FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Koninklijke Douwe Egberts BV v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1277
File number: VID 61 of 2023 Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J Date of judgment: 7 November 2024 Catchwords: TRADE MARKS — shape marks – where the first applicant is the registered owner of a trade mark constituted by the shape of a cylindrical container with a stopper in Class 30 over coffee and instant coffee (the KDE shape mark) – where the respondent (Cantarella) released a 400-gram instant coffee product under its brand name “Vittoria” in a cylindrical jar with a stopper lid – whether the Vittoria 400-gram product infringed the KDE shape mark within the meaning of s 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – the jar of the Vittoria 400-gram product was not used as a trade mark within the meaning of s 120(1) – the jar of the Vittoria 400-gram product was not deceptively similar to the KDE shape mark – Cantarella has not infringed the KDE shape mark.
TRADE MARKS — shape marks – where Cantarella sought, by a cross-claim, the removal of the KDE shape mark from the Register under s 88(1)(a) or 92 on grounds including ss 41, 59, 62(b), 62A and 88(2)(e) – no ground of removal established.
TRADE MARKS — unjustified threats under s 129 of the Trade Marks Act – held: the applicants made unjustified threats within the meaning of s 129 – declaration and injunction refused – the question of damages, including additional damages, to be determined in a separate hearing.
CONSUMER LAW — whether Cantarella has contravened ss 18, 29 and 33 of the Australian Consumer Law, or committed the tort of passing off – held: there is no real risk that Cantarella’s use of its get-up will mislead or deceive persons familiar with the applicants’ product to believe that there is a commercial association between the Vittoria 400-gram product and the applicants or their products.
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 ss 18, 21–2, 29, 33
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 91
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6(1), 7(3), 8, 8(1), 8(2), 8(3), 17, 41, 41(1), 41(2), 41(3), 41(3)(b), 41(4), 41(4)(b), 57, 59, 62(b), 62A, 88, 881(1)(a), 88(2)(a), 88(2)(e), 92, 92(4)(a), 92(4)(b), 120, 129(1), 129(2), 129(2)(a), 129(2A)
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 46 & 47 Vict, c 57, s 32
Cases cited: Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 905; 308 ALR 74
Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovický Budvar, Národní Podnik [2002] FCA 390; 56 IPR 182
Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 968; 209 ALR 93
Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F S Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641
Bosanac v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2022] HCA 34; 275 CLR 37
Burger King Corp v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 1277
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved whether Cantarella's packaging of its coffee in a cylindrical jar with a stopper constituted an infringement of Douwe Egberts' trade mark, as well as whether the threats made by Douwe Egberts were unjustified under the Trade Marks Act. The court also examined whether Cantarella's actions contravened the Australian Consumer Law or constituted the tort of passing off.
In its reasoning, the court found that Cantarella's packaging did not infringe Douwe Egberts' trade mark, as the jar was not used as a trade mark and was not deceptively similar. The court further concluded that Douwe Egberts had made unjustified threats, as per section 129 of the Trade Marks Act, but declined to grant Cantarella the declaration and injunction it sought. The matter of damages was reserved for a separate hearing. Additionally, the court found no evidence that Cantarella's actions would mislead consumers into believing there was a commercial association with Douwe Egberts.
The court dismissed Douwe Egberts' claims and Cantarella's cross-claims, reserving the question of costs until the hearing and determination of Cantarella's claims for damages. The court also issued orders restricting access to certain confidential information and scheduled further case management and hearings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants’ claims be dismissed.
2. The cross-claimant’s claims for relief specified in paragraphs 1 to 7 of its amended notice of cross-claim be dismissed.
3. The question of the parties’ costs of the claim and the cross-claim be reserved until after the hearing and determination of the cross-claimant’s claims for damages and additional damages pursuant to s 129 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
4. Pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), until further order, access to and disclosure (by publication or otherwise) of Confidential Annexure A to the reasons of the Court delivered on 7 November 2024, comprising paragraphs [564]–[603], be restricted to the persons identified below –
(a) the respondent;
(b) the legal representatives of the respondent; and
(c) those persons to whom access is allowed
(i) under the terms of the confidentiality regime agreed between the parties relating to information claimed to be confidential by the respondent; or
(ii) by express written permission from the respondent.
5. If any party wishes to apply for a further non-publication order under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act in relation to any part of the balance of the reasons for judgment, then that party may do so by emailing the Chambers of the Hon Justice Wheelahan by 12 noon on 8 November 2024 identifying with precision the part or parts of the reasons in respect of which a non-publication order is sought.
6. Upon receipt of any application in accordance with order 5 above, the Court will consider making an interim order in Chambers under s 37AI of the Act.
7. The hearing of any application for a further non-publication order is fixed for 15 November 2024 at 9.30 am.
8. By 4.00 pm on 14 November 2024, the legal practitioners for the parties are to confer in relation to procedural orders for the hearing and determination of the cross-claimant’s claims for damages and the hearing of any further applications for non-publication orders, including the final determination of applications that are the subject of existing interim orders.
9. The proceeding is listed for further case management on 15 November 2024 at 9.30 am.
10. Any proposed consent orders are to be emailed to the Chambers of the Hon Justice Wheelahan by 4.00 pm 14 November 2024.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the court as a proceeding brought by KDE against Cantarella, alleging infringement of KDE's registered shape mark. Cantarella filed a cross-claim against KDE, seeking the removal of the KDE shape mark from the Register and relief under s 129 of the Trade Marks Act for unjustified threats. The court heard evidence in chief by affidavit and considered documentary evidence, with some lay witnesses providing sworn statements and being cross-examined. The matter was heard by Justice Wheelahan, who delivered reasons for judgment on 7 November 2024.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants submitted that there might be no utility in the Court granting declaratory relief under s 129, given Cantarella’s delay in making an application under s 129 only by cross-claim, and because the relief has been rendered inutile by the bringing of the infringement proceeding. In this last respect, the applicants relied on the decision of O’Bryan J in Urban Alley at [290].Issue (13) — Consideration In light of how the parties presented their cases, and my conclusions on other questions, the issues for consideration are straightforward. For the reasons I have already explained, the applicants’ infringement case has failed. The applicants conceded that it would follow from the failure of their infringement case that Cantarella’s s 129 action would succeed. That concession was properly made. The scheme of s 129 is that a person aggrieved by a threat may bring an action under s 129(1). Putting ss 129(5)–(6) to one side, the primary defence to an action under s 129(1) is located in s 129(4). Section 129(4) supplies a defence in cases where, essentially, the threats were made in relation to conduct that actually did constitute infringement of a registered trade mark. As Moshinsky J put it in Stone & Wood Group Pty Ltd v Intellectual Property Development Corp Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 820; 120 IPR 478 at [233] –It appears from the text and structure of s 129 that, where the terms of s 129(1) apply, subject to subs (5) and (6), a defendant to an action under s 129 can only succeed if the defendant satisfies the court of the matters referred to in s 129(4), namely that the trade mark is registered and that the acts of the threatened person in respect of which the defendant threatened to bring an action constitute an infringement of the trade mark. Thus it is insufficient for the defendant to show, for example, a bona fide belief that the acts of the threatened person constituted infringement; the defendant must establish infringement: cf Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 154 at 193; 157 ALR 247 at 284; 41 IPR 593 at 630 per Drummond J, in relation to s 202 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); and Bradken Resources Pty Ltd (ACN 098 300 988) v Lynx Engineering Consultants Pty Ltd (ACN 059 949 469) (2008) 78 IPR 586; [2008] FCA 1257 at [39] per Emmett J, in relation to ss 128 and 129 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). See also Urban Alley at [278] (O’Bryan J); Firstmac Ltd v Zip Co Ltd [2023] FCA 540 at [400] (Markovic J). In other words, s 129 does not call for a roving inquiry into whether the person who made the threats acted reasonably. The action created by s 129(1) will succeed where s 129(1) is engaged, unless an express defence is established. For the purposes of that particular question, there is no call to engage in a broader inquiry as to whether the threats were “unjustified” in any other sense of the word. Accordingly, Cantarella was entitled to bring an action under s 129(1). It is a separate question, however, whether Cantarella is entitled to any remedy on that account. As I have explained, Cantarella sought a declaration, an injunction, and damages in relation to its action under s 129.