JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION -v- AZMITIA [2015] WASCA 246
CORAM: BUSS JA
MAZZA JA
CHANEY J
HEARD: 18 MARCH 2015
DELIVERED : 4 DECEMBER 2015
FILE NO/S: CACV 77 of 2014
BETWEEN: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Appellant
AND
ELENA MARGARITA AZMITIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MCCANN DCJ
Citation :DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION -v- AZMITIA [2014] WADC 85
File No :APP 104 of 2013
Catchwords:
Workers' compensation - Application under the Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) for leave to appeal against a judgment, order or determination in proceedings in the District Court - Arbitral proceedings at first instance - Whether the arbitrator's finding that the respondent was totally incapacitated for work during a relevant period was open on the evidence and involved an appellable error - Whether expert evidence inadmissible because crucial facts upon which the opinions were based had not been proved
Legislation:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33
District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA), s 79
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32
Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), pt XI div 4, s 3, s 5, s 18, s 21, s 56, s 247, s 254, sch 1
Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Arbitration Rules 2011 (WA), r 58
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr D W Williams
Respondent: No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant: WHL Legal Pty Ltd
Respondent: Perth City Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Arnotts Snack Products Pty Ltd v Yacob [1985] HCA 2; (1985) 155 CLR 171
Atanasoska v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 17
Beer v Duracraft Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 192
BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250
Casey v Repatriation Commission (1995) 60 FCR 510
Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266
Department of Education v Azmitia [2014] WADC 85
Minister for Immigration v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611
Mitchell v Canal Rocks Beach Resort [2002] WASCA 331
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361
Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1
Secretary of the Department of Security v Jordan (1998) 83 FCR 34
Thompson v Armstrong & Royse Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 46; (1950) 81 CLR 585
BUSS JA: I agree with Mazza JA.
MAZZA JA: At all material times, the appellant, the Department of Education, employed the respondent, Ms Azmitia, on a full-time basis as a teacher at Calista Primary School (Calista). On or about 26 March 2012, the respondent allegedly suffered a stress-related injury in the course of her employment. The respondent left work that day and took accrued leave between 26 March 2012 and 16 August 2012.
By application dated 20 August 2012, the respondent sought weekly payments of workers' compensation and statutory…
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- Case
- [2015] WASCA 246
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were twofold. Firstly, the court had to determine whether the arbitrator's finding that the respondent was totally incapacitated for work during the relevant period was open on the evidence presented. Secondly, the court needed to consider whether the expert evidence provided was admissible, given that some crucial facts upon which the opinions were based had not been proved. The admissibility of secondary evidence of the respondent's symptomology was also scrutinized.
The court's reasoning involved examining whether the arbitrator erred in considering secondary evidence of the respondent's symptomology. It was established that such evidence was admissible under the Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA). The court noted that the appellant did not argue any unfairness resulting from the arbitrator's consideration of this evidence and that no objection was raised before the arbitrator. Therefore, the court found no error of law in the arbitrator's consideration of the secondary evidence. Regarding the second issue, the court held that the arbitrator's duty was to assess the respondent's capacity to work based on all relevant evidence, not just expert opinion. The court emphasised that the arbitrator was free to accord the weight they thought fit to the accepted expert evidence and could consider the respondent's symptomology, opportunities for return to work, and her response to these opportunities. The court concluded that the arbitrator's decision was not an error of law.
In conclusion, the court found that the arbitrator did not err in considering the secondary evidence of symptomology or in their overall assessment of the respondent's capacity to work. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Provisions such as s 188 of the Act and s 33 of the AAT Act are intended to be facilitative, not restrictive. Their purpose is to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from the constraints otherwise applicable to courts of law and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals: Minister for Immigration v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611 [49] (Gleeson CJ & McHugh J). The evidence of the respondent's symptomology as set out in the medical reports - particularly those of Drs Sekhon, Terace and Tannenbaum - was plainly relevant to the issue of her incapacity. As such, that evidence was admissible pursuant to s 188(2) and s 188(3) of the Act and could be considered by the arbitrator and given such weight as he thought fit. I note that the appellant does not allege that it suffered any unfairness as a result of the arbitrator taking into account this secondary evidence. The statements made by the respondent to the medical practitioners appeared in the reports. These were apparently available prior to the hearing before the arbitrator and counsel for the appellant was free to cross‑examine the respondent as to her symptomology. I also note that no objection was taken to the admissibility of this material before the arbitrator. For these reasons, no error of law occurred because the arbitrator took into account secondary evidence of the respondent's symptomology. I now turn to the question of whether his Honour erred in law by failing to find that there was no evidence to support the respondent's claim of total incapacity during the closed period. The appellant's submissions in support of this contention are based on an unduly narrow proposition; that is, the only evidence capable of establishing total incapacity for the closed period was the expert opinion evidence. That evidence, the appellant asserts, went only 'one way' and that was to the effect that the respondent was capable of returning to full‑time employment during the entire closed period. The question of the respondent's capacity to work during the closed period was one of fact for the arbitrator to decide. While expert evidence is plainly relevant and may even be decisive, the duty of an arbitrator is to assess the question based on all of the relevant evidence. It is unnecessary in this case, and inappropriate in any event, to attempt to define what kinds of evidence are relevant or irrelevant to the assessment of a worker's capacity. In the present case, the arbitrator could properly have regard to the expert's opinions, the respondent's symptomology, the opportunities provided by the appellant for the respondent to return to work, the respondent's response to those opportunities and whether that response was reasonable. In his assessment of the medical evidence, the arbitrator was not bound to accept all of a witness's testimony. As with any witness, it was open to the arbitrator to accept all of a medical practitioner's evidence, part of it, or none of it, and it was for the arbitrator to accord what weight he thought fit to the expert evidence he accepted.