Anderson v Mercy Hospital Mount Lawley

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   ANDERSON -v- MERCY HOSPITAL MOUNT LAWLEY [2018] WADC 74

CORAM:   JUDGE LONSDALE

HEARD:   20 DECEMBER 2017 & 18 JANUARY 2018

DELIVERED          :   1 JUNE 2018

FILE NO/S:   APP 63 of 2017

BETWEEN:   SHARON MARIE ANDERSON

Appellant

AND

MERCY HOSPITAL MOUNT LAWLEY

First Respondent

ST JOHN OF GOD HEALTH CARE INC.

Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARBITRATION SERVICE (WA)

Coram:   ARBITRATOR SONTER

File Number             :   A38241 of 2017


Catchwords:

Workers' compensation - Appeal - Section 247 of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 - Question of law - Whether arbitrator failed to properly determine that the appellant sustained an injury - Whether arbitrator erred by failing to determine the extent to which the appellant had contracted a disease - Credibility of appellant - Failure to provide adequate reasons - Conflicting expert evidence

Legislation:

Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 5, s 5(a), s 5(c), s 5(d), s 5(5), s 18, s 188, s 213, s 213(4), s 247(1), Sch 1 cl 17, Sch 1 cl 19

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr M J Lourey
First Respondent : Ms M C Browne
Second Respondent : Mr R D McCabe

Solicitors:

Appellant : Chapmans Barristers & Solicitors
First Respondent : Jackson McDonald
Second Respondent : St John of God Health Care Inc.

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139

Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430

Beer v Duracraft Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 192

BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250

BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Treby [2017] WADC 6

Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266

Department of Education v Azmitia [2014] WADC 85

Department of Education v Azmitia [2015] WASCA 246

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2004) 29 WAR 273

Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60

Peter Nardi v Department of Education and Training [2006] WACC C22-2006

Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd v Space Suleski [2017] WADC 114

Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1

Sotico Pty Ltd v Wilson [2007] WASCA 112

Summit Homes v Lucev (1996) 16 WAR 566

Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439

Contents

Introduction

The facts

The appellant's position before the arbitrator

The second respondent's position before the arbitrator

The arbitrator's summary of the parties' respective positions

The arbitrator's findings

The grounds of appeal

The appeal must involve an error of law

Grounds 1 and 2

Legal principles governing the arbitrator's reasons

Ground 3

Ground 4

The requirement to give reasons

The arbitrator's reasons – analysis of adequacy of reasons

The appellant's denial of being angry with her employer

Discrepancies between the evidence of the appellant and Ms…

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Details
Case
[2018] WADC 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Anderson v Mercy Hospital Mount Lawley concerns a dispute over whether the appellant sustained an injury that warranted workers' compensation from her employer, Mercy Hospital Mount Lawley. The case was heard in the Industrial Relations Court of Western Australia. The primary legal issues before the court involved whether the arbitrator had erred in his determination of the appellant's credibility, the extent to which she had contracted a disease, and whether the arbitrator failed to provide adequate reasons for his decision.

The court examined whether the arbitrator had erred in his determination of the appellant's credibility and whether he adequately addressed the conflicting expert evidence. The court found that the arbitrator's decision to deem the appellant not credible was justified based on the discrepancies between her testimony and other evidence presented, including her medical records and the testimony of other witnesses. The court also held that the arbitrator was not required to examine every piece of evidence in detail, as the statutory framework permitted a more streamlined approach to decision-making. The court found that the arbitrator's reasons were sufficient and did not amount to an error of law.

The reasoning of the court was rooted in the principles set out in section 213 of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981, which allows for a less exhaustive examination of evidence by the arbitrator. The court emphasized that the arbitrator's decision to find the appellant not credible was supported by various discrepancies in her testimony and other evidence, such as her denial of anger towards her employer despite her claims of significant distress from the incident. Given the substantial evidence supporting the arbitrator's findings, the court concluded that there was no error of law warranting an appeal.

The final orders of the court were to refuse leave to appeal in respect of grounds 1 and 2, and to dismiss the appeal in relation to ground 4, affirming the arbitrator's decision. The court held that the arbitrator's decision was sound and adequately supported by the evidence presented.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 213 of the Act governs the principals to be applied by the arbitrator in the provision of reasons. Relevantly, it states:213.Decisions and reasons, form and content of(1)…(4)The reasons for an arbitrator's decision -(a)need only identify the facts that the arbitrator has accepted in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(b)need only identify the law that the arbitrator has applied in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(c)need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and(d)need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case.(5)A written transcript of the part of the proceeding in which a decision is given orally or reasons are given orally is sufficient compliance with the requirement for the decision or reasons to be in writing.(6)The fact that a decision is, or reasons are, given orally or in accordance with subsection (4) or (5) is not of itself a ground for reversing or modifying the decision on an appeal. Counsel for the appellant's submissions lacked any meaningful analysis as to why the arbitrator's decision making process was wrong or inadequate. In reality the appellant's submission amounted to no more than a complaint that the arbitrator made findings of fact contrary to that for which the appellant contended. Having regard to the fact that section 213(4) of the Act is designed to promote 'expedition, simplicity and transparency'[9] the arbitrator was not required to provide detailed reasons.[9] See: Peter Nardi v Department of Education and Training [2006] WACC C22-2006 As I will explain however in relation to ground 4 the arbitrator did provide comprehensive reasons for his findings that the appellant did not suffer a compensable injury.[10] I can find no deficiency in his reasons amounting to an error of law.[10] Arbitrator's reasons, pars 35 ‑ 49. I would refuse leave in respect of grounds 1 and 2. The arbitrator found that the appellant's account of the incident was accurate but that she was not credible. He found that her account of her symptoms of PTSD was not plausible. At the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant submitted that the arbitrator fell into error because he gave the question of credibility 'more than its proper place in the decision‑making framework'.[11] The thrust of the appellant's argument in relation to ground 3 was, because the arbitrator had said that the central issue was the credibility of the worker, it led to the inevitable conclusion that any medical evidence favourable to the worker could not be relied on. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned arbitrator erred because, once he found the appellant not to be credible, he rejected 'anything [she] had [has] ever said to anyone'[12] (in particular, what she had said to her treating doctors).[11] Appeal ts 33.[12] Appeal ts 41. As I will explain, having regard to various factors, including the delay in the appellant having reporting the alleged injury, the appellant's gynaecological issues, the evidence of Ms Sanasi to the effect that the appellant made no complaint in the weeks following the incident, the various clinical notes in the two years post the incident (which make no mention of the appellant being concerned about it) together with Dr Piirto's opinion, an adverse finding as to her credibility was inevitable. Once that finding was made, it followed that arbitrator was not bound to conclude that the opinions of Dr Claasen and Dr Bassett (upon whose opinion her entire claim rested) should be accepted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both cases are consistent with what the High Court said in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272 where the Court held that the reasons of an administrative decision maker should not be scrutinised over-zealously. In my view, although the arbitrator may not have examined every item of evidence, he was not required to do so. His failure to examine every item of evidence, even if that could be established, would not be sufficient to conclude that there had been an error of law giving rise to a miscarriage of justice. In any event, the arbitrator did specifically refer to discrepancies between the evidence of Ms Sanasi (as well as other evidence) and the appellant.[22][22] Arbitrator's reasons at [44]. The following examples of discrepancies between her evidence and other evidence illustrate why the arbitrator was justified in reaching the conclusion that he did in relation to the issue of credibility. The appellant gave evidence in cross‑examination denying that she was angry about the events.[23] However, in her witness statement filed in support of her application she said that she was angry Dr Thyer had not taken her opinion into account.[24] She said she was 'so angry that she been asked to perform an unsafe operation by Dr Thyer.[25] She had also said that she felt a 'mix of emotions' after the events, including anger.[26][23] ts 36, 173.[24] Exhibit A4 par 37.[25] Exhibit A4 par 34.[26] Exhibit A4 par 42. In contradiction to her evidence, Dr Piirto noted in the mental state examination conducted on 3 January 2014 that the appellant appeared more frustrated and angry rather than anxious when describing what had happened. [27][27] Exhibit R6.1 page 12. The appellant asserted that the second respondent had failed to offer her counselling or debriefing services after the incident. However, there was evidence that on 12 May 2014 her general practitioner did offer her counselling services but she turned the offer down.[28] Also, Dr Bassett's report referred to the fact that the appellant had made similar comments which suggested that she was more concerned about the failure of the hospital to manage the situation properly.[29][28] Exhibit R 6.1 page 17.[29] Exhibit A6 page 72. The appellant's denial of being angry with her employer for not offering counselling or debriefing was inconsistent with her contention that her employment - and specifically the events of 4 and 5 May 2014 - were a primary reason for her mental illness. There were a number of significant discrepancies between the evidence of the appellant and the witness Anna Sanasi who gave evidence that the appellant did not report any ongoing distress following the incident.[30][30] Exhibit R4.1 pars 32 – 33, ts 227, 249, 250, 256. Although in the period following the incident in question, the appellant took sick leave and was absent from work on a number of occasions, Ms Sanasi's evidence was that the reason for her absenteeism was not related to the incident on 4 and 5 May 2014.[31][31] Exhibit R 4.1 pars 27, 28, 34 – 36, ts 225, 235, 238, 255.