JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: NRW CONTRACTING PTY LTD -v- CLIFFS ASIA PACIFIC IRON ORE PTY LTD [2020] WASCA 107
CORAM: MURPHY JA
BEECH JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 21 MAY 2020
DELIVERED : 7 JULY 2020
FILE NO/S: CACV 80 of 2019
BETWEEN: NRW CONTRACTING PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
CLIFFS ASIA PACIFIC IRON ORE PTY LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: SMITH J
Citation: BGC CONTRACTING PTY LTD -v- CLIFFS ASIA PACIFIC IRON ORE PTY LTD [2019] WASC 248
File Number : CIV 2405 of 2018
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application for summary judgment or strike out of counterclaim dismissed by judge - Appeal from interlocutory decision - Leave to appeal - Principles relevant to whether leave to appeal should be granted - Whether judge erred in failing to find that the counterclaim was untenable by reason of the type of loss claimed in the counterclaim - Whether judge erred in finding that the costs of the application be the respondent's in the cause of the counterclaim
Contract - Construction of indemnities and exclusion clause in lengthy mining contract - Complex questions of law - Whether judge made an error of law in finding that the proper construction of exclusion clause should be determined at trial
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 1 r 4A and r 4B, O 14 r 1 and r 6, O 16 r 1, O 19 r 1, O 20 r 19
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 60(1)(b)
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | D Miller SC & D J Osborn |
| Respondent | : | M D Howard SC & E M Heenan |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan |
| Respondent | : | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170
AGC Industries Pty Ltd v Karara Mining Ltd [2019] WASC 140
AON Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Aquatec‑Maxcon Pty Ltd v Minson Nacap Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 18; (2004) 8 VR 16
Astor Theatre WA Pty Ltd v Zimmerman Investments Pty Ltd [2014] WASC 329
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256
BGC Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 248
Blenkinsop v Blenkinsop Nominees Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 254 (S)
Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2009] HCA 44; (2009) 239 CLR 269
Carratti Holding Co Pty Ltd v Austpeak Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 34
Casella v Hewitt [2008] WASCA 13; (2008) 36 WAR 1
Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64
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- Case
- [2020] WASCA 107
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the judge had erred in finding that the counterclaim was not untenable due to the nature of the loss claimed, and whether the judge had erred in his decision that the costs of the application should be borne by the respondent. Additionally, the court considered whether there was an error in the judge's finding that the proper construction of an exclusion clause in the contract should be determined at trial rather than summarily.
The court examined the principles relevant to granting leave to appeal, considering the High Court's decision in Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster. The court found that the judge's approach to the application was correct and that the power to grant summary judgment or to strike out the counterclaim should be exercised in a manner consistent with the Rules of Court. The court concluded that the judge had correctly applied the relevant legal standards in dismissing the application for summary judgment and in determining that the costs should be borne by the respondent. The complexity of the legal questions involved warranted a full trial rather than summary determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Both of those authorities dealt with the exercise of a power of summary dismissal of a plaintiff's claim. Nevertheless, in Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster,[98] which concerned an application for summary judgment, Barwick CJ said:[99]Perhaps the summary intervention to prevent the continuance of a plaintiff’s action ought to be much rarer than the giving of summary judgment but there is sufficient correspondence in the two situations to make apposite to this case much of what I said in General Steel Industries v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)[.][98] Theseus Exploration NL v Foyster [1972] HCA 41; (1972) 126 CLR 507.[99] Theseus (514). Theseus was a case in which the plaintiff company sued on a contract under which the defendant agreed to apply for 20 cent shares in the company on the basis that 5 cents would be payable on application and 15 cents would be payable on the company's listing. The company was listed and the plaintiff sued for the 15 cents tranche of the consideration. The defendant alleged that the claim was prevented by s 320 of the Companies Act 1961 ‑ 1964 (Qld). The plaintiff brought a summary judgment application. There was no issue of fact to be tried. The application was dismissed by the primary judge without reasons, although Barwick CJ considered it 'evident that the judge was satisfied that there was a question in dispute with respect to the [plaintiff's] claim which ought to be tried'.[100] The High Court found, in effect, that the defendant's defence had no validity.[100] Theseus (513). Barwick CJ said:[101]Although I have reached a clear conclusion as to the lack of validity in the [defendant's] submission that the [plaintiff] was unable to recover the amount claimed, I would not be prepared to hold that the judge erred in the course he took. Equally, however, I would not have thought him in error if he had granted the [plaintiff's] application for summary judgment. The case was one which, in my opinion, could have been disposed of upon legal argument upon the application. But it was for the judge to be satisfied that there was a matter to be tried. Whilst there were no facts to be decided, it was open to the judge, in my opinion, to take the view that the extent and complexity of the matters of law and of argument thereon warranted a hearing.However, we have now heard a full argument on the substance of the matter from both [plaintiff] and [defendant]. I am convinced that the suggested defence fails and that the [plaintiff] is entitled to judgment in the action. Thus, although I would not hold the dismissal of the summons for summary judgment to be erroneous, I would allow the appeal and now grant that application. [101] Theseus (514). Gibbs J said:[102]No doubt the remarks in [earlier] cases were not intended to preclude the exercise of some discretion by a judge to whom application for summary judgment is made in deciding whether the question of law raised is so difficult that it ought not to be decided summarily, and no doubt also sometimes some explanation or reference to authorities will be necessary to enable a judge to decide whether a question is really unarguable. However, in the present case the questions were serious and disputable and, assuming that the learned primary judge had a discretion, it was entirely proper for him to decline to dispose of them in chambers.Logically it should follow that the appeal should be dismissed. However, we have heard full argument on the questions upon which the fate of the action depends and have reached the conclusion that the defence raised by the [defendant] must fail. No fact is in dispute. It has not been suggested that there is any other matter on which argument could usefully be advanced. If the action is sent to trial the court will be bound to apply our statement of the law and the [plaintiff] must succeed. In these circumstances it would be absurd to give the [defendant] leave to defend the action. Justice therefore requires us to take the anomalous course of allowing an appeal from a judgment which was correct; but in the circumstances it would not in my opinion be right to allow the [plaintiff] the costs of the appeal.[102] Theseus (515).