JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: KNIGHTS CAPITAL GROUP LTD -v- BAJADA AND ASSOCIATES PTY LTD [2016] WASC 69
CORAM: PRITCHARD J
HEARD: 18 DECEMBER 2014, 25 FEBRUARY 2015 & ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 4 MARCH 2016
FILE NO/S: CIV 1875 of 2014
BETWEEN: KNIGHTS CAPITAL GROUP LTD
Plaintiff
AND
BAJADA AND ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
First DefendantSELWYN JOHN BAJADA
Second Defendant(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)
BAJADA AND ASSOCIATES PTY LTD
PlaintiffAND
KNIGHTS CAPITAL GROUP LTD
First DefendantGRANT BARTLEY HODGETTS
Second DefendantMICHAEL JOHN BRITTON
Third DefendantGREGORY JAMES PARAMOR
Fourth DefendantGRANT CHARLES PRIEST
Fifth Defendant(BY COUNTERCLAIM)
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Pleadings - Strike out - O 20 r 19(1)(a) Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 (WA) - Application to strike out part of counterclaim - Where counterclaim discloses no reasonable cause of action - Where party concedes that pleading should be struck out - Where application for leave to amend - Unnecessary to determine application for leave to amend because summary judgment granted
Practice and procedure - Summary judgment - Application for summary judgment brought by defendants by counterclaim - Application of O 16 Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 (WA) to counterclaim - Whether defendants by counterclaim have good defence on the merits - Where state of law unsettled - Inappropriate to grant summary judgment on basis that counterclaim defective in law - Where defendants make out prima facie case for summary judgment - Evidentiary onus on plaintiff to show real question to be tried - Where plaintiff cannot show real question to be tried - Where affidavit in opposition to application for summary judgment discloses insufficient facts to support defence - Where affidavit contains only speculation - Summary judgment granted
Torts - Inducing breach of contract - Interference with contractual relations - Where counterclaim against directors for inducing breach of contract by company - Rule in Said v Butt - Directors not generally liable for inducing breach of contract by company - Exceptions to rule in Said v Butt - Whether directors liable for inducing breach of contract by company in circumstances where directors acting in breach of their duties to the company - Whether evidence sufficient to establish that directors not acting in best interests of company - Where evidence not sufficient to displace directors' assertions that they acted in best interests of company
Legislation:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Application for summary judgment granted
Category: B
Representation:
Original Action
Counsel:
Plaintiff: No appearance
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: No appearance
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : No appearance
Counterclaim
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr A V Vinciullo
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : Mr J A Thomson SC
Third Defendant : Mr J A Thomson SC
Fourth Defendant : Mr J A Thomson SC
Fifth Defendant : Mr J A Thomson SC
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: HopgoodGanim
First Defendant : No appearance
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- Case
- [2016] WASC 69
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court first considered the application to strike out part of the counterclaim. The defendants conceded that the pleading should be struck out, which effectively resolved the issue of whether the counterclaim disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The court did not need to determine the application for leave to amend the pleading as it ultimately granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants. Regarding the summary judgment application, the court assessed whether the defendants had a good defence on the merits. Given the unsettled state of the law on the issue of directors' liability for inducing a breach of contract, the court deemed it inappropriate to grant summary judgment solely on the basis that the counterclaim was defective in law. Instead, the court focused on whether the defendants had made out a prima facie case for summary judgment. The plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment application did not provide sufficient facts to support a defence, and instead contained only speculation. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff could not show a real question to be tried.
The court's reasoning led to a final order that the defendants' application for summary judgment be granted, and the plaintiff's action be dismissed with costs. The court determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a triable issue, and that the defendants had established a prima facie case for summary judgment. The ruling underscored the importance of the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to show why summary judgment should not be granted, and highlighted the need for specific facts rather than mere speculation in opposing such applications. The decision also reaffirmed the principle that directors are generally not liable for inducing a breach of contract by the company, except in cases where they act in breach of their duties to the company.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There was also no dispute that the principles in relation to the tort of interference with contractual relations are those summarised by Master Newnes (as he then was) in Boase v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd.[45] [45] Boase v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2005] WASC 269 [32] - [33]. In a case where, as here, the interference with contractual relations is an actual breach of contract, there is little material difference in the case which needs to be established for the purposes of either tort. In this case, BA must establish that the Applicants knew of the Management Agreement between BA and KCGL; that the issue of the Notice of Default constituted a breach of the Management Agreement; that the Applicants knew that issue of the Notice of Default would constitute a breach of the Management Agreement; that the Applicants procured KCGL to issue the Notice of Default to BA; that the Applicants intended to induce KCGL to breach the Management Agreement by issuing the Notice of Default; and that that breach of the Management Agreement caused loss or damage to BA. What is in issue in this application is whether the Applicants can be liable for either tort. It is a trite proposition that a company can only act through its officers and agents.[46] The application of that principle has been held to have the consequence that where a director of a company, acting within the scope of his or her authority, causes the company to breach a contract with a third party, the director cannot be held liable for inducing or procuring the company to breach the contract[47] (the rule in Said v Butt). [46] O'Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 32 (Starke J).[47] Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497, 504 - 506 (McCardie J); O'Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 32 (Starke J), 34 (McTiernan J); Rustic Haven Sdn Bhd v The Ravenswood Resort Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) [2005] WASC 88 [24] - [25] (Newnes M) and see the cases cited by his Honour at [24]. Counsel for BA submitted that the Applicants' conduct in this case fell outside the scope of the rule in Said v Butt. BA's intended case is that when the Directors resolved to issue the Notice of Default they did not act in good faith in the best interests of KCGL but rather were acting in the interests of AET or IOOF, of or Folkestone, or in their own best interests, and that Mr Priest was acting in his personal interest, or in the interests of Sothertons, or in the interests of the Directors (or the interests in which the Directors were acting).[48] [48] Plaintiff to Counterclaim's Summary Evidence [5]. For completeness, I note that although Said v Butt was a case concerning the tort of procuring a breach of contract, the parties appeared to proceed on the basis that the rule in Said v Butt also applies in relation to actions for the tort of interference with contractual relations. Although the parties did not refer to any authority in which the rule in Said v Butt has been applied in the context of the tort of interfering with contractual relations, there is authority for the proposition that the defendant in an action of that kind must be a third party, who stands outside the contractual relationship being interfered with.[49] At least in a case where the interference in contractual relations is said to have occurred through an actual breach of contract, it is difficult to see any rationale for why the rule in Said v Butt would not apply to the tort of interference with contractual relations also. I am content to proceed on that basis.