FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
J & A Vaughan Super Pty Ltd v Becton Property Group Limited [2013] FCA 340
Citation: J & A Vaughan Super Pty Ltd v Becton Property Group Limited [2013] FCA 340 Parties: J & A VAUGHAN SUPER PTY LTD ( ACN 157 636 505) v BECTON PROPERTY GROUP LIMITED File number: VID 114 of 2013 Judge: KENNY J Date of judgment: 15 April 2013 Catchwords: COSTS – Preliminary discovery application – Costs of the preliminary discovery application - Costs of compliance with preliminary discovery orders – Security for costs of giving preliminary discovery – consideration of the discretionary basis for cost orders pursuant to Rule 7.29 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) . Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)Cases cited: Alstom Power Limited v Eraring Energy [2004] ATPR 42-009
C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864 Davis v Sagar Pty Ltd [1998] WASC 249
Riley as Trustee of the Ker Trust v Jubilee Gold Mines NL [2000] WASC 114
Waller v Waller [2008] WASC 51
Waller v Waller [2009] WASCA 61
Stratford Sun Limited v OM Holdings Limited [2009] FCA 1055
Cappuccio v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1999] FCA 1188
E D Oates Pty Ltd v Edgar Edmondson Imports [2012] FCA 356
SmithKline Beecham plc v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 271
Alstrom Power Limited v Eraring Energy [2009] FCA 681
Novartis AG v Agvantage Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 160
Procter v Kalivis (No 3) [2010] FCA 1194
Hoyts Multi-Plex Cinemas Pty Ltd v Fox Entertainment Precinct Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1347
Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 124Date of hearing: 19 March 2013 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Applicant: A d'Arville Solicitor for the Applicant: T F Grundy Counsel for the Respondent: L Papaelia Solicitor for the Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 114 of 2013
BETWEEN: J & A VAUGHAN SUPER PTY LTD (ACN 157 636 505)
Prospective Applicant
AND: BECTON PROPERTY GROUP LIMITED
Prospective Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 APRIL 2013
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT:
1. Within 35 days of this order, the Prospective Respondent (Becton) give discovery to the Prospective Applicant of:
(a)the document or documents which Becton confirms in writing were the documents used by Mr Vanderzalm in preparing the diagram at page 719 of the affidavit of John Vaughan dated 14 February 2013.
(b)a document or documents which Becton confirms in writing contains the operative terms of the “Byron Bay Joint Venture” as that entity is described in the document entitled “Structure Diagram – Byron Bay Joint Venture (2002-2007)” at the following dates:
(i)31 August 2006;
(ii)28 February 2007.
(c)a document or documents which Becton confirms in writing contains the operative terms of “Byron Bay Holdings Joint Venture”…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 340
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centred around the proper allocation of costs for preliminary discovery applications, particularly in cases where the application is resolved consensually and without an adversarial approach. The Court had to consider the consequences of the discovery obtained, the nature of any anticipated proceeding, and the likely passage of time before resolution at trial. Additionally, the Court examined whether an order for security for costs should be made, given the applicants' financial position as of June 2012.
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the allocation of costs in preliminary discovery applications depends significantly on the nature of the case and the conduct of the parties. The Court observed that while some authorities suggest no costs order should be made unless unreasonable conduct is shown, others advocate for an order if the respondent does not adopt an adversarial approach. The Court ultimately decided that if the respondent does not take an adversarial approach and provides discovery, it may be appropriate to order the applicants to pay the respondents' costs. However, if the respondent takes an adversarial approach, the costs caused by that approach may be borne by the applicant, but not necessarily the costs of complying with the discovery order.
The Court ordered that unless proceedings were instituted within two months, the applicants were to pay the respondents' costs of the preliminary discovery application. If proceedings were instituted within that period, the costs would be in the discretion of the trial judge. The Court also rejected the applicants' request for security for costs, finding that the applicants had sufficient assets to meet any liability for costs.
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Vaughan Super also opposed the making of an order for security such as Becton sought. Counsel for Vaughan Super relied on a letter dated 19 March 2013 to the receiver’s solicitors from Mr T F Grundy, solicitor for the Vaughan Super, enclosing a copy of Vaughan Super’s audited Statement of Financial Position as at 30 June 2012. This indicated that Vaughan Super had more than sufficient assets to meet any liability for costs. Becton accepted that I might receive this letter, with its enclosure, as evidence of the financial position of Vaughan Super as at 30 June 2012 and did not suggest that there was any reason to suppose that this position had relevantly altered.CONSIDERATION The disposition of the costs of an application such as this is in the discretion of the Court or Judge: see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“Federal Court Act”), s 43(2). Rule 7.29 of the Rules provides that:A person against whom an order is sought or made under this Division may apply to the Court for an order that:(a)the prospective applicant give security for the person’s costs and expenses including:(i) the costs of giving discovery and production; and(ii)the costs of complying with an order made under this Division; and(b) the prospective applicant pay the person’s costs and expenses. First, who should bear the costs of the application? In Cappuccio, in ex tempore reasons for judgment, Burchett J observed (at [3]) that in his view “the costs order which would be appropriate in a case like this depends very much on the consequences of the discovery obtained”. This led him to hold, in that case, that, if an action were subsequently commenced, then the costs of the preliminary discovery application should be part of the costs of the action; otherwise, the preliminary discovery applicant ought pay the costs. Other judges, including me, have made the same or similar orders in other preliminary discovery cases: see E D Oates, SmithKline and Alstrom Power (Costs). As already noted, Vaughan Super relied on these authorities to support its proposed costs orders. As I sought to make clear in argument at the hearing, however, much depends on the nature of the case, including the way the parties conducted the preliminary discovery litigation, the nature of any anticipated proceeding and the likely passage of time before resolution at trial. Some judges have taken the view that where parties have resolved a preliminary discovery application consensually, then there should be no order as to costs unless it is shown that one or other party acted unreasonably in bringing or (initially) opposing the application: see, for example, Novartis AG v Agvantage Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 160 at [7]. Other judges have not pursued this approach even though the prospective respondent has not adopted an “adversarial approach”: see, for example, Procter v Kalivis (No 3) [2010] FCA 1194 (“Procter”), where Besanko J said (at [17]):First, the jurisdiction to make an order for preliminary discovery is an extraordinary jurisdiction. There is a sense in which a respondent is entitled to remain passive until the applicant makes out a case for preliminary discovery: Glencore International AG v Selwyn Miners Limited (2005) 223 ALR 238 at 241 [15] per Lindgren J. Secondly, if the respondent does not take an adversarial approach to the application for preliminary discovery and in fact provides discovery then it may be appropriate to make the type of order sought by the respondents in this case. Thirdly, if the respondent does take an adversarial approach then it may be appropriate to order that it pay the costs caused by that adversarial approach: Re Steffen; Western Bulk Carriers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd [2002] FCA 1520. The costs caused by an adversarial approach would not necessarily include the costs of complying with an order for preliminary discovery. I would have thought that those costs ought to be paid by the applicant or at least be the subject of the type of order the respondents seek in this case.In that case, with respect to the preliminary discovery application, his Honour ordered that the preliminary discovery applicants pay the respondents’ costs unless proceedings were instituted within two months, in which case the costs were to be in the discretion of the trial judge.