JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE FULL COURT (WA)
CITATION: MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2004] WASCA 149
CORAM: STEYTLER J
TEMPLEMAN J
SIMMONDS J
HEARD: 15-19 MARCH 2004
DELIVERED : 13 JULY 2004
FILE NO/S: FUL 12 of 2003
BETWEEN: MOUNT LAWLEY PTY LTD
Appellant (Applicant)
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Respondent (Respondent)
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :McKECHNIE J
Citation Number : [2002] WASC 307
File Number : CIV 1550 of 1997
Catchwords:
Town planning - Reservation and acquisition of land - Value of land required to be assessed under s 36 of Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA) without regard to attributes of planning scheme - Need to consider events leading to reservation and attributes of the land - Whether difference between election to acquire and compulsory acquisition
Town planning - Reservation and acquisition of land - Valuation - Need for valuations not influenced by exigencies of litigation - Whether concept of special value applicable under s 36 of Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA) - Whether market value includes costs of development application, holding the land until settlement, and of acquiring replacement property - Whether interest payable by planning authority as part of purchase price - Whether interest on purchase price able to be ordered under s 32 of Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
Town planning - Election to acquire land - Whether validly made - Whether omission in notice of election can be remedied by later notice, after expiry of time fixed by s 36(2)(b) of Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA), relying upon s 55 of Interpretation Act 1984 (WA)
Town planning - Claim for injurious affection - Whether damage arising from severance claimable under s 36 of Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA) - Whether claim for injurious affection can proceed in absence of development application
Appeals - Difficulties of appeal court in assessing evidence - Extensive, complex, controversial evidence at trial - Inadequate reasons in trial judgment
Appeals - Delay in judgment of trial Judge coupled with inadequate reasons
Legislation:
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA), s 31(d), s 33(1) s 38(1)(b)(ii)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 55
Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA), s 36
Public Works Act 1902 (WA), s 2
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 32, s 142
Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA), s 11(1), s 12(2a)(b)
Western Australian Planning Commission Act 1985, s 4
Result:
Appeal allowed in part
Cross-appeal allowed in part
Retrial ordered
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant (Applicant) : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr P L Harris
Respondent (Respondent) : Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr B P King
Solicitors:
Appellant (Applicant) : Ilberys Lawyers
Respondent (Respondent) : State Solicitor's Office
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
15 Lorimer Street Pty Ltd v Secretary to the Department of Infrastructure (1997) 97 LGERA…
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- Case
- [2004] WASCA 149
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning focused on the proper assessment of land value under s 36 of the Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA). It held that the value of land should be assessed without regard to the planning scheme attributes but must consider events leading to the reservation and the attributes of the land. The court also emphasised that valuations should not be influenced by the exigencies of litigation and that the market value should include costs of development application, holding the land until settlement, and acquiring replacement property. Regarding the election to acquire land, the court ruled that an omission in the notice could be remedied by a later notice, even after the time fixed by s 36(2)(b) of the Act, under s 55 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). The court further clarified that the claim for injurious affection could proceed in the absence of a development application.
Due to the extensive, complex, and controversial nature of the evidence, the court had to carefully review the findings of fact, considering the lengthy delay in giving judgment. It noted that while the trial judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, the significant delay weakened this advantage. The court's decision underscored the importance of timely judgments and adequate reasons to maintain public confidence in the judicial process. The final orders addressed the valuation of the land, the validity of the election to acquire, and the claim for injurious affection, providing clarity on these critical issues in the context of town planning and land acquisition.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: TEMPLEMAN J
In this case, the trial Judge had available a full transcript of the evidence and the argument and, of course, the various exhibits. However, even then, a long delay can give rise to disquiet, not only because of the lengthy period of uncertainty with which the litigants are required to live pending the judgment, but also because of the suspicion, on the part of the losing party, that the task may have become too much for the trial Judge and that he or she had been unable, in the end, to grapple adequately with the issues. Thus, in Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246 (a case involving a delay of nearly eight months in giving judgment) Lawton LJ said:"[Counsel] submitted that this long and, in my experience, unprecedented delay resulted in the Judge making material findings which were not justified by the evidence. I am not satisfied that this was so. But the fact that responsible and experienced counsel, acting for a public corporation, felt it incumbent upon him to make this submission shows that long delays in delivering judgment can cause disquiet and suspicion amongst litigants who lose - and those who win may feel they have been deprived of justice far too long. Delays of this length should not occur unless there are compelling reasons why they should; and, if there are such reasons, it would be prudent of a judge to refer to them briefly." Similarly, in Goose v Wilson Sandford & Co, unreported; England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division); 13 February 1998, Peter Gibson, Brooke and Mummery LJJ said (in a substantial case involving a delay of over 20 months from the end of the hearing), at [112] and [113], that:"A judge's tardiness in completing his judicial task after a trial is over denies justice to the winning party during the period of the delay. It also undermines the loser's confidence in the correctness of the decision when it is eventually delivered. Litigation causes quite enough stress, as it is, for people to have to endure while a trial is going on. Compelling them to await judgment for an indefinitely extended period after the trial is over will only serve to prolong their anxiety, and may well increase it. Conduct like this weakens public confidence in the whole judicial process. Left unchecked it would be ultimately subversive to the rule of law. Delays on this scale cannot and will not be tolerated. A situation like this must never occur again.Because of the delay in giving judgment it has been incumbent on us to look with especial care at any finding of fact which is now challenged. In ordinary circumstances where there is a conflict of evidence a judge who has seen and heard the witnesses has an advantage, denied to an appellate court, which is likely to prove decisive on an appeal unless it can be shown that he failed to use or misused, this advantage. We do not lose sight of the fact that the judge had transcripts of the evidence, as well as very extensive written submissions from counsel. But the very fact of the huge delay in itself weakened the judge's advantage, and this consideration had to be taken into account when we reviewed the material which was before the judge. In a case as complex as this, it is not uncommon for a judge to form an initial impression of the likely result at the end of the evidence, but when he has come to study the evidence (both oral and written) and the submissions he has received with greater care, he will then go back to consider the effect the witnesses made on him when they gave evidence about the matters that are now troubling him. At a distance of twenty months, Harman J denied himself the opportunity of making this further check in any meaningful way."