Koninklijke Douwe Egberts BV v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Koninklijke Douwe Egberts BV v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1277

File number: VID 61 of 2023
Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 7 November 2024
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS — shape marks – where the first applicant is the registered owner of a trade mark constituted by the shape of a cylindrical container with a stopper in Class 30 over coffee and instant coffee (the KDE shape mark) – where the respondent (Cantarella) released a 400-gram instant coffee product under its brand name “Vittoria” in a cylindrical jar with a stopper lid – whether the Vittoria 400-gram product infringed the KDE shape mark within the meaning of s 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – the jar of the Vittoria 400-gram product was not used as a trade mark within the meaning of s 120(1) – the jar of the Vittoria 400-gram product was not deceptively similar to the KDE shape mark – Cantarella has not infringed the KDE shape mark.

TRADE MARKS — shape marks – where Cantarella sought, by a cross-claim, the removal of the KDE shape mark from the Register under s 88(1)(a) or 92 on grounds including ss 41, 59, 62(b), 62A and 88(2)(e) – no ground of removal established.

TRADE MARKS — unjustified threats under s 129 of the Trade Marks Act – held: the applicants made unjustified threats within the meaning of s 129 – declaration and injunction refused – the question of damages, including additional damages, to be determined in a separate hearing.

CONSUMER LAW — whether Cantarella has contravened ss 18, 29 and 33 of the Australian Consumer Law, or committed the tort of passing off – held: there is no real risk that Cantarella’s use of its get-up will mislead or deceive persons familiar with the applicants’ product to believe that there is a commercial association between the Vittoria 400-gram product and the applicants or their products.

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 ss 18, 21–2, 29, 33

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 91

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6(1), 7(3), 8, 8(1), 8(2), 8(3), 17, 41, 41(1), 41(2), 41(3), 41(3)(b), 41(4), 41(4)(b), 57, 59, 62(b), 62A, 88, 881(1)(a), 88(2)(a), 88(2)(e), 92, 92(4)(a), 92(4)(b), 120, 129(1), 129(2), 129(2)(a), 129(2A)

Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 46 & 47 Vict, c 57, s 32

Cases cited:

Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 905; 308 ALR 74

Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovický Budvar, Národní Podnik [2002] FCA 390; 56 IPR 182

Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 968; 209 ALR 93

Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F S Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641

Bosanac v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2022] HCA 34; 275 CLR 37

Burger King Corp v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417

Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1277
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Koninklijke Douwe Egberts BV v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Douwe Egberts, sought to enforce its trade mark rights against the defendant, Cantarella, which was alleged to have infringed its registered trade mark by selling coffee in a shape similar to that of Douwe Egberts' trademarked product. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether Cantarella's coffee jar constituted an infringement of Douwe Egberts' shape mark and if Cantarella had made unjustified threats as per the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

The legal issues before the court involved whether Cantarella's packaging of its coffee in a cylindrical jar with a stopper constituted an infringement of Douwe Egberts' trade mark, as well as whether the threats made by Douwe Egberts were unjustified under the Trade Marks Act. The court also examined whether Cantarella's actions contravened the Australian Consumer Law or constituted the tort of passing off.

In its reasoning, the court found that Cantarella's packaging did not infringe Douwe Egberts' trade mark, as the jar was not used as a trade mark and was not deceptively similar. The court further concluded that Douwe Egberts had made unjustified threats, as per section 129 of the Trade Marks Act, but declined to grant Cantarella the declaration and injunction it sought. The matter of damages was reserved for a separate hearing. Additionally, the court found no evidence that Cantarella's actions would mislead consumers into believing there was a commercial association with Douwe Egberts.

The court dismissed Douwe Egberts' claims and Cantarella's cross-claims, reserving the question of costs until the hearing and determination of Cantarella's claims for damages. The court also issued orders restricting access to certain confidential information and scheduled further case management and hearings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants’ claims be dismissed.

2. The cross-claimant’s claims for relief specified in paragraphs 1 to 7 of its amended notice of cross-claim be dismissed.

3. The question of the parties’ costs of the claim and the cross-claim be reserved until after the hearing and determination of the cross-claimant’s claims for damages and additional damages pursuant to s 129 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

4. Pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), until further order, access to and disclosure (by publication or otherwise) of Confidential Annexure A to the reasons of the Court delivered on 7 November 2024, comprising paragraphs [564]–[603], be restricted to the persons identified below –

(a) the respondent;

(b) the legal representatives of the respondent; and

(c) those persons to whom access is allowed

(i) under the terms of the confidentiality regime agreed between the parties relating to information claimed to be confidential by the respondent; or

(ii) by express written permission from the respondent.

5. If any party wishes to apply for a further non-publication order under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act in relation to any part of the balance of the reasons for judgment, then that party may do so by emailing the Chambers of the Hon Justice Wheelahan by 12 noon on 8 November 2024 identifying with precision the part or parts of the reasons in respect of which a non-publication order is sought.

6. Upon receipt of any application in accordance with order 5 above, the Court will consider making an interim order in Chambers under s 37AI of the Act.

7. The hearing of any application for a further non-publication order is fixed for 15 November 2024 at 9.30 am.

8. By 4.00 pm on 14 November 2024, the legal practitioners for the parties are to confer in relation to procedural orders for the hearing and determination of the cross-claimant’s claims for damages and the hearing of any further applications for non-publication orders, including the final determination of applications that are the subject of existing interim orders.

9. The proceeding is listed for further case management on 15 November 2024 at 9.30 am.

10. Any proposed consent orders are to be emailed to the Chambers of the Hon Justice Wheelahan by 4.00 pm 14 November 2024.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Koninklijke Douwe Egberts BV (KDE) is the registered owner of a trade mark constituted by the shape of a cylindrical container with a stopper in Class 30 over coffee and instant coffee, known as the KDE shape mark. Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (Cantarella) is a company incorporated in Australia since 1951, originally established by brothers Orazio and Carmelo Cantarella. Cantarella has been distributing beans and ground coffee products under the trade mark "Vittoria" since 1958, supplying to delicatessens, cafes, and restaurants, and later to supermarkets. In the early 1980s, Cantarella began distributing Vittoria coffee beans and ground coffee. Cantarella released a 400-gram instant coffee product under its brand name "Vittoria" in a cylindrical jar with a stopper lid. KDE brought proceedings against Cantarella, alleging that Cantarella's Vittoria 400-gram product infringed the KDE shape mark. Cantarella, in turn, filed a cross-claim seeking the removal of the KDE shape mark from the Register and relief under s 129 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) for unjustified threats.

The case came before the court as a proceeding brought by KDE against Cantarella, alleging infringement of KDE's registered shape mark. Cantarella filed a cross-claim against KDE, seeking the removal of the KDE shape mark from the Register and relief under s 129 of the Trade Marks Act for unjustified threats. The court heard evidence in chief by affidavit and considered documentary evidence, with some lay witnesses providing sworn statements and being cross-examined. The matter was heard by Justice Wheelahan, who delivered reasons for judgment on 7 November 2024.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent, Cantarella, was incorporated in Australia in 1951. The origins of its business lie in a business established in Australia in 1947 by brothers Orazio and Carmelo Cantarella. That business involved the importation into Australia of various European products, such as mineral water, parmesan cheese, preserved tomato products, wine, olive oil, and pasta. Since 1958, Cantarella has carried on a business distributing beans and ground coffee products under the trade mark “Vittoria” to delicatessens, cafes, and restaurants. In the early 1980s, Cantarella began supplying Vittoria coffee beans and ground coffee to supermarkets.The evidence Evidence in chief was given by affidavit, and most but not all of the documentary evidence, although organised in the court book, comprised annexures to the affidavit evidence. The lay witnesses whose affidavit evidence was read by the applicants were –(a)Ross Norman Tillman, the “Head of Category Development and Shopper Insights” of JDE AU, who made three affidavits and was cross-examined;(b)Louise Marie Smith, the “Director of Global Intellectual Property” of the JDE Peet’s group of companies, who addressed and was cross-examined on the group corporate structure and licensing arrangements between the applicants;(c)Linda Margaret Armstrong, the Finance Director of JDE AU, who produced documents and was cross-examined on issues relating to the applicants’ claim that JDE AU was an authorised user of the KDE shape mark; and(d)Georgia Rosemary Mae Christie, a lawyer employed by the applicants’ solicitors, who produced documents and who was not required for cross-examination. Of the applicants’ witnesses who were cross-examined, only Mr Tillman’s evidence calls for any comment. Mr Tillman’s position with JDE AU placed him in a position of some expertise, as he demonstrated a high degree of familiarity and experience with the consumer coffee market in Australia. Mr Tillman was challenged in cross-examination in relation to a number of contentious opinions that he expressed. I formed the view that Mr Tillman was an honest witness, and no questions going to his credit arise. However, he was cautious about making concessions, and the evidence of his opinions on contentious issues concerning the claimed similarities and differences between the Moccona jars, the Vittoria jars, and other jars containing products such as scented candles, was coloured. This was demonstrated most clearly when Mr Tillman was taken to two jars containing scented candles with clear similarities to the Moccona jar, yet did not accept that they were similar. In relation to a third jar containing a lemongrass and ginger scented candle, Mr Tillman did not accept that it was different from the Moccona jar, or that it was similar to the Vittoria jar. These are opinions that I do not share. These are not criticisms of Mr Tillman, because he was not put forward as an independent witness, and his position with JDE AU precludes any conclusion that he came to his evidence with objectivity. Moreover, Mr Tillman’s opinions on these issues were never going to carry much weight, and it is evident that the forensic purpose of much of the cross-examination of Mr Tillman was to provoke responses to expose more completely some of the questions that the Court must decide for itself.

Decision

Reasons for decision

None of this discussion forecloses evidence and submissions that Cantarella may put forward concerning loss or damage sustained as a result of the threats that were made, which are the subject of the admission on the pleadings. Different considerations arise in that context, which do not influence my discretion on the questions of the declaration and injunction sought by Cantarella.Conclusion The applicants’ claims will be dismissed. The several claims made by Cantarella in its cross-claim that have failed will also be dismissed. I will hear the parties on costs, and on any other orders that should be made for the further hearing and determination of the question of damages, including additional damages, sought by the cross-claim.CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXURE A[This section is intentionally blank, and takes the place of Confidential Annexure A, which comprised paragraphs [564]–[603].]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants submitted that there might be no utility in the Court granting declaratory relief under s 129, given Cantarella’s delay in making an application under s 129 only by cross-claim, and because the relief has been rendered inutile by the bringing of the infringement proceeding. In this last respect, the applicants relied on the decision of O’Bryan J in Urban Alley at [290].Issue (13) — Consideration In light of how the parties presented their cases, and my conclusions on other questions, the issues for consideration are straightforward. For the reasons I have already explained, the applicants’ infringement case has failed. The applicants conceded that it would follow from the failure of their infringement case that Cantarella’s s 129 action would succeed. That concession was properly made. The scheme of s 129 is that a person aggrieved by a threat may bring an action under s 129(1). Putting ss 129(5)–(6) to one side, the primary defence to an action under s 129(1) is located in s 129(4). Section 129(4) supplies a defence in cases where, essentially, the threats were made in relation to conduct that actually did constitute infringement of a registered trade mark. As Moshinsky J put it in Stone & Wood Group Pty Ltd v Intellectual Property Development Corp Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 820; 120 IPR 478 at [233] –It appears from the text and structure of s 129 that, where the terms of s 129(1) apply, subject to subs (5) and (6), a defendant to an action under s 129 can only succeed if the defendant satisfies the court of the matters referred to in s 129(4), namely that the trade mark is registered and that the acts of the threatened person in respect of which the defendant threatened to bring an action constitute an infringement of the trade mark. Thus it is insufficient for the defendant to show, for example, a bona fide belief that the acts of the threatened person constituted infringement; the defendant must establish infringement: cf Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 154 at 193; 157 ALR 247 at 284; 41 IPR 593 at 630 per Drummond J, in relation to s 202 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); and Bradken Resources Pty Ltd (ACN 098 300 988) v Lynx Engineering Consultants Pty Ltd (ACN 059 949 469) (2008) 78 IPR 586; [2008] FCA 1257 at [39] per Emmett J, in relation to ss 128 and 129 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). See also Urban Alley at [278] (O’Bryan J); Firstmac Ltd v Zip Co Ltd [2023] FCA 540 at [400] (Markovic J). In other words, s 129 does not call for a roving inquiry into whether the person who made the threats acted reasonably. The action created by s 129(1) will succeed where s 129(1) is engaged, unless an express defence is established. For the purposes of that particular question, there is no call to engage in a broader inquiry as to whether the threats were “unjustified” in any other sense of the word. Accordingly, Cantarella was entitled to bring an action under s 129(1). It is a separate question, however, whether Cantarella is entitled to any remedy on that account. As I have explained, Cantarella sought a declaration, an injunction, and damages in relation to its action under s 129.