FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 882
Citation: Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 882 Parties: ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED v ACPA PTY LIMITED and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC; ACPA PTY LIMITED and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC v ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED File number: NSD 149 of 2014 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 21 August 2015 Catchwords: TRADE MARKS – claims for infringement of trade marks – whether respondents’ use trade mark use – whether good faith defence open to respondents – whether applicant owner of trade marks – whether prior use established – whether any relevant illegality existed to defeat any prior use of respondents – matters relevant to discretion to remove trade marks from register
CONSUMER LAW – whether respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by using certain names
TORTS – passing off – whether respondents’ conduct constituted passing off
ESTOPPEL – whether respondents estopped from pursuing cross-claim for removal of trade marks from register – whether procedurally fair to raise conventional estoppel in circumstances
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12DA, 12DB(1)(e), 12DB(1)(f)
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 911A(1)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 42(b), 58, 60, 88(1)(a), 88(2)(a), 88(2)(c), 120(1), 122(1)(a)(i), 122(1)(b)(i), 122(1)(f), 122(1)(fa), 124Cases cited: Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 cited
Coca-Cola Company v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107 applied
Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 1 considered
EOS Australia Pty Ltd v Expo Tomei Pty Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 277 cited
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 cited
Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (2011) 197 FCR 67 considered
Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd [1962] RPC 265 cited
Re Hicks’s Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 considered
SAP Australia Pty Ltd v Sapient Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 169 considered
The Hearing Clinic (Niagara Falls) Inc v 866073 Ontario Ltd [2014] ONSC 5831 (7 October 2014) cited
TheSeven Up Company v O.T. Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 203 cited
The Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 citedDates of hearing: 15, 17-19 December 2014; 29-30 January and 2-3 February 2015 Date of last submissions: 25 February 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 55 Counsel for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Mr A Leopold SC, Ms ST Chrysanthou and Ms SL Ross Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Watson Mangioni Counsel for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Mr AJL Bannon SC, Mr C Dimitriadis SC and Mr R Clark Solicitor for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Herbert Smith Freehills
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 149 of 2014
BETWEEN: ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED
ApplicantAND: ACPA PTY LIMITED
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 882
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the power to remove the trade marks from the register was discretionary and that the respondents had established prior use of the marks, which precluded the applicant from being the owner. The court concluded that the applicant was not the owner of the trade marks as there was prior use by another party in Australia. The court also found that the respondents had not acted in bad faith and that there was no evidence of misleading or deceptive conduct or passing off. Furthermore, the court held that the respondents were not estopped from pursuing their cross-claim and that it was procedurally fair to raise the estoppel argument.
The application was dismissed, and the respondents were required to file submissions on the issues of costs and the exercise of the discretion within 28 days. The applicant was then given a further 28 days to file any submissions in response. The court ordered that the submissions not exceed 10 pages.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The respondents file any submissions within 28 days on the issues of costs and the exercise of the discretion.
3. The applicant file any submissions in response within a further 28 days.
4. Submissions not to exceed 10 pages.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The estoppel case therefore fails. A consequence of these conclusions about the meeting between Mr Howes and Mr Briggs is that I do not accept that the respondents have in any way acted in bad faith. The second respondent has continued to use the US ANCHORAGE names just as it always has and has never suggested that it would not do so. There is no evidence that it is seeking somehow to exploit confusion surrounding the names. The fact that the respondents became aware of the applicant from no later than May 2011 does not provide any basis for a conclusion of bad faith.6. Is the power to remove the applicant’s registration of the marks enlivened? The answer to this question is ‘Yes’. The respondents claim that the marks were liable to be removed from the register for the following reasons:(a)the applicant was not the owner of the marks (there having been prior use) (ss 88(2)(a) and 58 of the Act);(b)there was a likelihood of confusion (ss 88(2)(a), (c) and 60 of the Act); and(c)the registration of the marks had been contrary to law (ss 88(2)(a) and 42(b) of the Act). For the following reasons, I accept that the power to remove the marks is enlivened by reason of (a) but not (b) or (c).(a) Applicant not owner of marks: sections 88(2)(a) and 58 It was not in dispute that the applicant would not be the owner of the ANCHORAGE marks if prior to the earlier of its first use of the marks in Australia another person in the course of trade in Australia used a mark which was substantially identical with the registered marks in relation to the same kinds of services for which the applicant’s marks were registered: The Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 423-424 per Kitto J; Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 432 per Deane J (with whom Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed). The debate between the parties was fourfold: (a) whether there was an additional requirement that it should be shown that the earlier user of the mark was entitled to its exclusive use; (b) whether it was shown that the second respondent had used substantially identical marks to the ANCHORAGE marks in the course of trade; (c) whether it was open to the respondents to rely on use of substantially identical marks by other members of the second respondent’s group; and, (d) if so, whether such use was established. As to (a), the applicant relied upon a passage in Re Hicks’s Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 (FC) at 639-640 where Holroyd J, speaking for the Court, said that for a person to be the proprietor of a mark he ‘must have claimed to be the proprietor, and the word “proprietor” must be taken to mean the person entitled to the exclusive use of that name’. However, this is not a statement that to establish prior use one must establish that the prior user had an exclusive right to use the name. What it is saying is that in order to obtain registration one needs to show that no-one else has been using the name as a trade mark in respect of the same goods or services. What follows from Re Hicks’s Trade Mark is not, as the applicant submits, that it is necessary for the second respondent to show that it had a right to prevent others from using the US ANCHORAGE names; rather, the point of the second respondent’s prior use is to show that the applicant’s use was itself not exclusive.