence to ascertain if it was excessive in all the circumstances of the case.
b)The learned sentencing judge was required to impose a sentence that adequately reflected the criminality of the offending and which was not crushing.
c)The eventual head sentence of eight years and six months was excessive having regard to the criminality of the overall offending and was a crushing sentence.
d)The learned sentencing judge's failure to adjust the sentence for totality has resulted in a sentence which was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case.
Ground 1 ‑ sentence for count 1 manifestly excessive
At the hearing of the appeal senior counsel for the appellant did not pursue the first ground of the appeal, although he did not formally abandon it. Counsel explained that the reason the ground was not pursued was that the question whether or not the individual sentence for count 1 was correct was effectively subsumed into the larger question of whether the total effective sentence was excessive. In other words, the real issue in the appeal was whether the total effective sentence offended the totality principle, not whether one or more of the individual sentences were excessive.
In my opinion this analysis of issues raised by the grounds of appeal was correct. There will, of course, be times when it is appropriate to examine an individual sentence because it may have proceeded on an incorrect factual basis or it may be tainted by some other demonstrable error. But generally speaking where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count will usually fall to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence. A heavy individual sentence, for example, may be softened by an order that it be served concurrently with sentences imposed in relation to the other counts. On the other hand, a relatively light sentence may, as a practical matter, have increased severity if it is ordered to be served cumulatively. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is excessive. In this case, such a question is raised by the second ground of appeal.
If, and to the extent that, the question whether the sentence imposed for count 1 was excessive remains alive, I would resolve the issue against the appellant. The appellant was convicted after trial of possessing 300 ecstasy tablets with intent to sell or supply. His sentence of 2 years' imprisonment (equivalent to 3 years in pre‑transitional terms) does not seem excessive when compared with the sentences commonly imposed for similar offences which were surveyed by Steytler P in The State of Western Australia v Higgins [2008] WASCA 157. There is nothing in the facts of the current case which leads me to conclude that, in imposing a sentence of 2 years for count 1, the sentencing judge's discretion miscarried.
To the extent that the first ground of appeal remains alive, it must fail.
Ground 2 ‑ whether the sentence breached the totality principle
The totality principle
The totality principle and the authorities in which it has been explained are well known. The principle has been described as having two limbs. First, a judicial officer sentencing an offender for a number of offences must ensure that the aggregation of the sentences appropriate for each offence is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved. Secondly, the overall sentence should not be 'crushing' in the sense that it would destroy any reasonable expectation of a useful life after release: see the authorities collected in Pollock v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 121 [24] ‑ [25].
A phrase often used to describe the practical application of the totality principle is that the judge, having fixed terms for the individual offences, should stand back and 'take a last look' to ensure that the aggregate term properly measures the overall criminality involved and that it is not crushing. In my view this is an apt description of the process and is a prudent step that a judicial officer should take in finalising the task of sentencing for multiple offences.
In the appellant's second ground of appeal, he contends that the total effective sentence offended both aspects of the totality principle. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the total effective sentence had a proper relationship with the overall criminality of the offending and whether it was crushing.
The sentence related to the overall criminality of the offending
Appellant's submissions
The appellant submits that the sentence imposed on him of 8 years and 6 months was too severe and did not bear a proper relationship with the overall criminality of his offending. In his written submissions he argues that the offences were carried out over a relatively short period. The offending was amateurish and not at all sophisticated. He also contends that he was young and did not have any previous drug convictions. In the appellant's submission, the sentence of 8 years and 6 months would be more appropriate for a sophisticated ongoing drug operation involving a large amount of drugs over a long period of time.
At the hearing of the appeal, senior counsel advanced a further point in support of the appellant's argument. He submitted that the appellant's involvement in much of the offending was 'subtle' and 'non‑instrumental'. It was Best who had made many of the phone calls offering to sell the drugs. Although the appellant had properly been convicted of these offences because he was involved in a joint criminal enterprise, his lack of active involvement in the commission of these offences ought to have been taken into account in assessing his criminality. In other words, even though the appellant was criminally responsible for the offences and his culpability was the same as Best's, his criminality (for sentencing purposes) was lower.
Seriousness of the offending
The offences committed by the appellant were serious. He was a commercial dealer of both methylamphetamines and ecstasy. He was not solely involved in the sale of drugs at the street level, but was selling drugs to other people who were selling them to the ultimate users. He sold drugs purely for financial gain, rather than to support an addiction.
The extent and seriousness of the appellant's drug dealing operation is illustrated by the quantity of drugs that he possessed. He was in possession of 300 ecstasy tablets between 1 and 4 March 2006 (count 1), 500 ecstasy tablets on 23 March 2006 (count 14) and 500 ecstasy tablets on 28 March 2006 (count 22) and he attempted to possess a further 500 tablets on 28 March (count 23). Over that period he also attempted to distribute about 140 g of methylamphetamine.
Earlier in these reasons I have set out the facts relating to the enterprise (and the appellant's participation in it) in some detail. I am not persuaded that the appellant's drug‑dealing operation was amateurish or unsophisticated. Although the appellant was ultimately largely unsuccessful in distributing the methylamphetamine, it was not for want of trying. The fact that the appellant was able to obtain large quantities of ecstasy and methylamphetamine, cut the methylamphetamine and distribute a large amount of ecstasy indicates that the endeavour was more than just a misguided hobby. The sentencing judge thought that it was significant that the appellant seemed to be familiar with the jargon of the drug‑dealing business. I too think that the ease with which the appellant conducted his business over the telephone is important. While the appellant's operation may have been carried out over a relatively short period and was, at least in respect of the methylamphetamine, largely unsuccessful, the endeavour was well‑organised and far from amateurish.
Was the appellant's criminality lower than Best's?
I have already outlined the appellant's submission that his overall criminality was lower than that of Best, notwithstanding that at sentencing the appellant's counsel conceded (and, presumably, the sentencing judge accepted) that Best and the appellant were equally culpable. I will leave to one side the question of whether an unchallenged finding of equal culpability between co-offenders necessarily precludes a finding that the criminality of one co‑offender is less than the criminality of the other. In my view, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that, for the purposes of sentencing, the criminality of the appellant was lower than the criminality of Best. It is true that some of the telephone calls offering to sell drugs were made by Best when the appellant was not present. On the other hand, some of the phone calls were made by the appellant when Best was not present.
Further, it was the appellant, not Best, who collected the ecstasy on 2 March 2006 and 23 March 2006 and who collected and cut the methylamphetamine on 10 and 11 March 2006. In these circumstances, and given the concession made by the appellant's counsel at sentencing that the appellant and Best were equally culpable, I am not persuaded that the appellant's criminality was lower than that of Best.
Mitigating factors
The mitigating factors falling in the appellant's favour were limited. He was 25 years old at the time the offences were committed. Accordingly, the extent to which he can claim youthful immaturity as an ameliorating factor is limited. He was not a drug user and his offending was not motivated by a need to support a drug habit. He came from a supportive family and there is nothing in his background which explains his offending. He was not suffering from any mental illness. His criminal record, though not bad, was not unblemished. He did not plead guilty to any of the offences and cannot call in aid the mitigating effect that attends such a plea.
The only factors which seem to be mitigating are his good work history and his expression of remorse at the sentencing hearing. Given the seriousness of the offending, however, the weight that can be attached to mitigating factors such as these (as opposed to, for example, youth or a guilty plea) are not significant. Further, the expression of remorse came quite late in the day. At the time the presentence report was prepared, for example, the appellant still maintained that he was innocent. Given the lateness of the expression of remorse, its value would have been reduced.
Conclusion on proper relationship with overall criminality
In my view, it cannot be said that the total effective sentence of 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment did not bear a proper relationship with the overall criminality of the appellant's offending. The appellant was convicted of 14 serious drug offences. He possessed, and attempted to distribute, large quantities of ecstasy and methylamphetamine. Although his endeavour (at least in relation to the methylamphetamine) was not particularly successful, it was an organised business and not merely an amateurish mistake. The mitigating features were few and not of great weight. The sentence was not disproportionate to his offending.
Was the sentence crushing?
In particular (c) of the second ground of appeal, the appellant contends that his sentence is crushing. No argument was advanced by the appellant, however, in either the written submissions or at the appeal hearing explaining why the sentence is said to be crushing. As the issue was not pressed by the appellant and was not addressed by the submissions of either party, my treatment of this aspect of the totality principle will be brief.
In Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201 at 205 Ipp J described a 'crushing' sentence as one that:
(a)leaves the offender with no hope for the future;
(b)would provoke a feeling of hopelessness in the offender if and when he is released; or
(c)destroys a reasonable expectation of a useful life after release.
In my opinion, the total effective sentence imposed on the appellant could not be said to be crushing. Although the sentence of 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment is heavy, it is not such as to deprive the appellant of a reasonable expectation of a useful life after his release from prison. He will have the opportunity in prison to participate in training and educational programmes. Prior to his offending, the appellant had a good work history. There is no reason to think that, after his release from prison, he could not once again be a useful and productive member of the community.
Conclusion
I have concluded that the sentence on count 1 was not manifestly excessive and the total effective sentence was neither disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending nor crushing. I would refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal.
PULLIN JA: I agree with Owen JA.
Schedule
| Count | Date(s) | Offence | Quantity | Sentence |
| 1 | 1 March 2006 ‑ 4 March 2006 | Possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply | 300 tablets | 2 years |
| 2 | 9 March 2006 - 13 March 2006 | Possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply | 3 oz (84 g) | 4 years cumulative on count 1 |
| 3 | 12 March 2009 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | 1 - 2 oz (28 g ‑ 56 g) | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 4 | 12 March 2009 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | Unknown | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 5 | 12 March 2009 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | Unknown | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 7 | 14 March 2006 | Supplying methylamphetamine to another | 2 oz (56 g) | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 9 | 17 March 2006 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | 1 oz (28 g) | 2 years 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 10 | 17 March 2006 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | Unknown | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 14 | 23 March 2006 | Possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply | 500 tablets | 2 years and 6 months cumulative |
| Count | Date(s) | Offence | Quantity | Sentence |
| 17 | 25 March 2009 | Supplying methylamphetamine to another | A 'weight' (unknown) | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 18 | 26 March 2006 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | 2 'bowls' (7 g) | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 19 | 26 March 2006 | Offering to sell or supply methylamphetamine to another | 2 'bowls' (7 g) | 2 years and 8 months concurrent with count 2 |
| 22 | 28 March 2006 | Possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply | 500 tablets (469 tablets recovered: total weight 95.6 g; pure weight 34.4 g) | 2 years and 6 months concurrent with count 14 |
| 23 | 28 March 2006 | Attempting to possess MDMA with intent to sell or supply | 500 tablets | 2 years concurrent with count 14 |
142
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