FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McCormick & Company Inc v McCormick [2000] FCA 1335
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – registration – application for registration of word marks “mccormick’s” and “mccormick’s instant batter simply add water” covering instant batter mix – marks deceptively similar to opponent’s registered trade marks – whether instant batter and goods the subject of opponent’s trade marks (including herbs, spices and seasonings) “goods of the same description” within meaning of s 14(1) of Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – whether honest concurrent use of trade marks established for purposes of s 44(3) – whether geographic limitation on registration should be imposed – where initial use honest – where significant sales outside of Queensland before application filed not shown – where real likelihood of confusion – exercise of discretion under s 44(3) would result in registration under honest concurrent use in Queensland but not other states – discussion of applicant’s alleged media campaign against opponent and opponent’s alleged acquiescence in applicant’s use of mark
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – opposition – whether opponent’s marks had acquired a reputation for purposes of s 60 – nature of evidence required to show reputation considered – evidence of substantial sales, advertising and promotion sufficient to infer reputation – whether s 60 grounds for opposition subject to honest concurrent use exception – opposition successful
EVIDENCE – Expert opinion – whether evidence from Australian and North American chefs about composition, function and effect of batter relevant – evidence admitted – whether applicant qualified under s 79 of Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to give expert opinion about relationship between relevant goods – applicant only qualified to give opinion about effect of own product
WORDS & PHRASES – “reputation”
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 14(1), 44(1), 44(3), 60
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 76, 79, 144
Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth)McCormick & Company Inc v McCormick (1998) 42 IPR 515 reversed
In Re Jellinek’s Application (1946) 63 RPC 59 cited
In Re John Crowther & Sons (Milnsbridge) Ltd’s Application (1948) 65 RPC 369 cited
In Re Frank George Whiting’s Application (1952) 69 RPC 219 cited
Reckitt & Colman (Australia) Ltd v Boden (1945) 70 CLR 84 citedSouthern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592 applied
In Re J & J Colman Ltd’s Application (1929) 46 RPC 126 referred
G Wood, Son & Co Ltd v McVitty & Co Pty Ltd (1964) 34 AOJP 2601 referred
In Re Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (HK) Ltd’s Application (1990) 90 IPR 140 referred
Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1988) 10 IPR 539 cited
Dinning v New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc (1992) AIPC 38719 cited
Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 (HL) mentioned
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd [No 7] (1999) 161 ALR 576 referred
O’Brian v Gillespie (1996) 41 NSWLR 549 referred
In Re Alex Pirie & Sons Ltd’s Application (1932) 49 RPC 195; 49 RPC 210; (1933) 50 RPC 147 applied
In Re…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1335
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the goods sold by Mary McCormick and McCormick & Co were similar, and if the registration of Mary McCormick’s marks would infringe upon the established reputation of McCormick & Co’s marks, thus causing confusion or deception. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the registration should be limited to specific states, as decided by the delegate of the Registrar.
The court ruled that the goods sold by both parties were indeed similar, as they were both batter products. Furthermore, the court found that McCormick & Co’s marks had acquired a reputation in Australia prior to the relevant date, which meant that the use of Mary McCormick’s marks would likely deceive or cause confusion. Consequently, the registration of Mary McCormick’s marks should be opposed on the grounds specified in section 60 of the Act. The court also dismissed Mary McCormick’s cross-appeal regarding the limitation of registration to Queensland and New South Wales.
In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the Registrar’s decision to register Mary McCormick’s marks, and instead refused the registration. The matter was adjourned to a future date, and the costs of the proceedings were reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The cross appeal be dismissed.
3. The decision of the delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks (“the Registrar”) that the word marks “mccormick’s” and “mccormick’s instant batter simply add water” the subject of application No 574023 be registered subject to the endorsement that “Under the provisions of paragraph 41(3)(a) [sic] registration of this series of trade marks is limited to the states of Queensland and New South Wales”, be set aside.
4. In lieu of the Registrar’s decision, registration of the marks referred to in par 3 above be refused.
5. The costs of the proceedings be reserved.
6. The matter be adjourned to a date to be fixed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
In the circumstances of the case, Mary McCormick’s submission that, simply by reason of its failure to protest against her use of the marks, McCormick & Co is to be taken to have acquiesced in her subsequent registration application, must fail: see Electrolux Ltd v Electrix Ltd (1953) 70 RPC 127; 71 RPC 23. I accept, as McCormick & Co submits, that there is a real difference between a rival trader using her own name and a rival trader seeking to assert exclusive rights over that name by having it registered. Whilst a person’s bona fide use of her name as her mark does not infringe (see s 122), registration of the mark does not necessarily follow (see, e.g., Johnson & Johnson at 432, 437). It is relevant to recall that registration gives significant additional rights beyond mere use: see Woolworths at 372.is registration precluded by section 60 of the act? Almost as an afterthought, McCormick & Co submits that s 60 of the Act presents an insurmountable obstacle to Mary McCormick’s application. The Act deals with applications for registration in Part 4 and opposition to registration in Part 5. Division 2 of Part 5 is headed “Grounds for opposing registration”. Section 57 provides:The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on any of the grounds on which an application for the registration for a trade mark may be rejected under Division 2 of Part 4, except the ground that the trade mark cannot be represented graphically. By virtue of s 57, McCormick & Co opposes registration of Mary McCormick’s marks on the grounds provided by s 44 (in Part 4). Section 60, which forms part of the second Division of Part 5, further provides:The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:(a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, a trade mark that, before the priority date for the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, had acquired a reputation in Australia; and(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first-mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. McCormick & Co submits that the evidence establishes the circumstances set out in pars 60(a) and (b). The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on any of the grounds specified in Division 2 of Part 5 and on no other grounds: see s 52(4). Mary McCormick’s marks are substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the McCormick & Co marks. That was not in issue on the appeal. But does the evidence establish that before 9 March 1992 the McCormick & Co marks had acquired a reputation in Australia on account of which the use of Mary McCormick’s marks would be likely to deceive or cause confusion? Counsel for Mary McCormick submits that McCormick & Co fails at this fundamental point. What is intended by the word “reputation” in s 60? The word is defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as follows:reputation … 1. the estimation in which a person or thing is held, esp. by the community or the public generally; repute … 2. favourable repute; good name … 3. A favourable and publicly recognised name or standing for merit, achievement, etc. … 4. The estimation or name of being, having done, etc, something specified.Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary. In s 60, the word is, I think, apt to refer to “the recognition of the McCormick & Co marks by the public generally”.