Opposition by Meat & Milk Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application number 2346585 (classes 25, 29, 35 and 40) -

[2025] ATMO 134

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Meat & Milk Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application number 2346585 (classes 25, 29, 35 and 40) - BERMUDA BUTCHERY AND MEAT CELLAR - in the name of BERMUDA BUTCHERY & DELICATESSEN PTY LTD

Delegate:

Anne Makrigiorgos

Representation:

Opponent: Rebecca De Stoop of Counsel instructed by Clifford Gouldson Lawyers

Applicant: Sonia Stewart of Counsel instructed by LegalVision ILP Pty Ltd

Decision:

2025 ATMO 134

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – opposition under section 52 – grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60 considered – no ground of opposition established – trade mark to proceed to registration

Background

1. This decision concerns an opposition under s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)[1] by Meat & Milk Pty Ltd (‘Opponent’) to registration of the following trade mark:

[1] Unless otherwise stated, each reference to a section is a reference to a section of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) and each reference to a regulation is a reference to a regulation in the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth).

Trade mark number	2346585 (‘Application’)
Trade mark	BERMUDA BUTCHERY AND MEAT CELLAR (‘Trade Mark’)
Applicant	BERMUDA BUTCHERY & DELICATESSEN PTY LTD (‘Applicant’)
Filing Date	11 April 2023 (‘Relevant Date’)
Specification	See Annexure A (‘Applicant’s Goods and/or Services’)

2.    The Trade Mark was examined and advertised as accepted for possible registration on 12 September 2023.

3.    On 18 October 2023, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose the Application. On 16 November 2023, the Opponent filed a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’). The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend the opposition on 8 December 2023.

4.    The Opponent filed Evidence in Support (‘EIS’) on 11 March 2024. The Applicant filed Evidence in Answer (‘EIA’) on 19 June 2024. The Opponent filed Evidence in Reply (‘EIR’) on 20 August 2024.

5.    The parties were given the opportunity to either request an oral hearing or to file written submissions. Both parties elected to be heard by video conference. The matter was heard on 22 April 2025. Providing submissions for the Opponent was Rebecca De Stoop of Counsel instructed by Nicola Hayden of Clifford Gouldson Lawyers. The Applicant’s submissions were made by Sonia Stewart of Counsel instructed by Sarina Cali of LegalVision ILP Pty Ltd. The hearing took place before another delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, however due to unforeseen circumstances that delegate was not available to decide this matter and as such, this matter has now been allocated to me for decision. I have read all the relevant documents and materials in respect of this opposition including the SGP, evidence and written submissions and have listened to the recording of the hearing. As a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, I have decided this matter based on the particulars set out in the SGP, the evidence of the parties and the written and oral submissions of the parties.

Grounds and onus

6.    The SGP nominates grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44, 58 and 60. The Opponent indicated in its oral submissions that the Opponent no longer pressed the s 58 ground. I therefore treat this ground as abandoned.

7.    The Opponent carries the burden of establishing at least one ground of opposition[2] on the balance of probabilities.[3] The date at which the rights of the parties are to be determined is the Relevant Date.[4]

Evidence

1. The parties filed the following evidence in this matter:

   [2] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32] (Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot JJ).

   [3] Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelmann JJ).

   [4] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 595 (Kitto J) (‘Southern Cross’).

Declarant and Position	Date	Annexures
EIS
Declaration of Luke Kevin Jensen, Director of the Opponent (‘Jensen 1’)	8 March 2024	LKJ1 to LKJ28 including Confidential LKJ7 to LKJ12
EIA
Declaration of Craig Allan Reid, Director of the Applicant (‘Reid’)	19 June 2024	CR-1 to CR-10
EIR
Second declaration of Luke Kevin Jensen (‘Jensen 2’)	20 August 2024	1 to 7

Summary of evidence

EIS

9.    Jensen provides details of the Opponent’s registered trade marks in Australia:

Number	Trade mark	Goods	Priority date
2124599	MEAT CELLAR (‘Word Mark’)	Class 35: butcher shop retail services; online butcher shop retail services; advertising and marketing services in respect of meat, meat products and prepared meals; butchers shop business franchising services; administration of the business affairs of franchises in relation to butchers shops; business assistance, advice and consultancy relating to franchising of butchers shops; business management and development services in relation to operation and franchising of butchers shops	30 September 2020
2388667	(‘Device Mark’)	See Annexure B	14 September 2023

10.    Jensen states that since at least December 2020, the Opponent has been using, by itself and by its related company and authorised user Meat Cellar at The Ridge Pty Ltd (‘Claimed User’), the Word Mark and the Device Mark (‘together ‘Opponent’s Marks’) in relation to meat, poultry, dairy, pies, pastries and other food products, butcher shop retail services, online butcher shop retail services, advertising and marketing of meat, meat products and prepared meals and butchery (meat preparation), smoking of meat and treatment of meat and meat products (‘Used Goods and/or Services’).

11.    Jensen claims that the Opponent caused the Claimed User to register the business name MEAT CELLAR[5] (‘Business Name’) in the name of the Claimed User on 24 April 2019. Jensen annexes an extract from the Australian Securities & Investments Commission register (‘ASIC’).

[5] The address of the business name is listed as 168 Long St. South Toowoomba.

12.    Jensen states that Mr Jensen is a butcher and that he and his wife chose the Word Mark around April 2019 for their butcher shop in Toowoomba, Queensland, which opened on 9 December 2020 (‘First Shop’). Mr Jensen also rebranded another butcher shop, also in Toowoomba, from Westridge Meats with the Opponent’s Marks (‘Rebranded Shop’). Jensen annexes a screenshot from the Opponent’s Facebook page dated 8 December 2020 referring to the opening (with 69 likes) and stating  and from 9 November 2022 referring to the rebranding (with 39 likes).

13.    Jensen claims that:

·the Opponent has approximately 4700 customers on its books and that the actual number of customers is greater;

·the Opponent’s customers span South-East Queensland and the Opponent offers and provides transportation and delivery services to customers in Brisbane, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast and everywhere in between; and

·the Opponent has received enquiries from people all over Australia including several customers requesting delivery to Melbourne.

14.    Jensen provides:

·the Opponent’s profit and loss statements for the years 2020 to June 2023 where I note the instore sales figures are impressive and website sales range from 1.8% to 6.7% of instore sales. Jensen states that these figures include sales figures for beef, goats, lambs and hoggets, marinades, sauces, seasonings, pigs and poultry goods under the Device Mark;

·the Claimed User’s profit and loss statements for the years 2021 to June 2023 where I note sales revenue is impressive. Jensen again states that these figures include sales figures for beef, goats, lambs and hoggets, marinades, sauces, seasonings, pigs and poultry goods under the Device Mark;

·stock item sales reports which detail the items sold for the years 2020 to 21 February 2024. The figures provided for the period 1 July 2023 to 21 Feb 2024 are after the Relevant Date. I note the stock sold, including online, includes beef, lamb, pork and chicken products, meat packs and trays, pantry items such as sauces, salts, rubs, dressings, stock, passata, chutneys, relishes, pickles, cakes and biscuits, ready made meals, eggs and dairy and small goods; and

·a financial report showing figures for sales and quantity of sales for the financial year 2022/2023 which are impressive.

15.    Jensen also provides advertising and marketing costs for the Opponent and the Claimed User for the financial years 2021 – 2023 which range from low to reasonable for a butcher shop.

16.    Jensen provides examples of advertising and promotion including:

·The Opponent’s website at launched in October 2020 annexing WayBack Machine screenshots dated 18 January 2022 where I note use of the Opponent’s Marks. I also note reference on the website to:

and  This theme of promoting ‘local’ runs through the Opponent’s advertising and promotion of the MEAT CELLAR butcher shops;

·A Facebook account with 3300 followers annexing screenshots of posts dated 18 November 2020, 12 January and 20 April 2021where I note use of the Opponent’s Marks and reference to ;

·An Instagram account since November 2020;

·Australian Awards in 2022 and 2023 including Australian Meat Industry Council (‘AMIC’) Charcuterie Excellence Awards and the Sydney Fine Food Show for bacon and ham. Jensen annexes an Instagram post dated April 2022 stating ‘On the weekend @meat.cellar was awarded BEST BACON in the Region!’ with no indication as to the awarding body, a post from the AMIC website announcing the Charcuterie Excellence Awards (‘CEA’) in 2022 where I note from 725 entries, there were 611 award winners, and a Facebook post dated December 2022 referring to the CEA for ham. The 2023 CEA for bacon and ham are dated after the Relevant Date; and

·International award for the World’s Best Bacon at the World Charcuterie Awards in London in September 2023, after the Relevant Date.

17.    Jensen attests that the Opponent supplies the Used Goods to two third party retailers in Toowoomba for resale and to a commercial establishment which provides cooked and baked goods, claiming that the commercial establishment promotes the Opponent’s Marks both by signage instore and online. Jensen annexes screenshots of three undated Instagram reels.

EIA

18.    Reid provides a history of the Applicant’s operation of butcher shops. Since 1995 the Applicant has operated ‘Bermuda Butchery’ in Mermaid Waters, Queensland. The Applicant now has two further butchers’ shops in Burleigh Waters and Benowa, Queensland, each of which offer home delivery.

19.    Reid states that the Applicant began using the Trade Mark in the Mermaid Waters store when it introduced a walk in retail cold room described as a ‘meat cellar’ concept, for customers to view and purchase meats and meat products. The ‘meat cellar’ opened on 9 April 2022. Reid annexes Instagram posts dated in March and April 2022 referring to the ‘meat cellar’ concept where I note use of the trade marks:

and

20.    Reid attests that in February 2024, a ‘meat cellar’ was also introduced into the Burleigh Waters store annexing undated photographs of store fronts and signage for the stores featuring a ‘meat cellar’ where I note use of:

and .

21.    Reid declares that the Applicant does not use the words ‘meat cellar’ to distinguish the Applicant’s business or act as a standalone trade mark of the business and the term ‘meat cellar’ is used to illustrate the Applicant’s stores which offer walk-in cool rooms. Reid also declares that the Applicant’s ‘meat cellar’ concept is designed to be an offering under the BERMUDA BUTCHERY brand, in which the Applicant has a long standing reputation.

22.    Reid annexes screenshots from the Applicant’s website at in 2024 referring to the ‘meat cellar’ concept and screenshots from Facebook (1600 followers) and Instagram (1700 followers) in 2024.

23.    Reid provides advertising and promotional expenditure for the financial years 2021 to 2023 which are reasonable and revenue figures for the years 2021 to 2024 for the BERMUDA BUTCHERY brand which are significant.

24.    Reid states that the Opponent’s butcher shops are located around 200 km away from the Applicant’s butcher shops and due to the nature of butcher shops being purveyors of fresh food, customer reach is generally localised.

25.    Reid states that the Applicant has at all times acted honestly and in good faith in adopting the Trade Mark. At the time of adoption, the Applicant was not aware of the Opponent or their use of the name Meat Cellar, or of any other entity providing similar goods and services under the same or similar trade mark in Australia. Further, Reid states that the Opponent did not approach the Applicant or express any concern with the Applicant’s use of the Trade Mark before the Application was filed.

EIR

26.    Jensen 2 responds to the statement in Reid that the Opponent’s butcher shops are located around 200 km away from the Applicant’s butcher shops and due to the nature of butcher shops being purveyors of fresh food, customer reach is generally localised. Jensen 2 states that the Opponent has had national enquiries from customers in Sydney looking to purchase its bacon.

27.    Jensen 2 claims it is highly likely that internet searches for the words ‘Meat Cellar’ from mid-2021 through to the filing date of the Application would have revealed the Opponent’s Meat Cellar business, as would a search of the IP Australia trade mark register.

28.    Jensen 2 responds to the statements in Reid that the Applicant does not use the words ‘meat cellar’ to distinguish the Applicant’s business or act as a standalone trade mark. Jensen 2 states that the Applicant was using the words ‘Meat Cellar’ as a website page name and heading annexing a Wayback Machine screenshot of the Applicant’s website at as it appeared on 28 October 2022

29.    The balance of Jensen 2 consists of arguments in reply to Reid and do not require summarising.

Discussion and reasons

Section 44

30.    Section 44 relevantly provides (several notes omitted):

Identical etc. trade marks

(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant’s trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant’s goods) must be rejected if:

(a)the applicant’s trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

(i)a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or

(ii)a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and

(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark in respect of the applicant’s goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.

Note 1:For deceptively similar see section 10.

Note 2:For similar goods see subsection 14(1).

(2)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant’s trade mark) in respect of services (applicant’s services) must be rejected if:

(a)it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

(i)a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar services or closely related goods; or

(ii)a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar services or closely related goods is being sought by another person; and

(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark in respect of the applicant’s services is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar services or closely related goods.

Note 1:For deceptively similar see section 10.

Note 2:For similar services see subsection 14(2).

(3)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied:

(a)that there has been honest concurrent use of the 2 trade marks; or

(b)that, because of other circumstances, it is proper to do so;

the Registrar may accept the application for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark subject to any conditions or limitations that the Registrar thinks fit to impose. If the applicant’s trade mark has been used only in a particular area, the limitations may include that the use of the trade mark is to be restricted to that particular area.

Note:For limitations see section 6.

(4)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied that the applicant, or the applicant and the predecessor in title of the applicant, have continuously used the applicant’s trade mark for a period:

(a)beginning before the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of:

(i)the similar goods or closely related services; or

(ii)the similar services or closely related goods; and

(b)ending on the priority date for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark;

the Registrar may not reject the application because of the existence of the other trade mark.

Note 1:An authorised use of the trade mark by a person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark (see subsection 7(3)).

31.    The SGP nominates the Word Mark. As a starting point, to successfully oppose the Application pursuant to s 44, the Opponent must establish that:

·The Word Mark has a priority date which is earlier than the Relevant Date and is held in a name other than that of the Applicant (the ‘first requirement’);

·the Trade Mark is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the Word Mark (the ‘second requirement’); and

·the Applicant’s Services are similar to the services of the Word Mark and/or the Applicant’s Goods are closely related to the Registered Services (the ‘third requirement’).

32.    I am satisfied that the priority date of the Word Mark is earlier than the Relevant Date and that the Word Mark is in a name other than the Applicant. Therefore, the first requirement is satisfied.

33.    I move then to consider whether the Trade Mark is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the Word Mark. The SGP claims that the Trade Mark is both substantially identical to and deceptively similar with the Word Mark. However, in the Opponent’s oral submissions, the Opponent indicated that it was no longer pressing that the Trade Mark was substantially identical. For the sake of completeness, I do not consider the Trade Mark to be substantially identical to the Word Mark. Compared side by side as a whole,[6] the Trade Mark has obvious visual and aural differences to the Word Mark and as a consequence, there is a total impression of dissimilarity.[7]

[6] The Shell Co. of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd [1963] HCA 66, [13] (Windeyer J) (‘Shell’).

[7] Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Sitmar Cruises Limited [1994] FCA 936, [53] (Gummow J).

34.    Next, I will consider whether the Trade Mark is deceptively similar to the Word Mark. Section 10 provides a definition of deceptively similar being that ‘a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion’.

35.    Justice Windeyer outlined the following approach for the assessment of deceptive similarity in Shell:

On the question of deceptive similarity a different comparison must be made from that which is necessary when substantial identity is in question. The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity. Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff's mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant's [mark].[8]

[8] Shell (n 6).

36.    The respective trade marks must be compared as wholes,[9] having regard to essential or distinguishing features,[10] and considering the marks visually and aurally, and in the context of the relevant surrounding circumstances.[11] What must be considered is the overall impression that the notional buyer, being a person of ordinary intelligence and memory, would likely have of the Trade Mark and the Word Mark, having regard to the look, sound, and ideas conveyed by the respective marks, and allowing for imperfect recollection.[12]

[9] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020, [50] (‘Woolworths’). See also, Torpedoes Sportswear Pty Limited v Thorpedo Enterprises Pty Limited [2003] FCA 901, [78] (Bennett J).

[10] Crazy Ron’s Communications v Mobileworld Communications [2004] FCAFC 196, [77]-[88] (Moore, Sackville and Emmett JJ).

[11] New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co Ltd [1989] FCA 124; (1989) 86 ALR 549, 589 (Gummow J).

[12] Jockey International Inc v Darren Wilkinson [2010] ATMO 22 (Hearing Officer Spence).

37.    In Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd, Kitto J noted the following regarding the risk of deception or confusion:

While a mere possibility of confusion is not enough - for there must be a real, tangible danger of its occurring - it is sufficient if the result of the user of the mark will be that a number of persons will be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt.[13]

[13] Southern Cross (n 4), 594.

38.    Deceived implies the creation of an incorrect belief or mental impression; ‘causing confusion’ may merely involve ‘perplexing or mixing up the minds’ of potential customers.[14]

[14] Coca-Cola Company v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107, 122 [39] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ) quoting Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Hy-Line Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 50, 62 (Richardson J).

39.    In relation to the comparison of marks, the Full Court said in Starr Partners Pty Ltd v Dev Prem Pty Ltd:

The first step in the analysis is to identify the impression produced by the registered mark considered in its entirety. Similarity is not based on only part of the registered mark. On the other hand, when one decides upon the impression produced by that mark it is not improper to give more or less weight to particular features of it, provided the ultimate conclusion is based on a consideration of the mark in its entirety. This approach does no more than recognise that one word or feature of a mark can be more striking and memorable than another.[15]

[15] [2007] FCAFC 42, [22] (Lindgren, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ).

40.     Thus, the presence of a common element is not conclusive to a finding of deceptive similarity.[16] Distinctiveness of the compared trade marks is a factor that can legitimately be taken into account when considering deceptive similarity[17] and the determination of the question ‘must necessarily involve some inquiry as to the inherent distinctiveness of the part which is common to both marks under consideration’.[18] Therefore it is relevant to take into account whether elements of the rival marks have a descriptive character’[19] and whether the element of a trade mark that is descriptive may call to mind the nature of the product or service, rather than its trade source.[20]

[16] Conde Nast Publications Pty Ltd v Virginia Taylor [1998] FCA 864 (Burchett J); PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 128 (Jagot, Nicholas and Burley JJ).

[17] Stone & Wood Group Pty Ltd v Intellectual Property Development Corporation Pty Ltd (2018) 129 IPR 238, [66] (Allsop CJ, Nicholas, Katzmann JJ).

[18] Re Frigiking Trade Mark [1973] RPC 739, 752 (Ch D).

[19] The Agency Group Australia Limited v H.A.S. Real Estate Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 482, [73] (Jackman J).

[20] Combe International Ltd v Dr August Wolff GmbH & Co KG Arzneimittel [2021] FCAFC 8, [78] (McKerracher, Gleeson and Burley JJ).

41.    The commonality of idea is part of the process of determining if the marks look or sound alike. In Cooper Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Sigmund Pumps Ltd, the High Court observed:

[t]he fact that two marks convey the same idea is not sufficient in itself to create a deceptive resemblance between them, although this fact could be taken into account in deciding whether two marks which really looked alike or sounded alike were likely to deceive.[21]

[21] (1952) 86 CLR 536, 539 (Dixon CJ, Williams, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ).

42.    Justice French expressed the view in Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths[22] that the determination of whether, and to what degree, an applicant’s goods or services are similar to, or closely related to, the relevant goods or services of the earlier trade mark owner is ‘logically antecedent to’ assessing the similarity of the parties’ trade marks. In particular, French J explicitly approved the observation in Wilcox J’s first instance decision in the Woolworths Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks matter that, ‘[t]he closer the relationship between the services and particular goods, the more likely any similarity in marks will prove deceptive’.[23]

[22] Woolworths (n 9) [39].

[23] (1998) 42 IPR 615, 624.

43.    In light of the authorities, I must decide whether there is a real tangible risk that the result of the use of the Trade Mark will be that a reasonable person will be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the Applicant’s Goods and Services bearing the Trade Mark are from the same source as the Opponent’s Services bearing the Word Mark. I must compare the respective wholes with regard to their essential or distinguishing features, and consider them visually and aurally, in the context of the relevant surrounding circumstances. I should account for imperfect recollection of the reasonable person.

44.    The Opponent submits as follows:

·the words MEAT CELLAR, being the only words in the Word Mark, are the essential elements of the Word Mark;

·the essential feature of the Trade Mark is also the words MEAT CELLAR as these words are not commonly used in the provision of butchery services or meat products; and

·the ordinary reasonable consumer is more likely to recall the words MEAT CELLAR when faced with the Trade Mark and wonder whether the similar goods and services are related, particularly as the target consumer for the goods and services of the respective marks are the same.

45.    The Applicant submits that:

·the word BERMUDA is the essential or distinguishing feature of the Trade Mark, because BERMUDA is not descriptive of the Applicant’s Goods and Services and the words MEAT CELLAR are no more or less important than the word BUTCHERY;

·in the context of the parties’ goods and services, where the word CELLAR is descriptive of a ‘room or set of rooms for the storage of foodstuffs, etc’ and the word MEAT is descriptive, the words MEAT CELLAR describe a room used for the storage of meat. It is therefore likely that any hypothetical consumer would believe that a trader known as BERMUDA or BERMUDA BUTCHERY operates a butchery in conjunction with a meat cellar: that is, they would perceive the words BUTCHERY and MEAT CELLAR in the Trade Mark to describe the place/room where the Applicant stores butchered meat and where such goods are available for purchase; and

·there is no evidence of confusion before the Relevant Date.

46.    In my view, the Trade Mark is not deceptively similar to the Word Mark. The ideas and impressions formed by the two trade marks differ, visually, aurally and conceptually. While the sole words MEAT CELLAR are the impression and recollection of the Word Mark, I consider the words MEAT CELLAR have low distinctiveness in light of the meanings of the words MEAT and CELLAR and the meaning of their combination. The word MEAT is well known to all Australians and relevantly the definition of the word CELLAR in the Macquarie Dictionary Online is ‘noun 1. a room or set of rooms for the storage of foodstuffs, etc, now always either wholly or partly underground, and usually beneath a building’. MEAT CELLAR is therefore apt to describe a room where meat is stored.

47.    Given that both marks contain the words MEAT CELLAR, there is a degree of visual and aural similarity, but this alone is not enough to establish that the Trade Mark is deceptively similar to the Word Mark. The Trade Mark consists of five words. The Word Mark of two. The Trade Mark contains three other words at the beginning of the mark – BERMUDA, BUTCHERY and AND. The word BERMUDA in respect of the Applicant’s Goods and Services is distinctive and unusual for a butcher shop, given that BERMUDA is not in Australia and not, on the evidence before me or to the best of my knowledge, a geographical location associated with butchery or meat. These three elements at the beginning of the Trade Mark cannot be ignored and nor would a notional consumer ignore these words and focus solely on the termination of the Trade Mark. The words BERMUDA BUTCHERY are a striking aspect of the mark both visually and aurally.

48.    Further, there is a synergy between the words BERMUDA BUTCHERY and MEAT CELLAR in the Trade Mark. In my view, a hypothetical consumer would likely perceive the words BERMUDA BUTCHERY as the name of the butcher shop and MEAT CELLAR as a room in the butcher shop where meat is stored and additionally, that room is one where the meat can be viewed for purchase.

49.    Visually and aurally, acknowledging the descriptive significance of the words MEAT CELLAR, I consider the respective marks compared as a whole are significantly different. I also consider that the respective marks express quite different ideas and impressions when the marks are viewed as a whole.

50.    The question is whether there is a real tangible risk that the result of the use of the Trade Mark will be that a reasonable person will be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that butcher shop goods and services bearing the Trade Mark are from the same source as butcher shop services bearing the Word Mark. This consideration is not concerned with the mere possibility of deception or confusion between trade marks but a real, tangible danger of it occurring.

51.    After consideration of the differences in the respective marks, taken together, and even allowing for imperfect recollection, as a matter of impression and common sense they generate an overall visual, aural and conceptual impression of difference. A consumer would not confuse the Word Mark with the Trade Mark.

52.    I am not satisfied that consumers viewing or hearing the Trade Mark would be caused to wonder whether the Applicant’s Goods and Services originate from the same trade source as the Opponent, or that the trade marks are otherwise connected in some way. I find that there does not exist a real, tangible danger of deception or confusion between the two. The s 44 ground is therefore not established.

Section 60

53.    The provisions of s 60 are reproduced below:

Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia

The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:

(a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and

(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

Note:For priority date see section 12.

54.    To establish this ground, the Opponent must demonstrate the existence of another trade mark(s) which had acquired a reputation in Australia before the Relevant Date. The Opponent must then establish that because of this reputation, use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

55.    The SGP identifies the Opponent’s Marks as supporting this ground of opposition. The Opponent claims that the Opponent’s Marks have been continuously used in respect of ‘butcher shop retail services including online, meat and meat products, butchery and smoked meats’ (‘Opponent’s Goods and Services’) and as a result the Opponent has a reputation in Opponent’s Marks and use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

Reputation

56.    The meaning of reputation was considered by Kenny J in McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick (‘McCormick’) as referring to ‘the recognition of the [trade mark] by the public generally’.[24]

[24] [2000] FCA 1335, [81].

57.    Further, Kenny J stated in McCormick that:

In practice, it is commonplace to infer reputation from a high volume of sales, together with substantial advertising expenditures and other promotions, without any direct evidence of consumer appreciation of the mark, as opposed to the product ... public awareness of and regard for a mark tends to correlate with appreciation of the products with which that mark is associated, as evidenced by sales volume, amongst other things.[25]

[25] Ibid [86].

58.    The reputation in the other trade mark must be amongst a ‘significant or substantial’ number of Australian consumers but this is tempered by the nature of the relevant market.[26] Here the relevant market is butcher shops and as such, is likely to include many Australian households. Meanwhile, the ‘existence and extent of reputation’ must be established as a matter of fact by the Opponent.[27]

[26] See, eg, Renaud Cointreau & Cie v Cordon Bleu International Ltee [2001] FCA 1170, [75] (Moore, Tamberlin and Goldberg JJ).

[27] ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd [1992] FCA 159, [57].

59.    In Rodney Jane Racing Pty Ltd v Monster Energy Company (‘Rodney’), it was observed that:

The reputation of a trade mark has quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The quantitative dimension concerns the breadth of the public that are likely to be aware of the mark, which can be evidenced by the quantum of sales, advertising and promotion of goods or services to which the mark is applied. The qualitative dimension concerns the image and values projected by the trade mark, which affects the esteem or favour in which the mark is held by the public generally.[28]

[28] [2019] 142 IPR 275, [83] (O’Bryan J) (‘Rodney’).

60.    The Opponent submits that:

·     the reputation in the Opponent Marks is strong among customers including third party retailers and commercial establishments;

·     the Opponent has spent a significant amount on advertising and marketing;

·     the Opponent has won an award every year since 2020 for meat products and these awards have been promoted in social media; and

·     since the Relevant Date, the Opponent’s reputation has continued to grow.

61.    While the Opponent bases the s 60 ground on the Opponent’s Marks, notably, each is considered a separate trade mark for the purposes of s 60.[29]

[29] Qantas Airways Ltd v Edwards (2016) 338 ALR 134, [160] (Yates J); Rodney (n 28), [89].

62.    As a preliminary point, there is evidence from the Opponent of sales by both the Opponent and the Claimed User. In order for these sales to be attributed to the Opponent, the Claimed User must be an authorised user.

63.    Section 7(3) provides:

Use of trade mark

An authorised use of a trade mark by a person (see section 8) is taken, for the purposes of this Act, to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark.

64.    Section 8 provides:

Definitions of authorised user and authorised use

(1)A person is an authorised user of a trade mark if the person uses the trade mark in relation to goods or services under the control of the owner of the trade mark.

(2)The use of a trade mark by an authorised user of the trade mark is an authorised use of the trade mark to the extent only that the user uses the trade mark under the control of the owner of the trade mark.

(3)If the owner of a trade mark exercises quality control over goods or services:

(a)dealt with or provided in the course of trade by another person; and

(b)in relation to which the trade mark is used;

the other person is taken, for the purposes of subsection (1), to use the trade mark in relation to the goods or services under the control of the owner.

(4)If:

(a)a person deals with or provides, in the course of trade, goods or services in relation to which a trade mark is used; and

(b)the owner of the trade mark exercises financial control over the other person’s relevant trading activities;

the other person is taken, for the purposes of subsection (1), to use the trade mark in relation to the goods or services under the control of the owner.

(5)Subsections (3) and (4) do not limit the meaning of the expression under the control of in subsections (1) and (2).

65.    In Lodestar Anstalt v Campari America LLC, Katzmann J commented on the construction of s 8 as follows:

… Subsections (3)–(4) reveal that use will be taken to be use under the control of the owner where, for example, the owner “exercises quality control over goods or services … dealt with or provided in the course of trade by another person … and … in relation to which the mark is used” or “exercises financial control over the other person’s relevant trading activities”. Subsection (5) states that subss (3)–(4) do not limit the meaning of the expression “under the control of” but this statement is ambiguous. It might signify that “control” is not limited to quality control or financial control. On the other hand, it might signify that control is not limited by the context provided by subs (3)–(4). The former construction is the preferable one. In my opinion, the examples given in subss (3) and (4) give colour to the concept of control in s 8. The language used in the two subsections strongly suggests that — regardless of the form control might take — it is the exercise of control that matters, not merely the right to do so.[30]

[30] [2016] FCAFC 92, [169].

66.    In Trident Seafoods Corporation v Trident Foods Pty Ltd, the Full Court noted that as a matter of practicality, control could be found in circumstances where the two companies shared the same directors, stating:

The issue is not whether one company controlled the other but rather whether Trident Foods, even though a wholly owned subsidiary of Manassen, had control over Manassen’s use of the trade marks. In that sense it is significant that at all relevant times the two companies had the same directors. It must be inferred from the evidence that the two companies operated with a unity of purpose. Trident Foods held the trade marks. Manassen sold the products under the TRIDENT brand and thereby used the trade marks. In the primary judge’s view these arrangements showed nothing more than that Trident Foods acquiesced in Manassen’s use of the marks: PJ [179(4)] and [217]. In the present case, where there were common directors, the concept of mere acquiescence by the one company to the use by the other company (albeit that Manassen is the parent company) appears alien. As directors of Trident Foods, the directors had obligations to ensure the maintenance of the value in the marks. To that end Trident Foods necessarily controlled Manassen’s use of the marks by reason of the simple fact that it owned the marks and its directors, who were also Manassen’s directors, must have had one common purpose, being to maximise sales and to enhance the value of the brand.… it is commercially unrealistic in the circumstances of the present case not to infer that the owner of the marks controlled the use of the marks because the common directors necessarily wished to ensure the maintenance and enhancement of the value of the brand.[31]

[31] [2019] FCAFC 100, [45] (Reeves, Jagot and Rangiah JJ).

67.    Section 8(3) makes it clear that it is the trade mark owner that must exercise control over the use of the trade mark by the authorised user. While the Opponent claims that the Claimed User is a related company, the Opponent has not provided any evidence to this effect such as a printout from ASIC. The Opponent submits that there is evidence that the Claimed User is a related company as the principal place of business address of the Business Name is the same as the Opponent’s address on its trade mark registrations. I do not find this submission convincing. The address is not of the Claimed User and even if it was, a similar address alone does not show control. The fact remains that the Opponent has not provided any evidence of control of the Claimed User by the Opponent and nor has the Opponent demonstrated evidence of any relationship between the Opponent or the Claimed User such as common directors or any evidence of a licence agreement. Absent any evidence of control, the Claimed User is not an authorised user and the use by the Claimed User in not use by the Opponent.

68.    In my view, the goods and services provided by a butcher shop are very much a localised offering. I consider it would be unusual for customers to go outside their own suburb, let alone outside their city, to a butcher shop. As noted from the Opponent’s website and social media, the idea of being local runs through the Opponent’s advertising and promotion of the MEAT CELLAR butcher shops. Further, while Jensen states that the Opponent’s customers include upwards of 4700 customers spanning South-East Queensland, plus several customers requesting delivery to Melbourne, there is no evidence to support this claim.

69.    To me, based on the Opponent’s evidence, if the Opponent has a reputation in the Opponent’s Marks at the Relevant Date, such a reputation is limited to the City of Toowoomba, where both the First Shop and the Rebranded Shop are located.

70.    It is important to note that reputation need not be Australia wide, and the existence of a predominantly localised reputation will not necessarily mean that an Opponent’s case under s 60 will fail. In Toddler Kindy Gymbaroo Pty Ltd v Gymboree Pty Ltd,[32] it was held that reputation existed in Australia in a trade mark used only in relation to a business with several locations across Melbourne and Geelong.

[32] [2000] FCA 618, [94] (Moore J).

71.    As observed by O’Bryan J in Rodney,[33] the reputation of a trade mark has quantitative and qualitative dimensions. In respect of the quantitative dimensions, the Opponent’s sales figures provided for the years 2020 to June 2023 are impressive for each year. However, based on the level of sales figures in 2020 for the Opponent, the fact that the First Shop only opened in December 2020[34] and the fact that there were no sales by the Claimed User in 2020, [35]these sales figures for the Opponent must relate to sales from the Rebranded Shop, which operated before November 2022 under the Westridge Meats brand and the sales figures for the Claimed User must relate to sales from the First Shop. As a consequence, the Opponent’s sales before November 2022 cannot be sales attributable to the Opponent’s Marks. Therefore, the only sales under the Opponent’s Marks by the Opponent cover a period of around 5 months from November 2022 to the Relevant Date. As the sales figures are expressed in years and not months, it is not possible to determine the extent of sales in this five month period.

[33] Rodney (n 28) [83].

[34] Jensen Annexure LKJ7.

[35] Jensen Annexure LKJ8.

72.    Further, Jensen states that the sales figures include sales figures for beef, goats, lambs and hoggets, marinades, sauces, seasonings, pigs and poultry goods under the Device Mark, making it impossible to ascertain what percentage of the sales figures relate to these goods sold under the Device Mark.

73.    In addition, the financial report showing figures for sales and quantity of sales for the financial year 2022/2023 headed Westridge Meats does not indicate whether these figures are for the First Shop and the Rebranded Shop or whether they also include figures of the Claimed User.

74.    As to the Opponent’s advertising and marketing costs, while ranging from low to reasonable for a butcher shop, these figures include the costs of the Claimed User. Therefore, I am unable to ascertain what percentage of these costs pertain to advertising and marketing the Opponent’s Goods and Services under the Opponent’s Marks and what percentage pertain to advertising and marketing the Claimed User’s goods and services.

75.    In respect of the qualitative dimensions referred to in Rodney, the Opponent provides screenshots of the Opponent’s website which are dated 18 January 2022, a mere 15 months before the Relevant Date. Facebook and Instagram follower numbers are very low with minimal likes and while three screenshots from Facebook show use of the Opponent’s Marks, there are no dated screenshots from Instagram. The Opponent also refers to Australian awards in 2022 for the Opponent’s bacon and ham.

76.    Having considered the totality of the Opponent’s evidence, I consider that there are significant weaknesses in the evidence as much of it lacks sufficient detail and specificity and, for the evidence dated after the Relevant Date, lacks relevance. As a consequence, I am not satisfied that the Opponent’s evidence supports a reputation in the Opponent’s Marks let alone a localised reputation in Toowoomba, nor does it support a reputation sufficient to enliven s 60. Whilst I acknowledge that the evidence demonstrates that the Opponent has used the Opponent’s Marks in respect of butchers’ shop goods and services, mere use of a trade mark does not demonstrate that a trade mark has garnered a reputation that may result in deception or confusion. Further the use of the Opponent’s Mark by the Claimed User undermines the Opponent’s claim to a reputation in the Opponent’s Marks.

77.    As I am not satisfied there is a reputation in the Opponent’s Marks in relation to the Opponent’s Goods and Services amongst a ‘significant or substantial’ number of Australian consumers, the Opponent has accordingly not established its ground of opposition under s 60.

78.    I add that had I been satisfied that the Opponent had a reputation in the Opponent’s Marks sufficient to enliven s 60, I would not be satisfied that because of that reputation, use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. For the same reasons detailed above under the s 44 ground of opposition, including the fact that the words MEAT CELLAR have low distinctiveness, the Word Mark and the Trade Mark do not share a significant degree of similarity. Further given that the Device Mark has the additional feature of a stained glass arch, this feature services to further differentiate the Trade Mark from the Device Mark.

Section 42(b)

1. Section 42(b) provides that a trade mark must be rejected if its use would be contrary to law. In its SGP, the Opponent states that the use of the Trade Mark contravenes the Opponent’s common law rights and contravenes s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’). The Opponent’s submissions expand on the SGP claiming that the conduct of the Applicant in offering butcher retail services and/or meat products under the Trade Mark would:

   ·constitute misleading or deceptive conduct, contrary to s 18 of the ACL;

   ·give rise to a false or misleading representation that the Applicant or its services have a sponsorship, approval or affiliation they do not have, contrary to section 29(1)(g) and (h) of the ACL; and

   ·amount to a passing off of the Applicant’s Services as services of, or associated with, the Opponent.

2. Section 18 of the ACL concerns conduct or representations that have, or are likely to, mislead or deceive. Section 29 of the ACL concerns representations that are false or misleading. These are stricter requirements than s 60 which can be established if the use is likely to cause confusion or wonderment.[36]

   [36] Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, 198 (Gibbs CJ); Monster Energy Company v Mixi Inc [2020] FCA 1398, [33] (Stewart J).

3. Where use of a trade mark does not contravene s 18 of the ACL neither will it amount to the tort of passing off.

4. Justice Hill in Re Equity Access Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation also addressed the relationship between s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the equivalent provision to s 18 of the ACL) and passing off. His Honour considered that:

   The scope for the operation of s 52 will thus be broader than that involved in the tort of passing off so that in a case such as the present where the claim is for the protection of the reputation in a name against the use of that name by another, failure to succeed under s 52 or s 53 will invariably mean that proceedings for passing off would likewise fail.[37]

   [37] [1989] FCA 506, [40] (citations omitted).

5. The Opponent submits that the Opponent has a significant reputation in the Opponent’s Marks and in light of this reputation, the use of the Trade Mark is likely to mislead or deceive consumers into thinking that the Applicant’s Services are a sub brand, branch, joint venture, franchise or sister shop of the Opponent or the Applicant’s Services are somehow, in some other way, otherwise approved by or affiliated with the Opponent and its well known MEAT CELLAR brand.

   84.     The Opponent further submits that the use of the Trade Mark, is likely to cause consumers to wonder whether the two brands BERMUDA BUTCHERY and MEAT CELLAR are related, particularly because of the use of the word AND in the Trade Mark. The Opponent continues that a customer, upon seeing the Trade Mark, will wonder whether it is the case that the Applicant’s use of BERMUDA BUTCHERY is intending to differentiate the butcher shop from the Opponent’s butcher shops in Toowoomba but still maintaining a marketing link between the businesses.

   85.     The Opponent’s oral submissions concede that the words MEAT CELLAR have a descriptive element, however, the Opponent submits that the Opponent was first to use these words as a trade mark and the words have, through this use, developed a secondary meaning as a badge of origin which identifies the Opponent. The Opponent makes reference to the Federal Court decision of Hemmes Trading Pty Ltd v Establishment 203 Pty Ltd (‘Establishment 203’)[38] where the court held that ESTABLISHMENT 203 was deceptively similar to ESTABLISHMENT and that there was a real possibility of ordinary and reasonable members of the public being led into erroneously thinking that the ESTABLISHMENT 203 restaurant was a commercial extension of, or otherwise associated with, the restaurant, bar and hotel business known as ESTABLISHMENT, or that the name ESTABLISHMENT 203 was being used with the approval of the owner of the ESTABLISHMENT business. In Establishment 203, Justice Jackman stated:

   [38] [2024] FCA 1100 (Jackman J).

   While the descriptive element of ESTABLISHMENT is an important consideration, in my view the applicant has succeeded in building up a reputation which is so strong that ESTABLISHMENT has acquired a secondary significance as identifying the applicant’s business venue in Sydney. The evidence of reputation in the present case establishes that the applicant’s reputation associated with ESTABLISHMENT is so extensive and prominent as to create a real possibility of leading ordinary and reasonable members of the public into erroneously thinking that the restaurant known as ESTABLISHMENT 203 is a commercial extension of, or otherwise associated with, the applicant’s restaurant, bar and hotel known as ESTABLISHMENT in Sydney. While the marks are different, I do not regard the addition of “203” as negating the real possibility that consumers would associate the word ESTABLISHMENT with the applicant’s well-known business. Apart from those rare consumers who are so deeply knowledgeable about the Queensland cattle industry to appreciate that “203” is a reference to the Stanbroke group’s abattoir registration number, the number “203” is unlikely to have any identifiable meaning in the minds of consumers. Those consumers may well think that “203” is intended to differentiate the restaurant in Brisbane from the business venue operated in Sydney, while retaining a marketing link with that business.[39]

   [39] Ibid [81].

6. In my view, the facts of the present case differ substantially from those of Establishment 203. Here, the Opponent has not built up a reputation, let alone one which is so strong that MEAT CELLAR has acquired a secondary significance and the additional words in the Trade Mark BERMUDA BUTCHERY do have an identifiable meaning in the minds of consumers.

7. In the end, I do not agree with the Opponent. Many of the Opponent’s submissions appear to separate the Trade Mark into two distinct trade marks. The question is not whether the Applicant’s use of MEAT CELLAR  separately to BERMUDA BUTCHERY would be contrary to law. The question is whether use of the Trade Mark as a whole would be contrary to law.

8. The Opponent seeks to rely on the reputation in the Opponent’s Marks which I have already discussed in relation to the s 60 ground of opposition. The Opponent does not have a reputation sufficient to enliven s 60 and certainly does not have a reputation that supports the Opponent’s submission that the Opponent’s Marks are well known. Where a ground of opposition under s 60 is unsuccessful, reputation-based claims under ss 18 and/or 29 of the ACL will also fail, as will claims of passing off.[40]

   [40] Re Equity Access Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1989] FCA 506 (Hill J); Riding for the Disabled Association of Australia Limited v Pony Club Australia Pty Ltd [2019] ATMO 63, [63]-[64] (Hearing Officer Richards).

9. I am not satisfied that use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant would be contrary to law. Therefore, the Opponent has not established the ground of opposition under s 42(b).

   Decision

   90.    Section 55 relevantly provides:

   Decision

   (1) Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:

   (a)  to refuse to register the trade mark; or

   (b)  to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;

   having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.

   Note:       For limitations see section 6.

   91.    The Opponent has failed to establish any of the grounds of opposition it nominated in the SGP. Trade mark application number 2346585 may proceed to registration not less than one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar is served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur until either the appeal is withdrawn or discontinued. Otherwise, the disposition of the Application should be in accordance with the Court’s order or direction.

   Costs

10. Both parties sought costs. It is usual for costs to follow the event, and I see no reason to depart from that principle here. I award costs against the Opponent under s 221 in the relevant amounts under Schedule 8 of the Regulations.

    Anne Makrigiorgos

    Hearing Officer

    Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks

    10 July 2025

    Annexure A

    Class 25: Clothing; Apparel (clothing, footwear, headgear); Hats; Baseball caps; Caps being headwear; Headwear; Jackets (clothing); Jumpers (pullovers); Pullovers; Shirts; Jumpers (sweaters); Sweaters; Sweatpants; Hooded sweatshirts; Sweatshirts; Printed t-shirts; T-shirts

    Class 29: Beef; Beef burgers (beef patties); Beef jerky; Beef products; Beef stock; Corned beef; Chicken (not live); Chicken products; Lamb; Lamb products; Chilled foods consisting predominantly of meat; Chilled meals made from meat; Chopped meat patties; Cold meats; Cooked meals consisting principally of meat; Cooked meat; Cooked meat dishes; Corned meat; Cubed meats; Dried meats; Freeze-dried meat; Fresh meat; Frozen meat; Grilled meat; Hamburgers (meat patties); Luncheon meats; Meat; Meat based stock; Meat broth concentrates; Burgers (meat patties); Meat burgers (meat patties); Meat conserves; Meat extracts; Meat gelatines; Meat jellies; Meat paste; Meat pates; Food products derived from meat; Food products made from meat; Frozen meat products; Game products (meat); Meat products; Meat-based snack food; Minced meat; Pastry fillings of meat; Pie fillings of meat; Cooked pork meats; Pork; Pork products; Pork products being cuts of meat; Food preparations consisting principally of meat; Lamb (prepared meat); Meat preparations; Food preparations made from meat; Preparations made from meat; Frozen prepared meals consisting principally of meat; Prepared meals consisting principally of meat; Prepared meals made from meat (meat predominating); Prepared meals, predominantly of meat or vegetables; Prepared meat; Prepared dishes consisting principally of meat; Prepared meat dishes; Food preparations consisting principally of meat products; Prepared meat products; Meat preserves; Meat, preserved; Preserved meats; Preserved prepared meat; Preserves made from meat; Processed meat products; Processed pork meats; Roasted meat; Salted meats; Pork sausages; Foodstuffs consisting of sausage meat; Sausage meat; Sausage products; Sausages; Smoked meats; Smoked prepared meat; Snack foods consisting principally of meat; Snack foods made from meat; Steaks of meat; Turkey meat

    Class 35: Retail sales services for prepared meat and meat products (butcher's shop); Retail services; Retail services for goods (by any means); Online retail services

    Class 40: Butchery (meat preparation); Drying of agricultural products; Food preservation; Food processing (other than cooking); Smoking of meat

    Annexure B

    Class 29: meat; fresh meat; frozen meat; meat products; frozen meat products; mince; minced meat; beef; beef products; beef burgers (beef patties); beef jerky; lamb; lamb (prepared meat); lamb products; lamb (prepared meat); pork; pork products; pork products being cuts of meat; processed pork meats; pork sausages; ham; ham products; bacon; bacon products; edible pork fats; chicken (not live); chicken products; chicken pieces; sausages; sausage products; sausage meat; blood sausage; hotdog sausages; sausage casings; rissoles; fish (no live); fish products; game (not live); game products (meat); turkey, not live; turkey meat; veal; liver; steaks of meat; steaks of fish; cold meats; meat trays; cubed meats; undercuts of meat; processed meat products; corned meat; corned beef; corned silverside; salted meats; smoked and smoke prepared meats; kebabs; burgers and hamburgers (meat patties); kabana; cheerios; saveloys; cooked meat; cooked meat dishes; prepared dishes and meals consisting principally of meat; cooked meals consisting principally of meat; chilled meals made from meat; food preparations and products made or derived from meat; frozen prepared meals consisting principally of meat; dried meats; extracts of meat and poultry; grilled meat; luncheon meats; meat based stock and broths; broth concentrates; meat conserves, extracts, gelatines, jellies, pastes and preserves; pie fillings of meat; salads containing meat; butchered poultry; dehydrated beef, chicken, ham, sausages and turkey; food products derived from meat; foodstuffs consisting of poultry; foodstuffs consisting of sausage meat; snack foods made from meat; meat sticks; stock (prepared); stock cubes; fresh poultry; eggs; egg products; dairy produce and products; butter; butter preparations; buttermilk and buttermilk products; by-products of milk; cows milk; cream (dairy products); cheese; cheese products; goats milk; goats cheese; yoghurt

    Class 30: meat pies; meat gravies; meat dumplings (cooked meat in a pastry envelope); pastries consisting of vegetables and meat; pies containing meat; sandwiches containing meat; binding preparations for meat; flavourings made from meat; sauces (condiments); sauces for meat and poultry; food pastes (seasonings); food pastes (spices); glazes for food

    Class 35: retail services; online retail services;

    Class 39: food delivery services; distribution of goods (transportation) in respect of meat, meat products and prepared meals; providing information, including online, about the aforementioned services

    Class 40: butchery (meat preparation); smoking of meat; treatment of meat and meat products; providing information, including online, about the aforementioned services