Opposition by JULIÀ GRUP FURNITURE SOLUTIONS, S.L. to registration of trade mark application 2396534 (20) –
[2025] ATMO 183
•9 September 2025
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by JULIÀ GRUP FURNITURE SOLUTIONS, S.L. to registration of trade mark application 2396534 (20) – KAVENO – in the name Jiaming Huang
Delegate:
Nicholas Smith
Representation:
Opponent: Legalvision ILP Pty Ltd
Applicant: Self-represented
Decision:
2025 ATMO 183
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - section 52 opposition: ss 42(b), 44, 60 and 62A considered – none established – trade mark to proceed to registration
Background
This decision concerns an opposition brought by JULIÀ GRUP FURNITURE SOLUTIONS, S.L. (‘Opponent’) to the registration of the trade mark which is the subject of the application detailed below in the name of Jiaming Huang (‘Applicant’):
Application Number:
2396534
Filing Date[1]:
15 October 2023
Goods:
Class 20: Couch step stools; High stools (furniture); Kick stool, non-metallic; Kneeling stools; Mobile stools (furniture); Step stools (furniture); Step stools made of plastics; Step stools made of wood; Step stools, not of metal; Stools; Stools incorporating height adjustable seats; Stools incorporating steps; Swivel stools; Work stools; Babies' bouncing chairs; Standing desks; Babies' chairs; Bed chairs; Chairs (seats); Chairs being furniture; Chairs being office furniture; Chairs for babies; Chairs for children; Chairs for computer workstations; Chairs for draughtsmen; Chairs for industrial use; Chairs for offices; Chairs on skid frames; Chairs with castor wheels; Conference chairs; Contour chairs; Convertible chairs; Deck chairs; Drafting chairs; Drawing chairs; Easy chairs; Ergonomic chairs for seated massage; Folding chairs; Hairdressers' chairs; High chairs; High chairs for babies; Low armless fireside chairs; Massage chairs; Office chairs; Pedestal chairs; Preformed cushions for easy-chairs; Recliners (chairs); Reclining chairs; Rocking chairs; Shower chairs; Swivel chairs; Table and chair sets; Work chairs; Book stands (furniture); Computer stands; Ottomans; Foam mattresses; Inner sprung mattresses; Latex mattresses; Mattress bases; Mattresses; Mattresses (sleeping pads of foam plastic for camping); Spring mattresses; Bench tables; Changing tables for babies; Coffee tables; Computer tables; Dressing tables; Kitchen tables; Massage tables; Sideboard tables; Tables; Work tables; Basin cabinets; Bathroom cabinets; Bedside cabinets; Cabinets; Cabinets in the nature of furniture; Disc cabinets (furniture; Display cabinets; Furniture cabinets; Stationery cabinets (furniture); Storage cabinets (furniture); Bedside lockers; Clothes lockers; Lockers; Wardrobe lockers; Sofa beds; Bed bases; Bed mattresses; Bedding (except linen); Bedroom furniture; Beds; Bunk beds; Children's beds; Fitted bedroom furniture; Folding beds; Headboards for beds; Massage beds; Portable beds; Transportable beds; Armchairs
(‘Applicant’s Goods’)
Trade Mark:
KAVENO
(‘Trade Mark’)
[1] Also known in this decision as the ‘relevant date’.
Unless otherwise indicated, any references to sections or regulations in this decision are references to sections or regulations of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’), respectively.
Following the advertisement of the application’s acceptance for possible registration, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose the registration followed by a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 22 May 2024. The SGP raised grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44[2], 59 and 60. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 7 June 2024.
[2] As the Opponent relied on protected international trade mark applications as the basis of this ground of opposition, the technical ground of opposition is under reg 4.15A of the Regulations rather than s 44. However, as the terms are substantively identical for all relevant purposes and for ease of reading, I have retained the reference to s 44 in this decision. References to s 44 as considered in the present decision should be taken to read reg 4.15A and the Opponent’s Trade Marks (as defined later in the decision) should be recognised as a protected international trade mark applications.
Evidence
The parties filed the following evidence in this matter:
Declarant and Position
Date
Annexures or Exhibits
Evidence in support
Francesc Julià Ametller, Attorney-in-fact at the Opponent (‘Ametller declaration’)
12 September 2024
FJA-1 to FJA-23
Sophie Pemberton, Senior Lawyer with LegalVision ILP Pty. Ltd (‘Pemberton declaration’)
13 September 2024
SP-1 to SP-3
Evidence in answer
Jiaming Huang, the Applicant (‘Huang declaration’)
20 December 2024
Various unnumbered attachments
Evidence in reply
N/A (None filed)
Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended the parties were given an opportunity to request a hearing in this matter or a decision without hearing. The Opponent requested that the matter proceed to a decision without hearing and paid the appropriate fee. As a result the matter has been allocated to a delegate of the Registrar for a decision based on the written record.
I am a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks and I am to decide the opposition as required by s 55 which provides that, unless the proceedings are discontinued, dismissed, or have lapsed under s 54A the Registrar must, at the end, decide:
(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or
(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;
having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.
In doing so I take account of the written record comprised of the materials mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
The Opponent
The Opponent is a Spanish company that since its incorporation in 2000, has offered a range of furniture products and associated services under trade marks consisting of or incorporating the element ‘KAVE’.
The Opponent is the owner of the trade marks listed at Annexure A (‘Opponent’s Trade Marks’). The goods and services for which the Opponent’s Trade Marks are registered are collectively referred to as the ‘Opponent’s Goods and Services’. The Opponent provides evidence of ownership of additional trade marks however these trade marks, not being particularised in the SGP, have no relevance to the present proceeding.
The relevant claims/statements in the Ametller declaration can be summarised as follows:
· The Opponent has offered its furniture and homewares products under the Opponent’s Trade Marks for over 20 years and has offered their products internationally since 2013, fulfilling over 788,000 orders internationally. The Opponent’s products are available at 20 physical stores worldwide, 8 franchises and 100 in-store shops and through its website at
· The Opponent’s products have been provided in Australia through its licensee LaGrand Furniture since November 2021. The Opponent’s licensee operates a physical store in Sydney and from a website at Opponent has promoted its goods and services under the Opponent’s Trade Marks extensively, including social media (where the Opponent’s Australian-targeted social media pages have an extensive number of followers) and online advertising. The Opponent’s products have been promoted as part of the television series the Block.
The annexures to the Ametller declaration display various marketing material that use the Opponent’s Trade Marks. The Opponent does not provide any evidence of sales figures in Australia other than between May 2023 and April 2024, which, noting the value of the Opponent’s furniture products and the size of the Australian market, seems quite small. The Opponent provides no evidence, in the Australian context, of number of customers serviced per year, amount spent on advertising or revenue between 2021 and May 2023.
The relevant claims/statements in the Pemberton declaration can be summarised as follows:
· The Declarant conducted a search to identify use of the Trade Mark. On 9 September 2024 she identified an Amazon store that appears to sell furniture products for sale under the Trade Mark. The seller name on the product listings is KAVENO, but upon clicking on the ‘About Seller’ page the seller is referred to as Auchampx. Auchampx refers to a Hong Kong entity known as Auchampx Group Co. Limited.
The Applicant
The relevant claims/statements in the Huang declaration can be summarised as follows:
· The Applicant is the legal representative of the Hong Kong Company Auchampx Group Pty Ltd who resells products in Australia and the United States under the Trade Mark and has done so since 2018. The Applicant has developed a significant reputation in the Trade Mark and plans to expand the range of goods and services sold under the Trade Mark.
The attachments to the Huang declaration include evidence of trade mark registrations in the United States and Australia as well as evidence of the operation of the Applicant’s Amazon store in the United States and Australia. The Amazon store prominently displays the Trade Mark above the tag line ‘Aussie Home living’ and appears to offer a variety of furniture products under the Trade Mark.
Grounds of Opposition, Onus and Standard of Proof
As indicated above, in the SGP the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44, 59 and 60. To successfully oppose the application the Opponent needs to establish one of the nominated grounds.
The onus of proof in an opposition rests upon the Opponent.[3] The relevant standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.[4] The date at which the rights of the parties are to be determined is the relevant date, which is also the priority date for the purposes of ss 44 and 60.[5]
[3] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32] (Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot JJ).
[4] Following Pfizer Products Inc v Karam [2006] FCA 1663, [6]-[26] (Gyles J), and Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelman JJ).
[5] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 82, [4] (Kitto J) (‘Southern Cross’), see also s 29(1) Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
Discussion
Section 44
The relevant provisions of ss 44 are reproduced below:
Section 44 - Identical etc. trade marks
(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant's goods) must be rejected if:
(a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:
(i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and
(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.
Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 2: For similar goods see subsection 14(1).
(2)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of services (applicant's services) must be rejected if:
(a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:
(i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar services or closely related goods; or
(ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar services or closely related goods is being sought by another person; and
(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's services is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar services or closely related goods.
Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 2: For similar services see subsection 14(2).
Note 3: For priority date see section 12.
Note 4: The regulations may provide that an application must also be rejected if the trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, a protected international trade mark or a trade mark for which there is a request to extend international registration to Australia: see Part 17A. …
(3)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied:
(a)that there has been honest concurrent use of the 2 trade marks; or
(b)that, because of other circumstances, it is proper to do so;
the Registrar may accept the application for the registration of the applicant's trade mark subject to any conditions or limitations that the Registrar thinks fit to impose. If the applicant's trade mark has been used only in a particular area, the limitations may include that the use of the trade mark is to be restricted to that particular area.
Note: For limitations see section 6.
(4)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied that the applicant, or the applicant and the predecessor in title of the applicant, have continuously used the applicant's trade mark for a period:
(a)beginning before the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of:
(i) the similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) the similar services or closely related goods; and
(b)ending on the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark;
the Registrar may not reject the application because of the existence of the other trade mark.
Note 1: An authorised use of the trade mark by a person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark (see subsection 7(3)).
Note 2: For predecessor in title see section 6.
Note 3: For priority date see section 12.
Section 10 - Definition of deceptively similar
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
To successfully oppose the application pursuant to s 44 the Opponent must establish the requirements of s 44(1), i.e. that at least one of the trade marks upon which it relies, being a trade mark registered or sought to be registered by a person other than the Applicant:
· has a priority date which is earlier than that of the Trade Mark (‘the first requirement’);
· is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the Trade Mark (‘the second requirement’); and
· is in respect of similar goods, and/or services which are closely related to, the Applicant’s Goods (‘the third requirement’).
In the event that each of these requirements is satisfied by the Opponent it may still be possible for me to allow the application to proceed to registration if I am satisfied, pursuant to ss 44(3) and 44(4), that there has been honest concurrent use of the Trade Mark, there are other circumstances which would make registration of the Trade Mark proper, or that the Applicant has continuously used the Trade Mark beginning before the priority date of the Opponent’s relied upon mark.
The Opponent has particularised the ground of opposition in the SGP by reference to the Opponent’s Trade Marks. Each of the Opponent’s Trade Marks has a priority date that is earlier than the priority date of the Trade Mark. In addition, each of the Opponent’s Trade Marks is registered for furniture and related products which encompasses the Applicant’s Goods. The first and third requirements being satisfied it remains necessary to consider the second requirement.
Substantially identical and/or deceptively similar
I will now consider whether the Trade Mark is substantially identical to the Opponent’s Trade Marks. For the purposes of this proceeding it is only necessary to consider the KAVE Mark as it is registered for similar goods to the Trade Mark and is clearly more similar to the Trade Mark than the KAVE HOME Mark. If I were to find the s 44 ground not established in respect of the KAVE Mark, I would necessarily reach the same conclusion when considering the KAVE HOME Mark.
When considering ‘substantial identity’ in Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (‘Shell’) Windeyer J said:
In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.[6]
[6] [1963] HCA 66, [12].
The Trade Mark and the KAVE Mark are set out below:
KAVENO KAVE
On a side-by-side comparison there are clear differences which mean that a total impression of dissimilarity emerges from a comparison of the KAVE Mark the Trade Mark. While the Trade Mark incorporates as an element the KAVE Mark, it is ultimately a different word with different pronunciation. I move then to consider whether the Trade Mark and KAVE Mark are deceptively similar.
The principal authority for guidance in determining whether trade marks are deceptively similar also comes from the judgment of Windeyer J in Shell:
On the question of deceptive similarity a different comparison must be made from that which is necessary when substantial identity is in question. The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity. Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant’s [trade mark].[7]
[7] Ibid [13].
The High Court in Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd[8] conveniently stated the relevant principles, which were summarised in The Agency Group Australia Limited v H.A.S. Real Estate Pty Ltd[9] as follows:
[8] [2023] HCA 8 (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ).
[9] [2023] FCA 482, [55] (Jackman J).
(a)the resemblance between the two marks must be the cause of the likely deception or confusion;[10]
[10] [2023] HCA 8 [26] citing Swancom Pty Ltd v The Jazz Corner Hotel Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 157, [69] (Yates, Abraham and Rofe JJ).
(b)in the trade mark comparison, the marks must be judged as a whole taking into account both their look and their sound;[11]
[11] [2023] HCA 8 [26] citing Cooper Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Sigmund Pumps Ltd [1952] HCA 15 (1952) 86 CLR 536, 538 (Dixon, Williams and Kitto JJ).
(c)the marks should not be compared side by side;[12]
(d)the effect of spoken description must be considered; if a mark is in fact or from its nature likely to be the source of some name or verbal description by which buyers will express their desire to have the goods (or services), then similarities both of sound and of meaning may play an important part;[13]
(e)the focus is upon the effect or impression produced on the mind of potential customers of the goods (or services) in relation to which the two marks are used and in the case of the registered mark, allowing for ‘imperfect recollection’;[14]
(f)the notional buyer is a person with no knowledge about any actual use of the registered mark, the actual business of the owner of the registered mark, the goods the owner produces, any acquired distinctiveness from the use of the marks prior to filing, or any reputation associated with the registered mark;[15]
(g)the correct approach is to compare the impression (allowing for imperfect recollection) that the notional buyer would have of the registered mark (as notionally used on all of the goods or services covered by the registration), with the impression that the notional buyer would have of notional and normal fair use of the opposed mark;[16]
(h)“deceived” implies the creation of an incorrect belief or mental impression; “causing confusion” may merely involve “perplexing or mixing up the minds” of potential customers; [17]
(i)the usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected, having regard to the character of the customers who would be likely to buy the goods in issue;[18]
(j)it is not necessary to establish actual probability of deception or confusion, but a mere possibility of confusion is not enough. There must a real, tangible danger of deception or confusion occurring. It is enough if the notional buyer would entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether, due to the resemblance between the marks, the two products come from the same source. Put another way, there must be “a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products ... come from the same source”;[19]
(k)evidence of actual confusion is of great weight, but not essential, and lack of such evidence may also be relevant;[20] and
(l)any intention to deceive or cause confusion may be a relevant consideration but is not required.[21]
[12] [2023] HCA 8 [27] citing Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F S Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641, 658 (Dixon and McTiernan JJ) (‘Australian Woollen Mills’).
[13] Ibid.
[14] [2023] HCA 8 [28], [29] citing Australian Woollen Mills, 658 (Dixon and McTiernan JJ) .
[15] [2023] HCA 8 [28], [29] citing Swancom Pty Ltd v The Jazz Corner Hotel Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 157, [69]-[70], [77]-[80] (Yates, Abraham and Rofe JJ).
[16] [2023] HCA 8 [29] citing Shell, 415.
[17] [2023] HCA 8 [30] citing Coca-Cola Company v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107, 122 [39] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ) quoting Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Hy-Line Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 50, 62 (Richardson J).
[18] [2023] HCA 8 [31] citing Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45, 79 [83] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
[19] [2023] HCA 8 [32] citing Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020, [50)] (French J) restating principles from Southern Cross Refrigerating v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 594-595 (Kitto J).
[20] [2023] HCA 8 [30], [71] citing Australian Woollen Mills Ltd, 658.
[21] 2023] HCA 8 [30], Hashtag Burgers Pty Ltd v In-N-Out Burgers Inc (2020) 385 ALR 514, 533 [67] (Nicholas, Yates and Burley JJ) (‘Hashtag Burgers’) citing Australian Woollen Mills, 657.
Furthermore the Court, in Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd, noted the following[22]:
In considering the likelihood of confusion or deception, "the court is not looking to the totality of the conduct of the defendant in the same way as in a passing off suit"[23]. In addition to the degree of similarity between the marks, the assessment takes account of the effect of that similarity considered in relation to the alleged infringer's actual use of the mark[24], as well as the circumstances of the goods, the character of the likely customers, and the market covered by the monopoly attached to the registered trade mark[25]. Consideration of the context of those surrounding circumstances does not "open the door" for examination of the actual use of the registered mark, or, as will be explained, any consideration of the reputation associated with the mark.[26]
[22] Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd [2023] HCA 8, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ).
[23] New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray-Goulburn Co‑operative Co Ltd [1989] FCA 124; (1989) 86 ALR 549, 589 (emphasis added) (Gummow J), approved in CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42, 62 [44] (Ryan, Branson and Lehane JJ), Hashtag Burgers, [64], Combe International Ltd v Dr August Wolff GmbH & Co KG Arzneimittel [2021] FCAFC 8, [27], PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd (2021) 285 FCR 598, [97] (see also 626 [111]) and Swancom (2022) 168 IPR 42, [73].
[24] Act, s 68.
[25] New South Wales Dairy [1989] FCA 124; (1989) 86 ALR 549, 589.
[26] Swancom Pty Ltd v The Jazz Corner Hotel Pty Ltd (2022) 168 IPR 42, 59 [2022] FCAFC 157 [89]. See also CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42, 62 [44] (Ryan, Branson and Lehane JJ).
As stated above, for the purposes of considering deceptive similarity, the reputation of the KAVE Mark is not a relevant factor.[27] Distinctiveness is a factor that can legitimately be taken into account when considering deceptive similarity.[28]
[27] See Swancom Pty Ltd v The Jazz Corner Hotel Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 157, [93] (Yates, Abraham and Rofe JJ) and, albeit in the s120(1) context Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd [2023] HCA 8, [49] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ).
[28] Stone & Wood Group Pty Ltd v Intellectual Property Development Corporation Pty Ltd (2018) 129 IPR 238, [66] (Allsop CJ, Nicholas, Katzmann JJ).
In the present case the Trade Mark wholly incorporates the KAVE Mark along with the addition of the element ‘NO’ to create a new word, KAVENO. The mere fact that the Trade Mark incorporates the KAVE Mark is not sufficient to render the trade marks deceptively similar. In some cases, a trade mark conveys an overall conceptual meaning sufficiently different from another trade mark which is contained within it, such that the trade marks are not deceptively similar. This was found to be the case in, for example, REBELLION vs SOUL REBELLION[29] and JOCKEY vs THROTTLE JOCKEY.[30]
[29] Kingsley v Scott [2011] ATMO 10.
[30] Jockey International Inc v Wilkinson [2010] ATMO 22.
In the present case, the addition of the element ‘NO’ to the Trade Mark creates a different word. I consider that this word is visually, aurally and conceptually different from the KAVE Mark. I consider it unlikely that consumers in the relevant market would view the Trade Mark as a combination of the KAVE and NO elements and even if they did, the ‘NO’ element would operate to suggest that the goods are not produced by the same entity as the holder of the KAVE Mark. Rather consumers would view the Trade Mark as a single word that is of a different length, different pronunciation and provides a different overall impression than the KAVE Mark. In the context of the common goods for which the Trade Mark and the KAVE Mark are registered/sought to be registered (being furniture products that are purchased with some care), I consider that the significantly different overall impressions provided by the respective marks are such that, notwithstanding that the Trade Mark wholly incorporates the KAVE Mark, the trade marks are not deceptively similar.[31]
[31] See Deckers Outdoor Corporation v B&B McDougal [2006] ATMO 5, [34] (Hearing Officer Thompson).
I find that the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition under s 44.
Section 59
Section 59 is reproduced below:
Section 59 - Applicant not intending to use trade mark
The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the applicant does not intend:(a) to use, or authorise the use of, the trade mark in Australia, or
(b) to assign the trade mark to a body corporate for use by the body Corporate in Australia;
in relation to the goods and/or services specified in the application.
The relevant date for assessing the Applicant’s intention to use the Trade Mark is the filing date being 15 October 2023.[32]
[32] See the discussion of the authorities in Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v 111Pix.com Limited [2012] ATMO 29, [31] (Hearing Officer Kirov). The relevant authorities are Suyen Corporation v Americana International Limited [2010] FCA 638; (Dodds-Streeton J) and Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58; (Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot JJ).
The nature of the intention in s 59 was considered by Jacobsen J in Health World Ltd v Shin-Sun Australia Pty Ltd where he stated:
In my view, the intention, or lack thereof, to which s 59 is directed, is a ‘real and definite intention’ of the applicant for registration, to use the mark publicly as a trade mark, although it is not necessary that the intention be immediate or within a limited time.[33]
[33] [2008] 75 IPR 478, [160].
There is a presumption that where an application has been filed the applicant, has the requisite intention.[34] However:
There is authority for the proposition that where an applicant for registration has been put on notice that its intention to use the mark was in issue, and has not responded to the opponent’s evidence, a finding of lack of intention may be made.
The principle which underlies these authorities seems to me to be that the evidentiary onus shifts to the applicant for registration where an opponent makes a prima facie case of lack of intention to use the mark.[35]
[34] Aston v Harlee Manufacturing Co (1960) 103 CLR 391, 401 (Fullagar J).
[35] Ibid [162]-[163] (citations omitted).
Jacobsen J also recognised the difficulty that an opponent has in establishing a ground under s 59, stating in the same case:
The subjective nature of the intention, the presumption of intention flowing from the application for registration and the onus on an opponent usually make it difficult for an opposition or an application for rectification, to succeed on this ground.[36]
[36] Ibid [161] (citations omitted).
In view of the authorities discussed above, the onus of establishing the ground of opposition pursuant to s 59 remains with the Opponent until it has established a prima facie case that on the relevant date the Applicant lacked the requisite intention. If the Opponent establishes a prima facie case the onus then shifts to the Applicant for rebuttal. The relevant intention requires that an applicant must have ‘a real intention to use, not a mere problematic intention, not an uncertain or indeterminate possibility, but it means a resolve or settled purpose which has been reached at the time when the mark is to be registered’.[37] There must be ‘a real and definite intention’ to use the mark publicly as a trade mark in connection with the services applied for.[38]
[37] Re Ducker’s Trade Mark (1928) 45 RPC 397, 402.
[38] Health World Ltd v Shin-Sun Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 100, [158] (Jacobson J).
The Opponent has particularised this ground of opposition in the SGP as follows:
The Applicant, as an individual, did not have the required intention as at the filing date of the opposed application to use, or authorise the use of, the opposed mark in Australia, in relation to the goods specified in the opposed application.
The Opponent has not provided sufficient evidence in support of this ground of opposition to shift the evidentiary onus, nor has it made any submissions on this ground. The Applicant gives evidence that it is operating an Amazon store selling the Applicant’s Goods under the Trade Mark. The Opponent’s evidence, at its highest, is that the store is actually operated by a third party, being Auchampx Group Co. Limited. The Applicant gives evidence he is operating the Amazon store, that his business involves selling products from Auchampx Group Co. Limited and he is operating permission from them to use the mark in Australia and the United States. Based on the limited evidence before me I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that at the relevant date the Applicant, being the operator of the Amazon store, intended to use the Trade Mark for the Applicant’s Goods in Australia. The Opponent has failed to establish a prima facie case that the Applicant lacked the requisite intention as at the filing date, and has, consequently, failed to establish a ground of opposition pursuant to s 59.
Section 60
Section 60 is reproduced below:
Section 60 - Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia
The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:
(a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and
(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
To establish a ground of opposition under s 60, an opponent must demonstrate that as at the relevant date there was another trade mark which had acquired a reputation in Australia amongst a significant or substantial number of persons in the relevant market such that use of the trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
Some of the relevant principles of s 60 are summarised in the recent case of Ragopika Pty Ltd v Padmasingh Isaac trading as Aachi Spices and Foods as follows:
The first of these elements calls for a factual inquiry into the extent and nature of the reputation that had been acquired by the existing trade mark – here, the Aachi mark – in Australia. The second element calls for an assessment of the likelihood of deception or confusion arising from use of the new trade mark as a consequence of that reputation.
The existing trade mark need not even be registered for s 60 to be engaged (Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc [2012] FCA 81; 201 FCR 565 (Fry Consulting) at [121] (Dodds-Streeton J); Qantas Airways Ltd v Edwards [2016] FCA 729 (Qantas Airways) at [144] (Yates J)). The classes of goods and/or services in respect of which the existing trade mark has been used, and those in which the new trade mark is intended to be used, may be very relevant to the likelihood of confusion (see Qantas Airways at [143] and GAIN Capital UK Limited v Citigroup Inc (No 4) [2017] FCA 519 at [148] (Markovic J)), but the fact that the classes are not the same cannot be determinative. The reputation of the existing trade mark need not relate specifically to the goods or services that are the subject of the proposed application (Qantas Airways at [143]; Rodney Jane Racing Pty Ltd v Monster Energy Company [2019] FCA 923 (Rodney Jane Racing) at [87] (O’Bryan J)). The question is simply whether the reputation of the existing trade mark in Australia is such that the use of the new trade mark is “likely” to be deceptive or cause confusion.[39]
[39] [2023] FCA 487, [20]-[21] (Kennett J)
In McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick[40], Kenny J considered what is intended by the word ‘reputation’ as used in s 60. Her Honour consulted the Macquarie Dictionary and on the basis of the definition provided concluded that it was ‘the recognition of the [trade mark] by the public generally’.[41] Her Honour quoted with approval the following words of Lockhart J in Re ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd:
[R]eputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements on television or radio, or in magazines and newspapers within the forum. It may be established by showing constant travel of people between other countries and the forum and that people within the forum, (whether residents there or persons simply visiting there from other countries) are exposed to the goods of the overseas owner …[42]
[40] [2000] FCA 1335.
[41] Ibid, [81].
[42] (1992) 33 FCR 302, 343.
On the subject of reputation, Kenny J also referred to Hugo Boss AG v Jackson International Trading Co Kurt D Bruhl GmbH & Co KG, where the Registrar’s delegate observed:
[I]t is true that the assessment of the reputation of a trade mark goes far beyond mere examination of sales or turnover of goods sold under that trade mark and contemplation of the advertising and promotional figures.
As regards a trade mark, its reputation derives both from the quantum of sales under that mark and also its esteem, or image, projected by that trade mark. The quantum of sales, advertising and promotion contributes to the ‘recognition’ component of the trade mark’s reputation. The credit, image and values projected by a trade mark attaches to the ‘esteem’ component of the reputation as do the public events and other trader’s marks with which [the] owner of the trade marks in question chooses to associate the trade marks via sponsorships, cross-promotions, ‘contra deals’ and so forth.
It follows that a trade mark used in relation to goods with comparatively low sales may have a high and strong reputation by virtue of the high credit or esteem in which it is held, or, conversely, that a trade mark which has very high sales may have a strong reputation notwithstanding the lack of esteem that attaches to it. The particular popular images, or sets of values, that attach to the trade mark are also, therefore, important parts of the reputation of the trade mark and may be as strong an associative force in the minds of the public as the association of the trade marks with the goods or services themselves.[43]
[43] (1999) 47 IPR 423, 436 (Hearing Officer Thompson).
As stated above, in assessing reputation under s 60, what constitutes a significant or substantial number of persons in the relevant market must be considered. The case of Le Cordon Bleu BV v Cordon Bleu International Ltee[44] was decided under s 28(a) of the (now repealed) Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth). That provision did not refer to ‘reputation’ at all, only that use of the impugned trade mark would be ‘likely to deceive or cause confusion’. Nevertheless the words of Heerey J provide some guidance:
What is ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ will depend on the nature of the goods or services in question. For some highly specialised products, awareness among a few thousand persons, or even less, might be sufficient … We are here concerned with foodstuffs sold in supermarkets, delicatessens, milk bars and other retail outlets. The relevant market is virtually the entire Australian population from early teenage years onwards.[45]
[44] [2000] FCA 1587.
[45] Ibid [91] (emphasis in original). Justice Heerey’s decision was overturned on appeal to the Full Federal Court, although not on the point quoted. Indeed the court specifically noted that his approach contained no error; see Renaud Cointreau v Cordon Bleu International Ltee [2001] FCA 1170, [75] (Moore, Tamberlin and Goldberg JJ).
The Opponent has particularised the ground of opposition in the SGP in the manner set out below:
The trade mark/s had acquired reputation before the priority date of the trade mark being opposed
The Opponent has used the word marks "Kave" (application 2417192) and "Kave Home", as well as the attached logo mark (registration 1975732), in Australia in connection with its range of lighting goods, furniture goods, tableware, cookware, linen and textile goods, carpets, wall coverings, retail and wholesale services for homewares and interior design services since at least 4 July 2022. As at the priority date of the opposed application (15 October 2023), the Opponent had established a reputation in Australia in connection with its range of furniture and homeware goods and services and had a significant customer base, in part due to its already well-established presence in the global market.
The Opponent supplies its goods and services both direct to consumer, as well as to other businesses or retailers. Annual revenue figures for direct to consumer sales and B2B sales average millions of Euros.
There is a real and tangible danger of deception or confusion if the opposed mark were to be used to promote or provide similar kinds of furniture goods in Australia.
I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the KAVE Mark had, before the relevant date, acquired a very limited reputation in Australia for furniture, sufficient for the requirements under s 60(a). I reach this conclusion noting that the Opponent has used the KAVE Mark for some time internationally and has an impressive social media presence as well as a limited presence on Australian television as a result of its furniture featuring on The Block. However, I also note the limited distribution channels in Australia, the very limited (and unimpressive) sales evidence and the relatively short amount of time the Opponent has operated in Australia and as such find that the Opponent has barely satisfied the s 60(a) requirement. It is not necessary for me to reach a similar conclusion about the other mark particularised in the SGP as it contains additional material that reduces the possibility of confusion between the mark and the Trade Mark (and I am notsatisfied that its reputation is any greater than the KAVE Mark).
It is not sufficient that the Opponent merely establish that its trade marks had a reputation; I must also be satisfied that, because of that reputation the use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. Discussions and decisions on the subjects of deception and confusion are legion and a good number provide relevant comments in relation to a consideration of deception and confusion for the purposes of s 60. In a case concerning trade mark infringement and passing off, Australian Woollen Mills Limited v F S Walton and Company Limited, Dixon and McTiernan JJ said the following:
An attempt should be made to estimate the effect or impression produced on the mind of potential customers by the mark or device for which the protection of an injunction is sought. … The usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected. Potential buyers of goods are not to be credited with any high perception or habitual caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded. The course of business and the way in which the particular class of goods are sold gives, it may be said, the setting, and the habits and observation of men considered in the mass affords the standard.[46]
[46] (1937) 58 CLR 641, 658.
In Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd French J highlighted the following further matters concerning confusion:
(ii) A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt.
It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source.
(iii) In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services.[47]
[47] [1999] FCA 1020, [25]. These considerations by French J are based on principles set out by Kitto J in Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 594-5.
In Pottle Productions Inc v Rute Ithalat Ve Ihracat Anonim Sirketi the delegate observed that:
The assessment of the likelihood of deception or confusion under section 60 is informed by the strength of the reputation of the Opponent’s trade mark(s), the inherent distinctiveness thereof, the degree of similarity between the trade marks under consideration and the nexus or connection between the goods and/or services of the parties. Each of these is a variable and it is possible that a trade mark’s reputation might be sufficiently strong and the degree of similarity to an opposed trade mark be so great (particularly where the trade marks are inherently distinctive) that confusion or deception will be a likelihood where very little, if any, nexus or connection exists between the goods and/or services under consideration.[48]
[48] [2012] ATMO 124, [40] (Hearing Officer Thompson).
While it is not necessary to show that the marks are deceptively similar for the purposes of an opposition under s 60, as stated in Qantas Airways Limited v Edwards, ‘the degree of similarity between the allegedly conflicting marks will be a relevant consideration to be taken into account when considering the likelihood of confusion resulting from use of the opposed mark.’[49]
[49] [2016] FCA 729, [142] (Yates J).
Finally I note that in considering whether there is a likelihood of confusion, I must consider the notional use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant, rather than actual use or any reputation in the Trade Mark held by the Applicant.[50]
[50] See, for example, McCormick & Company Inc v McCormick [2000] FCA 1335 where it was established that the fact that the Applicant might have been an honest concurrent user is not relevant to the operation of section 60.
In the present case I consider that confusion is highly unlikely to arise. I note the limited reputation of the KAVE Mark in Australia and refer to my reasons in paragraph 30 relating to the unlikelihood of consumer confusion given the differences between the marks. Finally, I note that furniture products, although they are consumer goods, are goods traditionally purchased with some care such that the differences between the respective marks are sufficient that consumer confusion is unlikely to arise.
I find that the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition pursuant to s 60.
Section 42
Section 42 is reproduced below:
42 - Trade mark scandalous or its use contrary to law
An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if:
(a) the trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter; or
(b) its use would be contrary to law.The Opponent pressed this ground of opposition solely on the basis that the use of the Trade Mark would be contrary to law (s 42(b)). The onus is on the Opponent to establish that use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant would be, rather than could be, contrary to law on the balance of probabilities.[51] The relevant time for assessing whether an application is contrary to law is at the relevant date but ‘looking forward to prospective conduct after registration’.[52]
[51] Advantage Rent-a-Car Inc v Advantage Car Rental Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 683, [28] (Madgwick J).
[52] Time Warner Entertainment Co LP v Stepsam Investments Pty Ltd [2004] 59 IPR 343, 353 (Wilcox J).
The Opponent has particularised the ground of opposition in the SGP as follows:
Tort of passing off; Competition and Consumer Act 2010
The Opponent has failed to particularise a ground of the Competition and Consumer Act but on the evidence filed I assume the Opponent refers to ss 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’). As previously stated the Opponent has failed to establish a ground of opposition under s 60. The test for misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the ACL is a more stringent one than that for deception or confusion under s 60,[53] and consequently I find that the Opponent has also failed to establish that the Applicant’s use of the Trade Mark would be contrary to s 18 of the ACL.
[53] See, e.g.: Ownit Homes Pty Ltd v Ownit Conveyancing Pty Ltd [2005] ATMO 47, [36] (Hearing Officer Williams); Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, 198 (Gibbs CJ).
Paraphrasing the statement of the Registrar’s delegate in A G Professional Hair Care Products Ltd v Geagroup Invest SRL[54], where a trade mark does not run afoul of s 18 of the ACL, neither will it run afoul of s 29 of the ACL. In Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v IPC Media Pty Ltd, Justice Beaumont considered—in connection with the superseded Trade Practices Act1974 (‘TPA’)—that ‘the Court’s conclusion on s 52 would necessarily carry with it a conclusion on s 53(c) and (d)’.[55] Sections 52 and 53 of the TPA were, respectively, the equivalent provisions to ss 18 and 29 of the ACL. Justice Hill in Re Equity Access Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation also addressed the relationship between s 52 of the TPA and passing off. His Honour considered that:
The scope for the operation of s. 52 will thus be broader than that involved in the tort of passing off so that in a case such as the present where the claim is for the protection of the reputation in a name against the use of that name by another, failure to succeed under s. 52 or s. 53 will invariably mean that proceedings for passing off would likewise fail.[56]
[54] [2014] ATMO 65, [50] (Hearing Officer Wilson).
[55] [2003] FCA 104, [107] (Beaumont J).
[56] [1989] FCA 506, [40] (citations omitted).
For these reasons I am not satisfied that use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant would be contrary to law. Therefore, the Opponent has failed to establish the ground of opposition under s 42(b).
Decision and Costs
The Opponent has failed to establish any of the grounds of opposition it nominated in the SGP. Trade mark application number 2396534 may proceed to registration not less than one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar is served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur until either the appeal is withdrawn or discontinued. Otherwise the disposition of the application should be in accordance with the Court’s order or direction.
The Applicant has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. I accordingly award costs against the Opponent under s 221 in the relevant amounts under Schedule 8 of the Regulations.
Nicholas Smith
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
9 September 2025
Annexure A
(‘Opponent’s Trade Marks’)
Number
Trade Mark
Priority Date
Goods or Services
1975732
(‘KAVE HOME Mark’)
10 Nov 2017
Class 11: Lighting equipment and apparatus; interior and exterior lighting; lamps; ceiling, floor and table lamps; lighting torches; lighting fixtures; lighting accessories; bulbs; fireplaces; barbecues; apparatus for cooking, heating, cooling and for food and beverage processing.
Class 20: Furniture; furniture parts; ladders of wood or plastics; doors for furniture; chairs; stools; benches; ottomans; armchairs; sofas; easy chairs; tables; small tables; desks; garden furniture; kitchen and bathroom furniture; kitchen worktops; beds, sofa beds; ottomans convertible to beds; shelving units; shelves; bookcases; bookcases [furniture]; lockers; divans; wardrobes; cabinet organizers; storage containers; chests of drawers; bed springs; shoe racks; furniture of wood; furniture made of wood substitutes; furniture of reed; plastic garden furniture; furniture of plastic materials for use in bathrooms; divans of plastic; mattresses; pillows; cushions; mirrors [looking glasses]; glass for mirrors; picture frames; frames for photographs; frames for pictures; coat stands; hangers for clothes; clothes stands; decorative articles and works of art made of wood, plaster or plastic; statues of bone, ivory, plaster, plastic, wax or wood; statuettes; ornaments of bone, ivory, plaster, plastic, wax or wood; indoor blinds and accessories for curtains and indoor blinds; curtain rods; hampers [baskets]; wicker cradles; wicker baskets; containers made of horn; knobs and handles; pedestals for plant and flower pots; bottle racks; bamboo and reed curtains; woven wooden blinds (furniture); screens (furniture); parts and integral parts for all the aforementioned goods.
Class 24: Bed linen; sheets; blankets; bedspreads and duvets; table linen; table linen; tablecloths, not of paper; bath linen; curtains; towels of textile; pillow, cushion and duvet covers; mattress covers; shower curtains; fabrics for furniture; cloth; table mats of textile materials; table napkins of textile; handkerchiefs made of textile materials; textile coatings and covers for furniture; wall hangings of textile; tapestries; parts and pieces of all the aforementioned goods.
Class 27: Carpets, doormats, mats, rugs, linoleum and other floor coverings; wall hangings, not of textile; wallpaper and wall coverings; floor carpeting; parts and accessories for all the aforesaid goods.
Class 35: Advertising; commercial business management; commercial administration; office functions; demonstration of goods; dissemination of advertisements; distribution of samples; on-line advertising on a computer network; organization of exhibitions for commercial or advertising purposes; organization of trade fairs for commercial or advertising purposes; presentation of goods on communication media for retail purposes; provision of commercial information via web sites; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for lighting equipment and apparatus, interior and exterior lighting, lamps, ceiling, floor and table lamps; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for lighting torches; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for lighting fixtures, lighting accessories, light bulbs; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for fireplaces, barbecues, apparatus for cooking, heating, cooling and for food or beverage processing; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for furniture, furniture parts, ladders of wood or plastic materials, doors, chairs, stools, benches, ottomans, armchairs, sofas, easy chairs; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for tables, small tables, desks, garden furniture, kitchen and bathroom furniture, kitchen countertops, beds, sofa beds, ottomans covering to beds, shelves, racks, bookcases, bookcases [furniture], drawers, divans; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for cabinets, cabinet organizers, containers for storage; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for chests of drawers, bed bases, shoe racks, furniture of wood, furniture made of wood substitutes; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for reed furniture, plastic garden furniture, furniture of plastic materials for use in bathrooms, couches of plastic, mattresses, pillows; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for cushions, mirrors, glass for mirrors, frames, photograph frames, picture frames; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for clothes racks, clothes hangers, clothes stands, decorative articles and works of art made of wood, plaster or plastic; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for statues of bone, ivory, plaster, plastic, wax or wood, statuettes, ornaments of bone, ivory, plaster, plastic, wax or wood, indoor blinds and accessories for curtains and indoor blinds, curtain rods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for hampers (baskets), wicker cradles, baskets of wicker, containers made of horn, knobs and handles; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for pots for plants and flowers, bottle racks [furniture], bamboo and reed curtains; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for woven wood blinds (furniture), screens (furniture), parts and integral parts for all the aforementioned goods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for bed linen, sheets, blankets, bedspreads and duvets, table linen, tablecloths, tables mats not of paper, bath linen, curtains; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for towels of textile materials, covers for pillows, cushions or duvets, mattress covers, shower curtains, fabrics for furniture, fabrics, place mats of textile materials, table napkins of textile materials, handkerchiefs of textile materials; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for textile covers and cases for furniture, textile wall coverings, tapestries, textile storage bags, parts and pieces of all the aforementioned goods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for carpets, doormats, mats, rugs, linoleum and other floor coverings, wall hangings not of textile materials, wallpaper and wall coverings, floor carpeting, parts and accessories for all the aforesaid goods; import, export and commercial representation for furniture, lamps, lighting, carpets, bed and household linen.
2417192
KAVE
(‘KAVE Mark’)
23 Apr 2023
Class 11: Lighting equipment and apparatus; interior and exterior lighting; lamps; ceiling, floor and table lamps; lighting torches; lighting fixtures; lighting accessories; bulbs; fireplaces; barbecues; apparatus for cooking, heating, cooling and for food and beverage processing.
Class 20: Furniture; furniture parts; stairways; steps; doors for furniture; chairs; stools; benches; ottomans; armchairs; sofas; easy chairs; tables; small tables; desks; garden furniture; kitchen and bathroom furniture; kitchen worktops; beds, sofa beds; ottomans convertible to beds; shelving units; shelves; bookcases; bookcases [furniture]; lockers; divans; Wardrobes; cabinet organizers; storage containers; chests of drawers; bed springs; shoe racks; furniture of wood; furniture made of wood substitutes; furniture of reed; plastic garden furniture; furniture of plastic materials for use in bathrooms; divans of plastic; mattresses; pillows; cushions; mirrors [looking glasses]; glass for mirrors; picture frames; frames for photographs; frames for pictures; coat stands; hangers for clothes; clothes stands; decorative articles and works of art made of wood, plaster or plastic; statues; statuettes; mobiles (decorative articles); indoor blinds and accessories for curtains and indoor blinds; curtain rods; wicker cradles; wicker baskets; containers made of horn; knobs and handles; pedestals for plant and flower pots; bottle racks; bamboo and reed curtains; woven wooden blinds (furniture); screens (furniture); parts and integral parts for all the aforementioned goods.
Class 21: Tableware, cookware; pots and pans; non-electric kettles and non-electric pressure cookers; cutting boards; serving boards; ironing boards; salt and pepper cellars; serving forks; scoops for household use; serving ladles and tongs; trivets; corkscrews; pasta meters; kitchen utensils; cups, glasses, drinking vessels and bowls; trays; glassware; cans and jars; statues and statuettes of ceramic, porcelain, crystal, glass, terracotta; toilet and kitchen paper holders; napkin holders; straws; teapots; plates and works of art made of materials such as porcelain, terracotta or glass; watering cans; planters of glass, porcelain, wood, earthenware; window boxes; irrigation hose nozzles; gardening gloves; fly swatters; clothes pegs; vases; bottles; drink coasters; feeders and drinking bowls for pets; brushes, combs, cages, for animals; litter trays for animals; scoops for animal excrement; money boxes; pails, cocktail shakers; mills, squeezers, crushers, grinders, hand-operated; indoor aquaria, terraria and vivaria; urns being flower vases; urns being vases; urns being flower and plant boxes; urns being flower and plant pots; place-mats [table utensils].
Class 24: Bed linen; sheets; blankets; bedspreads and duvets; table linen; table linen; tablecloths, not of paper; bath linen; textile curtains and veils; towels; pillow, cushion and duvet covers; mattress covers; shower curtains; textile goods for furniture; rags; cloth; table mats of textile materials; table mats of plastic materials [substitute for fabrics]; table mats of lace, not of paper; table napkins of textile; handkerchiefs made of textile materials; textile coatings and covers for furniture; wall hangings of textile; tapestries; parts and pieces of all the aforementioned goods.
Class 27: Carpets, doormats, mats, rugs, linoleum and other floor coverings; wall hangings, not of textile; wallpaper and wall coverings; floor carpeting; parts and accessories for all the aforesaid goods.
Class 35: Advertising; promotional and marketing services; commercial business management; commercial administration; office functions; demonstration of goods; dissemination of advertisements; distribution of samples; on-line advertising on a computer network; organization of exhibitions for commercial or advertising purposes; organization of trade fairs for commercial or advertising purposes; presentation of goods on communication media for retail purposes; providing commercial information via websites; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for lighting equipment and apparatus, interior and exterior lighting, lamps, ceiling, floor and table lamps; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for lighting torches; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for lighting fixtures, lighting accessories, light bulbs; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for fireplaces, barbecues, apparatus for cooking, heating, cooling and for food or beverage processing; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for furniture, furniture parts, ladders, steps, doors, chairs, stools, benches, ottomans, armchairs, sofas, easy chairs; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for tables, small tables, desks, garden furniture, kitchen and bathroom furniture, kitchen countertops, beds, sofa beds, ottomans covering to beds, shelves, racks, bookcases, bookcases [furniture], drawers, divans; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for cabinets, cabinet organizers, containers for storage; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for chests of drawers, bed bases, shoe racks, furniture of wood, furniture made of wood substitutes; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for reed furniture, plastic garden furniture, furniture of plastic materials for use in bathrooms, couches of plastic, mattresses, pillows; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for cushions, mirrors, glass for mirrors, frames, photograph frames, picture frames; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for clothes racks, clothes hangers, clothes stands, decorative articles and works of art made of wood, plaster or plastic; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for statues, statuettes, mobiles (decorative articles), indoor blinds and fittings for curtains and indoor blinds, curtain rods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for urns, baskets, wicker cradles, baskets of wicker, containers made of horn, knobs and handles; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for pots for plants and flowers, bottle racks [furniture], bamboo and reed curtains; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for woven wood blinds (furniture), screens (furniture), parts and integral parts for all the aforementioned goods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for bed linen, sheets, blankets, bedspreads and duvets, table linen, tablecloths, tables mats not of paper, bath linen, textile curtains and veils; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for towels, pillow, cushion and duvet covers, mattress covers, shower curtains, furnishings, rags, cloth, fabric, table mats, table napkins of textile materials, handkerchiefs of textile materials; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for textile covers and cases for furniture, textile wall coverings, tapestries, textile storage bags, parts and pieces of all the aforementioned goods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for carpets, doormats, mats, rugs, linoleum and other floor coverings, wall hangings not of textile materials, wallpaper and wall coverings, floor carpeting, parts and accessories for all the aforesaid goods; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for products for perfuming linen, perfumes and cosmetics for the home, essences, incenses, scented woods, candle holders and candles, toilet bags, articles of glassware, porcelain and earthenware, cups, teapots, flatware, household and kitchen utensils and containers; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for electric household apparatus, data, image and sound carriers, costume jewelry and clocks, office requisites, bags, handbags, satchels, wallets, purses, cases, covers and other object carriers made of skin, leather or other substitute materials, home decoration products, games and toys; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for clothing, footwear and headwear and fashion accessories; retail and wholesale services for food and beverage products; import, export and commercial representation services for furniture, lamps, lighting, carpets, bed and household linen, decoration accessories, games and toys; advertising and marketing services provided via blogs; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for cutlery and flatware products, openers, toys, games and playthings; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for tableware, cookware, pots and pans, non-electric pressure cookers and kettles, cutting boards, serving boards; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for ironing boards, salt and pepper shakers, forks, scoops, ladles and serving tongs; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for table mats, corkscrews, pasta meters, cooking utensils, cups, glasses, drinking vessels and bowls, trays, glassware, cans and jars, statues, statuettes; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for tissue holders, napkin holders, straws, teapots, plates and works of art made of materials such as porcelain, terracotta or glass; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for gardening articles, watering cans, flower stands, nozzles for watering hose, gardening gloves, fly swatters, clothes pegs, vases, bottles, bottle racks, coasters, feeders and drinking bowls for pets; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for articles for animals, money boxes, buckets, cocktail shakers, small kitchen apparatus for chopping, grinding, pressing or crushing that are manually operated, indoor aquaria, terraria and vivaria; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for Christmas decorations, candles, fragrances, fragrances and incenses for the home; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for office requisites, printed matter and stationery, adhesives for stationery or for the home; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for hydroponic gardens; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for electric household apparatus and home automation articles; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for cookers; retail, wholesale and sale services via global computer networks for art material and works of art.
Class 42: Design services; architecture services; Interior decoration services; interior design services; interior styling services; design of furniture and spaces; design of lamps and lighting; design of home accessories; product design; design of kitchens; architectural services for home automation; design and installation of home automation systems; consultancy relating to interior design; textile design services; information services relating to the combination of colors, paints and furniture for interior and exterior design; property plan drafting services; event decoration services; design of fashion accessories; providing online information with respect to interior design; technological services for the creation, production and modification of digital designs, avatars and overlays in online virtual environments; development, programming and implementation of software; technology development services for NFTs.
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