Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1319

Citation: Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1319
Parties: COMPLETE TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 097 753 458) v GREEN ENERGY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (ACN 141 454 266), RAYMOND DAVID WHALING, SANDRA ANN WHALING and DEAN AARON WADE
File number: VID 1023/2010
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 18 November 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary judgment application pursuant to s 31A(1) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – applicable test – where respondent company in liquidation – whether individual respondents have no reasonable prospect of success – allegations of trade mark infringement – use of applicant’s registered trade marks on advertising materials and associated business paraphernalia including website and metatag use – consideration of relevant principles – consideration of what constitutes “use as a trade mark” under s 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – strong prima facie case of trade mark infringement by first respondent – allegations of passing off – first respondent’s use of applicant’s business name and trade marks would lead customers to the false belief that businesses were in some way connected – whether individual respondents joint tortfeasors – misleading and deceptive conduct pursuant to ss 52 and 53(d) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – first respondent’s use of applicant’s business name and trade marks was likely to mislead and deceive consumers – first respondent represented that its business was affiliated with applicant’s contrary to s 53(d) – liability of individual respondents considered in relation to s 75B as persons involved – findings made against second and fourth respondent – no finding against third respondent – allegations of copyright infringement – applicant claimed copyright in template quotation letter as a ‘literary work’ for the purposes of Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) – original work created by managing director – no clear and distinct evidence of contract of service – no reproduction of a substantial part of copyright work established – breaches of employment contracts relating to second and fourth respondents only – employment contracts contained non-competition and confidentiality clauses – evidence demonstrated a prima facie case that second and fourth respondents acted in breach of those clauses – breaches of confidence and fiduciary duties – unnecessary to determine on summary judgment application – summary judgment application granted in part

COSTS
– consideration of circumstances in which order for costs taxed and paid forthwith will be made – order made
Legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2011 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)
Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth)
Consumer and Competition Act 2010 (Cth)
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
QS Holdings Sarl v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 460
GM Holden Ltd v Paine (2011) 281 ALR 406

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd, the applicant, Complete Technology Integrations (CTI), sought summary judgment against the respondents for various alleged breaches including trade mark infringement, breaches of sections 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), passing off, copyright infringement, and breaches of employment contracts, confidence, and fiduciary duties. The respondents, including individual directors and the respondent company, Green Energy Management Solutions (GEMS), were in the process of liquidation, which complicated the proceedings. The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the individual respondents had any reasonable prospect of successfully defending the claims and whether the court could grant summary judgment against GEMS despite its liquidation.

The court considered the applicable test for summary judgment under section 31A(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which requires the court to be satisfied that the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding. The court noted that the legislative intent behind section 31A was to allow for the dismissal of proceedings that have no reasonable prospect of success, even if they were not "hopeless" or "bound to fail." The court highlighted that the provision should be interpreted broadly to achieve its legislative purpose.

After evaluating the evidence and arguments presented, the court found that there was a strong prima facie case of trade mark infringement by the first respondent. The court also determined that the first respondent's use of CTI's business name and trade marks would mislead consumers into believing that the businesses were connected, which constituted passing off. Additionally, the court found that the first respondent's actions likely constituted misleading and deceptive conduct under sections 52 and 53(d) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Regarding the individual respondents, the court held that the second and fourth respondents were liable for breaches of their employment contracts, confidence, and fiduciary duties. The court did not make any findings against the third respondent.

The court granted summary judgment in part, holding that the second and fourth respondents were liable for the breaches as pleaded. The court ordered that the second and fourth respondents pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the notice of motion, and that these costs be taxed and payable forthwith. The court's decision provided clarity on the applicability of summary judgment in cases involving liquidated respondents and established that the court could grant such judgments where there was no reasonable prospect of success for the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. On or before 2:15 pm on Monday, 21 November 2011, the applicant file a minute of proposed orders to give effect to the reasons for judgment delivered on Friday, 18 November 2011.

2. The second and fourth respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the applicant’s notice of motion filed on 29 July 2011.

3. The costs payable by the second and fourth respondents to the applicant pursuant to Order 2 above be taxed and payable forthwith.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

CTI relied on the following affidavits in support of its motion:·the affidavit of Peter Bruce Camden Garrett affirmed on 27 July 2011;·the affidavit of Scott Andrew Warren affirmed on 27 July 2011;·the affidavit of Colin Lee Shin Cheung affirmed on 27 July 2011; ·the affidavit of Joel Brady Masterson sworn on 15 July 2011; and·the affidavit of Johanna McPherson affirmed on 25 August 2011. RELEVANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CTI is a company incorporated since 7 August 2001. CTI provides automated electronic controls for residential and commercial buildings. The controls are used primarily for lighting but also for audio visual systems, air-conditioning and other building functions. From the beginning, CTI has operated under its own name “Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd” and the business names “CTI” and “CTI Australia”. In about July/August 2001, CTI also registered the domain names ctia.net.au and ctiaustralia.net.au. CTI’s primary customers have been (and remain) electrical contractors who have engaged CTI to provide the automation component within broader electrical contracts. CTI has used products sourced from various suppliers (including Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd (“Clipsal”)), to design automation solutions. Although CTI has not sold automation systems directly to end users (generally, tenants and building owners) CTI has provided maintenance services directly to them. Further, CTI has been awarded work after end users directed their electrical contractors to engage CTI. CTI’s business has grown very well since its beginning in 2001. In 2010, CTI employed 47 employees and has now a substantial national turnover. CTI established that it is the owner of eight registered trade marks (being 1148516, 1148523, 1148527, 1162007, 1162008, 1162009, 1162010, 1162011) for the words: CTI, CTI Australia, Complete Technology Integrations, CTI Energy Management, and CTI Building Automation (“CTI’s Registered Trade Marks”). The respondents admitted ownership by CTI of CTI’s Registered Trade Marks: see Amended Defence, par [11]. There was evidence that CTI has engaged in a variety of advertising and marketing activities in order to promote its business, including the publication and distribution of “case studies” about CTI’s work on various projects and newsletters to a significant number of persons, including consultants, builders, developers, architects and end users across Australia. CTI has sponsored a boat race, racing cars, and the Hornsby RSL Football Club. CTI has also exhibited at trade shows, including “DesignEX” – a very widely-attended industry show for architects, consultants, builders, developers and others in the building trade. CTI has arranged for its own public relations and advertising campaigns, including, since 2009, the use of a public relations/advertising company and, in 2010, the engagement of another enterprise to run a direct marketing campaign. CTI has also used marketing folders for use in presentations to contractors and consultants, which prominently displayed the trade marks of CTI (including “CTI Australia”, “CTI”, “CTI SmartHome”, “CTI Energy Management” and “CTI Building Automation”). Altogether, CTI’s expenditure on advertising and marketing in each of the past five years has been substantial.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By its statement of claim dated 29 November 2010, CTI alleged that the respondents’ conduct in setting up business in competition with it gave rise to the following causes of action:·trade mark infringement – the individual respondents being liable as joint tortfeasors with the first respondent;·breaches of ss 52 and 53 of the TPA – the individual respondents being liable pursuant to s 75B in respect of relevant breaches by the first respondent;·passing off infringement – the individual respondents being liable as joint tortfeasors with the first respondent;·copyright infringement – the individual respondents being liable as joint tortfeasors with the first respondent;·breaches of contracts of employment by the second and fourth respondents;·breaches of confidence by the second and fourth respondents; and·breaches of fiduciary duties by the second and fourth respondents. TEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to s 31A(1) of the Federal Court Act, the Court may give judgment for an applicant against a respondent in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if the Court is satisfied that the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. For these purposes, a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be “hopeless” or “bound to fail” for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. Section 31A does not limit any other powers that the Court may have: see s 31A(4). Section 31A relevantly provides:(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if: (a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. (2) …(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be: (a) hopeless; or (b) bound to fail; for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. (4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)… The High Court considered s 31A in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 (“Spencer”). After noting (at 139 [53]) that “s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered”, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ said (at 141 [60]):The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of the decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. At this point in the development of the understanding of the expression and its application, it is sufficient, but important, to emphasise that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As I said in QS Holdings Sarl v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd (2011) 92 IPR 460 (“QS Holdings”) at 465 [16]:No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when summary judgment is available. Much depends on the case at hand. Nonetheless, generally speaking, summary judgment would appear appropriate when well-established propositions of law deny the prospect of success. Summary judgment would appear inappropriate where there are “factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute”. See generally Spencer 132 [25] per French CJ and Gummow J. Generally speaking, it also remains true to say, as Gordon J did in Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 … at 407 [127] that “it is inappropriate in defence of a claim for judgment made under s 31A of the Federal Court Act to seek to defend by merely putting a claimant to formal proof”. There are, of course, a variety of circumstances that may attract summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court Act and, on each occasion, the critical question is that set by the statute – has the moving party persuaded the Court that the opposing party has no reasonable prospect of success?CONSIDERATION To establish the individual respondents are liable as pleaded, CTI seeks relevant findings against Green Energy. It is open to the Court to make a finding of trade mark infringement (as well as findings that Green Energy engaged in passing off, contravened the TPA and infringed copyright: see below) notwithstanding that, since Green Energy has gone into liquidation, the proceeding against it is stayed: see GM Holden Ltd v Paine (2011) 281 ALR 406 (“GM Holden”), Matheson Engineers Pty Ltd v El Raghy (1992) 37 FCR 6 at 9, Richardson & Wrench (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Ligon No 174 Pty Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 681, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1 at 14 [48], and Corporations Act 2011 (Cth), s 500(2). The first respondent’s trade mark infringement By its statement of claim, CTI alleged that Green Energy had infringed CTI’s trade marks and that each of the individual respondents was liable for the infringements as joint tortfeasors. Section 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (“TMA”) provides:A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered. Whether a sign is being used as a trade mark is referable to the definition of a trade mark in s 17, which states:A trade mark is a sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any other person.As Sundberg J said in Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Ltd (2008) 76 IPR 161 at 171 [45], in the context of goods:Use “as a trade mark” in s 120(1) is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods. See Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326 at 341 and 351 … That is the concept embodied in the definition of “trade mark” in s 17.