BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Treby

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   BHP BILLITON IRON ORE PTY LTD -v- TREBY [2017] WADC 6

CORAM:   HERRON DCJ

HEARD:   3 JUNE & 6 OCTOBER 2016

DELIVERED          :   20 JANUARY 2017

FILE NO/S:   APP 88 of 2015

BETWEEN:   BHP BILLITON IRON ORE PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

LEE DIANE TREBY
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARBITRATION SERVICE (WA)

Coram  :ARBITRATOR NUGAWELA

File No  :A 17006 of 2015

Catchwords:

Worker's compensation - Appeal - Section 247 Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 - Question of law - Meaning of error of law or expression 'a question of law is involved' - Whether meaning has been broadened - Whether medical opinion has no probative force - Whether arbitrator's decision involves a question of law because unreasonable or irrational

Legislation:

Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA)

Result:

Application for leave to appeal refused

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr J R Ludlow

Respondent:     Mr G T Stubbs

Solicitors:

Appellant:     HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

Respondent:     Perth City Legal

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

A v Corruption and Crime Commissioner [2013] WASCA 288; (2013) 306 ALR 491

Atanasoska v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 17

Attorney General for Western Australia v Her Honour Judge Schoombee [2012] WASCA 29

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Limited (1985) 4 NSWLR 139

Beale v GIO of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 450

BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Health Department of Western Australia v Prosser [2004] WASCA 83

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 12 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Migration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482

Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1

Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370

Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501

Steele v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 197 CLR 459

Summit Homes v Lucev (1996) 16 WAR 566

Velez Pty Ltd v Tudor [2007] WASCA 218

HERRON DCJ:

Introduction

  1. By an application dated 8 September 2014 the respondent, Lee Diane Treby (Ms Treby), claimed worker's compensation payments, being weekly payments and payment of statutory allowances, for a back injury described as 'L4 endplate fracture, left L4 nerve root impingement, L4/5 degeneration and foraminal disc protrusion'.  The application alleges the injury occurred through truck driving involving 'repetitious bouncing and rocking whilst driving, being jolted back and forward and shuddering of truck'.  Despite the application claiming the injury was sustained by the repetitive actions of truck driving, the injury was described as occurring on a specific date, 21 March 2013.  Ms Treby claimed weekly payments of compensation for total incapacity…

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Details
Case
[2017] WADC 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Treby involved a dispute over worker's compensation and the interpretation of the law concerning errors of law in the context of an arbitrator's decision. The matter was appealed to the court, where the primary issue was whether the meaning of an error of law had been broadened to encompass situations where an arbitrator's decision was unreasonable or irrational, or where the medical opinion had no probative force. The court was required to determine if the arbitrator's reliance on a particular medical report constituted an error of law.

The court considered the nature of errors of law and whether the concept had been expanded to include unreasonable or irrational decisions. It examined the observations of Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and the subsequent case law, including Minister for Migration and Citizenship v Li. The court held that the law regarding what constitutes an error of law had not been broadened to the extent suggested by the appellant. It found that while the approach of English courts and some Australian authorities may support a 'no sufficient evidence' test, this had not been accepted by the High Court. The court concluded that an error of law does not occur simply because a finding appears illogical, provided the inference is reasonably open.

Consequently, the court determined that the arbitrator's reliance on the report of Mr Wong, despite it lacking sufficient analysis, did not amount to an error of law. The court held that the arbitrator's decision was not unreasonable or irrational, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The final orders affirmed the decision of the arbitrator and rejected the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By s 213 arbitrators are required to provide written reasons for decision. By s 213(4):213. Decisions and reasons, form and content of…(4)The reasons for an arbitrator’s decision —(a)need only identify the facts that the arbitrator has accepted in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(b)need only identify the law that the arbitrator has applied in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(c)need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and(d)need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case.… At the resumed hearing on 6 October 2016, the appellant's counsel refined or restated the issues raised by the amended notice of appeal as follows:1(a).The arbitrator misdirected himself as to the issue to be resolved – grounds 4 and 5.1(b).In resolving the conflict in the medical opinions between Mr Wong and Dr Flahive and the other medical evidence, including Mr Bannan, the arbitrator failed to have any, or any sufficient, regard to the onus of proof being on Ms Treby to prove that she had suffered an injury by accident.2.The arbitrator erred in law by relying upon the report of Mr Wong when it was of no probative force and therefore could not be relied upon – grounds 1 to 3.3.The arbitrator's reasoning, and his reliance upon and acceptance of Mr Wong's opinion, was unreasonable or irrational – Wednesbury or Li unreasonableness – ground 4. The thrust of counsel's submissions was that since Bond, and in particular since 2010, the law as to what is an error of law has been broadened. Counsel referred to the observations of Mason CJ in Bond, at (355 – 357) earlier cited in those reasons, in which, after referring to the approach in a number of English cases and the judgment of Deane J in Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482 [67] – [68] (in which Deane J said that findings of material fact must ordinarily be based upon logically probative material), he said that approach has not so far been accepted by the High Court. As I earlier explained, it was submitted that the case law has moved on since then and that the approach of the English courts, noted by Mason CJ not to have so far been accepted by the High Court, has since been accepted and the law as to what is a reviewable error of law has been broadened. Counsel also submitted that the decision at first instance in Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, a decision of Brennan J sitting as the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, is authority for the proposition that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions would be committing an error of law if he or she had regard to evidence that had no probative force. It was submitted that at (492 – 493) Brennan J held that such a person must base his or her decision on material which tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined and that the person may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some rational probative force. Brennan J referred to the English decisions referred to by Mason CJ in Bond and also United States cases. His comments must be read in the context of a tribunal which is not bound by the rules of evidence, including the rule against hearsay. At (493) after observing that hearsay has a wide scale of reliability, Brennan J observed 'there is no reason why logically probative hearsay should not be given credence'. In my view, those observations do not establish any principle of law that a person exercising quasi-judicial functions commits an error of law if he or she has regard to evidence that had no probative force. Brennan J's observations must be read in the context of the specific circumstances which applied in that case. In the decision on appeal the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (60) (Deane J) said:There is no general principle of law binding the tribunal either to the effect that 'the probative force' of information heard in confidential session … 'must be particularly cogent if that information is to be acted upon' …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the third question of law said to arise, counsel referred to the judgment of the High Court in Minister for Migration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 which he submitted extends the scope of what is an error of law as explained by Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321. Counsel submitted that the report of Mr Wong which was relied upon by the arbitrator for his findings that Ms Treby suffered an endplate fracture at the L4/5 level in 2013, and whose opinion he preferred to the opinion of Dr Flahive, whose report was relied upon by the appellant at the hearing before the arbitrator, was of no probative force because there was no analysis in the report to support the conclusions. There was no proper, or any, explanation for the conclusions arrived at. Therefore, so the submission proceeded, the report of Mr Wong was unable to be relied upon by the arbitrator but because he did rely upon the report, his reliance was so unreasonable because no reasonable arbitrator would have relied upon the report. Counsel referred to the well-known passage of Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (355 – 357):(4)Review of the Findings of Fact(a)Grounds of Review….The question whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law: McPhee v. S. Bennett Ltd. (46); Australian Gas Light Co. v. Valuer-General (47). Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law: Australian Gas Light (47); Hope v. Bathurst City Council (48). This is because, before the inference is drawn, there is the pre1iminary question whether the evidence reasonably admits of different conclusions: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Broken Hill South Ltd. (49). So,. in the context of judicial review, it has been accepted that the making of findings and the drawing of inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law: Sinclair v. Maryborough Mining Warden (50). But it is said that '[t]here is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact': Waterford v. The Commonwealth (51), per Brennan J. Similarly, Menzies J. observed in Reg. v. District Court; Ex parte White (52): 'Even if the reasoning whereby the Court reached its conclusion of fact were demonstrably unsound, this would not amount to an error of law on the face of the record. To establish some faulty (e.g. illogical) inference of fact would not disclose an error of law.'Thus, at common law, according to the Australian authorities, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as there is some basis for an inference - in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open - even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. Counsel also referred to the paragraph which followed in which Mason CJ observed:On the other hand, there are statements in the English cases which support a 'no sufficient evidence' test in the context of judicial review of findings of fact: see, for example, Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Armah (53). It remains to be seen whether these statements convey any more than a 'no probative evidence' test. So far no occasion has arisen to determine whether this is the case and, if so, whether the statements are to be seen as expressing what is or should be the law of Australia on the topic. There are also statements in the English cases which suggest that findings and inferences are reviewable for error of law on the ground that they could not be reasonably made on the evidence or reasonably drawn from the primary facts: Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow (54); Cooper v. Stubbs (55); British Launderers' Research Association v. Borough of Hendon Rating Authority (56); Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (57). Further, in Mahon v. Air New Zealand (58) the Judicial Committee stated that natural justice requires that 'the decision to make [a] finding must be based upon some material that tends logically to show the existence of facts consistent with the finding and that the reasoning supportive of the finding, if it be disclosed, is not logically self-contradictory'. These statements may be traced back to the observations of Diplock L.J. in Reg. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore (59); see also Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Pochi (60), per Deane J. (an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the AA.T. Act). The approach adopted in these cases has not so far been accepted by this Court. [emphasis added]