Knights Capital Group Ltd v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   KNIGHTS CAPITAL GROUP LTD -v- BAJADA AND ASSOCIATES PTY LTD [2016] WASC 69

CORAM:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD:   18 DECEMBER 2014, 25 FEBRUARY 2015 & ON THE PAPERS

DELIVERED          :   4 MARCH 2016

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1875 of 2014

BETWEEN:   KNIGHTS CAPITAL GROUP LTD

Plaintiff

AND

BAJADA AND ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
First Defendant

SELWYN JOHN BAJADA
Second Defendant

(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)

BAJADA AND ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
Plaintiff

AND

KNIGHTS CAPITAL GROUP LTD
First Defendant

GRANT BARTLEY HODGETTS
Second Defendant

MICHAEL JOHN BRITTON
Third Defendant

GREGORY JAMES PARAMOR
Fourth Defendant

GRANT CHARLES PRIEST
Fifth Defendant

(BY COUNTERCLAIM)
 

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Pleadings - Strike out - O 20 r 19(1)(a) Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 (WA) - Application to strike out part of counterclaim - Where counterclaim discloses no reasonable cause of action - Where party concedes that pleading should be struck out - Where application for leave to amend - Unnecessary to determine application for leave to amend because summary judgment granted

Practice and procedure - Summary judgment - Application for summary judgment brought by defendants by counterclaim - Application of O 16 Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 (WA) to counterclaim - Whether defendants by counterclaim have good defence on the merits - Where state of law unsettled - Inappropriate to grant summary judgment on basis that counterclaim defective in law - Where defendants make out prima facie case for summary judgment - Evidentiary onus on plaintiff to show real question to be tried - Where plaintiff cannot show real question to be tried - Where affidavit in opposition to application for summary judgment discloses insufficient facts to support defence - Where affidavit contains only speculation - Summary judgment granted

Torts - Inducing breach of contract - Interference with contractual relations - Where counterclaim against directors for inducing breach of contract by company - Rule in Said v Butt - Directors not generally liable for inducing breach of contract by company - Exceptions to rule in Said v Butt - Whether directors liable for inducing breach of contract by company in circumstances where directors acting in breach of their duties to the company - Whether evidence sufficient to establish that directors not acting in best interests of company - Where evidence not sufficient to displace directors' assertions that they acted in best interests of company

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)

Result:

Application for summary judgment granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Original Action

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     No appearance

First Defendant              :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     No appearance

First Defendant              :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Counterclaim

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr A V Vinciullo

First Defendant              :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     Mr J A Thomson SC

Third Defendant            :     Mr J A Thomson SC

Fourth Defendant           :     Mr J A Thomson SC

Fifth Defendant              :     Mr J A Thomson SC

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     HopgoodGanim

First Defendant              :     No appearance

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Details
Case
[2016] WASC 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Knights Capital Group Ltd v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd, the court was called upon to decide several significant legal issues. The primary dispute centred around a counterclaim filed by the defendants, Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd (BA), against the plaintiff, Knights Capital Group Ltd (KCGL). The defendants sought to strike out part of their counterclaim and also applied for summary judgment against the plaintiff's action. The legal issues the court needed to resolve included whether the counterclaim disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the circumstances under which the court could grant summary judgment on a counterclaim, and the potential liability of directors for inducing a breach of contract by the company.

The court first considered the application to strike out part of the counterclaim. The defendants conceded that the pleading should be struck out, which effectively resolved the issue of whether the counterclaim disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The court did not need to determine the application for leave to amend the pleading as it ultimately granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants. Regarding the summary judgment application, the court assessed whether the defendants had a good defence on the merits. Given the unsettled state of the law on the issue of directors' liability for inducing a breach of contract, the court deemed it inappropriate to grant summary judgment solely on the basis that the counterclaim was defective in law. Instead, the court focused on whether the defendants had made out a prima facie case for summary judgment. The plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment application did not provide sufficient facts to support a defence, and instead contained only speculation. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff could not show a real question to be tried.

The court's reasoning led to a final order that the defendants' application for summary judgment be granted, and the plaintiff's action be dismissed with costs. The court determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a triable issue, and that the defendants had established a prima facie case for summary judgment. The ruling underscored the importance of the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to show why summary judgment should not be granted, and highlighted the need for specific facts rather than mere speculation in opposing such applications. The decision also reaffirmed the principle that directors are generally not liable for inducing a breach of contract by the company, except in cases where they act in breach of their duties to the company.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The principles applicable to summary judgment applications A defendant to an action may apply to the court for summary judgment pursuant to O 16 r 1 RSC. Although the Applicants are defendants to the Counterclaim, in my view it is open to them to bring the present application pursuant to O 16 r 1.[29] BA did not contend otherwise.[29] Cf WA Country Builders Pty Ltd v Premium Coastal Property Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 236 [11] (Sanderson M). O 16 r 1 requires the court to be satisfied either that the action is frivolous or vexatious, or that the defendant has a good defence on the merits, or that the action should be disposed of summarily. The principles in relation to the determination of applications for summary judgment are well established. A party should not ordinarily be denied the opportunity to have his or her case determined following trial, and for that reason, the jurisdiction to grant summary judgment should be reserved for the clearest of cases, where there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the action if it were allowed to go to trial.[30] In other words, the question is whether, on the material before the court, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff's action should not be permitted to proceed to trial because it is apparent that it must fail.[31] [30] Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; (2000) 201 CLR 552 [57] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ); Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne & Crennan JJ); Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 [24] (French CJ & Gummow J); Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87, 99; Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598, 602 ‑ 603 (Mason CJ, Deane & Dawson JJ).[31] Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598, 602. However, that does not mean that summary judgment will be given only where the case is so hopeless as not to require argument. Extensive argument may be necessary to demonstrate that a party's case is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.[32][32] General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964)112 CLR 125, 130 (Barwick CJ). The defendant bringing the summary judgment application bears the legal onus of establishing that there is no serious question to be tried on any cause of action raised by the plaintiff.[33] Under O 16 r 1(2) the defendant is required to file an affidavit verifying the facts upon which the application is based. [33] Anderson v Effexseven (1999) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61 ‑ 424, 74,757 (Parker J, Owen J agreeing). The plaintiff is also entitled, under O 16 r 2, to file an affidavit to show cause against the application. If the plaintiff shows cause against the application for summary judgment by filing an affidavit in response, the plaintiff may assume an evidentiary onus to show why summary judgment should not be given. In other words, the plaintiff needs to show, on the evidence, that there exists a 'triable issue'.[34] In doing so, the affidavit must 'condescend upon particulars' ‑ that is, it must set out facts which establish that it is reasonable to permit the plaintiff to pursue the action.[35] [34] See Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd v Mosbert Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 109, 110 (Brinsden J) in relation to applications under O 14 r 1 RSC; see also Bankwest (a division of CBA) v Mann [2015] WASC 187 [46]; HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153 [26]; Gel Custodians Pty Ltd v Dewar [2014] WASC 177 [25]; Hee v Nyoni [2014] WASC 44 [25]; Wright v Wright [2002] WASC 30 [19].[35] Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd v Mosbert Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 109, 110 (Brinsden J), citing Wallingford v Mutual Society (1880) 5 App Cas 685, 704 (Lord Blackburn).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There was also no dispute that the principles in relation to the tort of interference with contractual relations are those summarised by Master Newnes (as he then was) in Boase v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd.[45] [45] Boase v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2005] WASC 269 [32] - [33]. In a case where, as here, the interference with contractual relations is an actual breach of contract, there is little material difference in the case which needs to be established for the purposes of either tort. In this case, BA must establish that the Applicants knew of the Management Agreement between BA and KCGL; that the issue of the Notice of Default constituted a breach of the Management Agreement; that the Applicants knew that issue of the Notice of Default would constitute a breach of the Management Agreement; that the Applicants procured KCGL to issue the Notice of Default to BA; that the Applicants intended to induce KCGL to breach the Management Agreement by issuing the Notice of Default; and that that breach of the Management Agreement caused loss or damage to BA. What is in issue in this application is whether the Applicants can be liable for either tort. It is a trite proposition that a company can only act through its officers and agents.[46] The application of that principle has been held to have the consequence that where a director of a company, acting within the scope of his or her authority, causes the company to breach a contract with a third party, the director cannot be held liable for inducing or procuring the company to breach the contract[47] (the rule in Said v Butt). [46] O'Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 32 (Starke J).[47] Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497, 504 - 506 (McCardie J); O'Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 32 (Starke J), 34 (McTiernan J); Rustic Haven Sdn Bhd v The Ravenswood Resort Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) [2005] WASC 88 [24] - [25] (Newnes M) and see the cases cited by his Honour at [24]. Counsel for BA submitted that the Applicants' conduct in this case fell outside the scope of the rule in Said v Butt. BA's intended case is that when the Directors resolved to issue the Notice of Default they did not act in good faith in the best interests of KCGL but rather were acting in the interests of AET or IOOF, of or Folkestone, or in their own best interests, and that Mr Priest was acting in his personal interest, or in the interests of Sothertons, or in the interests of the Directors (or the interests in which the Directors were acting).[48] [48] Plaintiff to Counterclaim's Summary Evidence [5]. For completeness, I note that although Said v Butt was a case concerning the tort of procuring a breach of contract, the parties appeared to proceed on the basis that the rule in Said v Butt also applies in relation to actions for the tort of interference with contractual relations. Although the parties did not refer to any authority in which the rule in Said v Butt has been applied in the context of the tort of interfering with contractual relations, there is authority for the proposition that the defendant in an action of that kind must be a third party, who stands outside the contractual relationship being interfered with.[49] At least in a case where the interference in contractual relations is said to have occurred through an actual breach of contract, it is difficult to see any rationale for why the rule in Said v Butt would not apply to the tort of interference with contractual relations also. I am content to proceed on that basis.