JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: COX -v- WEST AUSTRALIAN PORK PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION [2021] WADC 68
CORAM: REGISTRAR HOGAN
HEARD: 23 JUNE 2021
DELIVERED : 7 JULY 2021
FILE NO/S: CIV 2805 of 2020
BETWEEN: RUSSELL COX
Plaintiff
AND
WEST AUSTRALIAN PORK PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION
Defendant
Catchwords:
Application for summary judgment - Claim for unpaid wages - Statute barred
Legislation:
Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 46, s 48, s 49
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Application for summary judgment granted
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | Mr R P Camm |
| Defendant | : | Mr D Markovich |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Camm & Associates |
| Defendant | : | Lane Buck & Higgins |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87
Knights Capital Group v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 69
Re Compania De Electricidad de la Provincia de Buenos Aires Ltd [1980] Ch 146
REGISTRAR HOGAN:
By application dated 6 April 2021 filed 9 April 2021 the defendant sought orders that:
1.Judgment be entered for the defendant.
2.Alternatively, in the event that judgment is not entered for the defendant:
2.1Pursuant to Order 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) the plaintiff do within seven days give security for costs by way of payment into court in the sum of $40,000 for the defendant's reasonable costs up to and including a listing conference.
2.2In the event that the plaintiff fails to comply with order 2.1 of these orders, the proceedings be stayed until such time as the plaintiff pays the further sum of $40,000 into court.
2.3The defendant have liberty to apply for further security for costs.
3.The plaintiff do pay the defendant's cost of these applications and of the proceedings to be taxed if not agreed.
By direction 8 of Consent Orders made 21 April 2021 the only issue to be determined at the special appointment was the summary judgment application.
In support of the application the defendant filed a substantive submission on 2 June 2021 and a submission in reply on 22 June 2021.
The defendant filed the following affidavits:
1.David Markovich affirmed 9 April 2021.
2.Graeme Leslie Dent affirmed 4 May 2021.
3.Richard Ian Evison affirmed 31 May 2021.
The plaintiff filed a submission in opposition to the application on 11 June 2021.
The plaintiff filed the following affidavits:
1.Richard Parker Camm sworn 7 May 2021.
2.Russell Cox sworn 11 June 2021.
By O 16 r 1(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) the court may enter judgment for a defendant if satisfied that the action is frivolous or vexatious (or) that the defendant has a good defence on the merits.
The power will not be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried: Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd.[1]
[1] Fancourt v Mercantile Credits…
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- Case
- [2021] WADC 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Cox's claims for unpaid wages were statute-barred under the Limitation Act 1936 (WA). The court needed to determine whether Cox's cause of action accrued within the limitation period and whether any conduct by the Association had reset or extended the limitation period. The court examined the terms of the Limitation Act 1936 (WA) and the circumstances in which the cause of action accrued to ascertain whether Cox's claims were time-barred. The court also considered whether the Association's conduct amounted to any form of concealment or misrepresentation that could have reset the limitation period.
The court concluded that Cox's claims for unpaid wages were statute-barred as they accrued prior to the commencement of the proceedings and no conduct by the Association had reset or extended the limitation period. The court found that Cox's employment was terminated due to misconduct, and there was no evidence to suggest that the Association had engaged in any conduct that would have reset the limitation period. The court determined that Cox's claims were not made within the requisite time, and thus the action was statute-barred.
The court dismissed Cox's claim and ordered that Cox pay the Association's costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles in relation to the determination of applications for summary judgment are summarised in Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson:[3]… A party should not ordinarily be denied the opportunity to have his or her case determined following trial, and for that reason, the jurisdiction to grant summary judgment should be reserved for the clearest of cases, where there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the action if it were allowed to go to trial. The question is whether, on the material before the Court, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff's action should not be permitted to proceed to trial because it is apparent that it must fail. However, that does not mean that summary judgment will be given only where the case is so hopeless as not to require argument. Extensive argument may be necessary to demonstrate that a party's case is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.[3] Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson [2017] WASC 106 [50] - [54]. The plaintiff filed a writ of summons on 31 July 2020 claiming repayment of $112,488.75, together with interest and costs as at the date of the writ, being money due and owing to the plaintiff by the defendant, for unpaid wages for work performed by the plaintiff, pursuant to his employment agreement with the defendant. The plaintiff was engaged under a contract of employment with the defendant between 2004 until either 31 July 2014 or 1 August 2014 when his employment with the defendant was terminated following a financial investigation and audit. It was agreed between the parties that the claim for unpaid wages was for a period from 2008 until July 2013 and that the plaintiff's entitlement to wages, pursuant to his contract of employment was to be paid on a fortnightly basis. The defendant contended that any claim for breach of the contractual terms, as alleged by the plaintiff, was statute barred. The plaintiff contended that the claimed overtime arose due to work he performed outside of his employment contract and that he was not remunerated for that work. The plaintiff did not contend that the cause of action arose at a different time than as understood by the defendant but that the time limits of pursuing the cause of action were reset by the conduct of the members of the defendant. The defendant's case is that the plaintiff was not entitled to payment of any entitlements beyond that prescribed in the employment contract. The plaintiff was suspended from his employment on 24 July 2014. The suspension letter refers to an admission of the plaintiff making transfers of money for his own personal use or for unapproved expenses and on 31 July 2014 or 1 August 2014 the plaintiff's employment was terminated. The plaintiff's case is that upon the termination of his employment (on 1 August 2014) that he sought to be remunerated for work he had performed on behalf of the defendant which included a claim in relation to a substantial volume of work that he had performed which he claimed was outside the scope of his employment contract for which he had not been paid.