Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

CAMPOMAR SOCIEDAD, LIMITADA & ANOR APPELLANTS

AND

NIKE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited
[2000] HCA 12
9 March 2000
S41/1999

ORDER

  1. Appeal allowed.

  1. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 7 July 1998 and in place thereof order that:

(a)     the appeal to that Court be allowed in part;

(b)     Order 3 of the orders made by Sheppard J on 20 August 1996 be set aside;

(c)      Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made by Sheppard J on 20 August 1996 each be varied by adding the words "SPORT FRAGRANCE" after "NIKE" appearing therein;

(d)      reserve liberty to any party to apply to a Justice of the Federal Court of Australia for variation of the terms of the orders of Sheppard J (as varied by these orders) on application made within 28 days of the date of this order;

(e)     the respondents pay two-thirds of the appellants' costs of the appeal to the Full Court;

(f)      otherwise the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed.

  1. The respondents pay two-thirds of the appellants' costs of the appeal.

2.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

D K Catterns QC with J R Baird for the appellants (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

D F Jackson QC with J V Nicholas for the respondents (instructed by Sprusons Solicitors)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

CAMPOMAR SOCIEDAD, LIMITADA   APPELLANT

AND

NIKE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited
9 March 2000
S42/1999

ORDER

  1. Appeal allowed with costs.

  2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia and in place thereof order that:

(a)the appeal to that Court be allowed in part and Orders 1 and 3 of the orders made by Sheppard J on 20 August 1996 be set aside;

(b)the entry in the Register of Trade Marks in respect of registration No A585204 be amended by amending the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered to read "Soaps, being goods in Class 3";

(c)otherwise the application be dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

D K Catterns QC with J R Baird for the appellant (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

D F Jackson QC with J V Nicholas for the respondents (instructed by Sprusons Solicitors)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited

Trade Marks – "NIKE" – Appellants and respondents registered identical trade marks in respect of different products – Appellants' use of mark likely to deceive or cause…

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Details
Case
[2000] HCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the registration of identical trade marks, "NIKE," by Campomar Sociedad, Limitada (appellants) and Nike International Ltd (respondents) for different classes of goods. The dispute arose from the respondents' contention that the appellants' use of the mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion, and that the appellants intended to exploit the respondents' established goodwill. The primary question was whether the appellants' trade mark registrations should be expunged from the Register.

The Court was required to determine several legal issues, including the interpretation and application of section 28 of the *Trade Marks Act 1955* (Cth), specifically whether it had a continuing or secondary operation and the interests it was designed to protect. This included whether section 28 could prevent the "dilution" of a trade mark and whether it accommodated prior or honest concurrent use. The Court also had to consider whether the appellants' trade marks had a reasonable probability of causing confusion, assessing this prospectively at the date of their respective applications for registration. Furthermore, the Court examined the power to expunge a mark from the Register and the exercise of discretion on appeal, particularly in light of the limitation of goods for which a trade mark might be registered. The case also touched upon the provisions of the *Trade Practices Act* concerning misleading or deceptive conduct.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Court reasoned that the Campomar registrations were not wrongly remaining on the Register under section 22(1)(b) of the *Trade Marks Act 1955*. It was held that section 28 of the Act operated primarily as a barrier at the time of registration, and the evidence did not establish that the Campomar registrations offended section 28 at their respective deemed dates of registration. The Court noted that the initial registration had occurred without opposition, and correspondence indicated that the respondents did not consider perfume and cosmetics to be part of their brand image at that time. The Court also considered the discretionary power to expunge a mark, finding that even if the later registration might have offended section 28, the discretion should be exercised in favour of Campomar, taking into account section 34 concerning honest concurrent use and the circumstances of international brand expansion.

Consequently, the High Court ordered that the Campomar registrations would be varied by adding the words "SPORT FRAGRANCE" after "NIKE." Liberty was reserved for parties to apply for further variation within 28 days. The respondents were ordered to pay two-thirds of the appellants' costs of the appeal to the High Court and the Full Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal allowed.

2.

Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 7 July 1998 and in place thereof order that:

(a) the appeal to that Court be allowed in part;

(b) Order 3 of the orders made by Sheppard J on 20 August 1996 be set aside;

(c) Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made by Sheppard J on 20 August 1996 each be varied by adding the words "SPORT FRAGRANCE" after "NIKE" appearing therein;

(d) reserve liberty to any party to apply to a Justice of the Federal Court of Australia for variation of the terms of the orders of Sheppard J (as varied by these orders) on application made within 28 days of the date of this order;

(e) the respondents pay two-thirds of the appellants' costs of the appeal to the Full Court;

(f) otherwise the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed.

3.

The respondents pay two-thirds of the appellants' costs of the appeal.

2.

Background

Background to the litigation

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada (Campomar), a Spanish company, registered the trade mark "NIKE" in respect of certain goods, including sportswear and sports equipment. Nike International Ltd (Nike), an American corporation, also registered the "NIKE" mark in respect of similar goods. Nike subsequently expanded its use of the "NIKE" mark to include sports fragrance products, which Campomar had registered the mark for as well. Nike initiated proceedings to expunge Campomar's registrations, alleging that Campomar's use of the "NIKE" mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion and that Campomar intended to take advantage of Nike's goodwill. The dispute centred on whether Campomar's registrations were valid and whether they could remain in the Register under the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth). The case progressed through various courts, with the High Court ultimately deciding on the validity of the registrations and the exercise of the court's discretion to expunge the marks from the Register. The High Court's decision considered the evidence regarding Nike's growing reputation, the lack of opposition to Campomar's registrations, and the specific circumstances of the case, including the period during which the registrations were made and the nature of the goods in question.

The matter of Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Ltd originated as an application to expunge trade marks from the Australian Register of Trade Marks. The respondents, Nike International Ltd, applied to expunge trade marks registered by the appellants, Campomar Sociedad, Limitada, on the grounds that the registrations were likely to deceive or cause confusion, and that the appellants intended to take advantage of the respondents' goodwill. The case first came before Sheppard J of the Federal Court of Australia who, on 20 August 1996, made orders that the Campomar registrations be expunged from the Register. Dissatisfied with Sheppard J's decision, Campomar Sociedad, Limitada appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. On 7 July 1998, the Full Court dismissed the appeal, upholding Sheppard J's decision. Campomar then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was granted. The appeal before the High Court primarily focused on the procedural and statutory interpretation issues arising from the Federal Court's decision, rather than the substantive merits of the trade mark dispute.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Campomar registrations were wrongly remaining in the Register within the meaning of s 22(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth).
2. Whether s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) has continuing or secondary operation.
3. What interests does s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) protect?
4. Whether s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) prevents the "dilution" of a trade mark.
5. Whether s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) accommodates prior or honest concurrent use.
6. Whether Campomar's trade marks had a reasonable probability of causing confusion.
7. Whether the issue of confusion should be considered prospectively at the date of application for registration.
8. Whether the power to expunge a mark from the Register should be exercised in this case.
9. Whether the limitation of goods for which a trade mark is registered affects the application of s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth).
10. What is the significance of an "erroneous assumption" in determining misleading or deceptive conduct under Australian Trade Practices law?
11. What is the required nexus between conduct and any resulting misconceptions or deceptions under Australian Trade Practices law?
12. How does Australian Trade Practices law assess the effect of conduct on ordinary or reasonable members of the class of prospective purchasers?

Held
1. Whether the Campomar registrations were wrongly remaining in the Register within the meaning of s 22(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth): The court concluded that the Campomar registrations were not wrongly remaining in the Register. The appeal was allowed in part.

2. Whether s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) has continuing or secondary operation: The court found that s 28 has primary operation as a barrier to registration, but its effect on existing registrations was not considered.

3. What interests does s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) protect: The court did not make specific findings on the interests protected by s 28, but it did discuss the protection of goodwill and reputation.

4. Whether s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) prevents the "dilution" of a trade mark: The court did not find that s 28 prevents the dilution of a trade mark.

5. Whether s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) accommodates prior or honest concurrent use: The court found that s 28 accommodates honest concurrent use, particularly in cases of brand extension.

6. Whether Campomar's trade marks had a reasonable probability of causing confusion: The court concluded that Campomar's trade marks did not have a reasonable probability of causing confusion.

7. Whether the issue of confusion should be considered prospectively at the date of application for registration: The court did not make specific findings on this issue, but it did consider the evidence presented at the time of the registrations.

8. Whether the power to expunge a mark from the Register should be exercised in this case: The court exercised its discretion not to expunge the Campomar registrations from the Register.

9. Whether the limitation of goods for which a trade mark is registered affects the application of s 28 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth): The court did not make specific findings on this issue.

10. What is the significance of an "erroneous assumption" in determining misleading or deceptive conduct under Australian Trade Practices law: The court did not make specific findings on this issue.

11. What is the required nexus between conduct and any resulting misconceptions or deceptions under Australian Trade Practices law: The court did not make specific findings on this issue.

12. How does Australian Trade Practices law assess the effect of conduct on ordinary or reasonable members of the class of prospective purchasers: The court did not make specific findings on this issue.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The result for the present appeals is that the Campomar registrations were not wrongly remaining in the Register within the meaning of s 22(1)(b) of the 1955 Act and thus their automatic registration under the 1995 Act was not liable to attack on that ground.The primary operation of s 28 There remains the question whether the Campomar registrations nevertheless are liable to expungement under s 22(1) because they are entries which were "wrongly made". This involves the application of s 28 in its primary, and, as indicated above, its sole operation as a barrier to the Campomar registrations at their respective deemed dates of registration in 1986 and 1992. Sheppard J made no findings on these issues. Nor did the majority of the Full Court. It was unnecessary for their Honours to do so in order to uphold the orders made by Sheppard J. However, it was necessary for Burchett J, who would have allowed the appeals, to deal with these issues. He did so and found that the Campomar registrations were not to be impeached for contraventions of s 28. Burchett J pointed out that the evidence had concentrated upon "the rapidly growing reputation of Nike International in the period up to trial"[79]. He noted that the Campomar registrations had been effected without opposition by Nike International and, in the case of the first registration in 1986, after correspondence with Nike Inc in which that corporation had indicated to Campomar that perfume and cosmetic products were not part of its "image".[79](1998) 85 FCR 331 at 344. Burchett J concluded[80]:"In my opinion, it would not be right to make a finding that Campomar's trade marks, particularly the earlier mark, offended s 28(a) at the date of their registration. Of course, this conclusion is stronger, on the evidence I have been discussing, in relation to the 1986 registration; but, given the validity of that, I do not think the slight extension of it involved in the later registration could be regarded as in itself involving any likelihood of deception or confusion.It is clear that the remedy of expunction is a remedy to be granted or withheld in the court's discretion[81]. The trial judge did not advert to this discretion because the weight he gave to the brand extension argument caused him to devote no separate consideration to the rights conferred by registration on Campomar in respect of the marketing of fragrances and cosmetic products generally, without any overt link to sports. At least in the case of the 1992 registration, assuming the 1986 registration was valid when granted, I think that, even if the 1992 registration offends s 28(a), the court's discretion should be exercised in favour of [Campomar]. In reaching that conclusion, I take into account s 34 and the matters of principle in relation to it which I have already discussed."[80](1998) 85 FCR 331 at 344-345.[81]General Electric Co [1972] 1 WLR 729 at 751; [1972] 2 All ER 507 at 526; Murray Goulburn (1990) 171 CLR 363 at 391. Section 34 was addressed to honest concurrent use. The matters of principle of which Burchett J spoke appear to be the need to recognise as points going to the exercise of discretion the special circumstances that arise from "the collision of marks through the invasive effect of brand extension" across national boundaries in an age of expansion in international commerce[82].[82](1998) 85 FCR 331 at 335, 338.