Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd v Clipso Electrical Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd v Clipso Electrical Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 60

File number: NSD 2537 of 2013
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 3 February 2017
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – claims for infringement of trade marks – nature of the market for electrical accessories – whether first respondent’s mark should be cancelled – whether first respondent infringed applicants’ marks – whether first respondent’s use trade mark use

TORTS – passing off – whether respondents’ conduct constituted passing off

TRADE PRACTICES – whether respondents’ conduct misleading and deceptive – whether representations about goods false or misleading

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 ss 2, 18, 29(1) and 236

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 10, 17, 44, 57, 60, 62A, 88(1), 88(2), 120, 122(1) and 190(a)

Cases cited:

10th Cantanae Pty Ltd v Shoshana Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 299

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPAPty Ltd (2015) 115 IPR 67

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd(No 3) (2015) 331 ALR 512

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand (2014) 319 ALR 388

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 5) (2012) 301 ALR 352

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (2016) 330 ALR 230

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640

Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia (2013) 308 ALR 1

Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42

Cooper Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Sigmund Pumps Ltd (1952) 86 CLR 536

Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 1

DC Comics v Cheqout Pty Ltd (2013) 212 FCR 194

de Cordova v Vick Chemical Co (1951) 68 RPC 103

Edmunds v Edmunds [1935] VLR 177

Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193

General Electric Co v The General Electric Co Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 729

Global One Mobile Entertainment Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 134

Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 348

JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings (2016) 329 ALR 625

Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 449

Mars Australia Pty Ltd v Sweet Rewards Pty Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 354

Mayne Industries Pty Ltd v Advanced Engineering Group Pty Ltd (2008) 166 FCR 312

McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v McDonald’s System of Australia Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 455

Norman Kark Publications Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1962] RPC 163

Parkdale Custom Built  Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191

Reckitt & Coleman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341

Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 365

Salena Estate Wines…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 60
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd sought relief against Clipso Electrical Pty Ltd and its director, Abdul Kader, for infringement of trade marks, passing off, and misleading and deceptive conduct. The applicants alleged that the respondents had intentionally selected a trade mark that closely resembled their own to capitalise on their established reputation in the market for electrical accessories. The primary dispute centred around the nature of the market for electrical accessories and whether the respondents' use of the trade mark CLIPSO was likely to mislead the public into believing there was an association between the Clipso products and the applicants' products. The court had to determine whether the respondents' use of the trade mark constituted an infringement and if the respondents' conduct was misleading or deceptive.

The court examined the evidence presented regarding the market for electrical accessories, including whether the market was broad or limited to Bakelite products, and the identity of the market participants. It was crucial to determine if the respondents' conduct could mislead the general public or only industry professionals. The court also scrutinised the credibility of Abdul Kader's evidence, particularly his claim of ignorance about the Clipsal brand when selecting the name CLIPSO. The applicants argued that this claim was implausible given Kader's extensive experience in importing and distributing electrical accessories prior to registering the CLIPSO mark.

The court concluded that Abdul Kader's intent in selecting the name CLIPSO was to create an association with the Clipsal brand, aiming to exploit the applicants' reputation. The court found that the evidence supported the applicants' claims of misleading and deceptive conduct, trade mark infringement, and passing off. The court's reasoning was based on the significant similarity between the marks, the likelihood of confusion among the public, and the deliberate intent behind the respondents' actions.

The court ordered the parties to prepare minutes of order within 21 days and scheduled further directions for 7 March 2017. The decision provided a comprehensive analysis of the market dynamics and the credibility of the evidence, ultimately siding with the applicants on all counts of infringement, passing off, and misleading and deceptive conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to bring in short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons within 21 days.

2. Stand over for further directions on Tuesday, 7 March 2017.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In those circumstances, I find as a fact that Mr Abdul Kader selected the name CLIPSO because it resembled CLIPSAL. The reason he did this was because he wished members of the public, electrical wholesalers and electrical contractors to think that there was some association between the Clipso products and the applicants’ products. I draw the inference that this intent was directed at the general public and not just those in the industry because of the fact, as I have found, that Mr Abdul Kader did sell the Clipso products from the first respondent’s website, which was accessible to the general public. 4. Facts relating to the Market There were several factual debates between the parties about the nature of the market for electrical accessories. The first of these debates concerned whether the relevant market was to be seen as involving the broad class of electrical products of the kind enumerated in class 9, or whether it was instead to be seen as limited to a narrower range of Bakelite products. There were several reasons why this debate was significant. One reason was because whilst it was true, generally speaking, that most Bakelite products could only be installed by an electrician, this was not true of the whole of the larger market for electrical accessories. In relation to electrical accessories which did not have to be installed by electricians (for example, electrical switch timers), it was more likely that members of the public would be purchasing the goods themselves. Secondly, even in what I will broadly refer to as the Bakelite market, there was a dispute as to who the market participants actually were. The respondents argued that the vast majority of people involved in the acquisition of switches and sockets were electrical contractors and electrical wholesalers. They denied that any reasonable number of end-consumers ever purchased such products. The relevance of this debate was its service as an entry point for the respondents’ broader argument that the Clipsal brand was so well known to electrical contractors and wholesalers that there was no sensible chance of anyone being misled by CLIPSO. On this view of affairs, to see that one was buying a Clipso product was to know that one was not buying a Clipsal product. As I have already observed, the pursuit of this argument by the respondents was an uneasy bedfellow with Mr Abdul Kader’s evidence that, despite having imported Bakelite into Australia for three years prior to registering CLIPSO and distributing product under it, he was quite unaware of the existence of the clear market leader, Clipsal. The applicants’ response to this nevertheless was threefold. First, end-consumers did actually purchase Bakelite products. Secondly, even in those cases where electrical contractors did the actual purchasing, often enough – particularly at the premium end of the market where some of the Clipsal products were situated – end-consumers who were designing homes would be controlling the decisions as to which switches and sockets would be purchased. In that more complex sense they, too, were to be seen as part of the market. Thirdly, the applicants submitted that even if all that were wrong, their marks, whilst famous, were not so famous that it would be obvious that a similarly branded product was a different product as, for example, might happen with a can of Coca-Cola and a can of Coca-Bola.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Correspondingly, it was his evidence that Clipso was not marketed to the general public. He regarded his market as consisting of electrical contractors and electrical wholesalers. It was illegal for non-qualified persons to install his accessories and he did not sell directly to the public. He did not think that electrical contractors or wholesalers were confused between Clipso and Clipsal, and he was unaware of any complaints to that effect.3. The Attack upon the Reliability of the Evidence of Mr Abdul Kader The credit of Mr Abdul Kader was one of the central themes during the trial. The applicants’ basic proposition was that Mr Abdul Kader had decided to choose the name CLIPSO precisely because of its similarity to CLIPSAL, and precisely because he wished to exploit the applicants’ reputation. If made good, that proposition would serve on two fronts. First, it would establish that the CLIPSO mark had been registered in bad faith, thereby providing a ground for its removal from the register. Secondly, it would corroborate the raft of allegations concerning the misleading nature of the CLIPSO mark, because it was said (perhaps by me during argument) that it might more readily be inferred that the use of CLIPSO was, in various ways, misleading if it had always been Mr Abdul Kader’s intention to mislead. It is implicit in the applicants’ submissions on bad faith that acceptance of them would entail the wholesale rejection of the detailed account Mr Abdul Kader has given of how he happened upon the name CLIPSO and his reasons for doing so. It would mean that a significant portion of his evidence on this issue was not just incorrect, but knowingly false. Such a finding would be a strong one indeed, and would involve a most serious traduction of Mr Abdul Kader’s credit. Given the extent and deliberate nature of the falsity which is alleged against him, it is as well to recall that the seriousness of the conclusions for which the applicants contend must be kept in mind in assessing their correctness. Put another way, it would be surprising and quite out of the ordinary for a party to this kind of litigation entirely to fabricate an account of how a brand came to be formulated: cf. s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. In what follows, I keep that firmly in mind. A critical step along the way to resolving this issue is the observation that a central part of Mr Abdul Kader’s account appears to me to be very, very unlikely, although perhaps not altogether impossible. The observation concerns his evidence that he knew very little, if anything, about the Clipsal brand at the time that he applied for registration of CLIPSO. The difficulty arises from two sets of facts. The first is the fact that by the time Mr Abdul Kader came to be applying for the registration of the CLIPSO mark in October 2008, he had been importing electrical accessories into the Australian market from China since 2005, and had distributed the Bakelite products thus obtained through his distribution outlets in Queensland, Western Australia and New South Wales. Mr Abdul Kader accepted during cross-examination that by this time his business had expanded significantly, and that he had a ‘huge’ market. Further, he had regular contact with electricians in his showroom.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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