Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 882

Citation: Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 882
Parties: ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED v ACPA PTY LIMITED and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC; ACPA PTY LIMITED and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC v ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED
File number: NSD 149 of 2014
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 21 August 2015
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – claims for infringement of trade marks – whether respondents’ use trade mark use – whether good faith defence open to respondents – whether applicant owner of trade marks – whether prior use established – whether any relevant illegality existed to defeat any prior use of respondents – matters relevant to discretion to remove trade marks from register

CONSUMER LAW – whether respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by using certain names

TORTS – passing off – whether respondents’ conduct constituted passing off

ESTOPPEL – whether respondents estopped from pursuing cross-claim for removal of trade marks from register – whether procedurally fair to raise conventional estoppel in circumstances

Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12DA, 12DB(1)(e), 12DB(1)(f)
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 911A(1)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 42(b), 58, 60, 88(1)(a), 88(2)(a), 88(2)(c), 120(1), 122(1)(a)(i), 122(1)(b)(i), 122(1)(f), 122(1)(fa), 124
Cases cited: Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 cited
Coca-Cola Company v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107 applied
Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 1 considered
EOS Australia Pty Ltd v Expo Tomei Pty Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 277 cited
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 cited
Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (2011) 197 FCR 67 considered
Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd [1962] RPC 265 cited
Re Hicks’s Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 considered
SAP Australia Pty Ltd v Sapient Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 169 considered
The Hearing Clinic (Niagara Falls) Inc v 866073 Ontario Ltd [2014] ONSC 5831 (7 October 2014) cited
TheSeven Up Company v O.T. Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 203 cited
The Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 cited
Dates of hearing: 15, 17-19 December 2014; 29-30 January and 2-3 February 2015
Date of last submissions: 25 February 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Mr A Leopold SC, Ms ST Chrysanthou and Ms SL Ross
Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Watson Mangioni
Counsel for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Mr AJL Bannon SC, Mr C Dimitriadis SC and Mr R Clark
Solicitor for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Herbert Smith Freehills

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 149 of 2014

BETWEEN:

ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED
Applicant

AND:

ACPA PTY LIMITED

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 882
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd involves a dispute over the ownership and use of trade marks. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the respondents had used the trade marks, whether they could rely on a good faith defence, and whether the applicant was the owner of the trade marks. The court also considered whether the respondents engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct and whether their actions constituted passing off. Additionally, the court examined whether the respondents were estopped from pursuing a cross-claim for the removal of trade marks from the register and whether it was procedurally fair to raise a conventional estoppel in the circumstances.

The court found that the power to remove the trade marks from the register was discretionary and that the respondents had established prior use of the marks, which precluded the applicant from being the owner. The court concluded that the applicant was not the owner of the trade marks as there was prior use by another party in Australia. The court also found that the respondents had not acted in bad faith and that there was no evidence of misleading or deceptive conduct or passing off. Furthermore, the court held that the respondents were not estopped from pursuing their cross-claim and that it was procedurally fair to raise the estoppel argument.

The application was dismissed, and the respondents were required to file submissions on the issues of costs and the exercise of the discretion within 28 days. The applicant was then given a further 28 days to file any submissions in response. The court ordered that the submissions not exceed 10 pages.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The respondents file any submissions within 28 days on the issues of costs and the exercise of the discretion.

3. The applicant file any submissions in response within a further 28 days.

4. Submissions not to exceed 10 pages.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Uninstructed by authority, I would agree with the conclusion of Branson J in EOS Australia Pty Ltd v Expo Tomei Pty Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 277 at 286-287 that the word ‘may’ in s 88(1) means ‘must’ and that no discretion arises. However, a Full Court concluded in Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 1 at 29 [129] that the power was discretionary. In doing so the Court relied upon the conclusions of the High Court in Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 at 80-81 [87] to similar effect but in relation to earlier provisions whose wording is, in my opinion, materially different. It seems to me, therefore, that there may be reason to doubt the correctness of this aspect of Crazy Ron’s. However, as a trial judge I am bound by it and conclude that the power is discretionary.9. Facts relevant to the exercise of the discretion Although I am yet to hear argument on whether the discretion should be exercised to expunge the marks from the register the following matters may be relevant to that exercise. I do not find that the applicant’s executives deliberately chose the name ANCHORAGE knowing of the second respondent’s business. The witnesses called by the applicant on this issue were its senior executives, Mr Cave, Mr Briggs and Mr Wong. They gave evidence that they were not aware of the second respondent when they met in early 2007 (with a Mr Brennan) to form the applicant and select its name. They said that they had sat in an office in Bridge Street and, over several hours and possibly, although not certainly, over several meetings tried to work out a good name for the new business they were setting up (each man was coming from an earlier business). They had used a dictionary and starting at ‘A’ had initially come up with the word ANCHOR. Mr Wong’s wife thought that ANCHOR had an unfortunate rhyming connotation. In any event, they eventually settled on ANCHORAGE which, to my mind, does not necessarily allay Mrs Wong’s concerns, although it potentially contributes a splendid new word to the language. As this process was undertaken, Mr Cave, apparently, would duck out of the room and check on a computer to see if each domain name was available. His searches revealed to him that anchoragecapital.com was already taken but he was not fussed by this because pretty much every .com domain name was taken. On the other hand, anchoragecapital.com.au was available and that was good enough for him. He checked and saw that there was no website. At the time that he did these checks the second respondent had not yet established its website, which did not occur until 2009. The respondents submitted that it was implausible that these men did not know of the second respondent’s business. I have found this a difficult question to resolve but have come to the conclusion that I am not prepared to find that their evidence about it was false. I accept that the second respondent’s business in the United States was significant and that, as at 2007, it had been engaged in quite a few significant transactions in this country. I also accept that Mr Briggs, Mr Wong and especially Mr Cave are very experienced businessmen. In order to assess whether it was impossible that they would not have heard of the second respondent in 2007 I would need to know a lot more about the industry than I presently do. More importantly, I do not think that these men would have set up the business with the name ANCHORAGE if they had truly appreciated that the second respondent was operating in Australia. Nor do I think that the fact that the domain name anchoragecapital.com was already reserved should have put them on notice. For all they knew, it was owned by a company selling knitting needles, particularly because there was no website. I therefore do not find either that they knew or that they ought to have known of the second respondent’s activities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

During the course of the trial Mr Fitzpatrick gave evidence that he overheard members of the team at the second respondent referring to the second respondent as ‘ANCHORAGE’. Given the size of the team, Mr Fitzpatrick’s knowledge of what they were doing and the physical proximity of the staff to each I accept that this material may be admitted. Although I accept Mr Fitzpatrick’s evidence about this was sincere, I doubt his ability to recall this level of detail at this remove of time and believe it more likely to be an innocent reconstruction. I have placed no weight upon it.11. Conclusions The application will be dismissed. I will hear the parties further on whether the ANCHORAGE and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL marks should now be removed from the register in light of my findings and on the question of costs. The respondents are to file any submissions on those issues within 28 days hereof and the applicant any submissions in response within a further 28 days.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The estoppel case therefore fails. A consequence of these conclusions about the meeting between Mr Howes and Mr Briggs is that I do not accept that the respondents have in any way acted in bad faith. The second respondent has continued to use the US ANCHORAGE names just as it always has and has never suggested that it would not do so. There is no evidence that it is seeking somehow to exploit confusion surrounding the names. The fact that the respondents became aware of the applicant from no later than May 2011 does not provide any basis for a conclusion of bad faith.6. Is the power to remove the applicant’s registration of the marks enlivened? The answer to this question is ‘Yes’. The respondents claim that the marks were liable to be removed from the register for the following reasons:(a)the applicant was not the owner of the marks (there having been prior use) (ss 88(2)(a) and 58 of the Act);(b)there was a likelihood of confusion (ss 88(2)(a), (c) and 60 of the Act); and(c)the registration of the marks had been contrary to law (ss 88(2)(a) and 42(b) of the Act). For the following reasons, I accept that the power to remove the marks is enlivened by reason of (a) but not (b) or (c).(a) Applicant not owner of marks: sections 88(2)(a) and 58 It was not in dispute that the applicant would not be the owner of the ANCHORAGE marks if prior to the earlier of its first use of the marks in Australia another person in the course of trade in Australia used a mark which was substantially identical with the registered marks in relation to the same kinds of services for which the applicant’s marks were registered: The Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 423-424 per Kitto J; Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 432 per Deane J (with whom Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed). The debate between the parties was fourfold: (a) whether there was an additional requirement that it should be shown that the earlier user of the mark was entitled to its exclusive use; (b) whether it was shown that the second respondent had used substantially identical marks to the ANCHORAGE marks in the course of trade; (c) whether it was open to the respondents to rely on use of substantially identical marks by other members of the second respondent’s group; and, (d) if so, whether such use was established. As to (a), the applicant relied upon a passage in Re Hicks’s Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 (FC) at 639-640 where Holroyd J, speaking for the Court, said that for a person to be the proprietor of a mark he ‘must have claimed to be the proprietor, and the word “proprietor” must be taken to mean the person entitled to the exclusive use of that name’. However, this is not a statement that to establish prior use one must establish that the prior user had an exclusive right to use the name. What it is saying is that in order to obtain registration one needs to show that no-one else has been using the name as a trade mark in respect of the same goods or services. What follows from Re Hicks’s Trade Mark is not, as the applicant submits, that it is necessary for the second respondent to show that it had a right to prevent others from using the US ANCHORAGE names; rather, the point of the second respondent’s prior use is to show that the applicant’s use was itself not exclusive.