Oxman v Raphael Road Pty Ltd
[2025] WASCA 144
•24 SEPTEMBER 2025
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: OXMAN -v- RAPHAEL ROAD PTY LTD [2025] WASCA 144
CORAM: THOMSON P
HALL JA
ARCHER JA
HEARD: 16 SEPTEMBER 2025
PUBLISHED : 24 SEPTEMBER 2025
FILE NO/S: CACV 8 of 2024
BETWEEN: ROY WALLACE OXMAN
Appellant
AND
RAPHAEL ROAD PTY LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: PRIOR DCJ
File Number : CIV 4150 of 2018
Catchwords:
Landlord and tenant - Duty of landlord to ensure proper RCD protection of leased property before lease commences - Contractual duty - Common law duty - Statutory duty - Occupiers' duty
Costs - Indemnity costs - Disapproval of failure to make appropriate concession in a timely way - Costs of trial and appeal
Legislation:
Electricity Regulations 1947 (WA), reg 12, reg 14
Occupiers' Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5, s 9
Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA), s 42(2)(c)
Result:
Appeal allowed
Matter remitted for assessment of damages
Indemnity costs of trial and appeal awarded to appellant
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | B W Walker KC & B L Nugawela |
| Respondent | : | J R B Ley SC & M L Greenland |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Tan & Tan Lawyers |
| Respondent | : | Greenland Legal Pty Ltd |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56; (2000) 205 CLR 166
Knights Capital Group Ltd v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 69 (S)
Sakoua v Williams [2005] NSWCA 405; (2005) 64 NSWLR 588
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
This appeal was heard on 16 September 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing on that day, the Court made orders allowing the appeal, remitting the case to the District Court for an assessment of damages and ordering the respondent to pay indemnity costs of the trial and the appeal. These are our reasons for doing so.
Background
On 1 October 2015, the appellant and his partner entered into a lease agreement (Lease) with the respondent to lease a residential house at 58 Edward Street, Kenwick (Property), from the respondent for 30 months.[1] The term of the Lease commenced on 1 October 2015.[2] However, the appellant and his partner only took occupation of the Property on 30 October 2015.[3] In the intervening period, the respondent organised for certain repairs to fences at the Property to make the yard secure, and also cleaned some rubbish out of a shed on the Property.[4]
[1] Oxman v Raphael Road Pty Ltd [2024] WADC 3 (Primary Reasons) [1], [3].
[2] Green Appeal Book (GAB) 1 (Ex 3.1).
[3] Primary Reasons [3].
[4] Trial ts (28 February 2023) 97 ‑ 98.
On 3 November 2015, just four days after going into possession of the leased premises, the appellant received a serious electric shock while taking a shower in the morning. While in the shower, the appellant reached up to adjust the chrome shower head. He received a shock from doing so. As well, he involuntarily clasped the shower head and could not let go. He gave evidence that his back arched right back and he felt pain throughout his body. He said that his back bent like it was going to break and he could not breathe. He eventually collapsed on the floor after losing grip of the shower head. He said that the shock caused his left arm to wrap unnaturally around the left‑hand side of his body.[5]
[5] Primary Reasons [66].
There was a hot water system fitted externally to the house. A cracked electrical cable had been tied to the hot water pipe, and plugged into an external socket.[6] The only expert witness called at trial about the way in which the shower head became electrified was Michael Sage, who was an electrical engineer. He was the appellant's witness. The trial judge accepted his evidence and was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the cracked electrical cable made 'intimate contact' with a pipe leading away from the hot water system. He found that moisture from the humidity, dew or rain penetrated cracks in the electrical cable, and that electrical current then leaked from the cable to the water pipe, causing the electric shock to the appellant when he touched the shower head.[7]
[6] Primary Reasons [76] ‑ [77]. Compare representation in GAB 43 ‑ 46 (Ex 23.1 ‑ 23.4).
[7] Primary Reasons [143].
The electrical circuit (HWS Circuit) which contained the power socket to which the hot water system was connected was not protected by a residual current device (RCD).[8] The trial judge found that:[9]
I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that if an RCD had been connected to the power socket that the hot water system was connected to, the RCD would have tripped by the time the electrical cable generated 30 milliamps of power and thus stopped or reduced the flow of electric current through the hot water pipe. Once the RCD tripped, the plaintiff would have then either avoided receiving an electric shock or the level of severity of the electric shock would have been reduced.
Having regard to the fact that the only expert called at trial could not say whether the RCD would have prevented the electric shock, as distinct from reducing its impact, I am unable to find that an RCD would have prevented the plaintiff receiving an electric shock. I am satisfied, however, that an RCD, if installed would at least have reduced the level of the electric shock he received.
[8] Primary Reasons [4], [161].
[9] Primary Reasons [152] ‑ [153].
The last paragraph of this quote has to be read in the context of the earlier evidence of Mr Sage which the trial judge mentioned:[10]
Mr Sage gave evidence that an RCD trips so quickly the shock you receive is a minor one and avoids death or irreversible injury. An RCD would also avoid involuntary grasping of a live object and prevent a prolonged electric shock.
[10] Primary Reasons [121].
Consequently, the finding of the trial judge that an RCD would have reduced the electric shock, had it been fitted to the HWS Circuit, should be understood as a finding that the shock would likely have been a minor one, and not a prolonged electric shock resulting from involuntary grasping of the shower head.
The trial judge also made certain findings about the history of electrical work at the Property. He found that:
(a)the respondent purchased the Property on 16 December 2013, and insisted that RCDs were installed before settlement, as was required by the Electricity Regulations 1947 (WA) (Regulations).[11] The respondent was provided with an electrical safety certificate dated 13 December 2013, which simply stated: 'fitted RCD to board and ran an earth test'.[12] The expert evidence of Mr Sage about this certificate was that:[13]
The Electrical Safety Certificate AA2078775 dated 13 December 2013 appears valid with regard to content and date, except that it does not mention that the water heater socket outlet final sub-circuit was not RCD protected. It is established in the electrical industry that an Electricity Safety Certificate is only valid at the date and time of issue. An Electricity Safety Certificate is not valid at a future date and time as the electrical installation may deteriorate, may be altered, and may suffer interference.
(b)Simon Norrish, a director of the respondent, was aware that a previous tenant had done some renovations to the kitchen of the Property;[14] and
(c)when the Property was leased to the appellant and his partner, Mr Norrish relied upon the 2013 certificate he had been provided for the RCD compliance at the time when he purchased the Property.[15] No other electrical inspections had been done since December 2013.[16]
Requirement under Electricity Regulations for RCD protection
[11] Primary Reasons [57].
[12] GAB 65 (Ex 34.2).
[13] GAB 106 (Ex 52) [7.8].
[14] Primary Reasons [64], [134].
[15] Primary Reasons [62].
[16] Primary Reasons [104].
A critical issue was whether the Regulations, which applied the requirements of the Australian/New Zealand Wiring Rules (AS/NZS 300:2007 Electrical Installations) (Wiring Rules) required an RCD to protect the HWS Circuit.
At the time, reg 14(b) provided:[17]
[17] GAB 56 ‑ 57.
14.Residential premises not occupied by owner
Subject to any exemption under regulation 18, an owner of residential premises that are not occupied by an owner must ensure that at least 2 residual current devices are installed in relation to the premises -
…
(b)before the owner enters into a residential tenancy agreement in respect of the premises with someone other than a person who was a tenant (as defined in the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 section 3) of the premises immediately before the commencement day
…
Penalty:
(a)in the case of an individual ‑ a fine of $15 000;
(b)in the case of a body corporate ‑ a fine of $100 000.
The definition of 'installed' was contained in reg 12:
installed, in relation to residential premises or common property relating to residential premises, means -
(a)installed in accordance with the Australian/New Zealand Wiring Rules in relation to those premises or that property; and
(b)not installed in relation to any other premises or property.
Wiring Rule 2.6.3.1 provided that for residential electrical installations:[18]
[18] Primary Reasons [167].
Additional protection by RCDs with a maximum rated residual current of 30 mA [milliamps] shall be provided for final subcircuits supplying –
(a)one or more socket-outlets; and
(b)lighting points; and
NOTE: For the purpose of this Clause, combination fan, light and heater units, smoke detectors, exhaust fans and ceiling sweep fans are all regarded as lighting points.
(c)directly connected hand-held electrical equipment, e.g. directly connected hair dryers or tools;
forming part of -
(i)individual domestic electrical installations; or
(ii)residential areas of other electrical installations (see Note below); or
(iii)multiple residential electrical installations that are provided for common use; or
(iv)external lighting installations in common areas of multiple residential electrical installations.
Where protection of final subcircuits is required, RCDs shall be installed at the switchboard at which the final subcircuit originates.
Exceptions:
1This requirement does not apply in medical treatment areas such as the home dialysis installations detailed in AS/NZS 3003.
2This requirement need not apply to certain alterations, additions or repairs in accordance with Clause 2.6.3.4.
3This requirement need not apply to a socket-outlet or a connecting device specifically for the connection of a fixed or stationary electric cooking appliance, such as a range, oven or hotplate unit, provided that -
(a)the socket-outlet is located in a position that is not likely to be accessed for general purposes; and
(b)the socket-outlet is clearly marked to indicate the restricted purpose of the socket-outlet and that RCD protection is not provided. (original emphasis)
At trial, the respondent's counsel (not counsel in the appeal) maintained that the Regulations did not require the HWS Circuit to be RCD protected, because the Wiring Rules simply required there to be at least two RCDs to protect the circuits at a premises, and there were (as a matter of fact) two RCDs protecting circuits at the Property. In the respondent's submission at trial, it did not matter that the HWS Circuit was entirely unprotected. In any event, the respondent submitted that there was an exception contained in the Wiring Rules (Exception 3) which meant that an RCD did not need to be fitted to the HWS Circuit.[19]
[19] Primary Reasons [160].
The trial judge accepted that it was sufficient if there were two RCDs to protect circuits at the premises and that, in these circumstances, the HWS Circuit did not also need to be protected. He said:[20]
As the parties have accepted at the date of [the] Incident two RCDs were installed at the Property, therefore, if reg 14(b) created a statutory duty on the defendant, it was compliant with this duty at the time of the Incident.
[20] Primary Reasons [174], see also Primary Reasons [178].
The respondent filed submissions in the appeal on 13 June 2024. These conceded that the trial judge had erred in concluding that the existence of two RCDs was sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the Regulations and the Wiring Rules, even if this left some circuits at the premises without RCD protection. However, the respondent maintained that the error of the trial judge was immaterial because the appellant did not adduce positive evidence to show that a particular exception (Exception 3) to the requirement to have RCD protection on the HWS Circuit did not apply.
On 11 September 2025, less than one week before the appeal hearing. the respondent sought leave to file amended submissions. In these submissions, the respondent accepted that it had breached the requirements of the Regulations and the Wiring Rules by failing to have RCD protection on the HWS Circuit. This represented a significant alteration of the respondent's position.
In our view, it is also, quite obviously, the correct position. It is an extraordinary submission to say that the Regulations and Wiring Rules, properly construed, contemplated that there could be final subcircuits at a premises without any RCD protection, so long as there were at least two RCDs protecting other circuits. There is no discernible reason why that position could be warranted. As well, it seems to us that, if the respondent wished to say that there was an applicable exception from the requirements of the Wiring Rules, it was incumbent upon the respondent at least to provide some evidence raising the operation of the exception in the first place. That did not occur. Quite probably, this was an issue upon which the respondent bore the burden of proof, but it is unnecessary to decide this point.
The upshot is that the respondent's position fundamentally altered on a critical issue between the trial and the hearing of the appeal. At trial, the respondent maintained that there was no need for the HWS Circuit to have RCD protection. The trial judge accepted that submission, and was thereby led into error by the respondent. By the time of the appeal hearing, the respondent conceded that the HWS Circuit should have had RCD protection in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulations and the Wiring Rules. On this basis, ground 1 of the appeal must be allowed.
Basis for damages remedy
The next question was whether there was any legal duty enforceable by a damages remedy which would mean that the appellant was entitled to compensation from the respondent for failing to comply with the requirements of the Regulations and the Wiring Rules.
At trial and on appeal, the appellant maintained four grounds for claiming damages against the respondent based upon non‑compliance with the Regulations and the Wiring Rules. These grounds were based upon claims for breach of contract, breach of s 5 or s 9 of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1985 (WA), breach of a statutory duty and common law negligence.
At trial and in the written appeal submissions (both initially and as amended), the respondent maintained that none of these grounds provided any compensatory remedy for the appellant.
Breach of contract (Ground 5)
At the hearing of the appeal, senior counsel for the appellant started with the claim for breach of contract. He pointed out that at trial there was a claim for breach of an oral collateral contract that the respondent would obtain an electrical inspection report certifying the Property's wiring as safe prior to the appellant signing the lease or occupying the Property. This claim failed, as the trial judge found that no oral agreement was proved.[21]
[21] Primary Reasons [191] ‑ [194].
However, senior counsel for the appellant pointed out that a different claim for breach of contract had also been made. There was an implied term of the Lease which applied by reason of s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA), and which required compliance with the Regulations. Section 42(2)(c) provides:
(2)It is a term of every residential tenancy agreement that the lessor -
…
(c)must comply with all requirements in respect of buildings, health and safety under any written law insofar as they apply to the premises.
Clause 21.3 of the Lease was also in materially similar terms:[22]
21.The lessor must:
…
21.3comply with all laws affecting the premises including building, health and safety laws.
[22] GAB 6 (Ex 3.6).
In its written submissions, the respondent asserted that the alternative claim for breach of contract was not open, as it was not expressly pleaded. In his oral submissions, senior counsel for the appellant accepted that the alternative claim for breach of contract was not pleaded.[23] However, he submitted that the contractual claim for breach of cl 21.3 of the Lease and the term implied by s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act was included in the appellant's case as it was conducted before the trial judge.
[23] Appeal ts 10.
Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that this was demonstrated by the fact that, in his Honour's reasons, the trial judge specifically referred to the appellant claiming that the respondent had a contractual duty to maintain the Property under cl 21.3 of the Lease and pursuant to s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act.[24] The trial judge said[25] that this claim was based upon the Regulations, which:[26]
required that RCDs protect all power point and lighting final subcircuits which would include the power socket to which the hot water system was connected at the time of the Incident. The [appellant] further submits no exemptions under the Regulations or exceptions under the Wiring Rules applied to the [respondent].
[24] Primary Reasons [228].
[25] Primary Reasons [230].
[26] Primary Reasons [158].
The trial judge dismissed the alternative contractual claim upon the basis that he had already found that the respondent had complied with reg 14 of the Regulations. As a result, the trial judge held that the respondent 'did not breach any contractual duty owed to the [appellant] to maintain the Property in compliance with s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act'.[27]
[27] Primary Reasons [231].
Of course, as we have explained, by the time of the hearing of the appeal, the respondent had conceded that it had not complied with reg 14(b) of the Regulations. Consequently, the trial judge's finding that there was no breach of the contractual duty arising under the term implied by the operation of s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act, which required compliance with the Regulations, could no longer stand.
In further support of his submission that the alternative contractual duty had been an issue in the trial, senior counsel for the appellant tendered an amended outline of the plaintiff's opening submissions, which referred to the respondent's contractual duty to maintain the Property under cl 21.3 of the Lease, and to s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act. This document was not included in the appeal books and it appears that senior counsel for the respondent (who had not been trial counsel) was not aware of it.[28]
[28] Appeal ts 11.
Ground 5 of the appeal specifically raised the alternative contractual claim (after a minor unopposed amendment at the hearing). It was in the following terms:
The learned trial Judge erred in law in concluding that the respondent did not breach clause 21.3 of the Lease. His Honour should have further found that the respondent had breached a term of the Lease requiring compliance with reg 14(b) of the Electricity Regulations [such term implied by operation of s 42(2)(c), Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA)], and that this per se was sufficient to establish breach of clause 21.3 of the Lease.
At the hearing of the appeal, senior counsel for the respondent was asked if, having heard the oral submissions made by the appellant, he maintained the position that ground 5 failed because the claim had not been pleaded. He informed the Court that he had no submissions about that.[29] He was then asked whether he could advance any submission as to why judgment should not be immediately entered upon the basis of the concession which the respondent had now made about the breach of reg 14(b) of the Regulations. He informed the Court that he could not resist the Court taking that action.[30] We infer that he was not in a position to make oral submissions against ground 5, due to his ethical obligation only to advance submissions which have a reasonable prospect of succeeding. However, senior counsel for the respondent also informed the Court that he was not in a position to formally concede ground 5, as he had no instructions to do so.[31]
[29] Appeal ts 60.
[30] Appeal ts 60 ‑ 61.
[31] Appeal ts 61.
Although unhelpful to the Court, the approach of senior counsel for the respondent was appropriate in the circumstances in which he found himself. However, the underlying difficulty is that the respondent ought to have conceded the first issue long before the trial. Consequently, the respondent ought also to have conceded that there was a breach of the contractual obligation contained in cl 21.3 of the Lease and a breach of the obligation implied in the Lease by s 42(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act at the same time.
As a result of the developments which we have set out, we were prepared to immediately allow the appeal and order the matter to be remitted for an assessment of damages. Upon being asked whether there was any need for the Court to consider other grounds for the appeal, senior counsel for the appellant confirmed that there was no need to do so if the appeal was allowed upon the basis of ground 5.[32] Therefore, the Court made the orders we have indicated.
[32] Appeal ts 62 ‑ 63.
Further grounds
Despite that confirmation from senior counsel for the appellant, we consider it appropriate to record that we would also allow the appeal on the ground that the respondent breached its common law duty (ground 4). This means that if there might be some difference in assessing damages for breach of contract and for a tort in this case, that difference will have no practical effect.
We consider that, at the very least, at the inception of the tenancy, the respondent (as landlord) owed a common law duty to the incoming tenant to repair defects of which the respondent was aware or ought to have been aware. As explained by Mason P (with whom Brownie AJA agreed) in Sakoua v Williams,[33] the existence of such a duty can be derived from the varied reasons of the High Court in Jones v Bartlett.[34] It is also consistent with the way Beazley JA expressed the duty. Her Honour said that a landlord is under an obligation at the time of the commencement of the tenancy to ensure that premises are reasonably safe for the purposes for which they are let.[35]
[33] Sakoua v Williams [2005] NSWCA 405; (2005) 64 NSWLR 588 [8].
[34] Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56; (2000) 205 CLR 166.
[35] Sakoua v Williams [61].
In the present case, through Mr Norrish, the respondent actually knew that there had been no electrical inspections of the Property certifying its safety since the respondent purchased the Property, and the respondent also knew of the incomplete form of electrical certification in December 2013.
As well, through Mr Norrish, the respondent actually knew that a tenant had done some renovation works in the kitchen since the last electrical inspection.
Mr Norrish signed an Exclusive Management Authority for Residential Premises appointing Mavin Real Estate to manage the Property in September 2015.[36] This contained a provision stating that the lessor warranted that the Property had at least two RCDs fitted 'to protect the power point and lighting final sub‑circuits to comply with the Electricity Regulations 1947'.[37] Another provision was an acknowledgment by the lessor that the lessor was obliged to ensure that 'at least two RCDs are installed to the Premises and maintained in accordance with the statutory regulations'.[38]
[36] Primary Reasons [3]; GAB 66 ‑ 77 (Ex 35.1).
[37] GAB 71 (Clause 4.2.7).
[38] GAB 71 (Clause 4.6.8).
At the very least, the circumstances which we have just set out mean that Mr Norrish and the respondent should have ensured that an electrical inspection of the Property was carried out prior to the inception of the tenancy, or at least prior to the tenants taking possession. This was because there was no up‑to‑date electrical report, there had been renovation work done in the kitchen and the respondent had warranted and acknowledged that there were appropriate RCDs in place in accordance with the Regulations. If an electrical inspection had been done, it may be presumed to have been done competently and to have discovered that the HWS Circuit was not protected by an RCD. Consequently, the respondent ought to have been aware of the absence of adequate RCD protection at the commencement of the tenancy, and ought to have repaired this.
At the oral hearing of the appeal, senior counsel for the respondent accepted that the statement of duty from Mason P's judgment in Sakoua could be adopted as a minimum duty of care, and that it had not been satisfied by the respondent in this case.[39]
[39] Appeal ts 58 ‑ 59.
It follows that we find that the respondent breached the minimum common law duty of care we have identified.
We also observe that, had it been necessary to do so, we would have likely found for the appellant on the claims for breach of the Occupiers' Liability Act and breach of statutory duty. However, there were some additional complexities about these claims, which were substantively disputed by the respondent.
For example, there was an argument about whether the landlord's duty under s 9 of the Occupiers' Liability Act to carry out maintenance and repair applied to require the respondent to ensure that the Property was in a safe condition prior to the appellant taking occupation of the Property. As well, the existence of the limited class who would benefit from an enforceable statutory duty was also put in issue by the respondent.
Indemnity costs
This is a matter where the incident for which damages are claimed occurred almost precisely a decade ago. The matter went to trial in the first half of 2023. For that entire period, until the appeal was heard, the appellant has been kept out of the monetary compensation to which he is legitimately entitled, at least partly by reason of a misinterpretation of the requirements of the Electricity Regulations and Wiring Rules, which the respondent ultimately conceded was untenable just prior to the appeal hearing. That misinterpretation led the trial judge into error. Had it not been made, and had the respondent correctly conceded from the outset that it was obliged by the Electricity Regulations to have placed an RCD on the HWS Circuit, it would seem likely that this case would have been resolved much sooner.
In saying that, we are aware that there were other issues at trial. For example, the respondent did not accept that the cause of the electrical shock received by the appellant was a deteriorated wire which supplied electricity to a hot water pipe attached to the hot water system. However, no other positive case theory was ever advanced by the respondent as an alternative cause.
There is an obligation upon all those involved in litigation, both as advisers and parties, to make appropriate concessions and not to advance untenable arguments. In the present case, we consider that it was always untenable to maintain that there was no obligation upon the respondent under the Regulations and Wiring Rules to ensure that the HWS Circuit was RCD protected. That conclusion is justified by the fact that the point was ultimately conceded.
Although it is regrettable, at the conclusion of the appeal hearing we reached the view that the court should mark its disapproval of the conduct of the respondent in not making the concession about non‑compliance with the Regulations.[40] This was done by making an indemnity costs order both in respect of the appeal and the trial. The point should have been conceded prior to trial.
[40] Knights Capital Group Ltd v Bajada and Associates Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 69 (S) [26].
It may be thought that the order for indemnity costs in this case might have a chilling effect in the future upon those determining whether to make appropriate concessions at a late stage. Lest that should be a consideration, we should say that we would have been inclined to take even stronger steps had an untenable point been maintained in the course of the hearing of the appeal.
Lastly, it is indeed unfortunate that the matter now has to be remitted for an assessment of damages. It would have been far preferable if there had been a provisional assessment of damages which could apply in the event that the appeal was allowed. This is no criticism of the trial judge, as questions of liability and damages had been split before the trial was commenced. However, the obvious inconvenience which this causes, in further delaying the provision of compensation to the appellant in a case where the electric shock occurred approximately 10 years ago, is manifest. Courts should be careful about too readily splitting questions of liability and damage in personal injury cases such as the present case.
Final orders
For these reasons, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Court made the following orders:
(a)the appeal to this Court be allowed;
(b)the judgment of the District Court of Western Australia made on 24 January 2024 be set aside;
(c)in lieu thereof, judgment be entered for the appellant (plaintiff) in the action below against the respondent (first defendant) for damages to be assessed; and
(d)the respondent should pay all the costs incurred by the appellant for the trial and for the appeal, except insofar as they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred, so that subject to the above exceptions, the appellant is completely indemnified by the respondent for its costs.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
LH
Associate to the Hon President Thomson
24 SEPTEMBER 2025
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