Opposition by Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC to applications under section 92 of the
[2025] ATMO 194
•16 September 2025
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC to applications under section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) by Australian Bar & Beverage Group Pty. Ltd for removal of trade mark numbers 735775 (25, 35, 38, 41, 42) – MARGARITAVILLE, 1231299 (43) – MARGARITAVILLE, 1464685 (35, 43) – JIMMY BUFFETT’S MARGARITAVILLE, 1464686 (43) – MARGARITAVILLE, 1871341 (36, 43) – MARGARITAVILLE, 2005533 (43) – COMPASS BY MARGARITAVILLE HOTELS & RESORTS, 2009564 (43) – COMPASS MARGARITAVILLE HOTELS & RESORTS (Figurative) – each in the name of Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Delegate:
Nicholas Smith
Representation:
Opponent: Megan Evetts of Counsel instructed by Spruson & Ferguson
Applicant: Shauna Ross of Counsel instructed by Gladwin Legal Pty Ltd
Decision:
2025 ATMO 194
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - section 96 opposition: s 92(4)(b) applications for removal - Removal Opponent’s evidence shows use of the Trade Marks for a subset of the services sought to be removed – no obstacle to use – exercise of Registrar’s discretion not appropriate – Trade Marks to be removed from the Register for a subset of the services sought to be removed
Background
This decision is pursuant to applications made on 22 January 2024 under s 92(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) by Australian Bar & Beverage Group Pty. Ltd (‘Applicant’) to remove the 7 trade marks detailed in Annexure A (‘Trade Marks’) from the Register of Trade Marks (‘Register’). Annexure A also contains the details of whether the applications for removal are in respect of some or all of the goods or services for which the particular Trade Marks are registered.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, any references to sections or regulations in this decision are references to sections or regulations of the Act or the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’), respectively.
3. Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC (‘Opponent’) has opposed the applications to remove the Trade Marks, filing Notices of Intention to Oppose removal on 22 March 2024 and Statements of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 22 April 2024. The Applicant filed Notices of Intention to Defend on 21 May 2024.
The parties filed the following evidence (in respect of all Trade Marks) in this matter:
Declarant and Position
Date
Annexures or Exhibits
Evidence in support (‘EIS’)
Kristen Fancher, Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel of the Opponent (‘Fancher 1’)
20 August 2024
A to X
Evidence in answer (‘EIA')
Benjamin Neumann, Managing Director of the Applicant (‘Neumann declaration’)
28 November 2024
A to E
Evidence in reply (‘EIR’)
Kristen Fancher (‘Fancher 2’)
31 January 2025
A1 to D1
5. Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended, the parties were given an opportunity to request an oral hearing or a hearing by written submissions. On 19 February 2025 the Opponent requested a hearing by video-conference. The matter was set down for a hearing on 12 August 2025 and the matter was allocated to me. In line with usual practice, a letter was sent to the parties on 24 June 2025 which contained a schedule for the provision of written summaries of submissions to be filed prior to the hearing. The Opponent filed written submissions on 29 July 2025 (‘Opponent’s Submissions’). The Applicant filed written submissions on 5 August 2025 (‘Applicant’s Submissions’). At the hearing Megan Evetts of Counsel represented the Opponent instructed by Francesca Colubriale and Lan Pham of Spruson & Ferguson and Shauna Ross of Counsel represented the Applicant instructed by Joshua Gladwin of Gladwin Legal Pty Ltd
6. I am a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks and the matter has been allocated to me to decide, which I have done, on the basis of the following relevant material, any oral submissions made by the parties and the evidence listed earlier in this decision:
·The Applications for Removal;
·The Notices of Intention to Oppose and SGP;
·The Opponent’s Submissions; and
·The Applicant’s Submissions.
The Relevant Provisions
7. Part 9 of the Act deals with removal of trade marks from the Register on account of non-use. In respect of this matter s 92 relevantly provides:
92 Application for removal of trade mark from Register etc.
(4)An application under subsection (1) or (3) (non‑use application) may be made on either or both of the following grounds, and on no other grounds:
(a) …
(b)that the trade mark has remained registered for a continuous period of 3 years ending one month before the day on which the non‑use application is filed, and, at no time during that period, the person who was then the registered owner:
(i)used the trade mark in Australia; or
(ii)used the trade mark in good faith in Australia;
in relation to the goods and/or services to which the application relates.
Note 1:For file and month see section 6.
Note 2:If non‑use of a trade mark has been established in a particular place or export market, then instead of the trade mark being removed from the Register, conditions or limitations may be imposed under section 102 on the registration of the trade mark so that its registration does not extend to that place or export market.
8. Under s 92(4)(b) the relevant period during which the Opponent must establish use of the Trade Mark is the three year period ending on 22 December 2023 (‘relevant period’).
9. I note that an application under s 92(4)(b) may not be made before a period of either 5 or (in the case of marks filed after 24 February 2019), 3 years has passed from the filing date of the application for the relevant trade marks,[1] and I confirm that the relevant requirement has been satisfied for each of the removal applications.
[1] Per s 93(2) prior to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity Commission Response Part 1 and Other Measures) Act 2018 (Cth) sch 1 pt 3 as applies in the present matter. The updated s 93(2) applies to trade marks filed from 24 February 2019 onwards.
10. The onus of rebutting an allegation of non-use lies with the Opponent. This onus is articulated in s 100 which provides, relevantly to this matter:
100 Burden on opponent to establish use of trade mark etc.
(1) In any proceedings relating to an opposed application, it is for the opponent to rebut:
(a) …
(b) …
(c) any allegation made under paragraph 92(4)(b) that the trade mark has not, at any time during the period of 3 years ending one month before the day on which the opposed application was filed, been used, or been used in good faith, by its registered owner in relation to the relevant goods and/or services.
[…]
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 1(c), the opponent is taken to have rebutted the allegation that the trade mark has not, at any time during the period referred to in that paragraph, been used, or been used in good faith, by its registered owner in relation to the relevant goods and/or services if:
(a) the opponent has established that the trade mark, or the trade mark with additions or alterations not substantially affecting its identity, was used in good faith by its registered owner in relation to those goods or services during that period; or
(b) in a case where the trade mark has been assigned but a record of the assignment has not been entered in the Register:(i) the opponent has established that the trade mark, or the trade mark with additions or alterations not substantially affecting its identity, was used in good faith by the assignee of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services during that period and that that use was in accordance with the terms of the assignment; and
(ii) the Registrar or the court is of the opinion that it is reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to treat the use of the trade mark by the assignee during that period as having been a use of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services by the registered owner; or(c) the opponent has established that the trade mark was not used by its registered owner in relation to those goods and/or services during that period because of circumstances (whether affecting traders generally or only the registered owner of the trade mark) that were an obstacle to the use of the trade mark during that period.
11. I proceed on the basis that the standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard being on the balance of probabilities.[2] In Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks, Branson J observed:
[2] Pfizer Products Inc. v Karam [2006] FCA 1663, [26] (Gyles J) and more recently: Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelman JJ) in respect of oppositions under s 52.
Where the Act requires the Registrar to be “satisfied” of any matter, it is to be understood as requiring that he or she be persuaded of the matter according to the balance of probabilities (Rejfeck v McElroy). That is, that the Registrar be persuaded, having given proper consideration to those factors and circumstances that the Act requires him or her to give consideration to, that such matter is more probable than not.[3]
[3] [1998] FCA 440 (citation omitted).
12. In accordance with s 101, I may decide to remove a trade mark the subject of the application from the Register for all or some of the goods and/or identified in the application for removal, or if satisfied it is reasonable to do so, decide not to remove that trade mark even if the grounds under which the application for removal was made are established.
13. I further note that a single bona fide use of a trade mark the subject of the application in the course of trade during the relevant period may be sufficient to rebut the allegation under s 92(4)(b),[4] but if a single act of use is relied upon then it should be established by ‘if not conclusive proof, at any rate overwhelmingly convincing proof’.[5] Little weight is to be given to assertions of use which are not supported by documentary evidence.[6] Undated examples of use carry little, if any, weight in support of a claim for use of a trade mark within the relevant period.[7] Use of a trade mark the subject of the application by an authorised user (as defined by s 8) is taken to be use of that trade mark by the Opponent.[8]
[4] Woolly Bull Enterprises Pty Ltd v Reynolds [2001] FCA 261, [17] (Drummond J).
[5] Nodoz Trade Mark (1962) RPC 1, 7 (Wilberforce J).
[6] Great White Shark Enterprises Inc v Joose Apparel Pty Ltd [1998] ATMO 8 (Hearing Officer Forno). See also Ion Asset Management Ltd v Ion Trading UK Limited [2015] ATMO 124, [21] (Hearing Officer Wilson).
[7] Digitus Information Systems Pty Ltd v Leap Software Developments Pty Ltd [2018] ATMO 153, [16] (Hearing Officer Wilson). See also Simon Burke v Factor Holdings Ltd [2019] ATMO 69, [24] (Hearing Officer Brown).
[8] Act s 7(3).
14. The principles when a trade mark has been used were recently summarised in Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd, in which the High Court noted the following:
Use of a trade mark in relation to goods means use of a trade mark upon, or in physical or other relation to, those goods, and so can include use of the mark on product packaging or marketing such as on a website. There is a distinction, although not always easy to apply, between the use of a sign in relation to goods and the use of a sign as a trade mark. A trade mark is a sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods dealt with by one trader from goods dealt with by other traders; that is, as a badge of origin to indicate a connection between the goods and the user of the mark.
Whether a sign has been "use[d] as a trade mark" is assessed objectively without reference to the subjective trading intentions of the user. As the meaning of a sign, such as a word, varies with the context in which the sign is used, the objective purpose and nature of use are assessed by reference to context. That context includes the relevant trade, the way in which the words have been displayed, and how the words would present themselves to persons who read them and form a view about what they connote. A well known example where the use was not "as a trade mark" was in Irving's Yeast-Vite Ltd v Horsenail, where the phrase "Yeast tablets a substitute for 'Yeast-Vite'" was held to be merely descriptive and not a use of "Yeast-Vite" as a trade mark. Therefore, it did not contravene the YEAST-VITE mark.
The existence of a descriptive element or purpose does not necessarily preclude the sign being used as a trade mark. Where there are several purposes for the use of the sign, if one purpose is to distinguish the goods provided in the course of trade that will be sufficient to establish use as a trade mark. Where there are several words or signs used in combination, the existence of a clear dominant "brand" is relevant to the assessment of what would be taken to be the effect of the balance of the label, but does not mean another part of the label cannot also act to distinguish the goods.[9]
[9] Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd [2023] HCA 8, [23]-[25] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ) (citations omitted).
15. A further useful summary of the principles of use is set out in paragraphs 82 to 84 of the Full Court’s decision in Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v Flujo Sanguineo Holdings Pty Ltd that I extract below:
The primary judge referred to the summary of the relevant principles concerning use “as a trade mark” in Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd v Nestlé Australia Ltd [2010] FCAFC 117; (2010) 87 IPR 464 (Stone, Gordon and McKerracher JJ) which was a case in which the words “luscious Lips” were used on packaged confectionary which included lip shaped lollies. The Full Court summarised the relevant principles as follows at [19]:
- Use as a trade mark is use of the mark as a “badge of origin”, a sign used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else: Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107; 47 IPR 481; [1999] FCA 1721 at [19] (Coca-Cola); E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 265 ALR 645; 86 IPR 224; [2010] HCA 15 at [43] (Lion Nathan).
- A mark may contain descriptive elements but still be a “badge of origin”: Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 310; (1991) 30 FCR 326 at 347–8; [1991] FCA 310; 101 ALR 700 at 723; [1991] FCA 310; 21 IPR 1 at 24 (Johnson & Johnson); Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 192; 33 IPR 161; Aldi Stores Ltd Partnership v Frito-Lay Trading Co GmbH (2001) 190 ALR 185; 54 IPR 344; [2001] FCA 1874 at [60] (Aldi Stores).
- The appropriate question to ask is whether the impugned words would appear to consumers as possessing the character of the brand: Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd [1963] HCA 66; (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 422; [1963] ALR 634 at 636; [1963] HCA 66; 1B IPR 523 at 532 (Shell Co).
- The purpose and nature of the impugned use is the relevant inquiry in answering the question whether the use complained of is use “as a trade mark”: Johnson & Johnson at FCR 347; ALR 723; IPR 24 per Gummow J; Shell Co at CLR 422; ALR 636; IPR 532.
- Consideration of the totality of the packaging, including the way in which the words are displayed in relation to the goods and the existence of a label of a clear and dominant brand, are relevant in determining the purpose and nature (or “context”) of the impugned words: Johnson & Johnson at FCR 347; ALR 723; IPR 24; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar (2002) 56 IPR 182; [2002] FCA 390 (Anheuser-Busch).
- In determining the nature and purpose of the impugned words, the court must ask what a person looking at the label would see and take from it: Anheuser-Busch at [186] and the authorities there cited.
The fact that a mark considered as a whole is largely or predominantly descriptive does not preclude a finding that it is also acting as a brand. Similarly, the fact that a product may bear more than one brand does not mean that only one of them is used as a trade mark. As the High Court said in Allergan at [25]:
...Where there are several words or signs used in combination, the existence of a clear dominant “brand” is relevant to the assessment of what would be taken to be the effect of the balance of the label, but does not mean another part of the label cannot also act to distinguish the goods [Anheuser-Busch [2002] FCA 390; (2002) 56 IPR 182 at 228 [191]].
In Anheuser-Busch, Allsop J observed at [191]:
It is not to the point, with respect, to say that because another part of the label ... is the obvious and important “brand”, that another part of the label cannot act to distinguish the goods. The “branding function”, if that expression is merely used as a synonym for the contents of ss 7 and 17 of the TM Act, can be carried out in different places on packaging, with different degrees of strength and subtlety. Of course, the existence on a label of a clear dominant “brand” is of relevance to the assessment of what would be taken to be the effect of the balance of the label.[10]
Discussion
[10] Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v Flujo Sanguineo Holdings Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 175, [82]-[84] (Nicholas, Burley and Cheeseman JJ).
To successfully oppose each application before me the Opponent must establish that it has used the relevant Trade Marks (or a substantially identical trade mark[11]) pursuant to s 100 (either through use or that there were circumstances that were an obstacle to use in the relevant period (per s 100(3)(c)).
[11] Act s 100(3)(a) and discussed in AgCare Biotech Pty Ltd v Crop Smart Pty Ltd [2009] ATMO 41, [10]-[21] (Hearing Officer Kirov).
If the Opponent fails to establish such use or an obstacle to use, I have discretion under s 101(3) to decide that that particular Trade Mark(s) should not be removed from the Register.
Use of the Trade Marks in the relevant period
The Opponent’s evidence in this matter consists of two declarations by its Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel, Kristen Fancher. Fancher 1 provides background material about the Opponent and the history of the Margaritaville brand, arising from the 1977 song by American singer-songwriter Jimmy Buffet, who later founded the Opponent. Fancher 1 states that the popularity of the song ‘Margaritaville’ has inspired a number of commercial ventures and product licensing arrangements engaged in by or through the Opponent, including a casual dining restaurant chain known as Jimmy Buffett’s Margaritaville and a number of hotel/resort ventures, including Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts, Compass by Margaritaville hotels, Margaritaville Casinos and Margaritaville Vacation Club. Due to the extensive promotion by the Opponent (including sponsorship and social media) and the enduring popularity of the song ‘Margaritaville’ the Trade Marks continue to maintain a global reputation. Fancher 1 gives evidence that there are over 150 restaurants offering services under one or more of the Trade Marks and hotels in more than 30 destinations offering services under one or more of the Trade Marks.
Fancher 1 provides the following examples of evidence of use of the Trade Marks:
·Websites accessible by Australians such as and (‘Opponent’s Websites’). As outlined in Confidential Annexures I and J the Opponent’s Websites receive a significant number of visitors from Australia. The Opponent offers various food and merchandise products for sale from those websites.
·Confidential Annexure L provides details of Australians who have made bookings to stay at the hotels and resorts offered under or by reference to the Trade Marks, with the number of Australian residents who have stayed at the hotels and resorts offered under or by reference to the Trade Marks being not insignificant. Australians can book both directly with the hotels and through third party websites such as booking.com and luxuryescapes.com.
·In 2012 a ‘Margaritaville’ branded restaurant opened in Darling Harbour, offering restaurant services and various goods under a subset of the Trade Marks. It is apparent from the evidence that the restaurant has now closed, but Fancher 1 omits to provide details of when the restaurant closed other than suggesting that it may have remained open in 2020 (by referring to a print out of an article in an online website from 2020 referring to the restaurant).
Fancher 2 primarily provides details of the licensing arrangements involving the Trade Marks and the degree of control exercised by the Opponent over the use of the Trade Marks. MARGARITAVILLE Hotels and Resorts are operated by franchisees and licensees of Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC, which is stated by the declarant to be an affiliate of the Opponent (the Opponent is the parent company of Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC and licenses the Trade Marks to Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC). Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC licenses the Trade Marks (other than the 2009564 and 2005533 marks) to the entities that operate the hotel and resort businesses and closely controls the use of those Trade Marks. The same process takes place for Compass Margaritaville L.L.C which is stated to be a wholly owned subsidiary of the Opponent that is responsible for controlling the use of the 2009564 and 2005533 marks.
Fancher 2 does not annex any company searches illustrating the relationship between the Opponent and Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC or Compass Margaritaville L.L.C. It does annex Whois reports for each of the domain names said to be owned by the Opponent, including and and states that these domain names have been consistently been owned by the Opponent (in the case of since 1995). It also annexes sample franchising/licensing agreements between, on one hand, Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC or Compass Margaritaville L.L.C. and, on the other hand, the licensees/franchisees that operate the hotels under the Trade Marks. While noting that exact terms of the agreements are confidential what is apparent is that each of these documents outlines:
·the relationship between the Opponent and Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC or Compass Margaritaville L.L.C., confirming the statement by the declarant in Fancher 2 that the Opponent is the parent company of each of these entities;
·the fees payable by the licensee/franchisee for the various services, including the right to use the intellectual property (including Trade Marks) licensed by Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC or Compass Margaritaville L.L.C.. These fees are not token fees, rather the fees are substantial;
·that the licensee/franchisee must participate in a quality assurance program, including the requirement to comply with various systems and standards in the operation of and promotion of their hotel;
·that the licensor/franchisor will provide a hotel website advertising the hotel on its central website, and absent prior approval, the licensee/franchisee must not develop, maintain or authorise any website or electronic medium that uses the Trade Marks without the consent of the licensor/franchisor. I note that the hotel websites through which this provision is satisfied are the Opponent’s Websites; and
·that the licensee/franchisee must participate in the licensor/franchisor’s loyalty program and provide various rewards for members who stay at the hotel to choose from.
The Applicant’s evidence consists of the Neumann declaration. The Neumann declaration gives evidence that the Applicant operates certain entertainment venues in Australia. It also notes that the Opponent does not operate any restaurants in Australia and suggests that the Opponent’s Darling Harbour restaurant and bar closed on or before 2016.
Relevant to the question of authorised use, the Neumann declaration attaches a copy of the Opponent’s privacy notice (‘Privacy Notice’) accessed from the website at as it was for at least some portion of the relevant period. The most relevant portion is reproduced below.
Margaritaville franchisees and licensees own and operate individual lodging properties such as hotels, resorts and residential communities, entertainment establishments and restaurants and may engage in certain business practices, such as operating and maintaining separate social media accounts and websites that use the “Margaritaville” name or other trademarks owned by Margaritaville (e.g., “Compass”, “Latitude”, “LandShark”), which are not controlled or managed by us. Margaritaville franchisees and licensees are independent third parties, not owned or controlled by Margaritaville, and this Privacy Notice does not apply to the information practices of any Margaritaville franchisee or licensee, including with respect to those websites that use the “Margaritaville” name or other trademarks owned by Margaritaville but that are controlled by a franchisee or licensee.”
Use of the Trade Marks in Australia
The Opponent concedes that there has been no use of the Trade Marks in the relevant period in Australia for restaurant and bar services. Noting that the Opponent has the burden of showing use, and has chosen not to provide the date of closure of the Darling Harbour restaurant in its evidence, I agree that there is no evidence of use of the Trade Marks in Australia in the relevant period for these services.
The Opponent did not operate any hotels in Australia during the relevant period, rather it submits that the fact that it operates hotels and resorts by reference to the Trade Marks outside Australia, bookable over the Internet, is use of the Trade Marks in Australia.
In Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v Sitmar Cruises Ltd.[12] (‘Sitmar’), Gummow J, in the Federal Court, found that although the actual services of carrying out cruises did not take place in Australia, ‘...crucial integers in the course of trade took place in Australia...’ and that the placing and acceptance of bookings amounted to use of the subject trade mark in Australia notwithstanding that the cruises took place entirely overseas.
[12] [1994] FCA 936
In Hilton Worldwide Inc v Waldorf Australia Group Pty Ltd[13] (‘Waldorf’), the Hearing Officer found that in the circumstances, the booking of rooms in New York Waldorf Hotels by Australian consumers and travel agents was sufficient to support use of Waldorf trade marks in Australia. For completeness I note that, in respect of restaurant services in Major Intellectual LLC[14], the Hearing Officer found that the availability of online booking for a New York restaurant did not constitute use of the restaurant’s trade mark (CARBONE) in Australia, on the basis that such use was not specifically targeted at Australian consumers. The Hearing Officer contrasted Sitmar and Waldorf on the basis that the crucial integers in the trade of cruise and accommodation services were different to those of restaurant services provided in a foreign country.
[13] [2013] ATMO 20, (Hearing Officer Thompson)
[14] [2022] ATMO 87, (Hearing Officer Knowles)
The Applicant has made a number of submissions differentiating Sitmar and Waldorf from the case before me. The Applicant submits that the current case is very different from Sitmar, since the factual matrix in Stitmar involved ‘crucial integers’ taking place in Australia to a much greater extent than in the present case, which at its highest merely involves Australians booking online at the Opponent’s Websites. With respect to Waldorf it notes that the evidence before the hearing officer in that case is not apparent in the decision and that I must make a decision as to whether use has occurred in Australia on the basis of the evidence before me. The Applicant includes a number of criticisms of the Opponent’s evidence, noting that, for example Confidential Annexure L, being a document supposedly showing bookings from Australians at the Opponent’s hotels, contains large numbers of $0 bookings, individuals not from Australia and other gaps in evidence. The Applicant submits that proper evidence should include invoices, receipts, and statutory declarations from Australian consumers who have booked and stayed at the Opponent’s hotels.
I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s submissions on this point. I am satisfied by the factual evidence before me that, even noting the gaps and errors identified by the Applicant, a not insignificant number of Australians booked stays at hotels offered under the Trade Marks in the relevant period, noting the significant number of Australian residents listed in Annexure L to Fancher 1. I am also satisfied that at least some of those bookings took place through the Opponent’s Websites. The Applicant, in their oral submissions drew my attention to the fact that, at least on the first page of the website at there was not a facility for booking hotels and that some of the websites where the hotels were could be booked were operated by the entities operating the hotels. However, the Opponent, in its submissions, drew my attention to the fact that, for example, the booking page for the hotel in Times Square New York under the Trade Marks was located at which is owned by the Opponent.
Given my factual conclusions above, I am unpersuaded that there is any aspect of this case that would justify me departing from the conclusions reached in the Sitmar and Waldorf cases, noting that each case involved an accommodation provider (cruise or hotel) offering services outside Australia bookable (and booked by) Australians physically located in Australia at the time of booking. I am also unpersuaded by the Applicant’s submissions that because the Opponent’s Websites were not specifically targeted at Australians (i.e. pricing in US Dollars) that under the principles in Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone[15] there was no use in Australia. This ignores the fact that, notwithstanding the lack of AUD pricing, a significant number of Australians purchased hotel services through the Opponent’s Websites, thus evidencing use in Australia. The nature of the services (providing accommodation to travellers) also suggests that the Opponent, in creating the Opponent’s Websites, would have anticipated that at least a subset of its bookings would come from travellers outside the United States including Australia. I find that the use of the Trade Marks for the hotel services outside Australia in the relevant period (but accessed over the Internet and booked by Australians) is use of the Trade Marks in Australia in the relevant period.
[15] [2005] FCA 471, [43] (Merkel J)
Is the use of the Trade Marks use by the Opponent?
The final question is whether the use of the Trade Marks was use by the Opponent (either directly or authorised use by the third party hotel operators). Under s 8, authorised use requires use under the control of the trade mark owner. In the Full Federal Court decision of Lodestar Anstalt v Campari America LLC (‘Lodestar’),[16] Besanko J summarises the law:
63. Section 8(1) of the Act defines a person who is an authorised user of a trade mark and the key concept in the subsection is that the trade mark is used in relation to goods or services under the control of the owner of the trade mark. Section 8(2) makes it clear that an authorised use only applies to the extent that the trade mark is used under the control of the owner of the trade mark. By reason of s 7(3) an authorised use is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark. Subsections 8(3) and (4) provide for two cases where the use of a trade mark is taken to be use under the control of the owner of the trade mark: the owner of the trade mark exercises quality control over the relevant goods or services or the owner exercises financial control over the other person’s relevant trading activities. Section 8(5) makes it clear that the meaning of the expression under the control of is not limited to the two cases identified in s 8(3) and (4) of the Act.
[16] [2016] FCAFC 92 (Allsop CJ, Greenwood, Besanko, Nicholas and Katzmann JJ).
Justice Besanko later stated that:
98. [A]ctual control will be a question of fact and degree. A licence agreement may contain a term that sets in detail a quality standard to be achieved. The details in the agreement may be such that it is not necessary for the registered owner to give directions or instructions from time to time. The licensee, aware of its obligations, may faithfully comply with those obligations without any entreaties or demands from the licensor. The primary judge had such a situation in mind when he referred to cases where there was obedience to the trade mark owner “so instinctive and complete that instruction was not necessary”.
In that same case, Katzmann J commented on the construction of section 8 as follows:
169. Section 8 provides that whether a person is an authorised user of a registered mark and whether the use of the mark by that person is an authorised use depend on whether the person uses the mark under the control of the registered owner (subss (1) and (2)). Subsections (3)–(4) reveal that use will be taken to be use under the control of the owner where, for example, the owner “exercises quality control over goods or services ... dealt with or provided in the course of trade by another person ... and ... in relation to which the mark is used” or “exercises financial control over the other person’s relevant trading activities”. Subsection (5) states that subss (3)–(4) do not limit the meaning of the expression “under the control of” but this statement is ambiguous. It might signify that “control” is not limited to quality control or financial control. On the other hand, it might signify that control is not limited by the context provided by subs (3)–(4). The former construction is the preferable one. In my opinion, the examples given in subss (3) and (4) give colour to the concept of control in s 8. The language used in the two subsections strongly suggests that — regardless of the form control might take — it is the exercise of control that matters, not merely the right to do so.
…
183. In my opinion, under the 1995 Act the use of a registered trade mark by an authorised user will only be taken to be use by the registered proprietor of the mark if the registered proprietor exercises control over the use of the mark during the period in question so as to maintain a connection in the course of trade between the goods or services and the registered proprietor. In a case where a registered proprietor of a trade mark is relying on use by an authorised user, it is still necessary to demonstrate that the trade marks indicate a connection in the course of trade with the registered proprietor. The purpose of s 8 is to identify the means by which that is done. …
184. A bare licence to use a trade mark, particularly a perpetual licence, would not be sufficient. Without more, it would amount to a divestment of control. But there is no reason in principle why control might not be exercised through conditions imposed by agreement on the use to which the trade marks might be put and, in the event of an application to cancel the registration for non-use, proved by evidence that the authorised user is complying with those conditions. Whether or not that is sufficient in any particular case, however, will depend on the terms of the agreement, most importantly whether the control is such as to maintain the registered proprietor’s connection with the marks. As the Act makes clear, that can be achieved if either quality control or financial control is exercised. If it is not, the registered proprietor (upon whom the burden of proof rests), must show that it has exercised some other form of control in the relevant period which maintains its connection with the marks.
34. In Trident Seafoods Corporation v Trident Foods Pty Ltd (‘Trident’),[17] the Full Federal Court noted that as a matter of practicality, control could be found in circumstances where the two companies shared the same directors:
[17] [2019] FCAFC 100 (Reeves, Jagot and Rangiah JJ).
The issue is not whether one company controlled the other but rather whether Trident Foods, even though a wholly owned subsidiary of Manassen, had control over Manassen’s use of the trade marks. In that sense it is significant that at all relevant times the two companies had the same directors. It must be inferred from the evidence that the two companies operated with a unity of purpose. Trident Foods held the trade marks. Manassen sold the products under the TRIDENT brand and thereby used the trade marks. In the primary judge’s view these arrangements showed nothing more than that Trident Foods acquiesced in Manassen’s use of the marks: PJ [179(4)] and [217]. In the present case, where there were common directors, the concept of mere acquiescence by the one company to the use by the other company (albeit that Manassen is the parent company) appears alien. As directors of Trident Foods, the directors had obligations to ensure the maintenance of the value in the marks. To that end Trident Foods necessarily controlled Manassen’s use of the marks by reason of the simple fact that it owned the marks and its directors, who were also Manassen’s directors, must have had one common purpose, being to maximise sales and to enhance the value of the brand.… it is commercially unrealistic in the circumstances of the present case not to infer that the owner of the marks controlled the use of the marks because the common directors necessarily wished to ensure the maintenance and enhancement of the value of the brand.[18]
[18] Ibid [45].
The onus under s 100 is for the Opponent to show evidence of use or authorised use of the Trade Mark by the owner of the mark in the relevant period.
The Applicant submits that the evidence of the Opponent is fundamentally incomplete in that the EIR indicates that:
·the Trade Marks were licensed and controlled by Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC or Compass Margaritaville LLC (not the Opponent);
·there is no documentary evidence, only assertion, that Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC and Compass Margaritaville LLC are wholly owned subsidiaries of the Opponent;
·the licence/franchise agreements provided in the EIR postdate the relevant period and even then do not provide evidence of actual control. There was no evidence of monitoring or actions taken by Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC and Compass Margaritaville LLC to confirm that the control provisions in the agreements are being complied with;
·the Privacy Notice clearly states that the hotels operated under the Trade Marks are ‘not controlled or managed by us. Margaritaville franchisees and licensees are independent third parties, not owned or controlled by Margaritaville.’; and
·there is no evidence of ownership and control of the various websites used to promote the hotels under the Trade Marks.
The Opponent submits that:
·This is not a case comparable to Lodestar, which involved a bare $1 licence with no actual control that was created in the context of the settlement of a trade mark dispute. The Opponent/Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC/Compass Margaritaville LLC operates a significant hotel chain at scale, with hotels in over 30 locations under the Trade Marks. The Opponent’s franchise/licensing agreements involve the franchisee/licensee paying significant revenue to Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC or Compass Margaritaville LLC, which would not be the case in the absence of significant efforts to maintain the branding and standards associated with properties offering services under the Trade Marks. Furthermore evidence of control can be seen by the fact that each of the hotel properties participate in the chain’s rewards program, as required under the agreements; and that their website use is closely controlled; all hotel websites are either operated centrally by the Opponent, or, when operated by the hotel operator, demonstrate consistent usage and control from the central website.
·While the Opponent does not provide documentary evidence being company search reports indicating that Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC and Compass Margaritaville LLC are wholly owned subsidiaries of the Opponent, this is clearly stated in the EIR and the status of the respective entities is restated multiple times in the various legal documents; including the franchise/licensing agreements, provided by the Opponent.
·Limited weight should be placed on the Privacy Notice, which is taken out of context by the Applicant, rather regard should be had to the actual franchise agreements and operation of the business which provides clear indicia of control.
While noting the gaps identified by the Applicant in the Opponent’s evidence[19], I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the use of the Trade Marks was by the Opponent, either directly through operation of the Opponent’s Websites (through which bookings were made), or as a result of the use by the various franchisees authorised (indirectly) by the Opponent. I am satisfied that Australians have made bookings for at least some of the hotel properties operated under the Trade Marks through the website operated by the Opponent at I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities, taking the Opponent’s evidence as a whole, that use of the Trade Marks by the Opponent’s franchisees/licensees was authorised by the Opponent. Firstly, I am satisfied by the statements in the EIR, as well as the numerous references in corporate documents such as the licence agreements that the franchisors/licensors are wholly owned subsidiaries of the Opponent and thus control can be found under the principles set out in Trident.
[19] In particular while the evidence of the franchising agreements and Whois statements postdated the relevant period, these documents are supported by sworn evidence that the domain names were held by the Opponent during the relevant period and the franchising agreements are similar to the agreements in place during the relevant period; I accept these statements noting that it is implausible that the Opponent created and instituted 380 page franchise agreements in the period between the conclusion of the relevant period and the date of Facher 2.
Secondly, regarding the relationship between the franchisors/licensors and franchisees/licensees, I find that Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC/Compass Margaritaville LLC exercised practical control over their use of the Trade Marks. Considering the Opponent’s evidence of its operation of a hotel chain as a whole, including the 380 page franchise/licensing agreements, it would be simply implausible to conclude that Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC/Compass Margaritaville LLC, the longstanding operators of a large hotel chain that hotel operators are prepared to pay large sums to partner with and use the Trade Marks, takes no steps to ensure that any of the detailed requirements surrounding the offering of hotel services under the Trade Marks by the franchisees/licensees are complied with. Furthermore, the license/franchise agreements provide that Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC/Compass Margaritaville LLC control the licensors/franchisors’ online use of the Trade Marks. The evidence indicates that Margaritaville Hotels & Resorts LLC/Compass Margaritaville LLC control and operate the central booking websites (the Opponent’s Websites) and operates at least some of the official websites for each of the hotels (as prescribed in the license/franchise agreements). In addition, each of the licensors/franchisors participates in the Opponent’s Perks (loyalty/rewards) program (again as prescribed in the licence/franchise agreements) illustrating compliance with the terms of the license/franchise agreements in the offering of hotel services under the Trade Marks.
Finally, I note the Applicant’s submissions regarding the effect of the Privacy Notice. While the Privacy Notice is undoubtedly poorly drafted, I cannot put more weight on a privacy notice than the significant evidence that the Opponent operates a detailed franchise system with ongoing controls on the Trade Marks.
Accordingly I am satisfied that the Opponent has used the Trade Marks in Australia in respect of hotels and similar services being services that involve the provision of short-stay accommodation, such as ‘resort hotels; providing temporary accommodation at cottages; providing temporary housing accommodations’ (‘Used Services’) in the relevant period. I am not satisfied that the Opponent has used the Trade Marks for the services sought to be removed other than the Used Services (‘Remaining Services’) during the relevant period.
Obstacles to use
41. The Opponent does not in its particulars formally submit that there have been any matters that amount to an obstacle to the use of the Trade Marks for the Remaining Services in the relevant period, pursuant to s 100(3)(c) and in the interests of completeness I note that I have been unable to identify any such obstacles. As there is no obstacle to use of the Trade Marks, it is therefore necessary to consider whether I should exercise the discretion to allow the Trade Marks to remain on the Register for any of the Remaining Services.
Registrar’s Discretion
42. As noted in Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off ,the policy of the Act is to facilitate the removal of an unused trade mark, and the public interest in the integrity of the Register will generally demand the removal of an unused trade mark.[20] In PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd, the Full Court of the Federal Court provided the following observations regarding the discretion under s 101(3):
[20] M Davison, I Horak Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off online edition, 2022 Thomson Reuters, [70.2505].
The following propositions are relevant to the exercise of this discretion:
(1) It is broad and is unfettered in the sense that there are no express limits on it. It is to be understood as limited only by the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the legislation and, in particular, by the subject-matter scope and purpose of Part 9 of the Trade Marks Act.
(2) The scope and purpose of the Trade Marks Act strikes a balance between various disparate interests. On the one hand there is the interest of consumers in recognising a trade mark as a badge of origin of goods or services and in avoiding deception or confusion as to that origin. On the other is the interest of traders, both in protecting their goodwill through the creation of a statutory species of property protected by the action against infringement, and in turning the property to valuable account by licensing or assignment. …
(3) The particular purpose of Part 9, within which s 101 falls, is to provide for the removal of unused trade marks from the Register. It is designed to protect the integrity of the Register and in that way the interests of consumers. At the same time, it seeks to accommodate, where reasonable to do so, the interests of registered trade mark owners. Accordingly, the Court must be positively satisfied that it is reasonable that the trade mark should not be removed. The onus in this respect lies on the trade mark owner to persuade the Court that it is reasonable to exercise the discretion in favour of the owner. …
(4) The discretion in s 101(3) is expressed in the present tense. It requires consideration of whether, at the time that the Court is called upon to make its decision, it is reasonable not to remove the mark.
(5) The range of factors considered in the exercise of the discretion has included whether or not:
(a) there has been abandonment of the mark;
(b) the registered proprietor of the mark still has a residual reputation in the mark;
(c) there have been sales by the registered owner of the mark of the goods for which removal was sought since the relevant period ended;
(d) the applicant for removal had entered the market in knowledge of the registered mark;
(e) the registered proprietors were aware of the applicant’s sales under the mark;
(f) A further factor, explicitly noted in s 101(4), but which falls within the scope of the discretion in s 101(3), is whether or not the trade mark under consideration has been used by its registered owner in respect of similar goods or closely related services.[21]
[21] [2021] FCAFC 128, [153] (Jagot, Nicholas and Burley JJ) (emphasis altered) (citations omitted).
In Health World Ltd v Shin-Sun Australia Pty Ltd, on the subject of the condition of the Register, the Court said:
[T]he legislative scheme reveals a concern with the condition of the Register of Trade Marks. It is a concern that it have “integrity” and that it be “pure”. It is a “public mischief” if the Register is not pure, for there is “public interest in [its] purity”. The concern and the public interest, viewed from the angle of consumers, is to ensure that the Register is maintained as an accurate record of marks which perform their statutory function – to indicate the trade origins of the goods to which it is intended that they be applied.[22]
[22] [2010] HCA 13, [22] (French CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ) (citations omitted).
44. While considering the discretion in E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited Flick J stated:
Although the ‘guiding principle behind the discretion is public interest, particularly in the integrity of the register’,[23] the private commercial interests of both [parties] remain matters which may be taken into account when exercising the discretion. Trade mark law, it has been recognised, is more complex than is suggested by the proposition that the supreme—or at least—a predominant interest is the maintenance of the integrity of the Register.[24] Speaking of the 1955 Act, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ there pointed out the balance struck by the legislation between various interests. Both the interests of the consuming public and the interests of traders have to be recognised.[25]
[23] Kowa Co Ltd v Organon [2005] FCA 1282, [92] (Lander J).
[24] Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd [2000] HCA 12, [40].
[25] E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2008] FCA 934, [210] (emphasis in original).
45. In the present case I reach the following conclusions:
· There is no residual reputation held in the Opponent’s Trade Marks in the Remaining Services in Australia, arising from the single, unsuccessful business venture. In particular I am unimpressed by the Opponent’s decision not to provide a date of closure of its Darling Harbour restaurant, and instead rely, at paragraph 84 of its submissions, on what is clearly an out-of-date reference to a closed restaurant on a website with no particular reputation.
· While accepting that there are a significant number of restaurants operated under the Opponent’s Trade Marks, the Opponent’s evidence of sales, advertising and third-party recognition for the Remaining Services is limited.
· There is no evidence that the Opponent seeks to use the Opponent’s Trade Marks in Australia for the Remaining Services.
46. The Opponent submits that one basis on which I should exercise the discretion not to remove the Trade Marks in respect of the Remaining Services on the basis of s 101(4) of the Act, namely that the Trade Marks have been used in respect of similar services, being the Used Services, and closely related goods, being the foodstuffs and beverages offered by the Opponent online. The Opponent submits that as a result of this use, by reason of the removal of the Trade Marks in respect of the Remaining Services, confusion will occur among the public.
47. In the present case, while I do accept that hotel providers often offer restaurant services and alcoholic beverages and bar services, this is not by itself determinative of whether or not I should exercise the discretion. Section 101(4) only identifies the use of the Trade Marks on similar services/closely related goods as a factor that I may take into account in the exercise of the discretion.
48. I am unpersuaded that the Opponent has any reputation in the closely related services, noting the lack of evidence of sales figures. The Opponent may have a reputation in the Used Services, but noting that the Opponent has never operated hotels in Australia, and is only based in 30 locations, mostly American and Caribbean, its reputation in Australia is modest. There is a public interest in the integrity of the Register, and I do not consider the public interest in this case is served by allowing a mark to remain registered for a wider variety of services than used or intended to be used by the Opponent. If I were to remove the Remaining Services the Opponent would still retain the protection of the Trade Marks for the Used Services (as well as the services for which removal is not sought) and (both in respect of any opposition or infringement matters) any similar goods/services or closely related services/goods. As such I do not consider that the private commercial interest of the Opponent would be significantly impacted by the removal of the Trade Mark for the Used Services. Nor would there be a significant risk of consumer confusion; the scope of the protection granted to the Opponent under the revised specification would (absent any defences) prevent the use of deceptively similar marks for Used Services and any similar goods or closely related services; it is not necessary for the protection of the public to retain the registration of the Trade Marks for a wider range of services then it has actually been used for.
49. Finally, while I accept that Jimmy Buffett and his music is well-known, I am unpersuaded that this, along with the other evidence before me, provides a clear basis to exercise the discretion to preserve the registration of the Trade Marks for the Remaining Services. To the extent that a third party seeks to improperly associate its goods and services with Mr Buffett, as would be the case with any well-known individual, there other remedies available outside trade mark law that do not require the maintenance of registration of a set of Trade Marks for services that the Opponent does not use in Australia and, based on the evidence before me, has no plans to use in Australia. Given the importance of the integrity of the Register I do not consider it appropriate to exercise my discretion not to remove the Trade Mark in respect of any of the Remaining Services.
Decision
50. The Opponent has not established its opposition to removal of Trade Mark 1464686. Accordingly, I direct that registration 1464686 be removed from the Register one month from the date of this decision.
51. The Opponent has established its opposition to removal of Trade Marks 1231299, 2005533 and 2009564. Accordingly I decline to remove Trade Mark registration Nos. 1231299, 2005533 and 2009564 from the Register.
52. The Opponent has partly established its opposition to the remaining removal applications. Accordingly, I direct that registration 735775 be removed from the Register in respect of all the Remaining Services one month from the date of the Decision. It will remain registered for the goods and services listed below.
Class 25: Clothing, footwear and headgear
Class 35: Mail order services in the field of clothing, gifts and souvenirs
Class 38: Radio broadcasting and programming
Class 41: Fan club services available on the Internet
53. I direct that registration 1464685 be removed from the Register in respect of all the Remaining Services one month from the date of the Decision. It will remain registered for the services listed below.
Class 35: Retail store services
Class 35: Mail order services in the field of clothing, gifts and souvenirs
Class 38: Radio broadcasting and programming
Class 41: Fan club services available on the Internet
54. I direct that registration 1871341be removed from the Register in respect of all the Remaining Services one month from the date of the Decision. It will remain registered for the services listed below.
Class 36: Real estate and vacation property management; real estate leasing; vacation real estate time share services.
Class 43: resort hotels; hotels; providing temporary accommodation at cottages; providing temporary housing accommodations.
55. If the Registrar is served with a notice of appeal I direct that removal shall not occur until the appeal has either been discontinued or, in the event of a decision from the Court, that the registrations be dealt with as the Court sees fit.
Costs
56. Neither party has been entirely successful in respect of the application for removal of the Trade Marks. As such I make no order as to costs.
Nicholas Smith
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
16 September 2025
Annexure A
(‘Trade Marks’)
Registration No.
735775
Lodgement date
30 May 1997
Goods and Services
Class 25: Clothing, footwear and headgear
Class 35: Mail order services in the field of clothing, gifts and souvenirs
Class 38: Radio broadcasting and programming
Class 41: Fan club services available on the Internet
Class 42: Restaurant services in class 42
Services sought to be removed
Class 42: Restaurant services in class 42
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
MARGARITAVILLE
(‘735775 Mark’)
Registration No.
1231299
Lodgement date
20 March 2008
Services
Class 43: Hotels; resort hotels; providing temporary housing accommodation services at hotels; providing temporary housing accommodation services at resorts, villas and condominiums
Services sought to be removed
Class 43: Hotels; resort hotels; providing temporary housing accommodation services at hotels; providing temporary housing accommodation services at resorts, villas and condominiums
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
MARGARITAVILLE
(‘1231299 Mark’)
Registration No.
1464685
Lodgement date
9 December 2011
Services
Class 35: Retail store services
Class 43: Restaurant, bar and cafe services
Services sought to be removed
Class 43: Restaurant, bar and cafe services
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
JIMMY BUFFETT’S MARGARITAVILLE
(‘1464685 Mark’)
Registration No.
1464686
Lodgement date
9 December 2011
Services
Class 43: Bar and cafe services
Services sought to be removed
Class 43: Bar and cafe services
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
MARGARITAVILLE
(‘1464686 Mark’)
Registration No.
1871341 (IR 1363922)
Lodgement date
19 July 2017
Services
Class 36: Real estate and vacation property management; real estate leasing; vacation real estate time share services.
Class 43: Bar services; restaurant services; resort hotels; hotels; providing temporary accommodation at cottages; providing temporary housing accommodations.
Services sought to be removed
Class 43: Bar services; restaurant services; resort hotels; hotels; providing temporary accommodation at cottages; providing temporary housing accommodations.
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
MARGARITAVILLE
(‘1871341 Mark’)
Registration No.
2005533 (IR 1463083)
Lodgement date
21 March 2019
Services
Class 43: Hotels
Services sought to be removed
Class 43: Hotels
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
COMPASS BY MARGARITAVILLE HOTELS & RESORTS
(‘2005533 Mark’)
Registration No.
2009564
Lodgement date
21 March 2019
Services
Class 43: Hotels
Services sought to be removed
Class 43: Hotels
Owner
Margaritaville Enterprises, LLC
Trade Mark
(‘2009564 Mark’)
0
18
0