Hemmes Trading Pty Limited v Establishment 203 Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hemmes Trading Pty Limited v Establishment 203 Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1100  

File number: NSD 177 of 2024
Judgment of: JACKMAN J
Date of judgment: 20 September 2024
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – where applicant the owner of the trade mark consisting of the word ESTABLISHMENT in Classes 9, 25, 41 and 42, which include restaurant, bar and hotel services – where trade mark has been used since September 2000 in respect of a multi-level restaurant, bar and hotel business in Sydney – where respondent operates a restaurant in Brisbane under the name ESTABLISHMENT 203 – where respondent is part of a family-owned beef business in Queensland which includes an abattoir, and that abattoir was given the establishment number 203 by the Australian Government in about 1997 – claim for infringement and cross-claim for cancellation – claim allowed and cross-claim dismissed

TRADE MARKS – whether to cancel ESTABLISHMENT as a trade mark under s 88(2)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – whether mark was capable of distinguishing applicant’s services – whether applicant was owner of mark at priority date

TRADE MARKS – whether ESTABLISHMENT 203 is deceptively similar to ESTABLISHMENT

TRADE MARKS – whether respondent can rely upon defence of good faith use of own name under s 122(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – whether defence available to new companies – whether respondent acted in good faith – where respondent did not conduct trade mark searches or ask the company’s lawyers for advice when choosing name – where respondent received letter of demand from applicant

CONSUMER LAW – contraventions of Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 29(1)(g) and (h) – whether respondent represented that its services are commercially related to the applicant’s ESTABLISHMENT business

DAMAGES
– whether to award additional damages – where respondent proceeded in the face of a letter of demand – additional damages not awarded

Legislation:

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 41, 58, 88, 122

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (‘Australian Consumer Law’) ss 18 and 29

Cases cited:

Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; (2018) 261 FCR 301

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 6; (2018) 259 FCR 514

Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar [2002] FCA 390; (2002) 56 IPR 182

Asprey & Garrard Ltd v WRA (Guns) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1499; [2002] FSR 31

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Employsure Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 142; (2021) 392 ALR 205

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 130; (2020) 278 FCR 450

Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 153; (2013) 308 ALR 1

Bed Bath ‘N’ Table Pty Ltd v Global Retail Brands Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1587

Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hemmes Trading Pty Limited v Establishment 203 Pty Ltd, the Federal Court addressed a dispute concerning the use of the word "Establishment" in the context of restaurant, bar, and hotel services. Hemmes Trading Pty Limited, the owner of the trade mark "ESTABLISHMENT" in Classes 9, 25, 41, and 42, filed a claim for trade mark infringement and contravention of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) against Establishment 203 Pty Ltd. The respondent, operating a restaurant in Brisbane under the name "ESTABLISHMENT 203", denied the infringement and sought to cancel the applicant’s mark.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the trade mark "ESTABLISHMENT" was capable of distinguishing the applicant's services and if the respondent's use of "ESTABLISHMENT 203" was deceptively similar to the applicant’s mark, thus constituting infringement. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the respondent could rely on the defence of good faith use of its own name and whether the respondent contravened provisions of the ACL by implying a commercial relationship with the applicant.

The court found that the respondent did not act in good faith as it did not conduct any trade mark searches or seek legal advice when choosing its name. Despite receiving a letter of demand from the applicant, the respondent persisted in using the contested mark. The court held that while the respondent’s conduct was imprudent, it did not merit an award of additional damages. The court ruled that the respondent’s use of "ESTABLISHMENT 203" was likely to deceive or cause confusion, thus constituting an infringement of the applicant's trade mark. The court also found that the respondent did not act in good faith when using the contested mark.

The court dismissed the respondent's cross-claim for cancellation of the applicant's mark, finding that the mark was distinctive and had been used continuously since 2000. The court granted an injunction prohibiting the respondent from using the mark "ESTABLISHMENT 203" and any substantially similar marks in relation to restaurant, café, bar, hotel, or function services, with a 30-day grace period to allow the respondent to make necessary changes. The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. The respondent, whether by itself, its employees, servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from the day which is 30 days after the date of these orders from using, or procuring or acting in concert with others to use:

(a) ESTABLISHMENT 203; and

(b) any other mark which is substantially identical thereto;

in relation to any restaurant, café, bar, hotel or function services.

3. The cross-claim be dismissed.

4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings, including the cross-claim.

5. The proceedings be listed for case management in relation to the remaining questions for determination on 11 October 2024.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is convenient to deal first with the cross-claim for cancellation of the applicant’s mark, before turning to the applicant’s claim for trade mark infringement and for contravention of the ACL.Salient facts in relation to the Cross-ClaimUse of “establishment” generally The respondent submits, and I accept, that dictionary definitions of “establishment” show that its ordinary meaning is relevantly a business or a place of business. Consistently with the ordinary meaning of the word, the respondent relies on evidence that “establishment” was used by other businesses offering restaurant services before the priority date. A business called “The Establishment Restaurant and Supper Room” was advertised on one occasion in The Age in 1989, offering dinner and late night suppers, with an address in East Melbourne (CB4/1517), and was listed in the Melbourne Metropolitan White Pages telephone directory in 1988, 1989 and 1990. I infer that a restaurant business of that name operated from 1988 to 1990 in Melbourne. Another business called “The Establishment Club Restaurant” had a business name registration in South Australia from May 1983 until it was de-registered on 23 May 1989, and was listed in the Adelaide White Pages in 1983, 1984 and 1986. I infer that such a business operated as a restaurant in the period 1983–86. A business called “The Establishment Cocktail Bar” was listed in the Melbourne Metropolitan White Pages in 1990 with an address in Moonee Ponds, and I infer that such a business operated under that name in 1990. The respondent also relies on evidence showing businesses offering restaurant services using the word “establishment” in their names after the priority date as evidence that traders would also have wanted to use the word as at the priority date. For example, a business called “The Establishment Coffee Co Pty Ltd” was registered on 17 June 2011, and its website indicates that it is currently trading as a coffee shop in Arundel in Queensland that sells wholesale coffee products with the words “The Establishment” printed on them. Another business is operated by a company known as “The Establishment 1858 Pty Ltd”, registered on 3 July 2014, and its Facebook page indicates that it was trading as an events centre and restaurant in Hahndorf in South Australia until 2015. Further instances are referred to below in relation to the issue of infringement by reason of deceptive similarity. The respondent also relies on multiple instances of the word “establishment” being used by the news media and entertainment media to refer to businesses offering restaurant services before the priority date.Use of “Establishment” by the applicant and JJE The property at 248–252 George Street, Sydney, where the applicant conducts its ESTABLISHMENT restaurant, bar and hotel business, was purchased by JJE in mid-1998. The property had been damaged by two fires, and was redeveloped before opening for business in September 2000. In 1999, during those construction works, the name ESTABLISHMENT was displayed on a large billboard hoarding on the George street frontage of the building.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant submits that the respondent launched its restaurant business despite being aware of the applicant’s registration in light of the letter of demand sent on 24 November 2023, and thus should be regarded as having “flagrantly” infringed the ESTABLISHMENT mark, as acting “with reckless disregard” for the trade marks of other traders, and as taking a “cavalier” approach to intellectual property rights in setting up the restaurant. I reject those submissions. Although I have found that the respondent did not act in “good faith” within the meaning of s 122(1)(a) of the TMA, I do not regard the respondent’s conduct as meeting the applicant’s descriptions. The respondent consciously took a risk in tenaciously adhering to its chosen mark after receiving the letter of demand of 24 November 2023, which I regard as imprudent, but I do not see any justification in the present case for an award of additional damages. For completeness, I do not regard Middleton J’s reasoning in Hugo Boss Trade Mark Management GmbH & Co KG v Sasalili Oxford FIA [2014] FCA 1328; (2014) 110 IPR 74 at [23]–[26], on which the applicant relies, as saying that defiant non-compliance with a letter of demand from the owner of the registered trade mark alleging infringement is in itself a sufficient basis for an award of additional damages. In any event, I do not agree with any such proposition.Conclusion Accordingly, the applicant has succeeded in its claims of trade mark infringement and contraventions of the ACL, and the respondent has failed in its cross-claim for cancellation of the applicant’s mark. The applicant is entitled to an order for costs of the proceedings. The parties have agreed that, in the event that the applicant is successful, any injunction should not take effect for a period of 30 days after judgment is given, in order to give the respondent sufficient time to remove the ESTABLISHMENT 203 mark (T200.37–38). That is an appropriate regime given the practical difficulties facing the respondent, including the removal of the sign at the front of its restaurant, as well as making a number of other changes. Accordingly, the injunction which I grant is subject to that 30-day period of grace.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by considering the cross-claim for cancellation of the applicant's mark, ESTABLISHMENT. It acknowledged the respondent's submission that "establishment" generally refers to a business or place of business and accepted that the word had been used by other businesses offering restaurant services before and after the priority date. However, the court found that these uses were not so prevalent or dominant as to prevent the applicant's mark from being capable of distinguishing its services. The court also confirmed that the applicant was the owner of the mark at the priority date, rejecting the respondent's argument for cancellation.

Regarding the issue of deceptive similarity, the court found that ESTABLISHMENT 203 was not deceptively similar to ESTABLISHMENT. The court noted the respondent's argument that its use of the number "203" sufficiently distinguished its mark. It held that consumers would not be misled into believing that the services offered by the respondent were associated with or endorsed by the applicant.

The court then examined the respondent's defence of good faith use of its own name. It considered that the respondent, being part of a family-owned beef business, had an established name before adopting ESTABLISHMENT 203. Despite this, the court found that the respondent's decision to ignore the applicant's letter of demand and proceed with its name showed a lack of good faith. The court held that the respondent's failure to conduct trade mark searches or seek legal advice further supported this finding.

Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the respondent represented that its services were commercially related to the applicant’s ESTABLISHMENT business. It found that the respondent's use of the name ESTABLISHMENT 203 led consumers to believe there was a commercial connection, resulting in a contravention of Australian Consumer Law. The court did not award additional damages, finding that while the respondent's conduct was imprudent, it did not warrant such a penalty. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a respondent cannot rely on the defence of good faith use of its own name if it fails to conduct proper due diligence regarding existing trade marks.