Waller v Waller

Case [2009] WASCA 61


JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WALLER -v- WALLER [2009] WASCA 61

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

PULLIN JA
LE MIERE AJA

HEARD:   20 OCTOBER 2008

DELIVERED          :   19 MARCH 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACV 52 of 2008

BETWEEN:   BARRY GRANVILLE WALLER

First Appellant

CHRISTINE MARGARET WALLER
Second Appellant

GERALDTON FOOD DISTRIBUTORS PTY LTD
Third Appellant

AND

CLIVE GREGORY WALLER
First Respondent

MARLENE McDONALD
Second Respondent

MICHAEL JOHN WALLER
Third Respondent

GAY CRIDDLE
Fourth Respondent

KERRY CLUNE
Fifth Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :SIMMONDS J

Citation  :WALLER -v- WALLER [2008] WASC 51

File No  :CIV 1682 of 2007

Catchwords:

Appeal - Procedure - Pre-action discovery against potential parties - Whether the respondents may have a cause of action - Whether pre-action discovery should be refused because the proposed action would be struck out as an abuse of process - Whether the respondents made reasonable enquiries - Whether the appellants had or are likely to have or have had possession of documents that may assist - Whether the discretion to order discovery should be exercised - Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 26A r 4 - Turns on own facts

Appeal - Procedure - Whether leave to appeal required - Whether orders appealed from are interlocutory - Whether leave to appeal should be granted - Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 60(1)(f) - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 15A r 6(a)
Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 47
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s 52
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 26A r 3, O 26A r 4, O 26A r 5, O 26A r 6
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 60(1)(f)

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Cross-appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Appellant               :     Mr D H Solomon

Second Appellant          :     Mr D H Solomon

Third Appellant             :     Mr D H Solomon

First Respondent           :     Mr P J Hannan

Second Respondent      :     Mr P J Hannan

Third Respondent          :     Mr P J Hannan

Fourth Respondent        :     Mr P J Hannan

Fifth Respondent           :     Mr P J Hannan

Solicitors:

First Appellant               :     Solomon Brothers

Second Appellant          :     Solomon Brothers

Third Appellant             :     Solomon Brothers

First Respondent           :     Curwood & Co Pty Ltd

Second Respondent      :     Curwood & Co Pty Ltd

Third Respondent          :     Curwood & Co Pty Ltd

Fourth Respondent        :     Curwood & Co Pty Ltd

Fifth Respondent           :     Curwood & Co Pty Ltd

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

A Hudson Pty Ltd v Legal & General Life of Australia Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 701

Airservices Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 886; (1999) 92 FCR 200

A‑Pak Plastics Pty Ltd v Merhone Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 896; (1995) 120 FLR 277

Asian Century Holdings Inc v Fleuris Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 59

Aussie Victoriaplant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2007] VSCA 121;

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Waller v Waller [2009] WASCA 61
Case
[2009] WASCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Waller v Waller involved an appeal against a decision to deny pre-action discovery against potential respondents. The dispute arose in the Supreme Court of Western Australia and centred on whether the applicants had made sufficient enquiries and if the respondents had or were likely to have documents relevant to the proposed action. The primary legal issues were whether the applicants had a reasonable cause to believe they had a cause of action against the respondents and whether the discretion to order discovery should be exercised. The applicants sought pre-action discovery under Rule 4 of Order 26A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA).

The court's reasoning was focused on the objective test required for determining if the applicants had a cause of action against the respondents. The court held that the applicants must show objective evidence that there was a reasonable cause to believe they may have a cause of action. This test is similar but not identical to the requirement in the Federal Court Rules. The court highlighted that while a prima facie case is not necessary, there must be some tangible support for the existence of a potential cause of action beyond mere allegation, suspicion, or assertion. The court also noted that the discretion to order discovery should be exercised if there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the applicants may have a cause of action against the respondents.

The appeal was allowed, and leave to appeal was granted. The court found that the applicants had demonstrated a reasonable cause to believe they had a cause of action against the respondents. Consequently, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and the orders appealed from were set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal granted

Appeal allowed

Cross-appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant must show that he may have a cause of action against the potential party. That condition is similar to, but not the same as, the condition in O 15A r 6(a) of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (FCR). The latter condition was discussed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Broadband, Communications and Digital Economy [2008] FCAFC 7; (2008) 166 FCR 64 where the court said:Under the first condition in [O 15A r 6(a)] an applicant must show that there is 'reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have the right to obtain relief in the court from a person whose description has been ascertained'. The criterion as framed does not require that any person actually hold the requisite belief. Its objective character requires the court to be satisfied that a reasonable person could form a belief on the basis of the material before the court that the applicant 'has or may have the right to obtain relief'. The word 'may' indicates that the putative belief does not have to amount to a firm view that there is a right to relief … However, mere assertion of a case against a prospective respondent is not enough … On the other hand a prima facie case for relief does not have to be demonstrated. As Emmett J said in Austrac Operations Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2003) ATPR 41‑960 [10]:'The words "where there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have the right to obtain relief" are not satisfied by mere assertion. The belief requires more than mere suspicion or conjecture. On the other hand, it is not necessary for an applicant to establish even a prima facie case. It is necessary, however, for the applicant to show objectively that there is reasonable cause for the relevant belief. It is not necessary to demonstrate whether or not the applicant has the belief.'In Glencore International AG v Selwyn Mines Ltd (2005) 223 ALR 238, Lindgren J said [16]:' … while the notion of "reasonable cause to believe that the applicant … may have the right to obtain relief" … may be seen to set the threshold "at quite a low level" … there must be some tangible support that takes the existence of the alleged right beyond mere "belief" or "assertion" by the applicant … '[58]. Order 26A r 4(1) does not, as FCR O 15A r 6(a) does, require that there be 'reasonable cause to believe' that the applicant may have the right to obtain relief. Nevertheless, O 26A r 4(1) should, like FCR O 15A r 6(a), be interpreted to require an objective test. The court must form an opinion as to whether there is sufficient evidence before it that the applicant may have a cause of action against the potential party. The court must make its own evaluation of the circumstances which ground the applicant's belief that he may have a cause of action against the potential party. The test is objective in the sense that it is not sufficient that the applicant believes that he may have a cause of action against a potential party; the court might determine this belief to be unfounded. It is not necessary that the applicant have a prima facie case. However, there must be material to establish that the applicant may have a cause of action against the potential party. There must be some tangible backing, or objective foundation, that takes the existence of the cause of action beyond a mere allegation, suspicion or assertion: see Kremer B & Davies R, 'Preliminary Discovery in the Federal Court: Order 15A of the Federal Court Rules' (2004) 24 ABR 235.