JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: RIZHAO STEEL HOLDING GROUP CO LTD -v- KOOLAN IRON ORE PTY LTD [2012] WASCA 50
CORAM: MARTIN CJ
BUSS JA
MURPHY JA
HEARD: 12 AUGUST 2011
DELIVERED : 9 MARCH 2012
FILE NO/S: CACV 126 of 2010
BETWEEN: RIZHAO STEEL HOLDING GROUP CO LTD
Appellant
AND
KOOLAN IRON ORE PTY LTD
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CACV 127 of 2010
BETWEEN :RIZHAO STEEL HOLDING GROUP CO LTD
Appellant
AND
MOUNT GIBSON MINING LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
For File No : CACV 126 of 2010
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :KENNETH MARTIN J
Citation :KOOLAN IRON ORE PTY LTD v RIZHAO STEEL HOLDING GROUP CO LTD [2010] WASC 384
File No :ARB 18 of 2010
For File No : CACV 127 of 2010
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :KENNETH MARTIN J
Citation :KOOLAN IRON ORE PTY LTD v RIZHAO STEEL HOLDING GROUP CO LTD [2010] WASC 384
File No :ARB 19 of 2010
Catchwords:
International Commercial Arbitration - Appeal from application to enforce an award as a judgment - Whether leave to appeal required - Whether primary judge's decision final or interlocutory - Whether appropriate Act the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) or Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) - Where primary judge purported to grant enforcement of award under the State Act - Whether appellant should be permitted to raise new point on appeal challenging jurisdiction of primary judge - Whether in the interests of justice or prejudicial - Whether parties can exclude the Model Law from an international commercial arbitration agreement - Whether there is an inconsistency of laws between the State and Federal Acts
Legislation:
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 8 (repealed)
Arbitration Act (NSW)
Arbitration Act 1950 (UK)
Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA), s 3, s 5
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA)
Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld)
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth)
International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 78B
Rules of the Supreme Court, O 42 r 1
Result:
Appeals dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
CACV 126 of 2010
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr F M Douglas QC, Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr M Feutrill
Respondent: Mr B A J Coles QC & Mr S Murphy
Solicitors:
Appellant: Holman Fenwick Willan
Respondent: Freehills
CACV 127 of 2010
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr F M Douglas QC, Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr M Feutrill
Respondent: Mr B A J Coles QC & Mr S Murphy
Solicitors:
Appellant: Holman Fenwick Willan
Respondent: Freehills
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Elspan International Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 321
Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield [2005] HCA 38; (2005) 223 CLR 251
American Diagnostica Inc v Gradipore Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 312
Attorney‑General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union (NSW) [1908] HCA 94; (1908) 6 CLR 469
Australian Granites Ltd…
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- Case
- [2012] WASCA 50
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether leave to appeal was required, whether the primary judge's decision was final or interlocutory, and whether the appropriate Act to apply was the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) or the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA). Additionally, the court had to determine whether the appellant should be allowed to raise a new point on appeal challenging the jurisdiction of the primary judge, and whether this was in the interests of justice or prejudicial. Finally, the court had to consider whether parties can exclude the Model Law from an international commercial arbitration agreement, and whether there is an inconsistency of laws between the State and Federal Acts.
The court held that leave to appeal was not required as the primary judge's decision was final, not interlocutory. The court also found that the appropriate Act to apply was the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), not the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA). The court held that the appellant should not be permitted to raise the new point on appeal as it was prejudicial and not in the interests of justice. Finally, the court held that parties can exclude the Model Law from an international commercial arbitration agreement, but that there is no inconsistency of laws between the State and Federal Acts.
The court did not make any final orders in this case as it was an appeal regarding the jurisdiction of the court and the applicable law. However, the decision provides important guidance for parties involved in international commercial arbitration disputes in Australia, and highlights the importance of carefully considering the applicable laws and procedures when enforcing arbitration awards.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Commonwealth Development Corporation v Montague [2000] QCA 252, an appeal and/or application for leave to appeal was brought in the Queensland Court of Appeal against a decision of the District Court of Queensland granting leave to enforce in Queensland an award made in an international arbitration outside Australia. At that time, s 8(2) of the IAA provided:Subject to this part, a foreign award may be enforced in a court of a State or Territory as if the award had been made in that State or Territory in accordance with the law of that State or Territory. Accordingly, the application was brought pursuant to s 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld) which is relevantly identical to s 33 of the CAA. In the Court of Appeal, the respondent conceded that if leave to appeal was necessary, it should be granted. A majority of the court (Ambrose and Fryberg JJ) proceeded on that basis and therefore did not determine whether leave to appeal was necessary, and in particular did not determine whether the orders made by the District Court were interlocutory. It follows that the decision is not a decision of an intermediate Court of Appeal dealing with uniform Australian legislation which this court should follow unless satisfied it is wrong (see Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485). The only member of the court to deal with the question of whether leave to appeal was required was Thomas JA. He did so in the following terms:Leave to appeal is necessary in the present matter because the judgment against which the applicant wishes to appeal is in form interlocutory. It was an order granting leave to enforce a 'foreign arbitration award sentence' as to costs. No objection was raised by counsel for the respondent against the grant of the necessary leave to appeal. I would be disposed to grant leave, not simply on absence of objection, but also in recognition that in substance the effect of the judgment below is to determine finally the rights of the parties, and that a legal question of some substance is raised [2] (citations omitted). With respect, if the legal effect of the judgment below was to determine finally the rights of the parties, it follows that the judgment below was final, not interlocutory. His Honour does not appear to have given any consideration to that part of s 33 which authorises the entry of judgment following the grant of leave. Accordingly, I respectfully differ from his Honour's conclusion that an order granting leave to enforce an judgment under s 33 of the CAA is interlocutory. For these reasons, the orders made by the primary judge are not interlocutory. Leave to appeal is not required, and the appeals have been brought within time. Absent an express provision to the contrary, appeals to this court are by way of a rehearing: see Court of Appeal Rules, r 25. However, as Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ noted in Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1:To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish (7).