Mars Australia Pty Ltd v Sweet Rewards Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mars Australia Pty Ltd v Sweet Rewards Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 606

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – allegations of passing off, misleading conduct, false representations and infringement of trade marks – whether ordinary consumer could be misled by respondent’s product – whether meaningful to speak of respondent’s get-up

Held: application dismissed

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 64(2), 67(4)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 10, 17, 120
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 53

Conagra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 referred to
Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 61 IPR 212 applied
de Cordova v Vick Chemical Co (1951) 68 RPC 103 referred to
Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (1987) 10 IPR 21 referred to
Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (1990) 17 IPR 1 applied
TGI Friday’s Australia Pty Ltd v TGI Friday’s Inc (1999) 45 IPR 43 referred to
Vieright Pty Ltd v Myer Stores Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 36 considered

MARS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v SWEET REWARDS PTY LTD

NSD 883 of 2007

PERRAM J
5 JUNE 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 883 of 2007

BETWEEN:

MARS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

SWEET REWARDS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 883 of 2007

BETWEEN:

MARS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

SWEET REWARDS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE:

5 JUNE 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Maltesers are a well known confectionary consisting of chocolate covered malt balls.   They first appeared in the United Kingdom in 1936 when they were sold both in a cellophane tube and in a box.  Since that time, apart from an interruption resulting from World War II, they have steadily grown in popularity spreading across Europe, the United States and Asia.  They appear to have arrived in Australia in about 1953.  The applicant Mars Australia Pty Ltd (“Mars”) has manufactured, distributed, marketed and sold Maltesers in Australia since 1989.  The marketing of Maltesers is a serious business reflecting the very large revenues at stake in the bite-size confectionary market in this country.  That marketing has, unsurprisingly, varied since its inception.  For quite some time, however, a typical packet of Maltesers has looked like this:

  2. Maltesers in such packaging have been sold in numerous locations throughout Australia and have been marketed extensively on television, in print and at cinemas.  They are, as was accepted by both parties in the present case, a famous product.

  3. The respondent (“Sweet Rewards”) is an importer of confectionary products.  Since about the middle of 2005, Sweet Rewards…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 606
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mars Australia Pty Ltd brought an application against Sweet Rewards Pty Ltd in the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant sought relief related to the distribution and reputation of its Delfi product range. Sweet Rewards contested the application, raising objections to certain evidence presented by Mars Australia.

A critical issue before the court was whether evidence provided by Sarah Jane Armstrong, who had discussions with various retailers, could be admitted under the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Specifically, Sweet Rewards argued that the evidence was hearsay and that the requirements for admitting such evidence under s 64(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) were not met. Mars Australia contended that the evidence should be admitted despite the procedural non-compliance, arguing that the evidence was essentially incontrovertible. The court needed to determine whether the evidence could be admitted under the hearsay exception, and if not, whether the non-compliance could be excused.

The court found that the evidence in question was indeed hearsay and that the statutory notice requirements for admitting such evidence had not been met. The court held that Mars Australia had not demonstrated that the admission of the hearsay evidence would have caused undue expense, delay, or impracticality. The court also rejected the argument that the evidence was essentially incontrovertible, noting the potential for inaccuracies and errors in the hearsay statements. Consequently, the court declined to exercise its discretion to relieve Mars Australia from the notice requirements. The evidence was therefore rejected.

The Federal Court dismissed the application and ordered that Mars Australia pay the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It follows that none of the applicant’s claims have been made good. The application should be dismissed with costs.Rulings on evidence Objection was taken by Sweet Rewards to paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Sarah Jane Armstrong sworn 29 May 2008 and to exhibit SJA-2 to that affidavit on the grounds of hearsay. Ms Armstrong had given evidence of certain discussions she had with various retailers about the distribution of the Delfi products. The purpose of that evidence was to show that the reputation of the Delfi range was limited. There is no doubt that the evidence is hearsay. Mr Webb SC submitted that it should be received pursuant to s 64(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which provides:(2)The hearsay rule does not apply to:(a)evidence of the representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made; or(b)a document so far as it contains the representation, or another representation to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the representation;if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation to give evidence. Section 64(2) is, however, attended by a requirement that notice be given: see s 67. The requirements of such a notice are specified in the Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth). It is common ground that these requirements were not complied with in this case. There is a power to relieve from the notice requirements: see s 67(4). The basis for the suggested exercise of that dispensing power was that the evidence was essentially incontrovertible. I do not see why this is so. There is nothing inherently accurate about a conversation with a retailer. Even more is this so when the possibility of reliability is considered through the prism of inaccuracy and error rather than the lens of dishonesty. Nor is this a case where the affidavit of Ms Armstrong itself provided the particulars contemplated in the notice. In the case of a number of the retailers only the first names were provided; in the case of others no names were provided at all. Addresses were not provided in many cases and neither was the occupation or job title of the person involved. Further, Ms Armstrong’s affidavit was prepared some five months in advance of the hearing. I am unable therefore to discern why it would have caused undue delay or expense to require a short affidavit from each person. In that circumstance, I decline to relieve Mars from the obligation to issue the notices. The consequence is that the evidence is rejected.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRAM J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRAM J

Full text does not contain this section.