Councillor v Hart
[2018] WASC 418
•26 FEBRUARY 2019
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: COUNCILLOR -v- HART [2018] WASC 418
CORAM: CORBOY J
HEARD: 21 & 28 DECEMBER 2018
DELIVERED : 28 DECEMBER 2018
PUBLISHED : 26 FEBRUARY 2019
FILE NO/S: SJA 1127 of 2018
BETWEEN: DARRYL RONALD VINCENT HARRIS COUNCILLOR
Appellant
AND
CAMERON HART
Respondent
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Whether error made in backdating sentences - Section 87 of Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) - Whether sentence for escaping lawful custody was manifestly excessive
Legislation:
Children's Court of Western Australia 1988 (WA), s 21(2)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 85, s 87
Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA), s 50B
Result:
Leave to appeal
Appeal allowed
Appellant resentenced
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr H Glenister |
| Respondent | : | Ms M M Yeung |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Cathal Smith Legal Pty Ltd |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Churnside v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 146
Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321
Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 299; (1999) 195 CLR 665
Rhattigan v Forbes [2009] WASC 368
Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82
CORBOY J:
These reasons were delivered orally on 28 December 2018 and have been edited from the transcript and from documents filed in the appeal.
The appellant was born on 8 May 2000. On 16 October 2018, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 18 months' imprisonment to be immediately served for various offences committed as a juvenile and as an adult. The sentence was imposed by a magistrate sitting in the Geraldton Magistrates Court and in the Children's Court of Western Australia at Geraldton.
The offences for which the appellant was sentenced as a juvenile were as follows:
(1)On 5 October 2017, at Utakarra, the appellant wilfully and unlawfully damaged a window, the property of Carmel Meleasha Westbrooke (charge GN 391/17). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 10 years' imprisonment and 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of $36,000. The appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 month cumulative.
(2)On 5 October 2017, at Utakarra, the appellant while in the place of April Healy without her consent, committed the offence of stealing in circumstances of aggravation, namely while in the company of another and the place being ordinarily used for human habitation (charge GN 419/17). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 20 years' imprisonment and 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of $36,000. The appellant was sentenced to a term of 4 months' imprisonment concurrent. The appellant was also charged with stealing an iPod, watches and a knife to the value of approximately $775 the property of Ms Healy (charge GN 418/17). No penalty was imposed for that offence pursuant to s 11 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).
(3)On 11 December 2017, at Rangeway, the appellant entered or was in the place of Leonie Michelle Patman without her consent, with intent to commit an offence therein and the place being a place ordinarily used for human habitation (charge GN 490/17). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 18 years' imprisonment and 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of $36,000. The appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 months' imprisonment, that sentence being the head sentence.
(4)On 7 April 2018, at South Hedland, the appellant stole a motor vehicle the value of which exceeded $1,000, namely KTM motor cycle registration R 4827, the property of Lloyd Te Ropiha Williams (charge PH 97/18). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 7 years' imprisonment and 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of $24,000. The appellant was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment concurrent.
(5)On 3 May 2018, at South Hedland, the appellant stole a motor vehicle the value of which exceeded $1,000, namely a Toyota Landcruiser being registration number 1EDY 633, the property of Chubb Security (charge PH 175/18). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 7 years' imprisonment and 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of $24,000. The appellant was sentenced to 1 month's imprisonment cumulative.
(6)On 6 May 2018, at Nickol, the appellant stole a motor vehicle the value of which exceeded $1,000, namely a Holden Commodore being registration number PH 25405, the property of Matthew Hedanek (charge PH 178/18). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 7 years' imprisonment and 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of $24,000. The appellant was sentenced to 2 months' imprisonment cumulative.
(7)The appellant was also fined $60 for a stealing offence committed on 7 May 2018 (charge PH 177/18) and no sentence was imposed for a further stealing offence that occurred on 4 May 2018 (charge PH 176/18).
The total sentence imposed for those offences was 15 months' imprisonment; the total effective sentence was 6 months' imprisonment. The magistrate indicated he would have imposed a total effective sentence of 10 months' imprisonment, but counsel for the appellant referred his Honour to s 21 of the Children's Court of Western Australia Act1988 (WA). That section provides that the Children's Court, when constituted by, or so as to include, a magistrate, cannot sentence an offender when at the time of being sentenced has reached 18 years of age to a term of imprisonment longer than 6 months for one offence or as the aggregate of the sentences imposed on the one occasion for more than one offence. His Honour adjusted the sentences to be imposed so that the total effective sentence was 6 months' imprisonment.
The offences committed by the appellant as an adult were as follows:
(1)On 10 May 2018, at South Hedland, without lawful excuse, the appellant trespassed on 22 Centaur Avenue, South Hedland (charge PH 1178/18). The maximum penalty for that offence is 12 months' imprisonment and a fine of $12,000. The appellant was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment concurrent.
(2)On 26 May 2018, at South Hedland, the appellant without lawful excuse trespassed on 34 Trumpet Way, South Hedland (charge PH 1209/18). The maximum penalty for that offence is 12 months' imprisonment and a fine of $12,000. The appellant was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment concurrent.
(3)On 26 May 2018, at South Hedland, the appellant unlawfully used a motor vehicle to the value exceeding $1,000, namely an unregistered Honda TRX 400 Xquad bike, the property of Melanie Joy Andrews without the consent of Melanie Joy Andrews (charge PH 1210/18). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 7 years' imprisonment and 2 years' imprisonment and a fine of $24,000. The appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4 months cumulative.
(4)On 27 May 2018, at South Hedland, the appellant without lawful excuse trespassed on 45 Brodie Crescent, South Hedland (charge PH 1212/18). The maximum penalty for that offence is 12 months' imprisonment and a $12,000 fine. The appellant was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment concurrent.
(5)On 27 May 2018, at South Hedland, the appellant attempted to steal a motor vehicle the value of which exceeded $1,000, namely an unregistered Yamaha Grizzly quad bike, the property of Kevin Michael Page (charge PH 1213/18). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment and 2 years' imprisonment and a $24,000 fine. The appellant was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment concurrent.
(6)On 24 July 2018, at Narngulu, the appellant escaped from lawful custody (charge GN 3090/18). The maximum and summary conviction penalties for that offence are 7 years' imprisonment and a $12,000 fine and 3 years' imprisonment and a $36,000 fine.
(7)In addition, the appellant was convicted of charge of stealing for which a fine of $100 was imposed.
The total effective sentence imposed on offences committed by the appellant as an adult was 12 months' imprisonment. The total sentence imposed was 24 months' imprisonment.
The grounds of appeal
The appeal notice pleads five grounds of appeal - that the learned sentencing magistrate erred in:
(a)imposing a total effective sentence that, in all the circumstances, breach the first limb of the totality principle;
(b)imposing individual sentences that were manifestly excessive;
(c)imposing an aggregate term of imprisonment greater than six months for offences committed while the appellant was a child in contravention of s 21 of the Children's Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA) (Children's Court Act);
(d)in backdating the term of 8 months' imprisonment imposed for escaping lawful custody to 16 February 2018 when the offence was committed on 24 July 2018;
(e)failing to accord the appellant a discount for his pleas of guilty under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).
The facts on which the appellant was sentenced
The facts alleged by the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing were admitted by the appellant.
The facts concerning the offences committed on 5 October 2017 at Utakarra were in summary that:
(1)The appellant and three others went to an address in Utakarra and entered the rear yard. The appellant acted as a lookout while his co‑offenders threw rocks at a window causing the window to break. The appellant and his co‑offenders went to another house in Utakarra and gained entry into the house after kicking in the front door. The appellant acted as a lookout while his co‑offenders entered the house and stole items from the house. The property stolen comprised an iPod, money, watches and a knife with an approximate value of $775. A search warrant was subsequently executed at the appellant's residence and the stolen knife was located.
(2)At about 8.50 am on 11 December 2017, the appellant entered a yard through an open side driveway gate. He removed the flyscreen from a window, smashed the window and entered the residence. He walked through the residence and in doing so, activated an alarm. He ran from the residence but a member of the public photographed him as he left. He was located by police a short distance from the residence.
(3)At about 9.30 pm on 6 May 2018, the appellant and two others entered the rear yard of a property by climbing over a fence. They opened the front gate to a driveway and one of the appellant's co‑offenders pushed the victim's motor cycle out through the front gate. The accused and his co‑offenders then left the property with the motor cycle.
(4)Sometime during the night of 3/4 May 2018, the appellant and others went to a property in Port Hedland where they located a Toyota Landcruiser with the keys in the ignition. The appellant and his co‑offenders entered the vehicle and drove away. They eventually drove the vehicle to Karratha where it was abandoned. The vehicle was subsequently recovered by police at Karratha.
(5)On 10 May 2018, the appellant went to an address in South Hedland. He walked up the front driveway of a house where a motor cycle was parked. He tried to move the motor cycle but it was secured. The appellant then left the premises.
(6)On 26 May 2018, the appellant and two others entered the rear yard of a residence in South Hedland. They gained access to the rear yard by jumping over a fence. Items were stolen from the yard and the appellant pushed a motor cycle out of the yard down the street and into a ditch. He tried unsuccessfully to start the motor cycle. He went back to the residence and took a pushbike and rode to a relative's house. He took a pair of scissors from the house and returned to the motor cycle and attempted to start the motor cycle using the scissors. Again, he was unsuccessful.
(7)On 27 May 2018, the appellant and two others entered a rear yard of a residence in South Hedland. Once in the yard they attempted to steal a quad bike using a cigarette lighter to burn through some tie down straps holding the bike onto a trailer. The appellant's companions also used bolt cutters to cut chains that were holding the bike to the trailer. The appellant then tried to pull the bike off the trailer but was unable to do so as it was stuck in gear.
(8)As at 24 July 2018 the appellant was a remand prisoner at the Greenough Regional Prison. On the afternoon of 24 July a riot occurred in the prison. During the riot, the appellant in company with others escaped from the prison by cutting a hole in the internal fences and using a ladder to scale two perimeter fences. The appellant then ran through bushland discarding his prison clothing and entered the town of Geraldton. He handed himself into police the following day after negotiating his surrender through lawyers.
(9)On 6 May 2018, the appellant and others used a vehicle that had been stolen in a burglary committed in Nickol. The vehicle was driven from Karratha to South Hedland where it was abandoned. The vehicle was subsequently recovered by police.
It should be noted in relation to the escape lawful custody offence, the appellant was sentenced on the basis that he was not involved in the planning of the riot or the escape by prisoners from the Greenough Prison, nor that he had damaged the prison during the riot. In fact, the appellant followed others out of the prison by climbing a ladder that had been placed against a fence. He went to his auntie's place and, following his escape, he stayed with her overnight; she organised for him to voluntarily surrender himself the next day.
The relevant statutory regime
Part VII of the Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) deals with sentencing and related matters for young offenders. Section 3 of the Act defines a 'young person' to mean a person who has not reached the age of 18 years or a person to whom the Act applies because of s 4. Section 4 of the Act states that if a person commits or allegedly commits an offence before reaching the age of 18 years, the Children's Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA) applies to the person as a young person for purposes connected with that offence or any order that was made in dealing with the person for that offence.
Section 50B of the Young Offenders Act applies to, and in respect of, a young person found guilty of an offence who at the time of being sentenced is 18 years or older. Section 50B(2) provides that the court dealing with the offender must dispose of the matter by sentencing the offender under the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) and that Act, and the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA), applies to, and in respect of, the sentence imposed. However, s 50B(4) further provides that if the court dealing with the offender is the Children's Court, s 50B(2) is subject to s 21 of the Children's Court Act.
Section 19 of the Children's Court Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Children's Court to hear and determine a charge of an offence alleged to have been committed by a child. Section 3 of the Act defines a 'child' to mean any boy or girl under the age of 18 years.
Section 21 of the Children's Court Act provides that when the Children's Court is constituted by a magistrate the court cannot sentence an offender who at the time of being sentenced has reached 18 years of age to a term of imprisonment longer than 6 months for one offence, or as the aggregate of the sentences imposed on the one occasion for more than one offence.
Section 87 of the Sentencing Act states that:
(1)If when an offender is being sentenced to imprisonment for an offence ‑
(a)the offender has previously spent time ‑
(i)in custody in respect of the offence for which the offender is being sentenced; or
(ii)in custody in respect of another offence, while on bail for the offence for which the offender is being sentenced;
and
(b)the sentencing court decides that that time should be taken into account,
the court may take that time into account ‑
(c)if it imposes a fixed term, by reducing that term by an appropriate period; or
(d)by ordering that the term it imposes is to be taken to have begun on a specified day being the day when that custody began or on some later date that is not later than the date of the sentence.
(2)Subsection (1)(a)(i) does not apply if the time in custody has already been taken into account in sentencing for another offence under subsection (1)(a)(ii).
Section 85 of the Sentencing Act defines the expression 'fixed term' to mean 'a term that is not life imprisonment. The section further defines that word 'term' to mean 'a term of imprisonment imposed on an offender by a court as a sentence, whether a fixed term or life imprisonment'.
Section 85(2) of the Sentencing Act states that for the purposes of pt 13 and pt 11 of the Sentencing Act and for the purposes of the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA), the aggregate of two or more fixed terms is the total effective period of imprisonment imposed on the offender having regard to whether the fixed terms are to be served concurrently, or partly concurrently, or cumulatively.
Finally, s 46 of the Young Offenders Act set out a number of objectives and principles to be applied in sentencing a young offender.
The proper construction of s 21(2) of the Children's Court Act
I raised with the parties an issue concerning the proper construction of s 21(2) of the Children's Court Act; in particular, whether the reference in the Act to a term of imprisonment was to the total term of imprisonment imposed by a sentencing magistrate or to the total effective sentence. As counsel for the respondent, Ms Yeung, pointed out, s 85(2) deals with what is meant by a term of imprisonment where two or more offences are aggregated. As s 50B of the Young Offenders Act requires the court sentencing someone who is over the age of 18 years to be sentenced according to the Sentencing Act, I accept Ms Yeung's submission that s 21(2) of the Children's Court Act is to be read with s 50 of the Young Offenders Act and s 85(2) of the Sentencing Act. The result is that it was open to the magistrate to sentence the appellant to terms of imprisonment of more than 6 months so long as the total effective sentence was no more than 6 months. That is what the magistrate did and there was no error made by his Honour in that respect.
The appellant's sentencing
The magistrate calculated that the appellant had spent 223 days in custody, which his Honour described as being 'pretty close to 8 months'. His Honour accepted that the appellant had pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity and, accordingly, reduced the sentences that would have been otherwise imposed by 25% pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act. His Honour considered the appellant required intensive counselling and intervention and that there was a grave risk he would reoffend in the future if he did not receive counselling. The magistrate noted the appellant was extremely immature for his age, lacked the ability to make decisions for himself, was easily led and was impulsive.
His Honour correctly noted that the appellant had committed a number of offences while on bail. He indicated that he took into account, as mitigating factors, the appellant's age, his pleas of guilty, and the time he had spent in custody.
His Honour characterised the escape lawful custody offence as being very serious as the appellant was part of a mass escape. He reached that conclusion despite accepting that the appellant was not one of the prisoners behind the escape; he did not 'do the kind of damage that others did'; and he 'effectively went along with others'. His Honour considered that the appropriate penalty for the escape in lawful custody offence was a term of imprisonment of 8 months, but the term should be backdated for that amount of time to take into account the time the appellant had spent in custody.
His Honour concluded that it was not appropriate that the terms of imprisonment should be suspended.
It is accepted that in backdating the sentence for the escape in lawful custody offence by 8 months, the magistrate erred as the appellant had not been in custody in respect of that offence for that time. The concession was rightly made.
The relevant principles
The principles that apply to an appeal against sentence are well‑established. They were outlined by the Court of Appeal in Wilson v The State of Western Australia.[1]
[1] Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82.
An appeal court will not intervene to set aside a sentence merely because it might exercise the sentencing discretion in a manner different from the sentencing judge.[2] An appeal court should only intervene if a material error of fact or law has been made or the result is manifestly unreasonable or unjust.[3]
[2] See Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 299; (1999) 195 CLR 665.
[3] Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321.
In this case, there was an express error made by magistrate in the application of s 67 of the Sentencing Act for the escape lawful custody offence. That error enlivens the court's jurisdiction and the nature of the error such that, in my view, a different sentences must be imposed. The backdating error affected all of those sentences that were imposed.
Further, in my view, the sentence his Honour imposed for the escape lawful custody offence was manifestly excessive when the circumstances of the offence, the circumstances of the appellant and all other relevant sentencing factors are considered. The fact that I have found that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive opens the jurisdiction to resentence the appellant not only for that offence but for all other offences.[4]
[4] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 41(2).
In Rhattigan v Forbes,[5] Hall J concluded that an appeal court can impose a conditionally suspended imprisonment order on resentencing even though a magistrate does not have that power. The jurisdictional limits that might apply to a magistrate sentencing at first instance do not apply in resentencing on appeal.
[5] Rhattigan v Forbes [2009] WASC 368.
The appellant faces a further charge arising out of what occurred in the riot at Greenough Prison on 24 July 2018. The resentencing of the appellant should not be taken as an indication to the magistrate presiding over that matter that a non‑custodial sentence for the charge is the only appropriate disposition if the appellant pleads or is found guilty. Section 77(3) of the Sentencing Act provides for what is to occur where an offender, who is subject to a conditionally suspended imprisonment order, is sentenced to a term of imprisonment to be immediately served. The suspended term continues to run as the offender is in custody. Accordingly, it would be open to the magistrate to impose a term of imprisonment to be immediately served if the appellant was found guilty of the further charge pending in the Magistrates Court. It would also be open to the magistrate to make any term of imprisonment imposed cumulative or concurrent.
The time spent by the appellant in custody
I have calculated the time that the appellant spent in custody as follows.
The first period of time the appellant spent in custody was between 11 December 2017 and 2 March 2018. That is a period of 81 days, to which should be added a day for 5 December 2017 and a further day for 26 May 2018. Those calculations accord with the calculations made by the sentencing magistrate.
The appellant spent a further period in custody between 29 May 2018 and 23 July 2018 (being the day before the appellant escaped from Greenough Prison). That is a period of 57 days. The time spent in custody between 11 December and 23 July is a total of 140 days.
The appellant spent another 84 days in custody between 25 July and 16 October 2018. That makes a total of 224 days.
The appellant has been in custody for a further 71 days between 17 October 2018 and 27 December 2018. That makes a total of 285 days spent in custody.
Section 87 of the Sentencing Act imposes some relevant limitations on backdating or reducing the sentences to be imposed on account of the time the appellant has spent in custody. First, the appellant spent 81 days in custody between 11 December 2017 and 2 March 2018. A further one day in custody was spent on 5 December 2018. The appellant spent that time in custody in respect of charges 391/17, 417/17 and 490/17.
The period of 82 days referred to immediately above can only be allocated against those three offences. However, the appellant subsequently spent time in custody in respect of those offences. It is possible to add time later spent in custody in determining the appropriate sentences or backdating the sentences for charges 391/17, 417/17 and 490/17.
Second, the appellant was in custody from 25 July 2018 in respect of the escape lawful custody offence. It is only the period after 25 July 2018 that the appellant spent in custody that can be taken into account in backdating or reducing the sentence to be imposed for that offence. The balance of the time that the appellant spent in custody can be allocated across all other offences.
Resentencing
As the respondent has pointed out, the appellant has a serious history of offending as a juvenile. He has been sentenced in the Children's Court to periods of supervision in the community and he has offended during those periods. The appellant has also committed offences while on bail. Moreover, the home burglary offences, in particular, are serious offences ‑ although, all of the offences committed by the appellant must be regarded as serious.
However, I have concluded that it is appropriate to conditionally suspend the terms of imprisonment that I shall impose having regard to the following matters:
(a)the time the appellant spent in custody;
(b)the appellant has been free from heavy cannabis use and alcohol abuse and has been away from his peers for some time;
(c)the appellant has the support of his mother who is willing to take the opportunity to try and assist the appellant to get his life in order;
(d)the appellant is still very young and has been dealt with for the first time in the criminal justice system as an adult;
(e)the appellant voluntarily surrendered himself after escaping from the Greenough Prison;
(f)the appellant has counselling and treatment needs;
(g)the appellant has suffered from a disadvantaged and, somewhat, dysfunctional upbringing (and see Churnside v The State of Western Australia);[6]
(h)the appellant's mother has relocated to Perth and this may be a real opportunity for the appellant to break his cycle of offending while under the influence of negative peers in Geraldton and Port Hedland.
[6] Churnside v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 146.
The offences committed by the appellant as a juvenile were serious. It is appropriate that a term of imprisonment of 1 month cumulative be imposed for each offence. The sentences will then be backdated in the following way:
(a)charges 391/17 - the sentence of 1 month will be backdated to 11 December 2017 with the result that the sentence will have been served by 10 January 2018;
(b)charges 417/17 - the sentence of 1 month will be deemed to commence on 11 January 2018 and end on 10 February 2018;
(c)charges 490/17 - the sentence of 1 month will be deemed to commence on 11 February 2018 and end on 10 March 2018;
(d)97/18 - the term of imprisonment of 1 month will be deemed to have commenced on 3 June 2018 and ended on 2 July 2018;
(e)charges 175/18 - the term of imprisonment of 1 month will be deemed to have commenced on 3 June 2018 and ended on 2 August 2018;
(f)178/18 - the term of imprisonment of 1 month will be deemed to have commenced on 3 August 2018 and had been completed on 2 September 2018.
I propose to utilise the balance of the time that the appellant has spent in custody that has not been allocated to the juvenile offences in reducing the sentence that would otherwise had been imposed for the escape in lawful custody offence. I would have imposed a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment for that offence. I will reduce the sentence to be imposed for the offence to 1 month's imprisonment on account of the time that the appellant has spent in custody in respect of that offence.
As to the balance of the offences that were committed by the appellant as an adult, I propose to impose the following sentences:
(a)Charge 1178/18 and charge 1209/18 ‑ 3 months' imprisonment concurrent for each offence (the same sentence as was imposed by the magistrate).
(b)Charge 1218/18 ‑ the magistrate imposed a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment. I would have imposed the same sentence, but I will reduce the sentence to 3 months concurrent to take into account the balance of the time that the appellant spent in custody that has not been allocated.
(c)Charge 1212/18 - 3 months' imprisonment concurrent (the sentence that was imposed by the magistrate);
(d)Charge 1213/18 - 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on charge 1218/18 (which will be the head sentence).
(e)Charge 3090/18 - 1 month's imprisonment cumulative.
The result is that the total effective sentence to be imposed will be 6 months and 1 day. The total sentence that would have been imposed for the offences committed by the appellant as an adult is 10 months but those sentences had been reduced on account of the time that the appellant has spent in custody.
The sentence of 6 months and 1 day will be conditionally suspended for 8 months. That should provide sufficient time for the appellant to engage with Community Corrections and for counselling and other treatment options that may be deemed appropriate to the causes of the appellant's offending to be reviewed and implemented. There will be supervision and programme requirements as part of the conditionally suspended imprisonment order.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
MB
Associate to the Honourable Justice Corboy25 FEBRUARY 2019
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